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PERSONAL PREFACE: HOW I GOT HERE 
 
“The core of all life is a limitless chest of tales.” 
– Tuomas Holopainen (Nightwish 2011), “Storytime” 
 
To all who come to read this scholarly piece: welcome. This dissertation is in your hands. 
Here, sages reveal the sad injustices of the past and youth may savour the challenge and critique 
of the status quo. This dissertation is dedicated to the ideals, the dreams and the hard facts that 
have created the humanities… with the hope that it will be a source of joy and inspiration to all 
the world. 
Based on my previous research, it was not at all obvious that I would come to write this 
work. During my undergraduate and MA years, I have been deeply engrossed in video game and 
theme park research, hence the opening paragraph’s tribute to Disneyland. Why would a scholar 
of media studies choose something so profoundly different from mass entertainment media as the 
topic of autism and its manifestations in literature and literary theory?  
Like many of my generation and the older Gen Xers, I have been introduced to autism via 
television and the movies: I have seen Rain Man (1988) around the turn of the millennium as a 
twelve-year-old, and I can’t say I really enjoyed it. The characters were too weird. That would 
have been my only experience of labelled autism for years. Later on, around 2004, I had the strange 
luck that I came across a little blurple book with a mind-bogglingly long title. This was Mark 
Haddon’s The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time. Fortunately, the language of the 
book was easy to follow, and by that time, I had gone through the five published Harry Potter 
books, so it did not pose much of a challenge. In spite of my lack of mathematical aptitude, I have 
identified with the book’s protagonist, Christopher and his struggles to make sense of the chaotic 
world of adults, even though he was a little quirky. Okay, maybe very quirky. Anyways, there was 
something strangely charming in Christopher’s straightforward way of speaking, his hyperlogical 
attitude to the world, his naivety that captivated me. I really liked the book and promptly forgot 
about it. Some years later I have read an article that discussed The Curious Incident and its 
relationship to ‘Asperger’s,’ which sounded a lot like Crohn’s disease at the time (my father’s a 
gastroenterologist, so that was my reference point). But it piqued my curiosity, and I chewed 
through all the resources I could find on the Internet. I was fascinated by it, and eventually forgot 
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about the whole thing. 
In March 2008, I was visiting friends in London. One day I wandered into a large used 
bookshop. Browsing the shelves, I quickly lost track of time, until I found myself picking up a 
book about a pianist, Jessica, who sees the world from a different angle, puzzled by the oddity of 
human relationships. All my previous reading about autism came to the surface at once and I knew 
I had to get this book. And once I read it, I could no longer forget about Asperger’s and autism. 
The bullying depicted in the novel, then Jessica’s disastrous marriage with Andrew, the haunting, 
poetic language of Morrall writing about music stayed with me. It was during that year that I met 
my future supervisors, Kérchy Anna and Cristian Réka in the classroom, where they taught 
children’s literature and film theory, respectively. The seeds have been sown, although they would 
long remain dormant before they could germinate. I have been furiously researching computer 
games and ludology to write my BA Thesis. And then my MA Thesis. 
While I was processing the material, I found a remarkable passage in Espen Aarseth’s 
ground-breaking book, Cybertext, which described the “autistic detective agency” (1997, 115) of 
a certain text adventure game, and argued that social interactions in computer games resembled 
the way autistic individuals handle conversations and fixate on objects. This got me thinking. It 
also got me to re-read The Curious Incident. Indeed, I have found that Christopher tackles some 
of the problems he faces by pretending that he is in a computer game. This was my way in, but it 
would be long before I finalised my decision to write on fictional autism. The decision was reached 
in the aftermath of my MA Thesis defence, when the head of the defence committee, Barát 
Erzsébet grilled me on the aspects of gender representation in computer games with questions that 
caught me off guard (though in retrospect, they shouldn’t have), followed by the question about 
how space is constructed in the medium. Missing the obvious point (i.e. space is not an inherent 
property of games, but a social construction, made by people for particular purposes), I realised 
that I have fallen victim to the sort of thinking promoted by the adventure games I was researching. 
I needed to work on people. Or, the next best thing, something social in literature. Then I put two 
and two together and came to the conclusion that the dissertation should be about autistic people 
and their social hardships. From these humble beginnings, the first germs of this dissertation was 
born. The rest, as they say, is history. The history of disability in psychology, literary criticism and 
theory, to be precise. 
Before I begin introducing the reader to the main ideas and the structure of the dissertation, 
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I have a couple of remarks to make on the language I use to describe the kinds of minds I work 
with. Obviously, this being a dissertation on a particular kind of neurological difference, I have to 
use the word ‘autism’ and ‘autistic’ a lot. The language used to describe autists in psychology has 
always been linked to the word “disorder” (as in: autism spectrum disorder, or ASD), since that is 
what the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (APA 2013) has termed all 
atypical configurations of the psyche that it seeks to treat or cure. No doubt, there are many 
instances where professional and medical attention ameliorates the life of the affected individuals 
and their community, and autism might be one good candidate for such a condition, but the idea 
that autism is primarily a disorder has been questioned by autism researchers and disability 
scholars.  
Simon Baron-Cohen, in particular, advocates the use of the expression ‘autism spectrum 
condition’ or ASC instead, because it is less stigmatising, acknowledges both the deficits and 
assets of autists, and brings ‘social condition’ to one’s mind as well. He argues that when we look 
at the neurological make-up of autistic individuals, there are few signs of dysfunction and a great 
deal of evidence for difference (Baron-Cohen et al. 2009). With this in mind, I will predominantly 
use ASC or ‘the condition’ or ‘the spectrum’ as synonyms for autism to avoid monotonous 
repetition. When referring to people, however, although I acknowledge their full personhood, I 
will primarily use ‘autists’ in contrast to, say, Elizabeth Moon’s usage of ‘autistics’ or the term 
preferred by some autism advocates: ‘people with autism’ or ‘autistic individuals,’ because I find 
the people-first terms to be quite a mouthful in the first place, its constant use breaking the flow of 
academic prose, and the word ‘autist’ as people understand it refers solely to human beings with 
complex psyches and subjectivities, whose lives are altered by neurological difference. 
Chapter 5 contains passages from “The Paradox of Reading Autistic Fiction” (Makai 
2013a), which is an earlier, much-condensed version of my argument concerning empathy and 
autism fiction, explained more fully with the case study on House Rules. Chapter 5 is also host to 
a reworked version of “Autlook – methods for representing autism in contemporary Anglophone 
literature” (Makai 2012), which surveyed the psychological theories about mindreading and novel-
reading with a less critical eye than what is present in this work. I have explored the effects and 
methods of speculative canon creation in “Autism’s Loose Canon: Finding the Artist, Not The 
Autist” (Makai 2013b), from which I have adapted passages to give a better account of autistic 
writing in the dissertation’s chapter on The Curious Incident and House Rules. Chapter 8 is an 
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extension of “‘No One Who Minds Is Here’: Redesigning the ‘Social Norms of Cognition’ for the 
Contemporary Autism Novel” (Makai 2013c), with a bigger scope and an added meditation on the 
ethics of neuroscience. Due to the vagaries of academic publishing, a distillation of my case 
studies, detailed in Chapters 8-10, “Autistic Consciousness Represented: Fictional Mental 
Functioning of a Different Kind” is yet to be published (Makai, forthcoming), as is a study on 
autistic autobiographies and Facilitated Communication, written in Hungarian “Ahány autista, 
annyi élet: Az autistalét tapasztalatai az önéletírásban és a regényekben” (Makai, forthcoming) 
parts of which have made it to Chapters 4 & 7. These articles were essential to refine my thinking 
on the subject and informed the whole of the writing process, the fruits of which I now present to 
the reader. 
Now that you know my terminological preferences and my previous work on autism in 
literature, I wish you a pleasant and exciting time while reading this work. I have become wedded 
to its production, although I know that there are errors in whatever the human hand creates. I take 
responsibility for my errors, biases and lapses of judgement. For this reason, I am happy to hear 
any and all suggestions, comments and criticisms regarding the scope, methodology, validity, 
structure, the fine points and the language of the writing before you. There is no greater gift for a 
scholar than constructive criticism. Let the adventure begin! 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: LITERATURE, SCIENCE AND THE HUMANITIES MEET AUTISM 
 
“Yes, I will be thy priest, and build a fane 
In some untrodden region of my mind, 
Where branchèd thoughts, new grown with pleasant pain, 
Instead of pines shall murmur in the wind.” 
– John Keats, “Ode to Psyche” 
 
The set of atypical, human neurodevelopmental trajectories known today as autism 
spectrum conditions (ASCs) have come to fascinate the whole world in the last twenty-odd years 
or so, largely thanks to the recognisability of the quirks, unique social hardships and uncanny 
abilities associated with young people on the spectrum. As medico-psychological understanding 
of autism grew, so did the number of people who were diagnosed with it. In our time, fiction 
featuring characters on the autistic spectrum have sprung up in as diverse media as computer 
games, comics, cinema, television and — dearest to departments of literature — books. For a 
condition that went under the radar until seventy years ago, ASCs are now enjoying widespread 
attention in the cultural and medical realm. US prevalence rates have reportedly risen from an 
estimated 1 in 88 to 1 in 68, about 1.5% in eight-year-old children (CDC 2014), while more 
conservative UK estimates report a levelling off of prevalence rates at 3.8 per 1000 boys and 0.8 
per 1000 girls between 2004 and 2010 (Taylor et al 2013). As a result of the increase in the rates 
of diagnosis, there has been a growing need in the general public to acquaint themselves with the 
nature of neurological difference in their autistic peers, raising awareness about the neurotypical 
configuration of society. The host of popular representations featuring people on the spectrum 
speaks volumes about the force with which this condition has gripped the imagination of our era. 
Scientific works, such as Oliver Sacks’ An Anthropologist on Mars (1995) and Simon Baron-
Cohen’s Mindblindness (1995) comment on autism with the reassuring tone of the expert, while 
autism autobiographies like Temple Grandin’s Emergence: Labelled Autistic (1991 [1986]), 
Donna Williams’ Nobody Nowhere (1999 [1992]), John Elder Robison’s Look Me In The Eye 
(2012) or Dawn Prince-Hughes’ Songs of the Gorilla Nation (2004) purport to give readers an 
inside-out view of what it means to live life as an autist. Films, including the iconic Rain Man 
(1988), and later works like Mercury Rising (1998), Mozart and the Whale (2005) or Mary and 
Max (2009) chronicle the ups and downs of the autistic experience, while novels and fictional 
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representations in other media infuse autism with mental richness – they immerse their readers in 
a sensory and cognitive world very different from the reader’s ordinary point of view. Although 
autism is ostensibly a neurological condition that has been part of humankind throughout our long 
history, its recent prominence in popular media and literature requires reflecting upon the 
emergence of autism fiction as a newly-defined category of narrative. Ian Hacking, a philosopher 
of medicine and science contends that we have only just started learning to talk about autism, and 
stories are essential to create a new discourse, “a new language game, […] extending a way for 
very unusual people—namely, autistic ones—to be, to exist, to live” (2010a, 262-263), Therefore, 
investigating the representational schemata according to which fictional autists are portrayed 
becomes as much an ethical imperative as a detached, theoretical question. Such an approach 
focuses on the constitutive nature of (scientific and literary) language that defines what autistic 
people are capable of, where they need assistance and what can be done to empower them on their 
way toward a fulfilling life. In addition, analysing the novelistic discourse of ‘autism fiction’ 
through the twin lenses of narratology and disability studies has strong implications for new 
paradigms of the profession, namely cognitive literary studies.  
Indeed, this dissertation intends to be a constructive corrective to the systematic bias in the 
early development of cognitive literary studies, which has built its foundations upon a number of 
premises surrounding the scientific construct called Theory of Mind (ToM), a postulated function 
of our psyche to treat other human beings and non-human animals as minded creatures with 
intentions, beliefs, desires, hopes, dreams and other psychological states that enrich and give 
meaning to our existence. The thought experiments that seek to validate the field frequently portray 
autism and other, hypothetical ‘alien’ intelligences as unable to understand the social dimensions 
of ordinary human life because they lack ToM, and thus they cannot create a coherent narrative of 
their lives. Routine references to either real-life autism or its fictional depictions strengthen the 
dividing line between a kind of mental life capable of embedding people in narrative and one that 
cannot produce these social narratives. To buttress their claims, cognitive literary critics import 
experimental data and theoretical speculations from the life sciences and psychology, and 
subsequently present cognitive disability as an enabling condition for their field. But if, as Lisa 
Zunshine writes in her preface to Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies, the goal of the project 
is “to understand the evolving relationship between two immensely complex, historically situated 
systems—the human mind and cultural artifacts, such as novels, poems, or paintings—and not to 
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merely use such artifacts to illustrate a particular scientific hypothesis about one particular feature 
of human cognition” (2010, 3), then it is inexcusable to ignore literary products that deal with 
cognitive and intellectual disabilities as anomalies. Rather, it would be beneficial to integrate these 
works of art into the fabric and purview of literary studies by meticulous analysis, rewriting the 
basic assumptions that undergird cognitive criticism today. Therefore I have endeavoured to 
investigate and critique its theoretical framework by focusing on disability studies and narratology 
as two fields which are in privileged positions to ‘rehabilitate’ cognitive literary criticism (with all 
the layers of meaning which the discourse of disability supplies). To do so, I incorporate autism 
fiction into its potential corpus, thereby redressing an exclusionary move. I contribute to the effort 
of reclaiming autism for cognitive criticism by producing fine-grained readings of four novels 
where autism plays an integral part of the story. Since one of the many signs that suggests an 
autism diagnosis is the lack of spontaneous pretend play and make-believe games in children, 
which later manifests in the avoidance of reading fiction, I investigate how autistic characters are 
depicted in relation to fictional narratives and the abilities that are deemed essential to the 
enjoyment in fiction: pretence, empathy and mind-reading. By attending to the intricacies of the 
narrative, I claim, it becomes obvious that the selected writers compose their novels so as to 
provide a counter-discourse to the model of autism that emphasises its deficits rather than its 
strengths. They conjure up a way of talking about the condition that acknowledges autistic people’s 
struggles in life, but one that also values them as fully human beings, capable of empathy, 
understanding the narratives of their lives, and as citizens integrating into the social fabric, creating 
an alternative form of life, an “autistic sociality” (Ochs and Solomon 2010). This is achieved by a 
careful construction of narrative that highlights neurological difference but allows empathetic 
engagement with the autistic character through a number of storytelling devices, including the 
finely detailed depiction of the sensory world of autists, the perception of the character from the 
outside and the representation of mental functioning, an important source of fascination in this age 
of “neuronovels” (Roth 2009). 
The literary merits of these works are also significant because the narrative design of the 
novels provides self-reflexive moments for readers, when they come face to face with the 
artificiality of the literary text. Moreover, autism fiction is a very effective tool for generating 
empathy for autists in neurotypical (non-autistic) readers through the strategic use of 
defamiliarisation and perspective-taking (Caracciolo, 2014), making them central to the 
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humanistic quest for acceptance and instituting changes in society to better accommodate autists. 
How this empathy is produced is the function of the literary text and its interaction with the 
communities of readers it addresses, which a psychologically-inflected narratology can easily 
handle. For this reason, I shall be assuming that the intended audience are neurotypicals, although 
there is a substantial community of autistic fiction readers who consume these novels with a 
knowing and critical eye. My thesis here is that autism fiction can thrive precisely because authors 
spend a great deal of time not on developing the plot of the novels, but on constructing the 
“structures of feeling” (Williams 1977) and the raw feels or qualia of ASCs in a novelistic 
discourse. I argue that the narrated percepts, thoughts and feelings of the protagonists articulate 
neurological difference to enhance our experience of stepping into someone else’s shoes as we 
read the novels and empathise with the characters. I investigate the granularity, or the level of 
depth in descriptions, the role of metaphors and other poetic vehicles, the use of intensive 
focalisation and the stumbling blocks to storytelling in greater depth as ways of making cognitive 
difference legible and experienceable. Novels have unique capabilities as technologies to deliver 
virtual neurophenomenological experiences, effectively functioning as textual virtual reality 
helmets. When people read autism novels, they are being persuaded that what they read is a form 
of life that someone with autism can experience.  
Still, due to our innate tendency to either standardise (Vereinheitlichung) or accentuate 
incoming patterns as we represent information (Prägnanz-Tendenz), we are unlikely to appreciate 
the smaller quirks in any Gestalt. While this was originally observed and studied in visual 
representations (Arnheim 1965), it is no less operational in more complex representations, such as 
those of literary characters with autism (not to mention the real-life discourses surrounding them). 
This warrants an adoption of an explicit ethical stance when dealing with cultural representation 
of disabled groups of people. Writers research their novels thoroughly when they decide to 
represent; they begin with looking at the complex behavioural profile of autists from a wide variety 
of publications, including clinical textbooks, works of popular science, autobiographies or autism 
blogs. After the research phase, writers inevitably select those characteristics which are somewhat 
different from typical people and then accentuate them to better grasp the readers’ attention. 
Alternatively, they can opt to downplay some aspects of neurological difference, claiming that 
there are facets of autism which are just like the daily experiences neurotypical people have, 
humanising them through the standardisation principle. It is for this reason that the representational 
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strategies are on the forefront of ethical questions surrounding representations. 
Autism novels are composed with plotlines that explicitly present ethical dilemmas: should 
we find a cure for autism? What are good reasons for being cured of the condition? Is the legal 
system capable of recognising neurological difference, and accommodate such people during legal 
procedures? How can these vulnerable people defend themselves from abuse? What societal styles 
of thinking produce said abusive behaviour, and what can be done to decrease these attacks? The 
dissertation will survey the stakes of strategies for representing autism by discussing the 
emplotment of the characters in the books, the rhetorics of scientific and literary depictions of 
neurological difference, and it will address other relevant aspects where appropriate.  
There is a danger that one creates an essentialised picture of autism, and this ideal picture 
might become a standard against which all representations are measured, in a sense creating a 
‘fidelity criticism’ of autism novels. In the normative mode, it can run the risk of becoming 
censorious, enforcing a canonical representation with little possibility left in artistic 
experimentation. Musing about the ethical necessity of writing accurately about disability 
narratives, Michael Bérubé contends that: “scholars in disability studies are right to point out that 
literary representations of people with disabilities often serve to mobilize pity or horror in a moral 
drama that has nothing to do with the actual experience of disability. A certain amount of literalism, 
even censorious literalism, seems to me acceptable in this regard” (Bérubé 2005, 570). He argues 
that disability studies “calls attention to the many figural uses of disability, but only to demonstrate 
that many of the narrative devices and rhetorical tropes we take for granted are grounded in the 
underrecognized and undertheorized facts of bodily difference” (loc. cit.), to which I would add 
cognitive and neurological difference for the sake of including autism.  
The point is that well-written texts can aesthetically please readers (even by directing 
horror at culturally acceptable targets) and simultaneously perpetuate views of a condition that are 
harmful or demeaning to the group in question. This is not to say that ethically deplorable acts and 
vices are not to be represented, or for that matter, wrong and stereotypical depictions of autism 
automatically condemn a book as fanciful or false and strip it of its other aesthetic qualities. Nor 
does it mean to suggest that criticism of autism fiction should only proceed along the criteria of 
faithful to/deviant from the present picture of autism in medical and liberationist discourses, far 
from it. Throughout my dissertation, but especially in my analysis of Speed of Dark, whose ending 
was hotly debated among scholars of disability, I argue that although ethical considerations are 
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essential to the sensitive interpretation of autism novels, they are neither the only nor the most 
important criteria for judging the success or artistic merit of the novels in question. 
In my understanding, critiquing representations of autism is one tool among many to reflect 
upon the various cultural and scientific influences that shape thinking about the condition and, 
consequently, affect the narrative design of the book. By way of a quick example, we now know 
without a doubt that autism is not caused by mercury (or more accurately, thiomersal) in vaccines 
the way Andrew Wakefield claimed it did. But when Jacob’s mother, Emma Hunt, entertains the 
notion in House Rules that vaccinations might have played a part in producing his son’s condition, 
I interpret this not as a pure-culture example of delusional thinking or that the writer did not do 
enough research. I recognise instead that it is motivated by developing Emma as a character, who 
becomes a ‘supermom’-type heroine similar to the mothers in the autism memoir genre, and I 
would argue that Jodi Picoult thoughtfully builds up the image of an overprotective mother, whose 
drive for agency sometimes conflicts with that of her son. Seen this way, being ambivalent about 
environmental causes, even demonstrably fallacious ones, is partially a reaction to the mother-
blaming etiologies of autism that were popular from the 1950s up until the 1980s in some segments 
of the psychological profession. It is also consistent with Emma’s master narrative of motherly 
love triumphing over adversity, which, as Stuart Murray observes, was ubiquitous in the vaccines 
controversy: “all worries seemed to be extensions of ideas of love” (Murray 2008, 177). In actual 
fact, autism has never been contracted through vaccines, just as there is no epidemic of autism, nor 
do autists lack empathy, and all these truth claims can be established using principled reasoning 
with careful observations, but these facts play second fiddle to the telling of a good story in a novel. 
This brings me to the question of a cross-domain interaction of different types of texts, 
namely literary works of art and scientific publications. I want to declare on the outset that every 
organised effort of humankind in the social sphere is mediated by human activities and 
understanding. Science is not outside the domain of the cultural, nor are scientists infallible 
observers, and the fruits of scientific research are results of interpretation. In this, scholars share 
their core goals across disciplines, seeking to understand some aspect of the world, including 
ourselves, by interpreting phenomena accessible to us. I shall be outlining the wider framework of 
the dissertation, the biocultural approach in the next chapter. As Lennard J. Davis and David B. 
Morris explain, it is an attempt to reconcile the differences between the humanities/social sciences 
and the natural sciences, healing the rift that tore the two apart during the science wars. Of their 
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programmatic dicta, three in particular should encapsulate what I find inalienable to the success of 
my project: “Selves today are embodied, biologized, shaped by medical knowledge. […] Patients 
and experimental subjects are part of the decision-making process. […] Biology, as a science, 
cannot exist outside culture; culture, as a practice, cannot exist outside biology” (Davis and Morris 
2007, 418). Let me condense their statements to how I see them affecting my approach. Firstly, 
autism has been made visible by changes in the interrelationship between the human subject and 
modernity, part of which was the increased attention given to childhood development at the first 
third of the 20th century. This relationship between scientific knowledge and autistic subjecthood 
is ongoing, as the two remain inseparable discourses. Second, changes in the scientific view of 
autism were not only produced internally, within the research laboratories and on the writing desk, 
they have responded to external factors, too, including families, the changing technological and 
institutional environment of modernity, autism advocacy groups, popular fears and scares about 
nurture, genetics and environmental factors, as well as autism autobiographies and fiction. These 
all played a part in shaping the medical discourse of autism. Third, novelistic discourse and 
fictional representations of autism depend upon scientific knowledge, various genres of other kinds 
of writing and, often, direct or reported personal experience of people living with autism as well. 
Writers and researchers are human, subject to cognitive biases, make errors, present their 
arguments persuasively and remain fallible in ways that are reassuringly human; this process 
produces textual knowledge that can and must be subjected to critical analysis.  
Nonetheless, for all its faults, science is not just a synchronic body of knowledge, deemed 
contingently true, but a methodology dedicated to improve upon the state of all human knowledge 
diachronically. It has devised its methods specifically to counter some well-known human biases 
in interpreting the experience of the senses and our innate structures of thinking, which are also 
shaped by our local histories and ideologies. Working scientists are not naive realists, they are 
trained to know the weaknesses of their methods and the limits of their interpretations. Reading an 
admittedly small selection of the deluge of articles produced within the medical, neurological and 
psychological sciences, my general impression is that people in the lab are painfully aware of what 
they do and do not know, and they fiercely debate one another’s theories about, say, the etiology 
of autism, or the future prospects of people on the spectrum.  
This does not invalidate the central insights of science and technology studies, that 
scientific knowledge is socially produced and professional paradigms constrain the type of 
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questions asked or the range of possible interpretations. But the standards of evidence and the 
techniques put in place to reduce individual folly should compel us to consider the results of 
scientific debates to be the best among currently existing interpretations of reality, as they are 
supported by evidence and fit best with the most robust theories of their time. We should always 
do so critically and provisionally, but we cannot treat scientific knowledge and methods with 
blanket refusal just because they are historically contingent or textually mediated in a cultural 
context. Science does not produce statements purely to dominate a discourse, as its success as a 
field of human endeavour depends upon providing reliable answers to human questions which a 
society judges worthy to investigate. For this, it needs to base its arguments in observable 
phenomena and come up with criteria for their interpretation, with an eye towards future 
predictions. When the evidence and reasoning align, we are talking about a good fit between 
linguistic statements and the observable, experienced world, which includes our psyche and 
society. Whenever science is capable of producing such propositional knowledge, we come closer 
to understanding our relationship to the social and natural world, and upon this knowledge, we can 
shape our habitat and habits in a way that we consider most fulfilling for the human race.  
Fiction, too, plays a significant part in this, as it is a discourse fit for adventuring from the 
realm of the probable into the realm of the possible. It sparks the imagination of readers to be 
mindful of alternative interpretations and new ways of seeing the world. Literary science is all the 
more important in this scheme because it theorises and dissects the figments of the imagination 
based on what we know about the unique human faculty to produce personally and socially 
meaningful art. This interrelationship between the human/social sciences and the natural sciences 
has been called consilience by Edward O. Wilson (1999), who promotes the unity of knowledge 
across disciplines, departments and faculties. Its methodological implications will become clear in 
the next section. In it, I turn to Marcus Nordlund’s attempt to create a meta-theory of consilient 
literary interpretation (2002), a new amalgam of fusing interdisciplinary views, but founded on the 
classic hermeneutical triangle of ‘text,’ ‘reader’ and ‘world.’ Nordlund’s contribution to 
hermeneutics is a call to update our theories of reading, contexts and reality with new theoretical 
perspectives developed in psychology – for me, this includes research on empathy, literary 
appreciation, mental simulation, social intelligence and the mechanisms that make them possible. 
Since each of my selected novels reflect upon our current cultural notions of autism, 
containing half-truths and stereotypes, in the interest of establishing what writers could possibly 
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have known about the condition, in Chapter 3, I present an abbreviated, critical intellectual history 
of psychological research and theories of autism. I follow the intellectual arc of research from 
Kanner and Asperger’s original papers through the domination of psychogenic, family-centred 
explanations of the condition to the qualitative improvement in theories during the 1970s and ‘80s, 
which have shifted clinical attention to the genetic and neurological origins of autism. I outline the 
search for the elusive ‘core deficit’ that was purported to be the basis of observed autistic behaviour 
(the Triad of Impairments), which resulted in three competing psychological theories: the weak 
central coherence hypothesis (later renamed detail-oriented processing), the impairment of 
executive functions and the theory of mind-deficit hypothesis. I show that these accounts are 
occasionally conflicting, but tend to support one another in the work of leading researchers. The 
most powerful discursive act that affects the treatment of autists is the DSM, so I conclude with 
dissecting the evolution of clinical definitions in the psychiatric manual, including the last, fifth 
edition (APA 2013), summarising the changes and their effect on autistic identity.  
Transitioning from the clinical to the social, I devote the next section of my dissertation to 
an extended analysis of psychiatric power in the current institutional matrix of autism. I position 
disability studies and cognitive (neuro)science as opposing discourses with different interests in 
describing autism. Based on Eva Vakitzri’s archaeology and genealogy of ASCs (2010), I relate 
how scientific discourse about neural difference is related to the power/knowledge dyad, and how 
autistic subjectivity is constituted in response to the techniques of bio-power. I also introduce a 
promising alternative to clinical definitions, the neurodiversity movement, and assess their claims 
about equal capabilities. I single out ‘functioning’ as a concept with normative power and show 
its relationship to ‘adaptive’ behaviour. The disability studies lens compels me to incorporate the 
voices of autists themselves. Although I cannot do justice to the wealth and breadth of memoirs 
written by people on the spectrum, I do explore the genre of the autobiography, zeroing in on 
problems of authorship and editorial work, independence and support, as their contributions pave 
the way for the subsequent chapters that finally turn to the literary rather than the clinical. 
I begin the section on literature with examining how the cognitive psychological concept 
called Theory of Mind is connected with autism and literary studies. ToM-related theories have 
captured the imagination of novelists, literary critics and disability studies scholars alike. The lack 
of ToM is frequently employed in contemporary literary works of art as the hallmark of the autist, 
which leads me to a survey of ToM’s history as a travelling concept. I follow its journey from its 
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origins in the problem of other minds in philosophy through primate research, where the phrase 
itself was coined, to aesthetics, where Colin Radford first introduced the conundrum (1977) later 
described as ‘the paradox of fiction.’ Thence we move to evolutionary psychology in the work of 
Leda Tooby and John Cosmides (1992), whose discussion is relevant to how we view narrative as 
an adaptive function of the human mind and fiction as a technology for empathy. Their scholarship 
on ToM made the concept interesting for cognitive literary and cultural studies. The dissertation’s 
attention to this voyage ends when postclassical narratology (defined as “extensions of the classical 
model that open the fairly focused and restricted realm of narratology to methodological, thematic 
and contextual influences from outside” (Alber and Fludernik 2010, 2)) begins to import concepts 
from real-mind discourses in the work of David Herman, Alan Palmer, Lisa Zunshine and Blakey 
Vermeule. In this section, I analyse how ToM has been used to validate the mind-oriented branches 
of postclassical narratology, and how their diverse schools have wrestled with strange and 
unreadable minds – in the case of autism fiction, the connection between the two fields illuminates 
the textual strategies for conveying neurological difference.  
Having established the critical stakes of the ToM discourse in literary studies, I segue into 
the concept of “unreadable minds” in literature, and what that implies for the representation of 
autism through questioning H. Porter Abbott’s reading (2008) of Melville’s Bartleby, the Scrivener 
on theoretical grounds. Working with David Herman’s definition of descriptive granularity and 
backgrounded elements, along with the general concepts of narrativity and tellability, I begin to 
build my analytical toolkit for the novels. I recognise autistic difference in the novels as a 
heightened sensory attention to patterns in the non-human elements of the diegetic environment 
and an atypical description of social cues (facial expressions, tone of voice, non-verbal gestures) 
by the autistic protagonist. These descriptive idiosyncrasies (which are the products of fictional 
mental difference) pave the way for the depiction of social biosemiotic ambiguity in interpreting 
neurotypical characters’ behaviour from the autist’s perspective, and when the narrative switches 
to NT characters, vice versa. Such a descriptive strategy, constantly underfeeding the reader with 
descriptive information, coalesces into higher-order atypicalities of fictional storytelling, leaving 
the reader a greater interpretative gap to bridge.  
Working with the largest meta-concept of postclassical narratology, narrativity (how story-
like the given text is; see glossary for definition) and its companion concept of tellability (defined 
as the social relevance, enjoyability and counterintuitive nature of the narrative to a particular 
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audience) enables me to argue that autism novels challenge NT notions of good storytelling 
strategies. The enumerative, list-based digressions and the heavy-handed expositional passages 
which focus on the protagonists’ obsessive interests but appear irrelevant to NT readers are clear 
examples of such challenges to convention. As a contribution to the contextual branch of 
postclassical narratology, I adopt and redesign the concept of the social norms of cognition from 
Nicholas Dames’ The Physiology of the Novel (2007), developed for Victorian novel criticism, to 
make it meaningful for discussing the power dynamics of autism fiction. This gives me some 
thematic cues (the shape and quality of attention, its duration, the speed of processing and patterns 
of musicality) to watch out for, which inform the autistic character’s evaluation of their own 
abilities. Thus, I tether an intentionally anachronistic, resituated system of criteria for formal 
narratological analysis (namely, Victorian novel theory) to disability studies’ critique of ‘norms,’ 
a homogenising social technology for the production of docile bodies. Norms of cognition define 
the socially sanctioned forms of perceiving and evaluating sensory and social information coming 
from one’s environment, and the organism’s subsequent reaction to it. When I analyse autism 
fiction with the social norms of cognition in mind, I look at narratological instances of atypical or 
non-narrative (‘unnatural’) segments of the literary text and I interpret their aesthetic properties in 
conjunction with the ethical representation of autistic cognition. 
Finally I consider wider strategies of reading autism thematically. I select three scholars of 
autism in fiction, Ian Hacking, Stuart Murray and Ato Quayson to show the haphazard nature of 
what counts as literary autism and the relative merits of their taxonomic efforts to categorise autism 
fiction according to diverse criteria. These range from the merely enumerative without much 
explanation (Murray 2008), through the broadly thematic (Hacking 2010b) to structural/functional 
distinctions (Quayson 2007). Together, they represent a productive network in which autism 
fiction can be seen as a genre of its own, serving vastly different narratological purposes and 
addressing diverse ‘current issues’ related to autism in the public eye. This chapter demarcates my 
own corpus and serves to dissociate myself from certain kinds of thematic investigation. 
After setting up the framework for analysing my corpus, I begin reading the selected works 
of literature with these foci in mind. I have chosen Mark Haddon’s The Curious Incident of the 
Dog in the Night-Time, Elizabeth Moon’s Speed of Dark, Claire Morrall’s The Language of Others 
and Jodi Picoult’s House Rules to compare and contrast neurotypical authors’ approaches to the 
depiction of autistic mental functioning in a wide variety of contexts. First, in the context of age: 
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while autism was initially seen as a predominantly childhood condition, only The Curious 
Incident’s protagonist is an adolescent boy, Christopher, whereas House Rules’ Jacob is eighteen 
and a young adult, Speed of Dark’s Lou and his colleagues are adults, and Jessica in Language is 
an aging, divorced mother. Second, in the context of gender: although gender relations will not be 
a focal element in this dissertation, I felt it important to include at least one story in which the main 
protagonist is an autistic woman to reflect the biased gender ratio of autism without silencing 
female protagonists’ voice and roles, especially in light of the predominance of autistic women 
who published autobiographical works and the literary qualities of Morrall’s haunting, honest 
prose. Thirdly, I have attempted to select works which situate autistic characters in different genres 
and plot structures: The Curious Incident is young adult (YA) fiction, an epistolary novel and a 
journey tale; Speed is a bioethical, near-future science fiction novel; Language is middlebrow 
literary fiction; and House Rules is a family-oriented legal thriller. These selections allow me to 
introduce people with different life stories at different stages of their lives, people who are capable 
of different degrees of self-reflection and share different problems in integrating into society. The 
corpus also presents opportunities to engage with several narratological constructs that are affected 
by the presence of autism in the stories. 
 In Haddon’s Curious Incident, I investigate the interactions between narrativity and 
autism. I discuss the genre-shifting break in the emplotment of the protagonist, Christopher, the 
use of visual elements in storytelling, Christopher’s composition of a metafictional book, the play 
with the hypotext of Sherlock Holmes stories and excursions from the main narrative to argue that 
autistic difference profoundly structures the form of the novel. It is a playful, self-reflexive artistic 
project which innovatively included intellectual disability in a postmodern YA book at the time of 
its publication. It presents Christopher as an (undiagnosed) person with Asperger’s Syndrome, and 
AS is utilised throughout the book as a trait that generates and resists narrative. It foregrounds 
atypical sensory processing during Christopher’s journey to London from Swindon, and the text 
fosters an interpretative practice in which readers try to filter out the narrative elements from a text 
which reflects Christopher’s senses inundated by the overflow of information. These efforts, and 
the protagonist’s fascination with computers, tie in with a contextual attention to anxieties 
surrounding the Information Age. I apply disability studies’ interest in self-writing and autistic 
identity formation to Christopher’s self-presentation. An additional point of interest is the question 
of authorship, as Christopher frequently tells the reader that his social skills teacher is helping him 
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write the book, making suggestions as to what would make good storytelling, and she adjusts the 
novel through an editing process that complicates the text. Here, I evoke the concept of the 
thoroughly debunked ‘treatment’ of some nonverbal autists, called ‘facilitated communication’ to 
produce an interpretative model for diegetic authorship in The Curious Incident. I suggest that 
Siobhan interferes with Christopher’s narrative production by applying NT standards of coherence 
when editing the book, mitigating the effect of cognitive difference upon the final manuscript. 
Proceeding to Speed of Dark, I delve deeper into the uses of descriptive granularity and the 
social norms of cognition to interpret Lou Arrendale’s autism as it is expressed in his perception 
of the diegetic world. I am chiefly interested in how the author, Elizabeth Moon uses explicit 
references to patterns as units of cognition, whether in fencing moves or in the data Lou analyses 
or in the social patterns of information which he struggles to learn. I distinguish between two forms 
of ‘realism,’ the normative realism of neurotypical society, which imposes the social norms of 
cognition on the autistic subject, and the perceptive realism of autists. They use detail-oriented 
descriptions to create a finely-grained model of the world, which anchors their mind-body in a 
concrete reality, whereas social information is presented more gappily, with elisions and 
hermeneutic impasses when Lou does not have the right interpretative schemata to make sense of 
other people’s actions and intentions. The two forms of realism clash when Lou is subjected to an 
experimental treatment that would cure his autism, and he goes on a quest to appropriate medical 
knowledge by learning brain science. He can spot manipulations of data and faulty explanation in 
the lead scientific investigator’s briefing, calling on the help of their section leader to function as 
a whistle-blower against the upper management, who want to force the experimental treatment on 
their employees. The analysis takes into consideration the presentation of ToM-related scenes in 
the narrative, claiming that Lou exhibits a range of different abilities depending on the social 
situations he encounters, from a complete inability to interpret other characters to a competent, 
even acute reading of facial expressions and what they entail in mental-state terms. I also 
investigate how thought collectives, such as the fencing group Lou trains with, or Section A, Lou’s 
workgroup operate and adapt to intergroup tension or changes in their self-understanding, which 
illustrate their shared, intermental functions. The chapter ends with a discussion of what an “alien 
phenomenology” (Bogost 2012) means for the autistic tendency not to prioritise social information 
and to engage with inanimate objects on equal terms. 
The next novel, The Language of Others by Clare Morrall continues with similar themes. 
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Music is central to pianist Jessica Fontaine, who feels most at home when she is playing classical 
compositions and the least when she has to navigate the tumultuous sea of interpersonal affairs. It 
is perhaps due to her social naivety that she pairs up with Andrew, a flamboyant, volatile man who 
abuses her, turning their marriage into a nightmare. Still, Jessica gives birth to a child, Joel, who 
acquires eccentric habits early on, and does not fit in anywhere. The themes of heredity, the role 
of the family and the vulnerability of autistic children and adults are central preoccupations of the 
novel, which I interpret with Alan Palmer’s contribution to character analysis (2004) in mind, who 
has used a broadly cognitive methodology to understand how attributions of mental illness turn 
into judgements and into narrative explanations of personality in novels that construe certain 
characters as ‘mad’ or ‘crazy.’ Because the diagnosis of autism only comes in late, almost at the 
end of the book, previously puzzling personality quirks and Jessica’s quest for emotional space 
acquires a new meaning, asking her to rearrange the story of her life into one that includes 
neurological difference, refracted through her personal history of abuse and motherhood. This 
restructuring occurs in a socially distributed thought collective, the family, and investigating how 
such an interpretative community deals with the diagnosis of autism brings the workings of ‘shared 
minds’ to light that earlier narratologies would not even have categorised as proper thought. 
The last book I intend to cover is Jodi Picoult’s House Rules, a tale that takes autism to 
court. In it, Jacob Hunt, a young man diagnosed with autism and a passion for forensics gets 
involved in the death of her social skills tutor, Jess. Everyone suspects Jacob, because his atypical 
behaviour is interpreted as proof of guilt, and many of his actions seem to be incriminating him. 
Picoult’s novel exposes that psychiatric power places autism in a medico-juridical discourse about 
accountability for one’s actions, and she plays with the situations this juxtaposition creates. 
Meanwhile, Picoult’s narrative design puts empathy, pretence, fiction and pro-social action on the 
centre stage, and presents an extended argument about the value of autism as different ability. 
Investigating how central pretence and the consumption of fiction is to the construction of Jacob 
as an autistic person, I discuss the narrative structure that creates mirrored events and even 
instances of genuine social mirroring to generate empathy between characters. I read Jacob’s own 
crime scene enactments as both logic puzzles for her mother and as a method for Jacob to attain 
authorship in his personal narrative, acquiring confidence and a poietic relationship to his 
surroundings to prove the ‘experts’ wrong.  
Through these and other reflections on make-believe and empathy, Jacob becomes a critical 
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reader of fiction and real life. He express his phenomenological point of view on life in metaphors, 
constructing new ways of talking about autists’ lived experiences. I comment on the ubiquity of 
metaphoric expressions in autism, and I claim that the metaphors, which have a strong somatic 
feel to them, shape readers’ perception of autism by making them enact little mental scenarios 
from the autistic perspective, generating low-level, visceral empathy. I also examine the rhetorical 
strategies for producing empathy in Suzanne Keen’s threefold typology (2007) of how narrators 
elicit strategic empathy in the readers: bounded, ambassadorial and broadcast narrative empathy. 
Knowing that all of the authors I work with are neurotypicals, I create a fourth category, advocative 
strategic empathy for instances where the author does not belong to a particular group, but manages 
to generate fellow-feeling towards a marginalised group on the basis of her own insights into 
another aspect of the human condition. I distinguish between two forms of empathy, cognitive 
empathy and rule-following empathy, and I critically assess Jacob’s opinion on empathy and his 
expressed views about responding socially to other people in distress. The middlebrow legal novel 
exploits readers’ expectations of diegetic conflict based on differences in empathetic engagement, 
and Picoult puts a new spin on it by placing autism in the crossfire of many different interacting 
minds, who all have some personal interest in disciplining Jacob’s expressions of personality to 
prove his innocence, adding to the courtroom drama. I view neuroconformism and Jacob’s self-
expression as a contest rooted in the social norms of cognition, and I claim that Jacob’s narrative 
rewrites these norms from an AS perspective.  
The authoritative tone of voice which narrates the little vignettes of real-life murder cases 
is revealed in the end to come from Jacob, who has gained narratorial powers when speaking about 
his preferred subjects, criminal justice and forensic science. I read the narrative breaks that appear 
regularly in the novel (similar to Christopher’s digressions) as a form of “ontographical 
cataloging” (Bogost 2012, 41), which focuses on object-oriented relationships between entities 
fundamentally alien to one another. I reiterate that the autist is a person who implicitly espouses 
an object-oriented ontology. This allows a non-anthropocentric view of the world to develop, one 
where Jacob would feel at home. It is a sphere beyond narrative coherence, and the narrative 
strategies that enable such incoherence are also integral to a neurodiverse narrative to flourish. 
In the final section, I summarise and synthesise the theoretical and literary critical insights 
gained from putting autism onto the map in the study of narrative and intellectual disability. I 
maintain that by taking autism into account, some of the shortcomings of cognitive literary theory, 
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namely the reliance on ‘mindblindness’ and ToM deficits as the enabling condition of the field 
have to be revised in a more inclusive framework. What is seen as a contradiction or a case of 
narrative irony (”showing sympathy for a client who is incapable of showing any himself”, as 
Oliver puts it in House Rules (409)) is in fact the product of misreading able autistic responses to 
neurotypical situations and practices. Autism can be read through a postclassical narratological 
lens to contemplate the consequences of judging certain fictional minds to be ‘unreadable.’ By 
reinscribing autistic minds as readable via learning their idiolect, we are lead to a more empathetic, 
less disabling form of cognitive literary studies. With respect to the novels, I come to the 
conclusion that a narratological attention to the designs by which the authors convey the presence 
of the feeling autistic mind in contemporary literature gives scholars a fertile ground for testing 
assumptions about our empathetic responses to characters who belong to another neurotype, and 
thus could be essential for empirical inquiries into reader identification with characters.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE USE OF CONSILIENT LITERARY INTERPRETATION IN  
MAKING SENSE OF THE AUTISM NOVEL 
 
“Please don’t make the mistake of thinking the arts and sciences are at odds with one another. 
That is a recent, stupid and damaging idea. You don’t have to be unscientific to make beautiful 
art, to write beautiful things. If you need proof – Twain, Douglas Adams, Vonnegut, McEwan, 
Sagan and Shakespeare, Dickens for a start. You don’t need to be superstitious to be a poet. You 
don’t need to hate GM technology to care about the beauty of the planet. You don’t have to 
claim a soul to promote compassion. Science is not a body of knowledge nor a belief system it’s 
just a term which describes humankinds’ incremental acquisition of understanding through 
observation. Science is awesome! The arts and sciences need to work together to improve how 
knowledge is communicated.” – Tim Minchin, Speech at UWA 
 
It would be difficult to imagine a literary critic who, first and foremost, is not interested in 
how texts interact with the human psyche, how those black marks on the page turn into uplifting 
vistas, heroic deeds, tragic misunderstandings, hair-raising horrors or heart-fluttering tales of 
romance. As a community, we are thrilled by texts which reward careful reading and open up a 
complex web of signification that reinforce or reshuffle our view of the world and the horizons of 
the possible. Conjuring counterintuitive meanings to being, the literary critic is forever committed 
to explicating the mechanisms by which poetry, novels, dramas and short works of fiction affect 
us, to point at the textual constructs that contribute to our sense of meaning in the work of art with 
the best tools available at the time. In the history of criticism, we have been continuously on the 
defence against forces which would see fiction solely in terms of frivolousness, its escapism or 
usefulness, or as propagating a fixed moral code. We have argued for the sheer joy of words, the 
emotions they inspire in us, the delightful uselessness of aesthetics as an irreducible birthright of 
our species, just as we have treasured fiction’s ability to revise and transform humankind’s notions 
of morality, which is nothing if not a supreme use of fiction. 
In our own time, we have experienced a wealth of new forms of delivering fiction to our 
homes with the emergence of television, personal computers and entertainment consoles as well 
as the Internet. In scientific circles, after a long silence on consciousness, the cognitive revolution 
in psychology during the 1960s allowed experts to investigate the processes of signification in the 
brain (modelled on analogies with the computer). Procedures stemming from the cognitive 
revolution continue to reveal the structures which underlie our ways of sense-making with different 
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methods of ‘expanding the mind,’ and in subsequent decades, neuroimaging techniques such as 
CAT and PET scans, MEG and (f)MRI made a trip into the mind a reality. Scientists started asking 
questions about the origins of brains, how our neural organisations came to be, couched in the 
informed speculation of evolutionary theory. For a long time, the meaning of these advances 
seemed to be strictly disciplinary, with little to no implication for humanists, especially not to 
literary critics, who deal with social meaning on a phenomenological, aesthetic level. After all, 
who cares where the word “cat” is stored in the brain, so long as you can imagine a cat? And who 
is interested in how empathy arises as long as the critic can feel it? And yet, the hypotheses, the 
constructs and the results of research in cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary psychology have 
struck a chord with humanists who have grown tired with models of culture as a self-contained 
sphere, epitomised by the motto of ‘omnis cultura ex cultura.’ 
The long and troubled relationship between the arts and sciences along the fault lines of 
the ‘two cultures’ model is not something I want to rehearse in great detail, as most of its actual 
history, including the Sokal hoax, the gender wars and other areas of confrontation are best left to 
individual studies. For the purposes of a general overview, it is enough to sketch its history in 
broad strokes. Following the publication of C. P. Snow’s The Two Cultures and the Scientific 
Revolution (2012 [1959]), a lively debate in and outside of the humanities has sprung up about the 
relationship between the two spheres of inquiry. Within the humanities, older structuralist 
strategies were phased out with a renewed moral vigour in favour of social, liberationist theories 
of culture. Within the life sciences, new attempts were made to synthesise the large-scale 
behaviours of organisms from a systemic perspective, producing a descriptive, non-deterministic 
sociobiology of species in works such as Edward O. Wilson’s Sociobiology: The New Synthesis 
(1975). It would not have been controversial, were it not for the fact that sociobiology extended 
the purview of its subject beyond non-human animals towards the human species. Positing a 
relatively stable human nature rooted in biology did not mesh well with social scientists, who saw 
sociobiology as a discipline which transgressed the is-ought divide with its descriptions and 
amorally justified a rigid, unyielding human nature.  
By the 1990s, sociobiology has been vindicated in the life sciences, and its intellectual 
cousin, evolutionary psychology was created to deflect criticisms of perceived determinism and 
its pernicious social effects. The foundational volume of evolutionary psychology, Barkow, 
Cosmides and Tooby’s The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of 
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Culture (1992) envisioned a conceptual integration of the humanities and the social sciences with 
the natural sciences in which findings from evolutionary biology and theories about the origins of 
the mind yielded insights into cognitive psychology, which would directly appeal to our 
conception of sociality and cultural change. They argued that the humanities are based on “the 
Standard Social Science Model” (Tooby and Cosmides 1992, 24-34), a model which jettisons a 
qualified, but essential human nature in favour of a purely cultural model of the development of 
the individual. In this model, a person sharpens their talents from a basic set of common 
capabilities, suggesting that the basics alone cannot explain the mental structure and behavioural 
repertoire of adult human beings. Therefore it is culture alone – the social realm as an autonomous, 
emergent system – that is the originator of the rapid intellectual development of human beings.  
Instead of the SSSM, the authors advocate an Integrated Causal Model of human nature 
and culture that sees the mind as an evolved organism for processing information, which has 
specialised mechanisms for solving specific problems of adaptation, and these mechanisms are the 
elements upon which the richness of culture is built. These are then evaluated psychologically by 
the members of the group, so the produced cultural content spreads through adoption by other 
people. The diffusion of these social technologies in turn generates the culture and history of 
societies, which can be examined with various hybrid scientific methods (Tooby and Cosmides 
1992, 19-136). This adaptationist view of culture, founded on the modularity of the mind enabled 
a burgeoning theorisation of the origins of aesthetics, based on the adaptive problem of habitat 
choice and environmental preference, and in the human sphere, of sexual selection (Orians and 
Heerwagen 1992, 555-580; Kaplan 1992, 581-600 and Dutton 2009). 
Ever the synthesist, Edward O. Wilson wrote on the effort to bridge the gap between the 
two cultures and published his arguments in favour of an integrated domain of inquiry as 
Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (1999). Its central tenet, that “while the social sciences are 
truly science, when pursued descriptively and analytically, social theory is not yet true theory” 
(205), or assertions like “even the greatest works of art might be understood fundamentally with 
knowledge of the biologically evolved epigenetic rules that guided them” (233) were bound to 
incite furore in practitioners of the social sciences and the humanities. The publication of Lisa 
Zunshine’s Why We Read Fiction (2006), Dennis Dutton’s The Art Instinct (2009), Jonathan 
Gottschall’s Literature, Science and a New Humanities (2008) and Brian Boyd’s On the Origin of 
Stories (2009), were among the most significant books penned by literary scholars and art 
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historians who took it upon themselves to start the work of consilient literary interpretation from 
cognitive scientific and evolutionary perspectives. After their publication, the profession retaliated 
against what they saw, at best, as an uninformed importing of natural scientific concepts into the 
study of literature or, at worst, a deliberately greedy, reductive attempt to colonise literary theory 
and to jettison the current scientific paradigm wholesale, without building on its hermeneutic 
foundations and the contextual approaches that scholars have developed since. These criticisms 
persisted even when the authors qualified and clarified their statements, exploring the logical 
premises behind the claim that evolutionary and developmental psychology, anthropology, 
behavioural ecology and other related fields supply important contextual information about the 
limits and possibilities of interpretation. One example of this controversy was the exchange in 
Critical Inquiry on the viability, desirability and scope of the evolutionary study of literature 
between Jonathan Kramnick, the most vocal critic of literary Darwinism (Kramnick 2011) and 
scholars of various persuasions who have been connected to the new, wider paradigm of cognitive 
and biological criticism (Bloom, Boyd, Carroll, Ryan, Starr, Vermeule 2012, with a reply from 
Kramnick 2012). Kramnick, himself no stranger to the study of interaction between science and 
literature, attacked evocritics on the grounds that they believed literature (fictional narrative) to be 
a direct adaptation of the human mind for some adaptive problem. He found that the readings 
which evocritics came up with were strongly thematic in persuasion and therefore negligent of the 
linguistic component of the literary work. He contends that without an explanation of their formal 
properties, what evocriticism can say about art and literature amounts to a trivial reformulation of 
common-sense thematic readings in quasi-scientific language (quasi-, since Kramnick does not 
sign on with the adaptationist programme, with frequent references to its most vehement opponents 
in evolutionary biology, Stephen J. Gould and Richard Lewontin, most notably Gould and 
Lewontin 1979). Finally, he warned critics that the paradigm which the evocritics pose is “not of 
a two-way exchange on points of shared interest. It is rather that the terms of art used in biology 
continue to hold further up the pyramid of explanation. The kind of claim you can make about 
natural selection puts limits on what you can say about psychology and what you can say about 
psychology limits what you can do with literature” (Kramnick 2012, 434). This is a model which 
Kramnick finds alarming and dismisses it as marginal in the domain of philosophy of science, 
which only attained public attention because it was couched in the language of popular science.  
It is apparent that, for the opposing sides, the stakes are high: depending on where you 
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stand, it is ‘either literary criticism with science or bust’ vs. ‘a properly reflective criticism 
appealing to aesthetic and contextual properties or a barbarous, reductionist account which leaves 
no room for interpretive complexity and the indigenous hermeneutic tradition.’ In all of this, the 
role and nature of the science involved is what is pivotal, because the state of our knowledge in 
biology, psychology and the neurosciences are starting to deliver on their promises to provide 
insight into our human nature in all its complexity, implying that it is not a fixed, deterministic 
human nature. Rather, it is one in which genetic instructions are carried out in response to the 
organism’s relationship to the environment –- our development in the family and other social 
institutions are paid their due respect. Suppleness and adaptability means being able to cooperate 
as much as to compete, and to form ever wider circles of group membership. 
More moderate scholars from humanities who find value in evolutionary and cognitive 
theories (and I consider myself one of these) share some of the concerns of Kramnick and give us 
constructive criticism about where Gottschall or Boyd go wrong:  
 
The sceptical aloofness which Darwinian approaches to literature are often confronted 
with in their home discipline is mostly due to the (not entirely wrong) impression that 
those mimetistic approaches of “proving that the universals are actually present in 
literature” or “simplistically mapping” them onto literary texts do not really deal with 
literature but rather with the world behind it, and thus indeed miss the proper object of 
literary study. (Mellmann 2011, 305)  
 
Nonetheless, she sees evolutionary theory as a useful heuristic in the paradigm of literary 
study, capable of answering well-formed questions about aspects of literature. As a corrective, she 
claims that we can construct (on analogy with the historical model reader) an anthropological 
model reader, an abstraction which would entail the sum of mental capabilities of the human mind 
to read and interpret literature as a starting point for empirically grounded speculation about a 
general readership’s responses to a piece of fiction. It also enables us to see fiction as a kind of 
“dummy stimulus” on our evolved cognitive capacities, a mock-environment that would be 
appealing due to our innate, developmentally expressed and culturally shaped set of preferences 
(Mellmann 2011, 308). Building on Cosmides and Tooby’s work, she argues that literary works 
of art give us so much readerly pleasure because “they provide occasions for an intrinsically 
rewarded organisation of our neurocognitive apparatus” (315). What is being formulated here is a 
view of fiction as virtual reality (Ryan 1997), of mimesis as make-believe (Walton 1990), concepts 
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which do not automatically presuppose an evolutionary pressure for the emergence of fiction, but 
which fit into the greater framework better once the evolutionary explanation is in place. In this 
view, fictional narrative utilises the neural circuitry of imaginative play and supplies new kinds of 
linguistic stimuli via the imagination to the brain, which merrily processes the dummy stimuli (for 
an extended discussion, see Chapter 5).  
This model is of considerable importance for autism fiction, which situates hypothetical 
people within a fictional construct, as the text often refers to and reflects upon the use and 
consumption of fiction by neurotypicals and autists. Fictional autists, like their living counterparts, 
champion a view in which their condition is not a disability, just a different ability. Some go even 
further and hold the opinion that autism may even prove to be the next step in the evolution of 
humankind, and their atypical development is just nature doing its best to respond to alternative 
selectional pressures (see the more extended discussion on the claims of the neurodiversity 
movement in Chapter 4). This would suggest that we could be witnessing some fast-paced gene-
culture co-evolution, and a sprinkling of autism could in fact be beneficial in modern 
circumstances. What is of primary interest here is that, whether right or wrong, evolution plays 
into the discussions of the meaning of autism in the diegetic worlds (insofar as a specific 
organisational model of the brain, or a family thereof can have an intrinsic evolutionary meaning), 
as do findings in cognitive science about the role of autists’ consumption and production of fiction. 
These concerns are prominently featured in discussions about the importance of ‘Theory of Mind’ 
in art appreciation, about the nature of the imagination or the role of literature as a cognitive tool 
for understanding the self and others in an interrelated biosocial sphere. 
But where does that leave the literary critic in terms of ‘methodology’? Naturally, the 
default methodology literary studies have developed is a sort of secular, critical hermeneutics, a 
close reading of the text, interpreted with references to a larger context that influenced its 
production, impinging upon the reality the text provides a commentary of. Because this is a work 
dealing with the effects of representing autism, a biological, neurological condition embedded in 
a social context of disability, the effort itself has to be strongly interdisciplinary. Still, there are so 
many different ways of becoming interdisciplinary, the question often becomes: how to do 
interdisciplinarity right? Disability studies scholar Lennard J. Davis and medical humanist David 
B. Morris express a need for bridging the gap between the sciences and the humanities, declaring 
that “that culture and history must be rethought with an understanding of their inextricable, if 
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highly variable, relation to biology,” suggesting that “the biological without the cultural, or the 
cultural without the biological, is doomed to be reductionist at best and inaccurate at worst” (2007, 
411). It is inspiring to hear this sort of call for integration from disability studies, since debates 
about the biological configuration and cultural situatedness of mind-bodies are essential starting 
points for investigating the psychological effects of particular social arrangements about a 
devalued form of corporeal living. Davis and Morris’ manifesto indicates that the justified 
interpretation of data is what connects all sciences, whether it is cognitive neuroscience or 
Literaturwissenschaft, the German term for literary studies that properly acknowledges it as a 
science. What they propose is a much deeper dialogue between wider disciplines, similar to the 
consilience model, which would earnestly discuss differences in interpretative strategies without 
excluding relevant data from other fields. They state that a biocultural approach  
 
suggests that the humanities may learn from other disciplines how to study significant 
textual features and affiliations accessible outside a narrow or exclusive focus on 
interpretation—features perhaps traceable through explorations in cognitive 
neuroscience such as fMRI brain imaging studies or through anthropological 
explorations in material culture and in social practice, which connect language and 
sign systems with what meaning (or meaning alone) cannot convey. (2007, 416) 
 
Importing knowledge from faraway disciplines allows the interpreter to get around 
impasses in their own discipline, whose methodological affordances and constraints limit the kinds 
of knowledge that can be produced. In analysing autism fiction, for example, we cannot understand 
how the descriptions of autistic behaviour make sense or how they constitute a meaningful 
interaction with the environment if we stick to neurotypical standards of interpretation. For that, 
we need to apply ourselves to reconstructing the autistic mind as “unstrange” (to quote E. E. 
Cummings’ poem, and Grinker 2007), which requires a whole host of findings from psychology, 
anthropology, ethology and background knowledge from biology and the neurosciences. We can 
no longer ignore advances in empirical research on reading, empathy and the enjoyment of fiction 
that has been conducted in psychology departments around the globe, but the question remains as 
to how these could be fruitfully brought to bear upon particular problems in literary criticism. 
As Marcus Nordlund summarises Richard Levin’s (1993) argument,  
 
current interdisciplinary literary theories tend to become self-validating. There are no 
negative tests; critics tend to choose theories on the basis of ideological preferences 
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rather than the criterion of truth; and there is a widespread assumption that theories 
can simply be transformed wilfully whenever they do not meet the requirements of the 
interpreter. (2002, 313)  
 
He offers us a solution by appealing to the creation of a consilient metatheory of 
interpretation which should be the “best possible theory that complies with minimum requirements 
for internal coherence, intelligibility, and openness to rational examination” (316). This would 
entail an update to the theories about the elements that compose the traditional triangle of 
interpretation, the Reader, the Text and the World. Their triangular relationship requires us to 
develop a set of theories: to understand how the reader interprets, we need a theory of reading; to 
see how a text can refer to an outside world, we need a theory of context; and to clarify the 
correlations between individual percepts and events in the world, we need a theory of reality. 
Nordlund advocates that no matter which side of the triangle we are investigating we should always 
consider the other two.  
I begin my analysis of autism fiction with a theory of reality. Nordlund gives a very simple 
definition of it: “the theory by which one understands the world in order to understand the text” 
(2002, 323). One of the things Nordlund takes as axiomatic is that readers bring almost all of their 
knowledge about the world to the interpretation of the text, and by default they read referentially 
unless the text cues them as otherwise (this is in line with Marie-Laure Ryan’s “principle of 
minimal departure” (Ryan 1980) in narratology). As he rightly asserts:  
 
the theory of reality not only serves as a foil for the theory of context […] but also has 
epistemological priority. In theory, it is possible to have an unexamined theory of 
reality without a theory of context—this would admittedly be something of a Kaspar 
Hauser theory of the world—but not vice versa. Put in terms of the triangular model, 
the reader must pass through his theory of reality in order to reach the theory of context. 
There can be no direct engagement with any historical or cultural context that is not 
mediated and informed by the reader’s larger conception of the world. (324) 
 
For us, it would mean the exploration of the clinical picture of autism with all of its 
nuances, into empirical studies beyond Simon Baron-Cohen and Uta Frith’s work (the two 
scientists who are most often criticised when discussing the medicalising model of autism) in order 
to show the wealth of data and theories about autism. I shall be drawing attention to the changing 
clinical picture of the condition as testing and experiments have become more refined, more aware 
of their shortcomings and other interpretations of autistic behaviour and thinking.  
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Of particular interest here is Nordlund’s off-hand quip that a theory of reality without a 
theory of context would be akin to a ‘Kaspar Hauser theory of the world.’ We now know that the 
historical person known as Kaspar Hauser was a fraud who exploited his culture’s ideas about feral 
children, cruelty and the relationship between nurture and nature, but he has captured the 
imagination of his contemporaries, and thus transformed into a prototypical feral child in the 
cultural psyche. In our times, there have been speculations about the reasons why such people were 
expelled from society. One famous case was Victor, the Wild Boy of Aveyron, of whom autism 
researcher Lorna Wing writes: “there can be no doubt that Victor was autistic” (1997, 14); his lack 
of social skills, mutism and general inability to cope with a human environment must have played 
a part in the casting out of these people. This sort of reference in Nordlund’s work just goes to 
show that the sort of naive realism ascribed to people with intellectual disabilities play a 
constitutive part in how we relate information to an interpretative problem. It also illustrates that 
the history of disability is interwoven with the history of ideas in surprising ways. 
Having seen the importance of establishing a theory of reality, I continue by erecting the 
second pillar of a biocultural interpretation: a theory of context. I outline the social incentives that 
promoted the fascination with autism in popular culture and inspired literary writers to create 
works of art exploring the condition. I situate the appearance of autism fiction within a cultural 
matrix of popular debates about the values of expert knowledge, science and novel insights into 
processing data with computers. I argue that autism gained wider recognition following the 
inclusion of Asperger’s Syndrome in the DSM and the ICD-10 under the label of autism, and the 
publication of popular science books by Oliver Sacks and Simon Baron-Cohen, as well as autism 
autobiographies by Daniel Tammet, Dawn Prince-Hughes, Donna Williams, Temple Grandin and 
others. In addition, new forms of communication with the advent of the Internet has allowed the 
mushrooming of autism communities and advocacy sites, while telecommunication and new media 
produce new anxieties about the nature of human sociality for cultural critics. The increasing 
visibility of autism in the public eye has been linked to fraudulent research on vaccines, which put 
the role of expert opinion into question for those taken in by arguments about the iatrogenic rise 
of autism. Research in the cognitive sciences have established several competing theories that 
purport to explain the unique developmental path autists take, and their characterisation has been 
critically dissected by scholars of disability, who argue that these descriptions (reproducing a 
deficit model) heighten the disability beyond its medical status as impairment. 
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Finally, the theory of reading I apply to the interpretation of autism fiction (and fiction in 
general) is one borne of studies of disability’s interaction with neuroscience, the narrative 
production of autists, philosophical and cognitive research on mind-reading and mental simulation. 
As I shall demonstrate, the problem known in philosophy as ‘the problem of other minds’ has had 
a recent upsurge in interest due to autism entering public and scholarly consciousness. It is known 
as a condition in which people do not react conventionally to social situations and have no less 
difficulty in giving standard responses to tests which gauge one’s ability to infer other people’s 
state of mind. This has influenced theories of pretence and aesthetics in philosophy, which directly 
affect our conception of the nature and processing of fiction in all kinds of minds. I intend to survey 
a segment of the current literature on the paradox of fiction and understanding other minds to 
create a framework for a theory of reading which is influenced by its interaction with autism. I 
also incorporate a narratological perspective into my readings, which focuses on narrative as 
mental simulation and interprets literary characters as fictional minds, since such a view is integral 
to the narrative strategies that authors of autism fiction use to evoke aesthetic effects in the reader. 
Therefore I employ a method of biocultural, consilient literary interpretative model, which 
cautiously combines the insights of an adaptationist, modular view of the mind with disability 
studies and narratology. I critically examine the effects of narrative strategies in science writing 
on autism research and the characterisation of actual autists (the theory of mind debate between 
some cognitive scientists and disability scholars) to sharpen our image of what discourses shape 
the representation of autism in fictional narratives. Then I attempt to close-read and interpret 
autism fiction with a focus on how the condition asks us to rethink narrativity, toward the 
presentation of fictional mental functioning. I also highlight autism novels’ ethical stance on 
critiquing the social norms of cognition and the importance of empathetic responses to emotional 
plights experienced by AS and NT characters, which includes both the expressions of empathy and 
helping behaviour within the stories and the empathetic strategies by which the text elicits 
emotional response in Mellmann’s anthropological model reader. 
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CHAPTER 3 
AUTISM’S CAREER IN PSYCHOLOGY: LIGHTING CANDLES IN A DARK MAZE 
 
“my mind is 
a big hunk of irrevocable nothing which touch and taste and smell  
and hearing and sight keep hitting and chipping with sharp fatal tools 
in an agony of sensual chisels i perform squirms of chrome and execute strides of cobalt 
nevertheless i 
feel that i cleverly am being altered that i slightly am becoming  
something a little different,in fact 
myself 
Hereupon helpless i utter lilac shrieks and scarlet bellowings.” 
– E. E. Cummings, “my mind is” (1991) 
 
In accordance with Nordlund’s threefold model of biocultural interpretation, I begin by 
outlining a short history of research on autism. In this dissertation, I generally espouse a Popperian, 
critical rationalist attitude towards the accumulation of knowledge, but I find it necessary and 
rewarding to connect it to the social scientific, critical realist reflections provided by disability 
studies scholars, who have done much to reinterpret autists as fully human subjects. My effort to 
synthesise these two strands of knowledge is attempted in order to generate a holistic, generously 
human view of people on the spectrum. Throughout the dissertation, I treat autism as a reality, as 
variations of the ordinary human mind-body, an identifiable set of neurological differences which 
create a unique array of lived experiences. Some scholars have been arguing that the heterogeneity 
of the condition warrants a rethinking of the diagnosis, and perhaps requires splitting autism into 
a manifold of different conditions (Waterhouse 2013, Anderson and Cushing 2013). This radical 
move is in agreement with the pressure for more diagnostic specificity that characterises current 
psychological research, which informed the fifth edition of the DSM, but with diametrically 
different results (see below for extended discussion). Philosophical and historical approaches to 
the discursive construction of autism are helpful complements, which situates the condition in a 
sociocultural matrix, foregrounding the institutional and societal changes that afforded the 
isolation of autism as a ‘unique’ property of the human mind. For the purposes of the dissertation, 
I follow the analysed literary works of art in treating autism as a more-or-less unified entity, and I 
strive to incorporate evidence and thought that tries to account for the heterogeneity of autisms by 
calling for further subtyping, even at the cost of losing the term ‘autism’ itself.  
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 Nonetheless, the word autism/autist is interesting enough on its own, alone, to start with. 
Deriving from the Greek word αὐτός, meaning ‘self’ or ‘same’, autism has been coined by Paul 
Eugen Bleuler in 1910 to denote the withdrawal of schizophrenic patients from reality into a world 
of their own fantasies. From its association with psychopathy, it gained a secondary meaning in 
1938, when Hans Asperger started referring to socially awkward children who expressed little 
empathy and preferred to play alone as exhibiting “autistic psychopathy” in a lecture, later 
followed by a paper in German (Asperger 1991 [1944]). In hindsight, it is somewhat ironic to see 
that schizophrenia and modern autism are understood to be polar opposites with considerable 
genetic overlap, as some of the same neural pathways are affected in the two, albeit in different 
directions (Crespi et al. 2009). Asperger described his form of autism on the basis of four ‘thick’ 
case studies in the anthropological sense, whose images coalesce into a “particularly interesting 
and highly recognisable type of child” (1991 [1944], 37). Contrasting them with the general 
population, and creating a sense of fascination that has shaped depictions of autism well into our 
age, he writes: “Human beings normally live in constant interaction with their environment, and 
react to it continually. However, ‘autists’ have severely disturbed and considerably limited 
interaction. The autist is only himself […] and is not an active member of a greater organism which 
he is influenced by and which he influences constantly” (38, my emphasis). Autistic aloneness, a 
marked lack of interest in the social is the condition’s most salient and, from the normative 
perspective, its most tragic feature. The concept of the human being as a social animal (ζῷον 
πoλίτικoν) who plays their role in a greater organism and exhibits agency is so entrenched in our 
conception of personhood that Asperger’s portrayal marks out the autist straddling the boundary 
between normal humanity and something profoundly Other, unintegrated into the social realm.  
The four case studies of the Viennese paediatrician are notable for their enduring quality, 
the clinical picture remains valid and recognisably autistic even today. Fritz V., Harro L., Ernst K. 
and Hellmuth L. have exhibited significant disturbances of social contact and affective expression 
during their whole childhood, are disturbed by eye-contact, have a sing-song intonation pattern or 
deadpan delivery and other peculiar prosodic features, which sets them off from their peers. They 
do not seem to pay attention to their parents, ignoring human social stimuli whenever they can, 
and have few facial expressions of their own. In conversation, they do not answer questions, or 
when they do, they come up with answers irrelevant to the topic, then they suddenly answer some 
question with stunning insight (Asperger reports the children’s questions about similarities 
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between objects, such as a fly and a butterfly, or glass and wood, and their ingenious ways of doing 
double-digit sums at a tender age). He describes their vocabulary as far exceeding those of their 
peers, and when they do speak, their speech is refined and adult-like. Their oddness is often 
enhanced by their propensity towards eating inedible objects (pica), precocious reading 
(hyperlexia). They are undisturbed by the goings-on in their environment and are scared by 
spontaneity, preferring to live by detailed daily and weekly schedules. They are reported to be 
clumsy and to have experienced hardships in motor learning (Asperger seems to single out 
handwriting as an iconic case, something that Joel in The Language of Others struggles with). 
Their behaviour is described as aristocratic and refined, and while they are often characterised as 
unruly or disobedient, sometimes malicious, at the same time they can be extremely rule-following 
if the instructions are phrased as if they were general commandments. In motion, they either tend 
to fidget, hop, rock, whirl and feel general bodily discomfort, but remain in motion even when 
sitting and absorbed in reading or they can sit stock still, with an odd posture and gait, if walking. 
With regard to their learning, Asperger observes:  
 
normal children acquire the necessary social habits without being consciously aware 
of them, they learn instinctively. It is these instinctive relations that are disturbed in 
autistic children. To put it bluntly, these individuals are intelligent automata. Social 
adaptation has to proceed via the intellect. In fact, they have to learn everything via 
the intellect. (58, emphasis mine)  
 
This comparison between autistic children and what we would now call robots or androids 
can be dehumanising, but it is also a very accurate way of describing autists’ impaired imitational 
skills and their lack of motivation to spontaneously conform to social norms. It also sheds light on 
the essential perception of the alterity of autism that has profound implications for science fiction, 
hinting at the human roots of representing robots, androids and other rational aliens as creatures 
animated by pure intellect (in the American context, Asperger’s people are often suggested to have 
a certain kinship with Mr. Spock and Data from Star Trek). Although they are invariably described 
as very bright, in the case studies they are said to perform atrociously in a school setting, because 
they are unwilling to work as part of the group and obey their teachers.  
The tone of Asperger’s clinical portraits foreshadows persistent patterns of psychological 
writing in which the otherness of autism becomes its most noteworthy feature, provoking a mixture 
of wonder and puzzlement, with some admiration for the unique talents of the children investigated 
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and an evoked pathos at the sight of the more unfortunate cases. The spectral nature of autism was 
already hinted at by Asperger, remarking that “[o]nce one has learnt to pay attention to the 
characteristic manifestations of autism, one realises that they are not at all rare in children, 
especially in their milder forms” (39). This observation is borne out today by the hypothesis of a 
Broader Autism Phenotype, which is characterised by some subclinical features of the condition 
surfacing in the families of individuals who are diagnosed with autism. Asperger is also 
commendable for openly tackling the question of autists’ adaptation to their environment. Of the 
social value of the diagnosed, he asserts: 
 
In the vast majority of cases work performance can be excellent, and with this comes 
social integration. Able autistic individuals can rise to eminent positions and perform 
with such outstanding success that one may even conclude that only such people are 
capable of certain achievements. It is as if they had compensatory abilities to counter-
balance their deficiencies. Their unswerving determination and penetrating intellectual 
powers, part of their spontaneous and original mental activity, their narrowness and 
singlemindedness, as manifested in their special interests, can be immensely valuable 
and can lead to outstanding achievements in their chosen areas. (88) 
 
The idea of an able autistic individual (referring to the lack of comorbid intellectual 
disability in Asperger’s terms) who has compensatory strategies to overcome their socio-cognitive 
difficulties and succeed in life is not only a brave assertion of ability in face of the reality of Nazi 
plans to exterminate the intellectually disabled. It is also a forward-thinking assessment of autists, 
and an ideal to which disability advocate groups, supporting families and autistic individuals aspire 
even today. These compensatory strategies are remarkable for their ingeniousness, while the 
accompanying psychological profile of determination and obsession is impressive by any means, 
and both will become significant when discussing some of the procedures which aid the protocols 
of contemporary diagnostics. 
Published on the other side of the Atlantic in 1943, the same year Hans Asperger finished 
writing his thesis in Vienna, Leo Kanner’s “Autistic Disturbances in Affective Contact” (1944) 
was the landmark English-language paper that put autism on the map for the psychological 
community. Nothing indicates the validity of the specific diagnosis more than the similarities 
reported between the two groups of children. These include the preference for loneliness and 
sameness, the repertoire of repetitive behaviours, the egocentricity and eccentricity of the children, 
their failure to spontaneously engage in social, imaginative play, impaired non-verbal 
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communication, capacity for memorising things and developing isolated sets of abilities in which 
they surpass their peers, or hypersensitivity to sensory stimuli (such as the taste or texture of food, 
noises, fascination with kaleidoscopic patterns, etc.). True to the more individual focus of 
professional psychological publications those days, the case studies presented in both papers have 
a distinctively narrative quality, and both describe only a handful of children, but in detail 
(Asperger discussed 4 boys, whereas Kanner wrote about 8 boys and 3 girls). Their tone bears a 
strong resemblance to the popular scientific writings of the late Oliver Sacks. Still, the low number 
of cases did not diminish Kanner’s insight and further research has corroborated his diagnosis of 
an atypical developmental trajectory. Contrary to Ian Hacking’s claim that “[m]ost of the behaviors 
described by Kanner seem not to exist any more” (Hacking 1999, 115), in fact, there is a great 
degree of overlap between the behaviour of WWII-era autists and their contemporary counterparts: 
aversion to touch, echolalic responses to questions, being absorbed by objects and oblivious to 
people, a lack of interest in communicating and the misuse or reversal of personal pronouns are all 
stable indicators of autism (for the complete list of all behavioural symptoms in Kanner’s paper, 
see Blacher and Christensen 2011).  
Nonetheless, there are a few differences between Asperger’s paper and Kanner’s. Kanner 
has been more synthetic in his approach, and he collected the similarities across the cases, 
constructing a clinical profile which would later form the basis of the DSM criteria for childhood 
autism. He begins by noting the “extreme autistic aloneness” (Kanner 1943, 242) of the children 
and their effort to shut out all social stimuli from the outside. Then he moves on to linguistic 
matters, such as their delay in the acquisition of speech (or their mutism), their excellent rote 
memory, delayed echolalia (storing, remembering and repeating the linguistic utterances of other 
people in situations where they don’t appear relevant), the literalness of their thought and use of 
language (when present), the reversal of personal pronouns, using them in the manner in which 
the child first heard it. He also mentions autistic children’s sensitivity to loud noises and fear of 
moving objects, their repetitive actions, stating that their behaviour “is governed by an anxiously 
obsessive desire for the maintenance of sameness” (245). Like Asperger, he notices the 
misdiagnosis of feeble-mindedness, asserting that they are “all unquestionably endowed with good 
cognitive potentialities,” but in contrast to Asperger, who wrote about the caricature-like features 
of the children he worked with, Kanner writes: “They all have strikingly intelligent physiognomies. 
Their faces at the same time give the impression of serious-mindedness and, in the presence of 
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others, an anxious tenseness” (247). In his closing remarks, he mentions that despite the children’s 
delayed development, the prognosis is good, many of the more worrying behaviours subside, 
language development catches up, and there is a definite amelioration of the childhood condition.  
The other feature of Kanner’s study that set the scene for later, psychogenic theories of 
autism is the Ukrainian-American’s willingness to meticulously detail the family situation of the 
children he was investigating. The parents are reported to be middle-aged professionals, both 
mother and father are likely to have been university-educated, and the mothers are predominantly 
represented as unemotional and practical-minded. Kanner told the readers that several of the 
marriages were abysmal failures and the cold-heartedness of the parents could have contributed to 
the children’s aloofness. He ends the paper by coming to the conclusion that the children were 
born with the “innate inability to form the usual, biologically provided affective contact with 
people, just as other children come into the world with innate physical or intellectual handcaps 
[sic!]” (250). Despite the speculation about the innateness of the condition, the attention paid to 
the family environment would prove damaging for the parents of similar children. As Hacking 
explains: “At that time the prevailing view, influenced by the (brief!) dominance of psychoanalysis 
in American psychiatry, was that the autistic child had a ‘refrigerator mother,’ one who could not 
express emotion to the child. This doctrine has by and large passed” (Hacking 1999, 114-115), he 
registers with relief, but let us not forget Kanner’s central role in the development of this belief.  
At the end of the 1940s, he delivered a paper at a conference, wherein he identified early 
infantile autism as related to childhood-onset schizophrenia in spite of autism appearing within the 
first two years of life, He expressed scepticism towards the necessity of ever separating autism 
from the rest of the schizophrenias, and once again turned to the well-educated parents of autistic 
children. Kanner observes that “[m]aternal lack of genuine warmth is often conspicuous in the first 
visit to the clinic. [… W]hen the mother is asked under some pretext to take the child on her lap, 
she usually does so in a dutiful, stilted manner, holding the child upright and using her arms solely 
for the mechanical purpose of maintaining him in his position” (1949, 422), but without 
considering that this could come from the child’s natural aversion to touch rather than the lack of 
maternal instincts and warmth. Of the fathers, he writers that they are “bigamists” (422), for they 
are workaholics and wedded to their jobs. Both parents are cast as young professionals determined 
to succeed in the new, post-war consumer society, who do not take joy in their children. 
Kanner unjustifiedly extrapolates from the parents’ behaviour and conversation that:  
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Most of the patients were exposed from the beginning to parental coldness, 
obsessiveness, and a mechanical type of attention to material needs only. They were 
the objects of observation and experiment conducted with an eye on fractional 
performance rather than with genuine warmth and enjoyment. They were kept neatly 
in refrigerators which did not defrost. Their withdrawal seems to be an act of turning 
away from such a situation to seek comfort in solitude. (425) 
 
So, in spite of Kanner’s ingeniousness to recognise the commonalities in the behaviour of 
autistic children, at some time even positing their innateness, his speculations concerning the 
aetiology of the condition in later years can be described as psychogenic, meaning that the 
children’s autism is psychologically generated due to the failure of developing a healthy mother-
infant attachment. This may have just been cautious speculation, but later psychologists have 
latched onto this and espoused the psychogenic theory of autism (notably, Bruno Bettelheim). 
These experts have never considered that the children’s innate behaviour might have ‘educated’ 
the parents to seek alternate forms of expressing their love and devotion to their children besides 
those conventionally recognised as motherly. Bettelheim’s 1967 book, The Empty Fortress: 
Infantile Autism and the Birth of the Self, was a milestone in cementing the image of refrigerator 
parents in the cultural consciousness, who built on his credentials as a Viennese survivor of the 
Shoah and his PhD degree in philosophy to begin a fraudulent career in psychology, drawing 
explicit parallels between the upbringing and behaviour of autistic children and those people who 
have survived the trauma of the concentration camps. He argued that the inability to connect 
emotionally to one’s mother and the subsequent feedback loop of inadequacy causes the condition:  
 
Infantile autism […] stems from the original conviction that there is nothing at all one 
can do about a world that offers some satisfactions, though not those one desires, and 
only in frustrating ways. As more is expected of such a child, and as he tries to find 
some satisfactions on his own he meets even greater frustration: because he neither 
gains satisfaction nor can he do as his parents expect. So he withdraws to the autistic 
position. If this happens, the world which until then seemed only insensitive now 
appears utterly destructive, as it did from the start to the child who [fails to thrive in 
institutions]. (Bettelheim 1967, 46, cited in Finn 2013) 
 
 It should not be forgotten, though, that Bettelheim voiced these opinions in the profession 
when psychodynamic explanations of all psychopathologies were routinely accepted. Still, by the 
time Bettelheim published his book, Bernard Rimland had already refuted the refrigerator mother 
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theory in his Infantile Autism: The Syndrome and Its Implications for a Neural Theory of Behavior 
in 1964. However, psychodynamic explanations have found a better soil for flourishing in the 
public consciousness after World War II and the renewed fascination with psychoanalysis, so 
Rimland’s arguments favouring a neurological cause were not widely adopted until later.  
The lasting impact of the psychogenic theory on the mothers of autistic children was 
memorialised in a later documentary, Refrigerator Mothers (2003), which testifies to the emotional 
strength and steadfastness of women who withstood widespread professional blame for spoiling 
their children when, actually, they have not been responsible for the atypical development of their 
kids. In light of these developments, it is hard to say just how honest Kanner was when he said in 
1969 at the meeting of the National Society for Autistic Children that  
 
I have been misquoted many times. From the very first publication until the last, I 
spoke of this condition in no uncertain terms as “innate.” But because I described some 
of the characteristics of the parents as persons, I was misquoted often as having said 
that “it is all the parents’ fault.” Those of you parents who have come to see me with 
your children know that this isn't what I said. As a matter of fact, I have tried to relieve 
parental anxiety when they had been made anxious because of such speculation. (cited 
in Feinstein 2010, 34-35)  
 
The best option I see is to acknowledge both the effect of his thoughts (as expressed in his 
1944 and 1949 papers) and his later, revised account as instances of irresponsible conjecture that 
the explanandum warranted, but ones that got out of hand quickly. The psychogenic explanation 
was so engrained in the culture of parenting that Lorna Wing, the psychiatrist who later made 
Asperger’s writings available for the English-speaking world wrote her Autistic Children: A Guide 
for Parents and Professionals (1972) specifically to dismantle the refrigerator parent theory. 
The ‘70s also marked an overwhelming change of attitude towards autism in research. 
More and more studies have shifted their attention from emotional deficits to the cognitive 
difficulties of the diagnosed. This effectively constituted a cognitive turn in the developmental 
psychology of autism and indicated a sea change in theory and research practice. Rutter and 
Bartak’s landmark paper in 1971 explicitly argued for a neurological cause of autism, and Kanner 
himself seemed to have accepted the differences between childhood schizophrenia and early 
infantile autism (1973). In this decade, Folstein and Rutter (1977) have conclusively proven that 
autism is inheritable, and thus has a strong genetic component. Folstein and Rutter’s work also 
acknowledged the existence of a variety of subclinical autistic traits in the family of autists, which 
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paved the way for our view of the Broader Autism Phenotype, or BAP (Piven 2001) and speculated 
that people fall into a continuum of symptom severity, which foreshadowed Lorna Wing and Judith 
Gould’s concept of the autistic spectrum, developed during their Camberwell study (1979).  
Wing and Gould have devised a way to distinguish between subtypes of the condition, 
separating the 132 children under assessment into four groups: the aloof, the passive, the active 
but odd and the over-formal, stilted group, in order of their sociocommunicative abilities. Their 
paper was also instrumental in formalising the children’s difficulties into three large groups, the 
so-called Triad of Social Impairments. The three axes tried to account for the wide variety of 
situations in which autistic children differed in their responses from typically developing peers: a) 
in their impairment in social interactions, b) communication, and c) in their flexible, imaginative 
functions. By 1980, the new edition of the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders, 
the DSM-III saw it fit to include ‘infantile autism’ as a separate diagnosis, setting it apart from 
schizophrenia. It indicated unresponsiveness to other people, gross deficits in language 
development, and bizarre responses to various aspects of the environment, such as obsessions, 
repetitive behaviours and a resistance to change as the defining hallmarks of autism. 
During the 1980s, the most significant development has been the extension of the spectrum 
towards people who did not experience delay in their language acquisition and, unlike those with 
‘classic’ autism, had intact intellectual abilities; i.e. the recognition of Asperger’s Syndrome. The 
decade also saw a renewed effort to find empirically-grounded theories about the causes of 
neurological difference in autism. Thanks to the efforts of Uta Frith to translate Asperger’s original 
paper (published Asperger 1991 [1944]), and of Lorna Wing to write up 34 cases she has worked 
with, Asperger’s Syndrome was brought to the attention of clinicians, spreading the word of a new 
kind of autism joining the fold of sociocognitive disability. Wing also acknowledged the 
continuum of socially appropriate behaviours shading into AS, highlighting the differences 
between them, putting social reciprocity into the centre. The paper denied a common aetiology of 
the condition, but it offered the hope of finding some common core deficit, which would entail an 
easier solution for treating and preventing autism. Wing favoured an explanation where  
 
all the conditions in which the triad occurs have in common impairment of certain 
aspects of brain function that are presumably necessary for adequate social interaction, 
verbal and non-verbal communication and imaginative development. It is possible that 
these are all facets of one underlying in-built capacity - that is, the ability actively to 
seek out and make sense of experience. (Wing 1981, 124) 
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Thus began the search for the elusive core deficit of autism. The neurological side of the 
investigations was kick-started by the report of an autopsy of a drowned autistic male’s brain, 
which indicated atypical developments of several brain regions (the amygdala, the hippocampus 
and the subiculum). The study concluded that the autistic brain was on an alternate path of growth 
and organisation from the earliest stages of development (Bauman and Kemper 1985).  
Assessing several decades of evidence, we now know that the atypical development of the 
autistic mind starts from early infancy and affects autists throughout their whole lives, but the 
general tendency veers towards amelioration in most or all behavioural aspects of the condition 
during the course of one’s life. Changes in the understanding of the condition also necessitated 
changes in diagnostic criteria. In the first two editions of the DSM, published in 1952 and 1968, 
respectively, the word ‘autism’ only appeared in connection with schizophrenia, and people 
exhibiting autistic withdrawnness were categorised as schizophrenic patients. It took 
diagnosticians until 1980 to follow the footsteps of Kanner and create a separate heading of 
“Infantile Autism” in the DSM-III, where the modern conception of autism finally started taking 
shape. The diagnostic criteria were rather thin, but at least focused on distinct characteristics that 
would be recognisably autistic even today. They specified the appearance of the condition in the 
first three years of life, emphasised social withdrawnness, linguistic peculiarities, included “bizarre 
responses” to elements of the environment and excluded schizophrenia in differential diagnosis 
(see Grinker 2007 for a more in-depth discussion of the DSM’s evolution). A revised version of 
the manual was published in 1987 (referred to as DSM III-R), when the condition acquired the 
fateful name of “Autistic Disorder.” It was the first DSM to take into consideration the Triad of 
Impairments and it introduced a ‘checklist’ approach to autism. In this scheme, distinctive features 
of autism were grouped according to the three categories (reciprocal social interaction, verbal and 
nonverbal communication and imaginative activities and finally, restricted activities and interests) 
and a successful diagnosis required eight from the sixteen features to be present across the triad. 
The menu-style scheme was continued by the fourth edition in 1994 and its revised version in 
2000, but the criteria used for diagnosis became more objective and were shrunk to twelve sub-
behaviours. Incorporating the idea of the autistic spectrum was an additional great step forward, 
which included other conditions among pervasive developmental disorders, such as Childhood 
Disintegrative Disorder (or Heller’s Syndrome), Rett’s Syndrome, Asperger’s Syndrome and the 
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‘joker’ category of Pervasive Developmental Disorder - Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS), 
where some atypical and mild autists would fall.  
In several respects, the newly revised DSM-V is the culmination of the view that autism is 
a continuum of atypical characteristics, but it might have also thrown the baby out with the 
bathwater when they scrapped a more fine-grained diagnostic scheme in favour of lumping the 
distinct conditions together. According to the new manual, ASDs are characterised by deficits 
along two axes instead of three:  
 
 persistent deficits in social communication and social interaction across 
multiple contexts […], including deficits in social-emotional reciprocity […], 
deficits in nonverbal communicative behaviors used for social interaction […], 
deficits in developing, maintaining, and understanding relationships  
 restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities […], including 
stereotyped or repetitive motor movements, use of objects, or speech […], 
insistence on sameness, inflexible adherence to routines, or ritualized patterns 
of verbal or nonverbal behavior […], highly restricted, fixated interests that are 
abnormal in intensity or focus […], hyper- or hyporeactivity to sensory input 
or unusual interest in sensory aspects of the environment. (APA 2013, 50) 
 
In the preface, the DSM-V team argued that the redefinition was beneficial, because these 
disorders fall on the same continuum, and the changes occurred “to improve the sensitivity and 
specificity of the criteria for the diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder and to identify more focused 
treatment targets for the specific impairments identified” (xiii). No matter how good-natured the 
intent of the revisers was, several studies have questioned the validity or the net effect of the 
changes in terms of specificity and efficacious treatment. Recognising the subtypes of autism is a 
major strength in the DSM IV(-R), heavily supported by hard scientific evidence and, as one author 
warns, “there is a real risk that eliminating the subtypes of PDDs and creating a single ASD will 
have an impact on services and may actually result in some patients being denied services” (Tsai 
and Ghaziuddin 2014, 327). Even during the drafting period, clinicians have expressed alarm at 
the significant change in who would be diagnosed with an ASC, especially about the disappearance 
of the Asperger’s and PDD-NOS categories (Kite et al. 2013, McPartland et al. 2012).  
In light of the changes, several advocacy and support groups have noted that Asperger’s 
Syndrome has become a part of many autists’ identity, who appropriated the label, and taking the 
name away now would constitute a break in their self-understanding (Giles 2014, Spillers et al. 
2014). In a peculiar twist, the DSM-V was conceived to combat stigmatisation, while advocacy 
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groups, like the Asperger’s Association of New England has voiced their opinion that such 
lumping would unduly homogenise a diverse group. This appeal has been heard in the clinical 
literature, who added that the changes would lead to label avoidance, since the diagnosis is 
anchored to the more severe end of the spectrum, ‘classical’ autism (Ben-Zeev et al. 2010). 
Nonetheless, these two prongs are behavioural criteria, used primarily for diagnostic purposes, and 
clinicians intend to provide a better subtyping of ASCs (Grzadzinski et al. 2013). A substantial 
segment of clinical research is dedicated to finding both the etiological causes of autism and the 
specific mechanisms that explain how the human mind is shaped by its atypical development.  
The psychological theories formulated in the 1980s, inflected by neurological inquiries this 
time, were much more subtle than anything before them. To a varying degree, these explanations 
tend to overlap and contradict each other, but all of them offer more explanatory power than the 
psychogenic theories. Each has vied to be a contender for the supposed “core deficit” in autism, 
but investigations to date are yet to agree on whether there is one in the first place (Schreibman 
2007, 109-131). They can be grouped into three distinct categories: neurological differences based 
on a) problems with executive functions, b) an account of weak central coherence in the cognitive 
domain and c) difficulties with attributing mental states (Theory of Mind). Each of the theories 
ascribe atypical functioning to some aspect of the mind, however, they all share the assumption 
that the mind is not merely a general purpose learning machine, but a sophisticated and integrated 
Swiss Army Knife of different modules, designed by evolution to solve specific adaptive problems.  
To begin with, some researchers in the 80s and 90s argued that autists experience problems 
in their daily living skills because they are unable to plan and succeed in goal-driven actions due 
to their impaired executive functions. The term “executive function” denotes a complex set of 
cognitive abilities related to the planning and carrying out of tasks, evaluating the possible 
solutions to a given problem and modulating the behavioural response, which is hypothesised to 
be generated by the frontal lobe and the prefrontal cortex (PFC). At the beginning of the 1990s, 
Sally Ozonoff and her colleagues started testing higher-functioning autistic children on their 
executive functions, which mostly entail a willingness to adapt their behaviour to the tasks they 
have been given, their ability to self-monitor, think forward, be flexible or to inhibit obvious but 
wrong answers when attempting to solve a task. They came to the conclusion that HFA and 
Asperger’s children do not perform up to par with their neurotypical peers, which might explain 
their preference for repetitive, stereotypical behaviours and their diminished capacity for future-
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oriented thought (Ozonoff et al. 1991a, 1991b). Autistic individuals are more likely to persevere 
with the already tried and failed method of achieving a goal, or can experience a breakdown if a 
personally meaningful but otherwise insignificant detail is altered in any fashion. Even so, 
researchers note that despite the convincing case for executive dysfunctions, negative findings 
crop up every now and then, and continued effort is needed to further solidify or discard this as a 
theory for the working of the autistic mind (Hill 2004). At the time, it was believed that AS and 
HFA children could be separated by tasks measuring executive functions; since then, Ozonoff has 
expressed doubts about the necessity to distinguish between the social and cognitive disabilities of 
autists (Feinstein 2010, 217). The theory might still be useful to explain the islets of abilities autists 
tend to have, which demand strong, obsessional attention. One problem with this theory is that it 
is not exclusive to the condition, and can be found in other disorders, such as ADHD, OCD and, 
surprisingly enough, schizophrenia. 
Related to task-relevant attention, researchers Uta Frith (1989), later in collaboration with 
Francesca Happé (Frith and Happé 1994; Happé and Frith 1996) have explored the 
neuropsychological background to autists’ observed attention to detail and their relative inability 
to organise their perceptions into larger, coherent wholes. The theory born from this research, the 
weak central coherence theory posits that autistic children and adults process the perceptions of 
their surroundings in a remarkably different manner to ordinary people. They tend to overlook 
obvious contextual information in their daily lives to solve problems, they appear less able to 
integrate different levels of information into a coherent whole, but they can spot tiny changes in 
their environment, and are much better at seeing specific figures embedded in richly illustrated 
images where the NT brain would assemble the details into wholes. It is illustrated by such 
colourful skills in the autistic population as identifying vacuum cleaner models from the sound 
they make, or delivering pitch-perfect phonetic imitations of foreign language features barely 
perceptible to language learners (Happé and Frith 2006). These abilities are called splinter skills 
by popular science writers, whose writing elevates even lower-functioning autists into the 
wunderkind sphere. One notable case is Stephen Wiltshire, a young man blessed with an eidetic 
memory and a prodigious skill in draughtsmanship, whose portrait was drawn in loving but 
sensational detail by Oliver Sacks on the pages of An Anthropologist on Mars (1995, 179-232), a 
book also famous for introducing Temple Grandin to a wider audience.  
Detail-oriented processing involves the atypical tendency of the mind to not organise 
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sensory data and cognitive information into wholes. Instead, it prefers to treat such stimuli in 
synecdochic chunks (with parts standing for the whole). The theory predicted that autistic people 
would process information with a local bias, and would experience difficulties with extracting 
linguistic information to contextualise their interpretations of the world. In a recent metaanalysis 
reviewing the evidence for and against the central coherence deficit account, Happé and Frith have 
found that AS/HFA people (in some cases, classic autists, too) were capable of extracting global 
information from sensory stimuli when the experiment called for it, albeit this problem-solving 
approach was not observed in spontaneous attempts to solve the experimental tasks (Happé and 
Frith 2006, 15). They note that the body of evidence for a detail-oriented bias is growing, but it 
appears to be a case of cognitive preference, rather than an autistic inability to process holistically. 
This theory can help us understand such diverse traits in ASCs as an increased cocktail-
party deafness, that is, a reduced ability in separating one’s speech as ‘figure’ from the ‘ground’ 
of sensations, an extraordinary hyper- and hyposensitivity to sounds and smells or their joyfully 
embraced skill in solving visuospatial puzzles, such as assembling a large picture from small 
building blocks (Plaisted et al. 2003). This latter skill is represented in one of the symbols of the 
autism advocacy/awareness movement as a coloured jigsaw puzzle piece, or a multi-coloured 
assembly of several pieces, implying a need to acknowledge neurodiversity and drawing attention 
to the strengths of minds with a sharp eye for detail.  
As investigations into visuospatial and auditory processing progressed, researchers have 
noted some difficulties with determining whether performance differences were caused by 
executive dysfunction or detail-oriented bias (Booth et al. 2003). Alternative accounts have been 
offered, including the “hierarchization deficit model” or “cortical underconnectivity theory” 
(Kumar 2013). At this stage, we still have no decisive evidence in favour of detail-focused 
processing as the ultimate core deficit, and researchers of autistic cognition are yet to agree upon 
a common model or theory for how this cognitive style manifests itself on the neural level. Even 
Happé and Frith (2006) argue that executive functioning and detail-oriented processing are not 
reducible to one another, and autistic social deficits are not wholly explainable by this theory. 
For scholars dealing with autism in the humanities, especially those who follow the current 
issues in gender studies or literary theory, the most powerful(ly contested) evidence towards 
autistic cognitive difference comes from research done on the psychological construct known as 
Theory of Mind (or ToM), and its hypothetical module (postulated by Alan Leslie 1992; 2000), the 
- 51 - 
ToM-mechanism (or ToMM). Briefly stated, ToM denotes the human mind’s ability to employ 
the intentional stance (Dennett 1989) towards other humans and living beings, treating them as 
having beliefs, desires, goals, agency and mental content. When the intentional stance is projected 
onto non-sentient objects, like dolls or props, we enter the realm of pretence, make-believe and 
ultimately, fiction. ToM is thought to harness several modular components of the brain, such as 
the Intentionality Detector, the Eye-direction Detector and the Shared Attention Mechanism 
(Baron-Cohen 1995) to facilitate understanding other minds in the real world. Inspired by Dennett 
(1978), Baron-Cohen and other researchers seek validation for this theory in the performance of 
people with autism on so-called false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). The task in its 
classical form involves the experimenters playing a scenario out with dolls. In this scene, one of 
the dolls, Sally, is being deceived by another one, Anne: after playing, Sally puts a toy back in its 
place in a box and leaves the room, while her cheeky companion hides the toy in another box; 
when Sally comes back, the child is asked to name the place where Sally will go to look for the 
toy. Most neurotypical children by age 4-5 will invariably arrive at the correct solution of Sally 
looking inside the box where she put the toy, whereas most autists predominantly answer that she 
will look for the toy in the box where Anne hid it, unbeknownst to Sally. Psychologists argue that 
children who point at the actual location of the doll do not take into account the beliefs and thoughts 
other people have when interacting with the world at large. They connect emotional understanding 
in a real-world situation to autists’ performance on false belief tasks, claiming that every form of 
mind-attribution depends upon similar judgements. 
Although there can be no doubt that autists perform under the baseline of typical 
individuals in tests of ToM, it has to be mentioned that mind-reading ability varies greatly in 
typically developing children as well. Furthermore, investigators of individual differences find 
support for the related claims that linguistic ability is “causally related” to performances of false 
belief tasks and this performance, in turn, is causally related to the perception of the make-believe 
status of children’s play and the preconditions necessary for entertaining make-believe activities, 
“joint plans and role assignment” (Astington 2003, 28). Observing typically developing children 
also problematises the connection between emotional understanding and FBTs. As Astington 
summarises, “studies showed that empathy, popularity, aggression, and frequency of pretend play 
were not related to false-belief understanding” (2003, 27). Tager-Flusberg has been prominent 
among researchers who sought to determine the correlation between ToM as measured in the lab 
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and the actual social impairments of autists. She, too, highlights linguistic ability as a predictor of 
social and communicative success, and she conducted research on several ToM-dependent tasks, 
including pretence, how people understand lies and jokes, intention-detection based on personality 
traits and other tests, as well as the discursive performances of autists in tests mimicking everyday 
social situations. With her colleagues, they were “able to demonstrate links between theory of 
mind and social and communicative impairments in autism that were independent of IQ or 
language level” (Tager-Flusberg 2003, 208). Such experiments are using more varied test batteries 
these days, only a segment of which are false belief tasks, since FBTs suffer from ceiling effects 
and cannot adequately measure ToM development in the later stages of childhood. Moreover, there 
is a segment of the autistic population which is able to ‘pass’ the test using compensatory, reality-
based strategies, so FBTs do not necessarily measure potential ToM deficits well.  
There is a growing need for more ingenious ways of measuring sociocognitive competence. 
Reading the mind in the eyes is one example, a test in which people have to correctly identify 
universal expressions of emotions from the photographed eyes of a person (Baron-Cohen 1997, 
2001). Reading and interpreting strange stories is another, where the meaning of the protagonists’ 
actions hinges on whether the person is talking literally or figuratively (Happé 1994). Studies have 
been conducted where subjects watched films with similar content, also used in the study of typical 
children (Devine and Hughes 2013), or identified whether a person has committed a social faux 
pas (Baron-Cohen et al. 1999). These tasks ingeniously test whether the social significance of 
particular actions are evaluated with the help of linguistic reasoning or utilising genuine social 
perspective-taking (Lind and Bowler 2009), a major improvement upon simpler FBTs.  
One big problem that still has to be resolved is that the well-structured tasks in a controlled 
laboratory environment often feature stimuli that are more easily attended to by ASC people, with 
few distractions. Therefore task performance usually does not mimic performance in a more 
naturalistic setting, while collecting data in observational studies in an everyday setting is time- 
and labour-consuming, and it requires more investigators for intercoder reliability of observed 
behaviour (Drain and Engelhardt 2013, Pegoraro et al. 2014). At present, the observation of 
behaviour is essential to the diagnosis of autism, which shows the importance of individual 
assessment on one hand, and the need for more objective standards of diagnosis with more accurate 
knowledge about the nature and extent of ToM-related sociocognitive difficulties on the other. 
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CHAPTER 4 
AUTISM AS DISABILITY: CRITICAL STUDIES OF THE CONDITION 
 
“rememberance might no patient mind unstrange  
learn(nor could all earth’s rotting scholars guess  
that life shall not for living find the rule)” 
- E. E. Cummings, “conceive a man,should he have anything” (1991, 420) 
 
As I discussed in earlier chapters of this work, scientific results, theories, hypotheses and 
constructs are always embedded in a social, historical and institutional context, which in our case 
is the latter two-thirds of the 20th century and the fifteen years of the new millennium. The 
affluence of the middle classes, the establishment and threats to the nuclear family, the changing 
psychological vogues or the increasing technicisation of life resulted in the appearance of 
particular conceptions of autism as Western nation states have attempted to shore up social 
institutions which were shaken up by the appearance of the diagnostic category of autism. The 
framework I have found the most efficient in uncovering the social matrix of autism is offered by 
a historicised, critical approach to psychiatric power. In this segment, I outline some of the cultural 
conditions that enable us to regard autism as a distinct psychological condition, with special 
attention paid to the interaction between subjectivity and literary modernism.  
Sketching the effects of medical categorisation, I pursue a line of thought that flows from 
Georges Canguilhem through Foucault to Eva Vakirtzi, who has conducted a thorough genealogy 
and archaeology of the discursive practices that brought autism into being. I am interested in 
bringing this knowledge into play because autism research and advocacy movements often clash 
on the subject of what constitutes expert opinion, and since the role and power of experts are 
invoked in Speed of Dark and House Rules in juridico-medical contexts. As such, this section is 
also a part of my theory of context, which will tie into a later section about narratological 
investigations concerning ‘unreadable minds’ and the ethics of interpreting them. Furthermore, I 
tackle the vexed question of how life-writing interacts with autism fiction through the clinical 
response to Temple Grandin’s first book and attributions of authorship to non-verbal autists based 
on spurious techniques of eliciting written material, called Facilitated Communication and the 
Rapid Prompting Method. Although discussing these ‘therapeutic’ modalities or autobiographies 
might appear out of place in a dissertation on what is, in effect, a thesis on published literary and 
therefore fictional works, I would assert that the two sister genres to autism fiction provide the 
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literary scholar with an important lesson about the authenticity of an autism-related literary text. It 
also gives us interdisciplinary mirrors in which we can reflect upon the collaborative nature of the 
produced text. This reflexivity is essential in making sense of The Curious Incident, as Siobhan, 
Christopher’s special education teacher is instrumental in shaping the narrative into the book the 
reader is holding in their hands – Christopher frequently remarks that the manuscript has been 
changed due to Siobhan’s suggestions, which makes the finished product more conformant to 
neurotypical standards of literary expression. 
Majia Holmer Nadesan uses an overtly social constructionist approach that hews close to 
a biocultural understanding of autism in order to conceptualise the emergence of the diagnosis in 
the 1940s. She argues that the conditions of possibility for an autism diagnosis (and later, HFA or 
Asperger’s) are more historical and cultural in nature than the internalist account of scientific 
histories of autism would have us believe. She claims that autism was “unthinkable” (Nadesan 
2008, 84) in the nineteenth century, because psychiatry did not recognise children’s psychosis as 
a meaningful category at the time, and ‘developmental disorder’ as a category was only devised in 
the new century, when child psychiatry was established. The same goes for the larger spectrum of 
autism conditions, which now includes individuals who would have only appeared a bit eccentric 
or odd to earlier eras and eyes. She collects a number of practices that worked together to invite 
the creation of the new label: “the invention of intensive mothering, the standardization of 
(narrowly delineated) benchmarks of developmental normality, and widespread pediatric 
surveillance of very young children” (Nadesan 2008, 84). She sees that the newfound fascination 
with autism correlates with the belief that Asperger’s ‘little professors’ are skilled geeks and excel 
in programming computers, the iconic device that produced the new condition of knowledge we 
call late modernism or postmodernism (Lyotard 1984).  
When she addresses to relationship between schizophrenia and the coinage of ‘autism,’ 
Nadesan notes that Bleuler and Freud’s influence “engendered the assumption that autism was 
characterized by aloneness, solipsism, and a turning away from the social world, resulting in a 
failure to develop a ‘normal’ ego” (2008, 87). Of course, normality itself is a culturally shaped 
expression of disciplinary power to attain an idealised state of invoking no opprobrium. Normality 
had to be conceptualised in terms that allow the separation of those who need assistance by the 
state to function (and thereby incur extra costs on it) and those who are independent (Canguilhem 
1991 [1978], Foucault 2006, 39-62 and 201-232). As Waltraud reminds us, this is especially true 
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of abnormal psychology, which deals with people who are judged to be atypical and may not have 
developed a ‘normal ego’ in the sense described by Nadesan: “The normal and normativity are 
therefore intrinsically linked in the sense that the concept of the ‘normal’ always implies a moral 
code that sets a normative standard; medical norms are both the result and the cause of social 
norms” (Waltraud 2006, 7). Nadesan also suggests that the prominence of HFA/AS people in our 
cultural representations resonate with our anxieties about technology and the crisis of masculinity, 
a topic picked up by Stuart Murray, too (Nadesan 2008, 88; Murray 2008, 139-167). 
The problem of temporality, of why has autism been discovered at a particular historical 
moment drives the investigation of Patrick McDonagh as well. His starting point is the work of 
Uta Frith, who looked for autism in reports about natural fools, idiots and eccentrics and found 
historical cases of people who would be labelled autists today. Describing such excavations in the 
prehistory of mental health and applying the term ‘autism’ to these people to be a “conceptual 
anachronism” (McDonagh 2008, 100), he focuses instead on modernist art and modern subjectivity 
as intellectual stepping stones to the construction of the autistic self.  
Methodically going through Asperger’s and Kanner’s papers, he remarks that the 
originality of expression, the innovative linguistic idiosyncrasies and the children’s egocentricity 
were also held to be characteristics of modern subjectivity and literary experimentation. He 
observes that “the discontinuities of the modern world threaten [ontological] security, displacing 
it with a sense of existential anxiety, which is characterized in part by a sense of isolation from 
other people [… that] become[s] the norm” (McDonagh 2008, 108). Governmentality is not the 
only force that affects this newfound subjectivity in radically new, invasive, statistical and medical 
ways – he locates another force in the interests of modernist writers like Joyce, Pound or Eliot, 
who are experimenting with idiosyncratic language and automatic writing. He asserts that aesthetic 
modernism “created a new perceptual framework” (McDonagh 2008, 113) for an odd, alienated 
subjectivity to emerge, which needs its own rituals to organise its rhythm of life, expressed in a 
language shunning the shared pragmatic means and forms, and this figure of modern life proved 
conducive to the scientific recognition of autism. Kristina Chew adds that when she analyses 
autistic poetry, the poetic tools of metaphor and metonymy provide a way to appreciate the 
differences between two forms of cognition: 
 
This intrinsic functioning of metaphors in both our linguistic and general 
understanding further attests to how an autistic person’s experience of language and of 
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the world of senses and stimuli as a whole is fundamentally different from that of 
neurotypicals because theirs is a metonymic rather than a metaphorical cosmos. (Chew 
2008, 140) 
 
In her view, the associative style in autistic poetry is a product of a metonymic vocabulary 
that is far more arbitrary (in the Saussurean sense), a private language where signifiers are attached 
to signified concepts that are often markedly different from their conventional meanings, based on 
the contingencies observed by each person on the spectrum. Although this “fractioned idiom” 
(Chew 2008, 142) is there in their everyday language use, autobiographical poetry has been the 
most prominent method to prove that autistic subjectivity has profound depths (but caveat lector: 
some of the artists whose utterances she analyses (Tito Mukhopadhyay and Larry Bissonnette) 
were likely produced by facilitated communication, thus their authorship is questionable). 
Eva Vakirtzi’s PhD dissertation has been irreplaceable to me in understanding the power 
relations that constitute autistic subjectivity in the disciplinary edifice of modern governments. 
The institutions she scrutinises are numerous and varied, from paediatrics, child psychology and 
psychiatry, through the APA and its magisterial tome, the DSM to schools offering remedial 
education and beyond, to a wider societal governmentality which embeds atypical children in an 
apparatus that ill serves their needs. She identifies the medicalising model as a homogenising 
discourse that erases individual differences in order to see autistic children as a separate kind. She 
contrasts this attitude with a heterogeneous view of poststructuralist thought (Vakirtzi 2010, 13-
15) that would do more than just pay lip service to the oft-repeated phrase, attributed to Stephen 
M. Shore: “If you meet one person with autism, you've met one person with autism” (n. d., n. p.).  
Ian Hacking is a philosopher of science who investigates kind-making as a human activity. 
In the construction of new classes of objects and subject positions, he distinguished between 
indifferent kinds, those sets whose elements have the same properties regardless of their categorical 
status, and interactive kinds, classifications that affect how its objects behave in the world 
(Hacking 1999, 104-109). He brings autism up as an example of an interactive kind, since children 
who are diagnosed as autists are treated differently then, say, if they were seen as merely eccentric 
or feeble-minded, and the classification of autism has important consequences for the family, 
because they might understand previously puzzling behaviour in a new light, while the children 
themselves can begin to understand the chaotic, disciplinary order of the NT world they live in. 
But Hacking also argues, along with a growing number of clinicians (Waterhouse 2013), that 
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autism need not be one single genetic or neuropsychological entity, and there could be a plurality 
of interactions among different subsystems of the human mind that express themselves in the 
behavioural symptoms of what we call autism today. He suggests that the underlying “pathology 
P,” if ever found, would be an indifferent kind, while the autistic adults and children who would 
be classified with the up-to-date version of autism would still belong in an interactive kind. 
Vakirtzi, in proper Foucauldian fashion, reminds us that interactive kinds are formed discursively, 
and autism is established in the discursive act of the DSM with the intent of normalising the 
subjects who exhibit behaviour associated with the still hazily defined pathology P (and P1, P2, 
…). In her view, the disciplinary power of the medico-juridical discourse of a diagnosis seeks to 
strip people with autism of their condition by subjecting the newly rendered patient to a regime of 
interventions designed to educate them into normalcy. This is also beneficial in the eyes of the 
government, the economy and the family unit; writing about the era when psychiatric power took 
hold of its first child patients, she observes: “We understand from the articles of the period, that 
the assistance offered to the idiot and retarded children through ‘education’, had as its major aim 
to releas[e] parents from taking care of their children so as to put them on the labour market; [t]he 
creation of the asylum had the same concern” (Vakirtzi 2010, 54). In a society which puts a 
premium on economically appearing productivity as the ultimate prosocial action, people who do 
not conform to the ideal of the efficient, affluent, consuming worker due to their unique cognitive 
range of abilities and difficulties can expect to be stigmatised and disciplined through educational 
and psychiatric power in order to approximate said ideal to the best of their abilities. 
Vakirtzi’s archaeological investigation of the DSM as a discursive event is focused on 
psychiatry’s claim to legitimacy as a proper science, which can identify indifferent, natural kinds 
in humans, an ongoing project that originated in the 19th century. She argues that the theoretical 
rigour of the discipline was rooted in the creation of nosology, more and more sophisticated 
classificatory systems in which the symptoms of the patients were grouped into disease entities, 
hopefully with a single determining cause. In Vakirtzi’s assessment, the “main achievement” of 
Kraepelin’s pioneering work in nosology was “the domination of a somatic-biological perspective 
and the marginalization of any biographical, psychological and socio-cultural perspectives” (2010, 
60). In other words, the new system situates mental illness within a body without a subject, who 
is classified not due to the improvement of the quality of care they receive, but due to societal and 
governmental needs to efficiently manage populations.  
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Mayes and Horwitz, however, note that when the first two editions of the DSM were 
published, the manual was written in a psychodynamic (which is to say, psychoanalytical) view of 
mental health, and therefore “[t]he DSM-I and DSM-II made little effort to provide elaborate 
classification schemes, because overt symptoms did not reveal disease entities but disguised 
underlying conflicts that could not be expressed directly” (Mayes and Horowitz 2005, 250). 
Concurring with Wilson (1993), they recognise the DSM-III as a paradigm shift in the practice of 
psychiatry from a porous boundary between the normal and the abnormal to a stricter scheme of 
medical, research-based diagnosis, which was hailed as a victory for science against the authority 
of their former colleagues, based on facts instead of theories. The shift to the empirical, objective 
mode also entailed the objectification of the diagnosed patient, where taking people’s anamnesis 
is only necessary to establish their place in the diagnostic scheme, erasing the individual’s history 
that shaped them into the person they are at the moment they enter the clinician’s door.  
Vakirtzi stops at DSM-IV-TR, as the DSM-5 will not be published for another three years. 
She assesses the revised edition as a “conservative” attempt to “preserv[e] the status quo of 
empirical research,” consolidating the major changes brought by the DSM-III (Vakirtzi 2010, 62). 
One important point she could not have anticipated was the act of fiat by which autisms were 
lumped together as ASDs in the new DSM-5, simultaneously with the inclusion of self-defined 
‘identity’ and identity narratives as valid aids to clinical description is personality disorders (but 
not in neurodevelopmental disorders: Schmeck et al. 2013). So, at the same time identity and self-
perception becomes a defining factor in clinical descriptions, people who were diagnosed with any 
of the subtypes of autism (e.g. Asperger’s, PDD-NOS) might lose less stigmatising scientific labels 
for their identity in a discursive act that prioritises medical specificity over sensitivity, which could 
result in a loss of services for individuals labelled autistic under DSM-IV but not under DSM-5 
(Lai et al. 2013). On one level, more precise specificity can be understood as a form of covert cost-
cutting, since the DSM has always played a part in governing social policy, while on another level, 
a decreased sensitivity also means that people who are subclinically autistic (as of DSM-5) are no 
longer subject to psychiatric power and deemed ‘normal’ from the juridico-medical perspective, 
at the cost of being denied services which they might potentially need for ideal development. 
Vakirtzi’s genealogical lens extends to a construction of normalcy that is embedded in the 
productive ethos of a neoliberal society. Using Marie Crowe’s constructionist analysis of normalcy 
(Crowe 2000), she identifies autistic symptoms as impairing the skills “essential for an 
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economically productive person; thus they can constitute a disorder” (Vakirtzi 2010, 70). 
Productivity, unitariness of the self, moderation and rationality are all seen as hallmarks of a 
healthy person in society (Crowe 2000), and the impairments that define autism currently add up 
to “a significant failure of the individual to comply with social and cultural disciplinary modes” 
(Vakirtzi 2010, 71). Normalisation is thus the goal of clinical observation and treatment, a medical 
surveillance technique that is used to coercive ends as it excludes the individual from the state of 
normalcy. It pathologises them as unreasonable, then it homogenises the stigmatised group to 
erode personal histories and perspectives on their relationship to power so that they can ensure 
their corporeal and mental docility. In this reading, the abnormality of autism is located in the 
individual’s genes or brain as a result of a biological fault or a lack of moral/personal responsibility 
(either the individual’s or their parents’) in order to sustain the corrective apparatus of 
governmentality as a legitimate exercise of power. Environmental or societal causes, which are 
harder to remedy and may clash with institutional or economic interests, are downplayed. To take 
an example that shall resonate with our later investigation of cognitive criticism’s claims, one 
dominant view of the deficits of autistic cognition is the ToM-deficit explanation. And yet, if we 
interpret ToM as an ability that is innate, but one that develops in every child in a broader 
psychosocial context of infant and childhood attachment that primes the mind for intersubjectivity, 
and is therefore improvable as a social practice of mind (Gallagher 2001), then this subjectivity 
can be nourished without the disciplinary truth statements that define autistic difference as lack, 
which hinders the performance of those labelled ‘mindblind’ as a result. 
Mindblindness, however, is a powerful metaphor, one that has implications beyond 
scientific conceptions of neurological impairment. It links cognitive disability with a perceptual 
one, weaving autists twice into the fabric of disability, conjuring up a striking image of helpless 
people who have lost one of their senses. It further suggests that autists are somehow devoid of or 
deficient in empathy, a concept that has been scrutinised by rhetoricians (Jurecic 2006) and 
scholars in the medical humanities (Dinishak and Akhtar 2013), only to find it severely wanting. 
The most withering critique came from disability studies. John Duffy and Rebecca Horner 
summarise their review of scientific ToM narratives by saying: “while ToM literature purports to 
explain autism, it ultimately attenuates the humanity of autistic people by representing autistics as 
evolutionary deviant, hypothetical beings, and, ultimately, as tragic figures. The result is a 
novelistic, poetically intensified account of sadness — we call this a rhetoric of scientific sadness 
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— in which autistic people are mourned even as they are apparently explained” (Duffy and Horner 
2011, 202). One needs to take this with a pinch of salt, but every scholar working with autism has 
to note the high stakes involved in the characterisation of the autistic mind as ‘blind’ in some sense.  
Take the image of mindblindness seriously, and you end up seeing an entire population 
unable to navigate the social world, completely at the mercy of cunning fellows who take 
advantage of the powerless wherever they see them, and more caring people, who can exercise 
benevolent agency and defend them by speaking/caring for others who cannot or will not do it for 
themselves. Conversely, should we refuse to acknowledge the profound difficulties the majority 
of autists have in managing social information, and opt for a utopian reconceptualisation of the 
condition instead, we run the risk of establishing an idealised ‘autism’ as an aesthetic category that 
can be speculatively applied to works which are not the products of either diagnosed ASC artists 
or NT artists explicitly dealing with autism. 
The standard clinical account of autism, as outlined in the previous section, has undergone 
substantial development from its association with schizophrenia to its ‘full bloom’ of a spectrum 
of different diagnoses, a high-profile neurological condition that resonates well with the emerging 
cultural ethos of information technology, new forms of virtual sociality and the neuroscientific 
turn. The clinical picture, although fairly nuanced, is heavily invested in the pathologisation and 
treatment of autism, sometimes with little regard to the lived experiences of those affected, or to 
the consequences of curing away a ‘form of life,’ the autistic life. Seeing autism not just as a 
disorder but as a disability within a cultural context is essential to make sense of the rich internal 
life that has been reported in autobiographies. The establishment of disability studies was a 
watershed moment in conceptualising a whole host of issues previously analysed under the aegis 
of histories of science and medicine, medical humanities, academic feminism and gender studies, 
or critical psychological and anti-psychiatric writings. Today, the large body of papers given, the 
wealth of books and articles published on the subject are a clear sign that disabilities have inspired 
academia to muster a spirited defence of the disabled ways of life and cultural artefacts.  
One of the foundational differentiations that made disability a legitimate subject of inquiry 
is the distinction between impairments, the congenital, developmental or acquired biological 
changes within a human being that compromise some adaptive function of the mind-body and 
disabilities, the institutional, sociocultural environment that stigmatises and hinders the agency of 
the disabled. Presumably, focusing on the cultural environment allows critical theorists to target 
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specific social practices which can be reformed to better serve the flourishing of the disabled and 
create new socio-political opportunities for them. Another important gesture is the separation of 
the two models of thinking about disability: the medicalising and the social model of disability. 
The social model “defines disability as a social creation—a relationship between people with 
impairment and a disabling society—the [medicalising model] defines disability in terms of 
individual deficit,” and it is said to “reduce the complex problems of disabled people to issues of 
medical prevention, cure or rehabilitation. Social model thinking mandates barrier removal, anti-
discrimination legislation, independent living and other responses to social oppression” 
(Shakespeare 2006, 198-199). Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell recognise that “the limitations 
of a medical model that early disability studies references may itself have little relation to actual 
practitioners of medicine. Instead, concepts of a ‘medical model’ refer to the social premise, 
frequently held outside of medicine, that disability requires referral to the purview of medical 
practitioners” (in Turner and Stagg 2006, 182). This is also the reason why I keep referring to the 
‘reactionary’ model with the ‘-ising’ extension. Simon Baron-Cohen, clearly a representative of 
the medical establishment, has been the one to advocate changing the name of ASDs to ASCs, 
conditions rather than disorders, in the hope of raising awareness about the different abilities of 
autists. Medical practitioners working with autists are careful to maintain a respectful, humanistic 
tone in their writings and speech when addressing neurological diversity and their own work.  
Traditionally, disability studies have been preoccupied with physical disabilities, which 
might owe something to the underrepresentation of cognitive disability in academic circles and the 
anxieties about speaking in the name of someone else (Bérubé 2010). In recent years, however, 
the field has shifted gears and is now much more eager to acknowledge the plight of intellectually 
disabled people (as well as the intriguing theoretical complications that arise from the more 
inclusive focus). A conceptual division similar to the medical and the social model occurred within 
disability scholarship on autism. Contesting the clinical description, in which autism is defined as 
a set of deficits vis-à-vis an agreed-upon norm, academics in psychology and the humanities have 
proposed an alternative model that emphasises the cognitive strengths of autists (Greenspan and 
Wieder 1999, Stevenson and Gernsbach 2013, Baron-Cohen 2004, Sarrett 2012, Broderick 2011). 
The strengths-based model is seen as a rehumanisation of autists, all the more necessary because 
the main discourse in which they are embedded is the ‘lack of theory of mind’ discourse that, at 
its extremes, strips them of their humanity (Haldane and Crawford 2010, Yergeau 2013).  
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Although the strengths-based model is intended as a positive, life-affirmative 
counterdiscourse to the deficit model, for many a parent, the change in the discourse is fraught 
with danger because the medical and state professionals who are tasked with deciding whether to 
aid their family because of their autism make decisions which boil down to judgements of ability 
and the need for supported living. One mother and autism blogger writes that adopting the 
strengths-based model as the dominant discourse a.) is risky because it celebrates only those who 
live life on the higher-functioning end of the spectrum, excluding those for whom autism is a day-
to-day struggle even before society labels them, and b.) can occlude the need for assistance and 
medical treatments, which incur a substantial cost on the families, and c.) may also cause problems 
in the development of life skills. She notes that by using such positive terminology  
 
we would seem to be reinforcing the all-too-common view that it’s just a condition in 
the minds of un-accepting and attention-demanding parents, and of money-hungry 
psychiatrists who like inventing conditions so they and ‘Big Pharma’ can get their pay 
check for helping children who have nothing particularly ‘wrong’ with them. (“Pitfalls 
of a Strengths-Based…”, n.p.) 
 
 Naturally, seeing a person as just a bundle of deficits is a crude reduction of humanity into 
a handful of symptoms, producing a damaging discourse, but the social conversation on autism 
needs to be framed in terms which best serve the flourishing of autists. This will likely be a way 
of talking which focuses on areas of potential development without denying the hardships 
experienced by autistic people, a view which acknowledges the social stigmas and the humiliating 
institutional practices but also recognises the biological and behavioural expressions of 
neurological difference, as well as the heterogeneity of the autistic human condition. 
One candidate for capturing this amalgamated, biocultural perspective on autism is the 
discourse of neurodiversity. Coined in an analogy to the concept of biodiversity, neurodiversity 
first emerged in discussions of autism and was later extended to other psychological conditions, 
such as ADHD, Tourette’s, bipolar disorder, epilepsy, etc. It seeks the acceptance of cognitive 
difference by pointing out that there is great natural variation in the neurological constitution of 
human minds and, consequently, that autism spectrum and other conditions are in fact not 
pathological or disabling, but just variations which enrich humankind with original insights 
(Sinclair 2012 [1993], Singer 1999). Moreover, neurodiversity activists see this as a question of 
human rights, as a struggle for political representation and visibility in a larger culture that 
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oppresses neurominorities and renders them faulty subjects, in need of correction or cure (Fenton 
and Krahn 2007). Neurodiversity scholarship’s main goal is to reconceptualise the basic category 
of ‘functionality,’ used in psychology to determine the level and type of life competences needed 
to survive in the social and institutional environment of modern society. As Fenton and Krahn 
observe, the current definitions of functionality are based on an evolutionary conception of 
adaptation, in a very normative notion of what fitness for life is. They propose that, instead of 
independent living, we should adopt a sense of ‘functionality’ as a means of human flourishing, 
rooted in personal perceptions of being a capable agent, of being recognised as a valuable member 
of society. The parallel of neuro- and biodiversity surfaces in their description:  
 
[flourishing is to be understood] in the loosely biological sense of an animal faring 
well (broadly construed to include an animal’s psychological state over time). This 
nicely connects flourishing with biological (qua psychological) functionality, though 
in a way that does not require fitness conferring capacities. This is an important feature 
of such a sense of functionality as it allows many of us currently described as normal 
to qualify as functional even though we posses traits that are not strictly-speaking 
fitness conferring (e.g., poor eyesight[, etc.]). (Fenton and Krahn 2007, 2-3)  
 
Letting go of fitness-conferring capacities is necessary because that sense of functionality 
hierarchises people according to their daily living skills. It excludes ‘low-functioning’ autists from 
full access to the fruits of civilised life, since the present state of society is “not conducive to the 
full expression of capacities possessed by those described as neurologically impaired” (2), so it is 
unfair to test people according to that set of criteria about what counts as dysfunctional behaviours. 
The authors argue that, instead of recognising our interdependence on one another, our societies 
codify independence as the essential, ideal state of existence. That normative act relies on our 
(perhaps too narrow) notions of adaptive and maladaptive behaviours and ‘fitness’ as a source of 
human flourishing (which evokes the terminology of evolutionary biology). 
Jaarsma and Welin (2012) have separated two aspects of the neurodiversity claim: 1.) that 
autism (or HFA) is not a disability but a naturally-occurring variation of the human mind and 2.) 
that the condition is not just natural, but valuable, and autistic people should be granted their proper 
rights. From the second aspect, it follows 3.) that their culture should be acknowledged by the 
neuromajority. That would also mean emphasising independent living and agency instead of 
support, which could be perceived as humiliating. The authors have also distinguished between 
‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ versions of neurodiversity, where the broad definition extends to the whole 
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of the spectrum, while the narrow conception of neurodiversity would only claim independent 
culture without care for high-functioning individuals. As they write, a paradox arises when the 
social efficacy of the claim to neurodiversity is examined in the context of the full spectrum:  
 
If neurodiversity is accepted by society as a special culture, the autists that need care 
may face a hard time getting it, because their state of being will be regarded as just a 
natural variation. The high-functioning autists that do not need care live happily in the 
knowledge that they are freed from the burden of having a deficit and may have a better 
life with non-interference. But it may not be so good for low-functioning autists or 
even high-functioning autists that do need care. Acceptance does not ‘cure’ 
difficulties with social relationships, social communication, rigidity and sensory 
issues. On the other hand if neurodiversity is not accepted by society as a separate 
culture, high-functioning autists will still suffer the stigma of having a deficit, even if 
some of them do not need special care and support. (Jaarsma and Welin 2012, 27, 
emphasis in original) 
 
They propose that using vulnerability as a unifying, egalitarian condition of humankind 
leads to a discourse characterised less by pity and more by communal responsibilities to care for 
one another. They regard differences in vulnerability as an opportunity to support the narrow 
conception of neurodiversity, but remark that LFA “may rightly be viewed as a disability” (28). 
Because able autists can lead independent lives, they see that the disability factor in autism “is 
always, at least partially, socially constructed disability” (28). To my mind, only accepting the 
narrow neurodiversity claim is risky but useful. Risky because the spectral nature of the condition 
generates many threshold cases, where the diagnostician’s judgement has an even greater 
consequence for services provided to autistic individuals, but useful for the development of a 
culture of able autists, who become advocates for the societal acceptance of the whole spectrum. 
The neurodiversity movement has started the struggle to show that neurological difference can be 
embedded in a social environment which actively “foster[s] equality without sameness” (Bumiller 
2008), and their writings have contributed to a better understanding of the lives of autists. 
In its most radical form, Simon Cushing tells us that we keep using that word, ‘autism’ as 
a collective term, but he does not think it means we think it does. For him, ‘autism’ is a problematic 
paradigm, forging the condition into a uniform whole that is deceiving. In his reading of the 
scientific literature, research proves that there is no one thing that could be labelled autism, and 
the concept is used not so much for acquiring new knowledge about the condition, but to help 
secure research grants and set up (potentially false) expectations about people known as autists 
- 65 - 
today (see Anderson and Cushing 2013, 17-46). Despite some valid philosophical scepticism, Ian 
Hacking’s view about the correlation of autism diagnoses and an underlying neurobiological 
profile feels immediately more useful in the project of recognising neurodiversity. He writes: “We 
need not argue that nearly all children diagnosed with autism today have exactly one and the same 
biological disorder. We need only hold possible that there are a few (possibly just one) basic 
fundamental biological disorders that produce the symptoms currently classified as autistic” (1999, 
116). Since I will be working with fictional autistic characters, written by NT writers rather than 
real people, I acknowledge the difficulties contemporary nominalists see in defining autism. Still, 
I shall pragmatically keep using the term that conjures up the fascination which inspired writers to 
create memorable characters like Lou Arrendale or Jessica Fontaine, whose atypical perceptions 
of the storyworld are the main draw of autism novels. 
In the next section, I will pay closer attention to a topic that approaches the boundaries of 
the literary: the problem of autistic authorship. Because novels like The Curious Incident and 
House Rules feature autistic characters who are also active creatively (both Christopher and Jacob 
are writing, and Jessica plays the piano), and because the public profile of the condition was raised 
by life-writers on the spectrum, autistic authorship has been on the forefront in questions about the 
internal life, the psychic richness of people who live with autism. Especially in the case of the 
early autobiographies, the authorship of several books have been questioned, and some disabling 
tactics have been utilised to invalidate all coherent self-narratives produced by autistic people 
because of their ToM impairment. In the vast majority of people who type independently, such 
scepticism about their observations and lived experiences has been allayed by critical qualitative 
research and a better understanding of the condition — few people today would question the 
authorship of independent typists on the autistic spectrum. And there are people like Tito 
Mukhopadhyay, whose creative work was elicited by rapid prompting (a method based on 
Facilitated Communication), who have been objected to scrutiny by the sceptical movement and 
disability scholars alike. Who is responsible for the utterances attributed to the non-verbal autist 
through FC? The result of rigorous inquiry into the method indicated that the authorship properly 
belonged to the facilitator rather than the autistic individual. I will be arguing that something 
similar occurs in NT writers penning novels, pretending to portray autistic people from the inside. 
However, unlike FC, fiction writers clearly present themselves as the authors of their own work, 
while facilitators ascribe the author function to the non-communicative person, purportedly 
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demonstrating that the person communicates with others, often at a level of linguistic ability 
incongruous with the severity of their condition. Fiction can empower autists by representing them 
as competent people without the farcical projection of said competence on non-verbal individuals, 
who would be best served by a therapeutic programme better suited to their needs. 
 
Writing Autistic Lives: The Personal, the Fraudulent and the Fictional 
 
Motto: “Having a self is not the exclusive privilege of those who write autobiographies.” 
– Marie-Laure Ryan (2010) 
 
The issue of authorship is never straightforward when NT and ASC people are working 
together to shape the way we talk about autism. When Margaret M. Scariano’s editorship of 
Temple Grandin’s first book was credited on the front cover, it was an honest acknowledgement 
of a genuine achievement in need of restructuring to conform to publishing standards (Grandin 
and Scariano 1986). However, the complex pathways of translation between Higashida Naoki, his 
mother (who helped him articulate the book), the rough translator Yoshida Keiko and her husband, 
David Mitchell in the production of the English publication of The Reason I Jump (2013) raises 
concerns about the many degrees of separation that could alter or falsify the author’s intent (if 
there was a genuine intent to begin with). In the case of Higashida’s book, we know that the 
original text was elicited by his mother using a Japanese alphabet grid (Fein and Kamio 2014). 
The method by which the writing was produced is suspiciously similar to the thoroughly 
discredited method of ‘communication,’ the so-called ‘facilitated communication’ technique.  
FC is a method that has been built on the commendable ideal of acknowledging 
interdependence in disability instead of forced independence, but with disastrous results. In this 
method, a facilitator ‘supports’ the hand of a person on the spectrum and ‘helps’ typing by 
supposedly picking up on the bodily cues of the their client so that they can decide which letter 
they ‘intend’ to write. Initially developed in Australia by Rosemary Crossley during the 1970s, it 
has been picked up by professor Douglas Biklen of Syracuse University. After a flurry of 
promising studies by its proponents in which facilitators were apparently successful in unleashing 
hidden communication potential in otherwise non-verbal autists, none of the earlier success was 
recaptured in carefully controlled tests at other research institutions (Jacobson et al 1995). Despite 
claims of independent communication, the facilitator establishes and remains in full bodily contact 
with the ‘supported’ person during the typing process.  
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The problem of authorship and independence has always been a vexed question in this 
method: just who is communicating, when sometimes the autistic person does not even look at the 
keyboard while typing? Proponents acknowledge that there is some prompting from the facilitator, 
but they start by assuming that autistic people possess unexpected literacy skills, and they 
steadfastly maintain that the people they work with eventually progress to independent typing 
(Biklen and Cardinal 1997). By contrast, the overwhelming majority of evidence in controlled 
experiments has come down to show no empirical support that the person with autism is the author 
of the utterances (Mostert 2001, 2010). The facilitator has been proven to initiate the typing 
behaviour by subconsciously influencing when their autistic client responds by pressing the letter 
on a keyboard or a printed letter board (Burgess et al 1998). For some disability scholars, the way 
the question of authorship is treated in the FC literature is less about the efficacy of the method 
than about what kind of an author is sought after, and what ideals of agency the two parties espouse.  
Nirmala Erevelles, for example, believes the discourse of FC proponents and detractors 
bespeaks of the crisis of the liberal humanist subject who is rational, autonomous and able to speak 
coherently. She suggests that critics of FC deny authorship to nonverbal autists, who are 
repositioned as co-authors with their facilitators, and instead of defending against criticism based 
on evidence, she would encourage Biklen and others to “expose the humanist construction of 
subjectivity as a fiction” (Erevelles 2005, 56), as if this were conclusively shown to be true. Her 
argument that FC users are only silenced because their voices are “resistant” to a certain 
construction of able-bodiedness (Erevelles 2005, 61) rather than because facilitators use their 
autistic clients as ventriloquists use their dummies is disingenuous. Although I am sympathetic to 
the promotion of interdependent lifestyles, Erevelles’ arguments are unconvincing since she does 
not consider the scientific evidence as anything other than a contest of Foucauldian truth-as-power. 
She uncritically accepts FC proponents’ claims to the communicative competence of nonverbal 
autists, and portrays advocates of FC as fighting a monolithic establishment that excludes 
nonverbal people. 
In clinical psychology, the authorship of autistic autobiographies proved to be contentious 
as well. An early example, “The Autobiographical Writings of Three Asperger Syndrome Adults: 
Problems of Interpretation and Implications for Theory” (Happé 1991) reads like a research paper 
in the humanities, and its title would not sound out of place in a journal of literary criticism. It 
deals with Grandin’s autobiographical essay and her first book, co-written with Margaret Scariano, 
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the letters of Barry, an American man with a penchant for correspondence and the autobiographical 
writings of a British man, David. Writing in the early 1990s, when autistic life-writing came as 
something of a shock to the reading public and still had novelty value, it is no surprise that Happé 
frames her text in the narrative of solving a puzzle: how come that a group of people thought so 
unreflexive before can express themselves articulately, in extended, more or less coherent stories? 
“What can we point to in their writings that deserves the label ‘autistic’? And what is it about even 
the most able patients that leads us to say autism is a handicap that one does not grow out of?” 
(207). She finds answers to their unique form of writing in relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 
1995 [1986]), a theory of communication that emphasises the importance of metarepresentations 
for successful social intercourse. The clinician discusses matters of style, composition, figurative 
language use and other qualities of linguistic expression that is of interest to literary studies. 
Reassuringly, Happé notes that “the first impression of Temple's book […] is one of great 
normality” (208). Soon enough, though, that great normality is qualified by Happé’s comment that 
what is left unsaid implies that this is no ordinary biography: she misses reminiscences about 
friends, family and would like to see more of Temple’s reflections about her own behaviour, which 
are omitted from the account. This observation and interpretative stance is understandable from 
the psychologist’s perspective, who looks for the juicy material of social interaction in the life-
writing of an able autistic individual. However, that almost deconstructionist curiosity about the 
absences in Temple’s text fades immediately as Happé dons her philologist hat and voices her 
concerns about the authenticity of the text:  
 
it was edited by Margaret Scariano, a children's writer, who rewrote sections of the 
book, gave it its flashback format and generally structured it to make it easier to read. 
This obviously presents us with problems, casting doubt on exactly those passages 
[about make-believe games and pranks] which are most interesting and challenging to 
our ideas about autism. […] but they are, sadly, undermined by the presence of a 
second, non-autistic author. (208)  
 
This sceptical attitude to authorship becomes one of Happé’s preoccupations, opting to 
discard the book as less authentic than Grandin’s unedited essay about her childhood: “It is a great 
shame that we cannot be sure of the authenticity of these accounts or of the degree of rewriting by 
the co-author. [… O]nly the work of the autistic writer alone can give us a reliable insight into 
autism,” she remarks (208). Happé approaches the unedited letters and autobiographical pieces 
with a naive realistic conception of life-writing, as if they were unmediated windows upon the 
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soul. There is also a palpable hesitation on her part to recalibrate received notions of autism in the 
face of evidence from personal narratives. It is illuminating to read her cautious statements about 
David’s work in this regard: “it is perhaps surprising that on reading the autobiography the most 
striking impression is of a man who is a little simple, but more importantly, is simply lonely, bored 
and depressed. Of course some social gaucheness shows through which in part accounts for his 
loneliness, but he shows a degree of social understanding not seen even in Temple’s edited work” 
(217). This comment serves as a bulwark against the wholesale acceptance of new evidence for 
social adaptability on the higher end of the spectrum. To her credit, Happé reads the autie-
biographies as achievements and speaks with admiration about the writers, but one can detect a 
hint of incredulity in this admiration.  
Her strategy for mitigating autistic creativity, self-reflexivity and the author function is to 
bring delayed echolalia, or ‘parroting’ in as an element that explains the more sophisticated 
passages in the autobiographies. And so, a great game of suspicious second-guessing begins. 
 
There is always the possibility that with autistic children and adults, who often seem 
to have such excellent rote memory for overheard material, some expression they use 
which may seem to show startling social skill is simply an echoed phrase remembered 
from a previous and similar context. In David’s work, and in all the writings considered 
here, it must be borne in mind that some instances of social insight may simply be 
copied or taught expressions. […] The possibility of parroting must, therefore, cause 
doubt on the significance of apparently insightful remarks such as “I read somewhere 
that certain tablets can destroy brain cells . . . Mind you, you can’t believe everything 
you read in the papers.” (219) 
 
The effect of Happé’s cautiousness is disabling. In an exact reverse of the case of 
Facilitated Communication, where eloquent speech, way beyond their years and mental 
capabilities is attributed to non-verbal autists, here we have a clinician who is unwilling to give 
able autistic people their own voices, because these utterances are judged to be too normal, too 
contrary to the prevailing psychological wisdom of the time. So Happé can never be sure that what 
she reads is a genuine remark of the writer, and she can negate this self-reflexive voice when it 
does not conform to her notion of essential social naivety in autism. 
Still, the sceptical attitude towards the content of the autobiographies has the desirable side-
effect of Happé shifting to the analysis of form, making use of relevance theory to provide new 
analytical foci. In addition to ‘parroting,’ a biased selection of the subject matter and the elision of 
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less memorable aspects of one’s life (what would simply be called the expression of personality in 
neurotypical autobiographies), Happé further identifies other hallmarks of ‘genuine’ autistic 
writing, such as exposition on a favourite topic, fragmented, incoherent vignettes of the writers’ 
lives and frequent digressions that seem to serve no function. She comments on the fits and starts 
of the life narratives she read, and the abrupt transitions as a function of the writers’ impaired 
empathetic and metacognitive abilities: “it is as if she fails to appreciate that her reader does not 
share the important background information that she possesses” (210), she writes of Grandin’s 
essay. The metonymic logic, hard to follow for the reader, is brought into play in conjunction with 
Barry’s letters, too: “The lack of awareness of what is private, as opposed to general, knowledge 
may also account for the apparently random flitting from subject to subject” (215).  
Happé explains these peculiar features as a result of a primary ToM deficit, manifested in 
intact language but diminished communicational skills. Their weak central coherence drives 
autistic attention to features of the world that appear irrelevant to their NT audience. Because of 
the potential difference in their memory structures, the minds of autists are likely to weigh 
information stored in their rote memory to be more important than the actual knowledge-frame of 
the present social exchange, which changes from conversation to conversation. Together, 
according to Happé, these characteristics constitute an essence of autistic self-expression, whose 
authenticity was in no small part the product of the strategies Happé used to defamiliarise autistic 
writing in an effort to aid diagnosis — after all, she is a clinician, and focusing on specific elements 
of communicative competence was a significant contribution to diagnostics.  
What distinguished this analysis from others was its methodological innovation: bringing 
in the tool-kit of literary analysis to develop a profile for the autism effect in the written output of 
people on the spectrum. “To do this,” Happé states, “I have applied the most stringent analysis – 
judging these writers by normal rather than handicapped standards. As can be seen, they come off 
very well, but I would suggest that what flaws their writings do show are significant” (239). I 
largely concur with her assessment, and I see the emancipating effort in the serious tone and the 
high standards Happé brought to these writings. Nonetheless, I cannot fail to see the problems with 
the caution Happé’s guesses of ‘parroting,’ her references to authenticity and editing causes. Like 
a suspicious critic, she takes nothing at face value, and often errs on the side of professional 
conservativism when she meets anomalous instances of autistic ability. In hindsight, the continued 
erosions of the power of autistic expressions appear quaint after a number of autobiographies were 
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published following the success of Grandin’s writings and her popularisation by Oliver Sacks. In 
the end, the editing process did not alter the reading public’s perception of Grandin’s able autism 
and her next book, Thinking in Pictures (1995) no longer needed a co-author to authenticate her 
experiences. Happé’s anxieties were unfounded, as the autobiographies have revealed an internal 
life that was previously unthinkable, and science shifted accordingly, thanks to her willingness to 
judge autistic writing candidly, both by its faults and its merits. 
For the study of autism fiction by neurotypical writers, the stories of Facilitated 
Communication and the clinical investigation of autobiographies supply different morals 
concerning authorship. The shared desire of the NT community to understand neurological 
difference created a climate where ‘inside’ stories of autism were lapped up to give the supporting 
families (and incidentally, the fledgling autistic community) hope and inspiration in a world that 
stigmatises autistic difference. But while FC effectively made facilitators unwitting ghost writers 
of non-verbal autists, overselling their abilities, able autistic autobiographies were initially 
scrutinised to tame the personal narratives that have challenged the accepted psychological picture. 
It is my suggestion that the dynamics of authorship in FC and in NT-authored novels of 
autism fiction share some similarities that are worth exploring. For a start, both discourses intend 
to give an accurate picture of atypical mental functioning. They acknowledge the difficulties 
autists have with conforming to neurotypical standards of expression. Authors step into the broken 
communicative chain as mediators translating between conversational partners. Both discourses 
rely on the strong interpretative capabilities of NT authors, speaking for the autistic subject and 
both produce an illusory effect of an autistic person narrating what goes on in their minds. 
But there are crucial differences about the ethics of these representations. For one, novels 
like Speed of Dark carry the name of the author on their front cover, and they are unambiguously 
labelled as fiction, books for entertainment, where writers are free to take some creative liberties 
with reality to narrate an exciting story. Practitioners of FC have no such excuses: they delegate 
the author function to the person whose hand or spelling implement they hold, they have the 
responsibility to represent the voices of actual individuals who might have entirely different 
thoughts and experiences than those communicated via facilitation. Readers bring a different 
horizon of expectations to a novel, where one can play fast and loose with reality without direct 
harm, than to a facilitator’s work, whose elicited responses give hope to families unwilling to 
accept the unique joys and challenges posed by educating an autistic child. In short, the politics of 
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representation demand different levels of accuracy in order to be counted as ‘authentic,’ and 
justifiably offer a far greater degree of imaginative latitude to writers. When Siobhan edits 
Christopher’s story in The Curious Incident, it is overtly stated so, with characteristic self-
reflexivity on the part of the writer, Mark Haddon, that facilitators seldom express (an exception 
is Boynton 2012’s mea culpa after her well-meaning complicity in a false accusation of sexual 
abuse made through FC). Despite the significant differences, the parallels of illusory authorship 
are important pieces in assessing the effect of autism fiction because neurotypical and autistic 
readers have been exposed to the scandal of FC in real life as well as stereotypical depictions of 
ASCs in fiction. They bring their knowledge about what modes and strategies of narration 
constitute the boundaries of ethically acceptable representations to their reading experience. 
We are on much firmer ground when talking about autistic autobiographies. Naturally, one 
requirement is that autobiographical narratives should issue only from the hand and mind of the 
autistic individual, where communicative intent and content is directly attributable to the author. 
Editing is a part and parcel of the publishing industry, but it should not involve the inclusion of 
additional material, as Happé worried about Grandin’s first book. It is necessary to resurrect 
Erevelles’ ‘humanist construction of subjectivity’ as a yardstick for authorship in the contested 
terrain of autism autobiographies, since all parties involved have a stake in representing autistic 
identity differently. We ought to prioritise evidence-based treatments and testimonies about the 
nature and extent of autistic ability, with the express hope that intervention tailored to the actual 
person would develop the full range of activity the individual is capable of, but without false 
expectations of mental age-discrepant abilities. Works like Grandin’s (1986, 1995), Stephen 
Shore’s (2003), John Elder Robison’s (2007) or Tim Page’s (2009) books have a strong authorial 
voice that challenged our knowledge of autism by honestly talking about the difficulties and the 
pleasures of autism and its membership by birthright in the grand community of humankind. 
Autistic autobiographies inform fiction writers and scholars of literature of the qualitative, 
embodied domain of autistic life, as accurate to the psyche as the media of the written word and 
the publishing industry allows. They speak of possible variants of the autistic experience and let 
neurotypical people walk a mile in the shoes of a neurominority. They practically provide building 
blocks for fictional characters in narratives of neuroatypicality, and when writers gather inspiration 
from these works, they know that they only represent a small subsection of possibilities. Moon and 
Picoult mention their correspondence with autistic individuals in the forewords to their novels 
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(Moon 2003, i, Picoult 2010, viii), while Morrall and Haddon have stated in interviews or other 
writings that their personal experiences with autistic individuals, as well as their literary 
antecedents have shaped how they wrote about the condition (Haddon 2009, Kean 2008). It might 
also be true that, as Haddon writes, “imagination trumps research” (Haddon 2009), a sour pill for 
disability scholars to swallow, but the enduring popularity of autism fiction suggests that 
autobiographies have shaped the reading public’s imagination – writers evoke popular tropes so 
that they can capture the Zeitgeist that elevated autism to international consciousness. 
These memoirs and recollections are part of a growing tradition that seeks new ways of 
talking about autism, outside the confines of the dour, deficit-oriented clinical discourse that 
stigmatises selves who do not conform to the normative ideals of mental functioning. The 
dynamics of authorship differ in autism fiction and autobiographies precisely because the NT 
authors have to exert themselves in thinking in a neurocosmopolitan fashion about ASC adults and 
adolescents, and their goal is to expand the empathetic boundaries across neurotypes. 
Autobiographies do remain our most immediate resources to date, but fiction should not be 
discredited, because these works offer the polyphonic chorus of neurotypical and autistic voices, 
dedicated to the dramatic juxtaposition of differences in a way few autobiographies do. The shifts 
in focalisation forcefully create an empathetic effect, capable of conquering our emotional bias 
towards our own kind (Harrison 2011) without sacrificing what makes literary characters 
endearing to us: their roundedness and vulnerability, their all-too-human imperfection. 
Autobiographies have to remain true to the lived experiences of the individual, selecting 
the more salient and illustrative memories that have shaped the person to the day of the writing. 
Literary works of art co-opt and/or simulate this representational strategy, endowing fictional 
people with a genuine personality for the illusion of personhood, but its authors are liberated from 
the confines of first-hand experience. With this freedom, they can thematise problems, clashes, 
and conflicts that allow readers a multifocal perspective on the dilemmas presented, whether it is 
a parable about the neuropolitics of employment (Moon), gender roles and agency (Morrall), the 
struggle for authorship itself (Haddon) or the legal recognition of neurological difference (Picoult) 
in a focused way that the autobiographies eschew. To put it more emphatically: autobiographies 
are more coherently focalised, exercise stricter mimetic controls and their structure remains more 
author-centred, while fictional takes on autism are thematically focalised, the mimetic barrier can 
be lifted to a greater degree and the narrative design is more audience-centred as it addresses the 
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wider, symbolic, societal anxieties about autism that the autobiographies seldom comment upon.  
This comparison is not meant to denigrate autobiographies: they are carefully articulated, 
rhetorically organised works, fascinating and valuable on their own. Yet, narratives possess certain 
alternative powers: one is the immediacy of the experiencing self that the temporal distance of 
memory in autobiographies tends to undercut. Even in the case of Jessica, the wisest and oldest of 
the protagonists, chapters from Jessica’s childhood are narrated without the older, narrating I’s 
authoritative voice; those sections are still focalised from her perspective, but in the third-person, 
omniscient mode, whereas her university and adult years are seen from the ‘inside’ of the 
authenticating ‘I.’ Another forte of fiction is its perspective-shifting potential. Only Christopher’s 
narrative is written entirely from his point of view, the other novels present the autistic figure from 
the outside, too – Jodi Picoult uses this polyphonic compositional style to the greatest effect. One 
could also include the interpersonal intensities of the dialogues that subtly affect the perception of 
character, or the strategic tangling of temporal realities that would not sit well with an 
autobiography which has a timeline set by the regular course of human life. 
In conclusion, the praxis of writing that developed in autism fiction is shaped by its sister 
discourses, the pseudo-autobiographies and poetry of facilitated individuals, which convey the 
worries and wishes of adults whose lives were transformed by autism, and the real, sometimes 
fancifully edited, but autonomously authored autobiographies, which remain among our most 
reliable sources for the phenomenological variety of lived autism (short of being born as one). 
They have both steered autism fiction’s growth in alternative directions, distancing themselves 
from their relatives. And although autism fiction can never be ‘authentic’ in the sense self-penned 
autobiographies are, they are written with the reading public in mind, expanding their empathetic 
circle in a way that pushes their conception of autistic ability to new limits. It is with this sense of 
represented achievement that writers contribute to the ongoing dialogue of what it means to be 
autistic, and how literature can provide bridges across neurotypes.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE TRAVELLING CONCEPT OF ‘THEORY OF MIND’ IN PHILOSOPHY,  
PSYCHOLOGY, LITERARY STUDIES AND ITS RELATION TO AUTISM 
 
“Paper is dead without words  
Ink idle without a poem  
All the world dead without stories  
Without love and disarming beauty  
Careless realism costs souls”  
– Tuomas Holopainen (Nightwish 2015), “Song of Myself” 
 
When you begin to read works on emotions and fiction these days, you immediately begin 
to notice a strange pattern. It usually doesn’t take a few pages for the expression “Theory of Mind” 
to crop up, defined more or less as our ability to attribute emotions, thoughts and feelings to other, 
sufficiently human-like agents in everyday social situations. Soon afterwards, you are asked to 
perform a thought experiment: imagine a kind of life in which humans are bereft of their ability to 
gauge the inner lives of others, producing a world where people appear to act irrationally and in a 
rather confusing manner, as if you were airlifted onto a faraway island or another planet. You are 
then informed that this thought experiment, in fact, naturally occurs, as there is a group of people 
whose ability to attribute thoughts and feelings to humanoid creatures is severely impaired, unlike 
typically developing people, who can instinctively project emotions into others and know that 
people move about in the world with a purpose. These unfortunates are called autists, and you are 
told that their impaired ToM sets them apart as tragic figures who cannot connect with the rest of 
humanity socially and emotionally. At this point, the writer directs your attention towards autists’ 
lack of interest in pretend play and make-believe, which the scholar portrays as the direct forebear 
to more mature forms of pretence, such as fiction. The argument goes something like this: we 
enjoy fiction because it gives us virtual human minds to empathise with and/or to track their 
emotional life, but we could not realise what an achievement our mind-reading was until we saw 
what set autists apart from other cognitive disabilities: their impairment of social cognition.  
This modern origin tale of literary aesthetics is re-enacted time and again in philosophy, 
neuroscience, cognitive and evolutionary psychology, and so-called ‘evocriticism,’ literary 
theory’s strongly contested attempt to understand the development of fiction in human culture as 
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a product of rising to the challenges of coordinating our lives in the phylogenetic past. Cognitive 
terms clarify and redefine concepts found in reader-response criticism, provide working models of 
reception aesthetics and contribute to the on-going reformation within the field of postclassical 
narratology. In the eyes of cognitive literary scholars, ToM is cast in the role of the lynchpin 
connecting empathy, solidarity and cooperation to the enjoyment of fiction. This chapter explores 
the relationship between ToM and fiction in this interdisciplinary mangle, which smooths out the 
creases in the fabric of ToM and the contradictions between the different uses to which this concept 
is put in their respective disciplinary practices. In providing this ambitious survey, I seek to roughly 
define a rugged area where talking about ToM makes sense in literary theory and analysis, 
demonstrating that it can be salvaged for critical readings of autism fiction, the ‘anomaly’ of the 
current paradigm of cognitive literary studies in the Kuhnian sense.  
After a substantial period of cultural consensus, the joy of fiction became an explanandum 
again for critics at the turn of the millennium because of a conflux of external and internal factors 
which re-evaluated the status of written narrative and its analysis. Some internal urges came from 
the socially oriented turn in literary and cultural criticism and a turning away from structuralist, 
textualist strategies of reading, as well as the skirmishes of the science wars. Other, external 
challenges to the self-evident nature and value of literary fiction have been issued by a.) the 
ubiquity and wide-scale commercialisation of new media for storytelling (cinema, television, 
comics, video games, etc.) which have contested the primacy of literature, b.) the availability of 
new imaging technologies that allowed a more sophisticated neuroscience to rise in the last few 
decades and c.) the continuing secularisation of society and the popularisation of evolutionary 
theory in response to the emergence of contemporary creationism.  
The growth of knowledge in the neurosciences has given us answers to many puzzling 
conditions of the mind, but autism is not yet among the phenomena which are fully explained or 
described by cognitive science. Still, the prolonged fascination with the behavioural repertoire of 
responses in autism and the no less intriguing paradox of feeling emotions for fictional characters 
converge at ‘Theory of Mind,’ a busy intersection in the traffic of scientific ideas. My aim in this 
section shall be to present a short intellectual history behind the idea of ToM, how it has been 
utilised in the discourse of aesthetics. After this, I outline some of the problems with current 
accounts of the relationship between autism and the joy of texts. Finally, I develop a framework 
that addresses the misrepresentation of autism in scientific discourse, one which contributes to 
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cognitive narratology by investigating the strategies authors use to convey neurological difference. 
 
Our ability to build communities and our skill in understanding other human beings 
depends upon our complex cognitive capabilities that govern our sociality. They provide us with 
behavioural templates and give us predictions of what other people think or feel based upon the 
signs other conscious agents produce, such as language, facial expressions, posture, tone of voice 
and nonverbal gestures. This is the fabled Theory of Mind, a module that is posited as our primary 
cognitive tool for judging the actions of others in terms of intentional states – it is our compass in 
predicting how other people would feel or act in a given situation. It is a mechanism also used in 
our manipulation of the social world; you simply cannot get what you want without knowing how 
you can get others to cooperate. ToM is based on the ability of the human mind to produce and 
hold metarepresentations, or in other words, thoughts about thoughts, specifically the thoughts, 
beliefs and disposition of others. Evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby 
reiterate the hypothesis that “mind-reading was the adaptive problem that drove the emergence of 
the distinctively human form of intelligence” (2000, 77), that is to say, social skills. The ability to 
represent the thoughts of others is an evolutionary adaptation that conferred a benefit to 
communities and the individuals who live in them by enabling them to hold information only as 
contingently true. Delimiting the scope of information and source-tagging it to individual minds 
as the containers of that information does not merely enable us to predict their behaviour, it also 
grants us enriched networks of interpersonal relationships and complex societies.  
Remarkably, humans were not the first to be investigated for the existence of ToM; as is 
quite common in studies in the evolution of cognition, it all started with chimps. In 1978, David 
Premack and Guy Woodruff asked the question whether the chimpanzee has a theory of mind. 
Their paper describes how play-acting humans bumbled through simple tasks in front of 
chimpanzees, who were allowed to ‘help’ them by choosing among photographs, some of which 
showed objects that would enable the actor to complete the tasks. In the authors’ definition,  
 
[a]n individual has a theory of mind if he imputes mental states to himself and others. 
A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory because such states 
are not directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions about the 
behavior of others. As to the mental states the chimpanzee may infer, consider those 
inferred by our own species, for example, purpose or intention, as well as knowledge, 
belief, thinking, doubt, guessing, pretending, liking, and so forth. (Premack and 
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Woodruff 1978, 515) 
 
Their research indicated that chimpanzees do indeed have some notion of what the goals 
of the actors were in these small scenes, and the animals aided the actors through the choice of 
correct tools for the job at hand. This is the skill which has gradually altered in human phylogeny 
to become the source of modern consciousness.  
In another crucial development of the human mind, we became able to handle information 
as only contingently or situationally true. The spontaneous appearance of pretend play or make-
believe in typically developing children at the age of about 18 months was what originally 
prompted Alan Leslie to posit a representational system that is capable of “decoupling” 
information from what our mind considers true according to its cognitive architecture (Leslie 
1987). This enables our mental structure to contemplate hypothetical and counterfactual scenarios. 
Metarepresentations and the mental act of decoupling opens up a whole new dimension of action 
— an increased ability to improvise. Human beings have been able to outpace biological evolution 
and kick-start cultural evolution precisely “because individuals are no longer limited by the flow 
of actual experience, which is slow and erratic in comparison with the rapid rate of vicarious, 
contrived, or imagined experience. So, vicarious experience, communicated from others, should 
be aesthetically rewarding” (Tooby and Cosmides 2000, 74). Pretend play in children is also a 
foundation of theatre, and fiction’s powers are based on this ability to decouple and metarepresent.  
A few years after Premack and Woodruff’s article appeared, Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith 
asked a similar question in the title of their paper (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985), substituting 
chimpanzees for autistic children: do they have ToM? Investigators of autistic children noticed 
that human intentions are often hard to calculate for their subjects, since they are second-order 
representations (Ona believes that Atiti will give her a birthday gift; Atiti hopes that Ona will be 
pleased with the new computer she intends to give her). Crucially, they are beliefs that compel 
people to put themselves into the shoes of another human being. Social cognition implies partial 
knowledge and evanescent perceptions of other people in a mutable web of relations. I may 
mistakenly think that magicians actually make coins disappear, whereas in actual fact, they are 
hidden in the palm of their hands during a sleight-of-hand performance. In this paradigm, 
hypothetical autists, upon having the situation described to them, including the nature of the 
deception, would be very likely to claim that the audience knows full well how the coin is within 
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the fold of the index and the ring finger, contrary to conventional wisdom, which would tell us 
that, for the captivated audience, the coin is as good as vanished.  
Baron-Cohen and his colleagues argued that autists do not make recourse to ToM-related 
heuristics when making guesses about the mental content of others or fail to correctly estimate said 
mental content in a consistent manner if they do develop some notion of what makes other people 
tick. They have termed this condition “mindblindness” (Baron-Cohen 1995), an ethically 
problematic term for its conflation of intellectual and physical disability that presents both 
communities in a more negative light for that association. After Baron-Cohen’s early work, a small 
cottage industry of pretence and ToM-related research has sprung up in developmental psychology 
(for an early overview, see Sterelny 1990 and further references below for examples). 
In all of this discussion, even in the context of typical development, authors regularly cite 
autism as an example of an anomaly, which is marked by the absence or diminished willingness 
to engage in pretend play. Cognitive and developmental psychologists attribute this impairment, 
which leads to difficulties in social integration with their neurotypical peers, as specifically 
stemming from an inability to decouple (Leslie 1987). Although young autists are eventually able 
to perform pretend play in an experimental setting, the lack of self-initiated, social make-believe 
suggests that the aesthetic/cognitive rewards which fuel typically developing children’s joyful play 
are not present in autism. As Kasari and her colleagues state: “if pretending requires play to be 
fun, creative, and spontaneous, children with autism are not truly playing with pretense,” and they 
report that “children with autism performed the ‘mechanics’ of play (they could show the play act) 
[in the experimental setting] similar to other children at the same language age but that they were 
less invested in ‘playful pretense’” (Kasari et al 2013). When left to their own devices, this 
impairment leaves autists less able to rise to the behavioural and emotional challenges of 
functioning in a rapidly changing social environment, hampering their own desire to be accepted 
by neurotypicals and integrated into a more neurodiverse society.  
Based on such research, Tooby and Cosmides claim that “[it] is not clear whether there are 
neuropsychological deficits that selectively knock out a person's ability to understand fiction 
without simultaneously knocking out other imaginative activities. But autism does seem to be an 
example of a developmental disorder that selectively impairs the imagination” (2000, 93). Even 
though imagining fictional worlds depends upon our mechanisms dedicated to decoupling, it is a 
fundamentally social imagination that fictional characters demand, and we are able to understand 
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most literary works of art because we apply our perspective-taking and metarepresentational 
strategies to make sense of the world depicted in a drama or a novel. Autistic people seem to have 
fewer issues with interpreting real-world narratives, it is only fiction that poses great problems. 
Realist and modernist fiction, with its focus on the interiors of the characters, challenges their 
mind-reading skills, whereas more fanciful writings, which deviate from the real world, ask them 
to suspend their disbelief about the existence of the fictional world, especially when they require 
belief in things like fairies and ghosts, or other non-existent phenomena. 
The theoretical questions that deal with humankind’s way of understanding our 
conspecifics, known in the philosophical tradition as 'the problem of other minds,’ has a long 
history, which I will not attempt to review here in its entirety due to the vastness of the topic (see 
Hyslop 2014 for a useful survey). But one subset of the larger debate in the philosophy of mind 
has addressed the problem with extensive research on folk psychology. This line of inquiry saw 
an increasing integration with experimental evidence from psychology and the neurosciences, as 
they both seek to explain how we develop an intersubjective perspective. It is within this discussion 
that the term ‘Theory of Mind’ first popped up in the humanities.  
There are two rival formulations of how we come to know mental states, and how we mind 
others: the somewhat awkwardly named theory-theory (TT) and its younger counterpart, 
simulation theory (ST). TT is the account with more pedigree and a longer history in the 
psychological and philosophical literature (Greenwood 1991; Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997). For our 
purposes, we can treat theory-theory as a model of learning which suggests that the human mind 
conceptualises other minds according to a ‘folk psychology,’ a set of unwritten rules which we 
acquire from childhood onwards, very much like a scientist would, by testing very basic theories 
(if-then logical constructs) of how people act and what internal states would bring about which 
outcomes. Theoretically, these rules could be wielded equally well by any other sentient species 
who can process propositional knowledge. Initially, TT offered much to psychologists studying 
social cognition, not only because it mirrored the working methods of practising scientists, but it 
was the most parsimonious explanation of the available evidence at the time. Although this way 
of envisaging social cognition processes as discrete principles was very promising, since it offered 
the prospect of empirical (dis)confirmation, theory-theory has run into severe problems due to its 
theories of social learning and because of evidence coming from several interlocking strands of 
experimental science (Stueber 2006, Bishop and Downes 2002). One defect in TT approaches to 
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mentalisation is that they are unable to incorporate the embodied, phenomenological aspect of 
social cognition, including the reason for the existence and function of mirror neurons, as well as 
neuroscientific evidence for our use of empathy in our everyday epistemology (Rizzolatti and 
Craighero 2005). A glaring failure of TT, especially relevant to our discussion here, is its inability 
to plausibly explain one of the core deficits of autism, namely autists’ impairment in predicting 
neurotypical behaviour and navigating the social world.  
On the other hand, experimental evidence for the existence of involuntary motor mimicry 
and the mirror neuron system lends considerable credence to an alternative view of mentalisation, 
simulation theory. The detection of the mirror neuron system (MNS) has provided a huge boost 
for research on mind-reading and what happens when it goes wrong, including the sociocognitive 
disabilities within autism. Mirror neurons are the neurons that fire within the brain when animals 
either move parts of their bodies or when they see other animals perform movements (Gallese et 
al. 1996; Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004). By unconsciously imitating our fellow humans, we get a 
head start on figuring out what they might do next. Imitation is not restricted to mapping the actual 
action in our minds, we can also make largely accurate guesses about the emotions involved, 
effectively empathising with others on the neural level (Rizzolatti and Craighero 2005, Ferrari and 
Gallese 2007, Sinigaglia and Rizzolatti 2011).  
TT appears the weakest when it tries to come up with an answer as to why autists perform 
remarkably worse on ToM tasks than neurotypicals or people with other developmental disorders. 
Simulation theory is much more successful in integrating neuroscientific and experimental 
findings (Goldman 2006, Gordon 1995). ST claims that we do not come to know how other people 
are likely to act or feel because we evaluate the external conditions and come up with a reasoning 
based on theoretical calculations; we feel what others feel because when we mentalise, we 
effectively create neurologically similar states of mind via the MNS. By running the MNS off-line 
(i.e. without having an actual pain response when we see others hurt themselves), we get a fairly 
accurate picture of how others would feel or act because we share their neurological make-up, but 
we are sheltered from being impelled to act upon that mental state. This is not to say that genuine 
empathy and action cannot arise from simulation. On the contrary, to this date, ST is the most 
coherent psychological framework for explaining how empathy arises from embodied cognition 
processes. However, TT and ST do not operate exclusively, in an either/or fashion; researchers 
consider both methods available for social cognition for specific purposes and the two can work 
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in tandem, and as such, a hybrid ST-TT approach is advocated (Apperly 2011). 
The MNS has been linked with autism by a number or cognitive scientists, but the 
hypothesis found its most forceful expression in Iacoboni and Dapretto’s paper (2006), where they 
state that data reviewed in the article “strongly support the proposal that mirror neuron dysfunction 
is a core deficit in autism” (emphasis added). Inquiries along the same lines have cast doubts upon 
the search for core deficits (Schreibman 2007, 109-131) and a recent review article on the 
connection between mirror neurons and autism has questioned the existence of any global 
dysfunction in the MNS of autists (Hamilton 2013). Besides the obvious underdetermination of 
evidence in this particular theory of autistic cognition, there is also the question of how the 
investigated subjects are characterised. From a critical perspective, Anne Corwin sums up the state 
of scientific discourse on mirror neurons up to 2007 in the following words that is worth keeping 
in mind for the research protocols portrayed in Speed of Dark:  
 
All things considered, many of the mirror neuron studies (along with other autism 
studies) all seem to suffer from the same fundamental flaw: that of presuming the 
autistic brain to be a “broken” version of a typical brain, as opposed to an entity unto 
itself. There is nothing ethically wrong with researching autism or researching autistic 
brains (so long as the research itself is conducted ethically, with full acknowledgement 
of the personhood of all involved), but it is of great concern that so few studies are 
being conducted from the standpoint of trying to figure out how autistic brains actually 
work—as opposed to how they supposedly don’t work, or how they represent 
deviations from some imagined ideal. (Corwin 2007) 
 
Additionally, experiments conducted on the assumption that mirror neurons are engaged 
in action understanding are not on as solid a footing as some of its proponents advertise (an 
especially detailed critique of the hypotheses for the functionality of the MNS is found in Hickok 
2009). The MNS’ role in social cognition is still debated among cognitive neuroscientists. As is 
readily apparent from the ambiguity in how to interpret observed differences in mirror neuron 
activity, I would not claim that mirror neuron dysfunction is the final word on the subject of what 
gives autism its defining characteristics. But the question of whether bottom-up or top-down 
control of perception plays a greater part in autistic cognition does not invalidate either a.) autists’ 
problems in processing emotions that they themselves or others experience, nor b.) their difficulty 
in expressing empathy. As indicated above, these are crucial skills for the understanding and 
appreciation of the human elements of fiction, and this section explores the relevant research on 
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ToM and its mechanisms with the explicit purpose of evaluating its findings as a part in a literary 
theoretical framework for interpreting fiction. 
 
We are on much firmer ground when investigating mental simulation in typically 
developing children and adults, and how they relate to the aesthetic effect of reading. When we 
read novels not for the joy of poetic language, but as a story of human beings, it does not matter 
that the people in question are reality-challenged. Contemporary scholars of aesthetics have been 
especially curious about this fact: how is it that we respond emotionally to words on the printed 
page as if it were constitutive of a person, replete with cunning, suffering, desire, aspirations and 
the like? The paradox of fiction, as formulated by Colin Radford (1977), consists of three related 
claims. First, we have a strange ability to “have an emotional reaction to the fate of Anna Karenina, 
the plight of Madame Bovary or the death of Mercutio. Yet we do. We weep, we pity Anna 
Karenina, we blink hard when Mercutio is dying and absurdly wish that he had not been so 
impetuous” (69). Secondly, our emotions are prompted by a reality condition of sorts. Radford 
states that “I can only be moved by someone’s plight if I believe that something terrible has 
happened to him. If I do not believe that he has not and is not suffering or what-ever, I cannot 
grieve or be moved to tears” (68). Still, readers know that fictional characters do not exist: “What 
is worrying is that we are moved by the death of Mercutio and we weep while knowing that no 
one has really died, that no young man has been cut off in the flower of his youth” (71). This 
arrangement of the paradox, and whether it constitutes a paradox at all, has been the subject of 
much speculation within aesthetics, and in doing so, it has invigorated cognitive literary criticism, 
too (for an even-handed survey, see Hjort and Laver 1997, 37-94). For our present purposes, it is 
enough to account for homologies in our processing of the fictional and the real world, which 
would let us economically preserve one model for our affective response. 
There is little doubt that mentally healthy human beings, including children at a relatively 
early age (Sharon and Woolley 2004), are able to distinguish between representational worlds and 
real life, so we can exclude any model which would explain our responses as a fault in our 
perception of reality (but note young children’s occasional blurring of the two, as reported in 
Bourchier and Davis 2002). Language is capable of substituting natural stimuli to generate 
cognitive processes, including social cognition and empathy, so we needn’t fear that we mistake 
fact for fiction, if it is properly source-tagged and paratextually framed. Even so, much of the same 
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neural circuitry is used to imagine virtual experiences and to perceive reality (in the folk 
psychological sense), which does not mean that we confuse the two, only that we experience it on 
similar terms within those paratextual frames. Recent advances in the understanding of emotional 
responses to fiction prompted Alvin Goldman to claim that mental simulation works through 
eliciting responses of enactive imagination, which underpins social cognition in the real world, but 
it can be evoked through sufficiently salient visual and verbal cues as well. In his words:  
 
According to the E-imagination hypothesis, affective responses to fiction occur 
because fiction serves as a series of textual or theatrical props that fuel a viewer’s or 
reader’s E-imagination into producing all sorts of surrogate states. The states are 
surrogates of believing, seeing, desiring, and so forth, and many bear a close 
resemblance to their natural, nonsurrogate counterparts. Thus, just as the natural 
counterparts are apt to generate certain emotions, the surrogates are apt to generate 
roughly similar emotions. (Goldman 2006, 284) 
 
This suggests that fictional works are the communal, cultured versions of what occurs in 
each of us throughout our lives, as artistic works exploit our neurological disposition towards 
mentalising to explain others’ behaviour. In close relation to the predictive power of the MNS, a 
growing body of research is unearthing how the brain uses sensorimotor integration of corporeal 
action to create thought/language and vice versa (Barsalou 2009, Gallese 2008, Grafton 2009, 
Zwaan and Pecher 2012). When we read or hear sentences, we simulate what happens and what 
properties the objects have, replaying the movements and sensations in our heads, activating some 
of the same pathways we would use if they were present. But we test reality and then run these 
processes ‘off-line,’ so we can inhibit the immediate action-generating potential of emotions and 
safely experience the thrill of vicarious love, fear, despair or excitement which the characters 
undergo. This, however, does not mean that the emotions experienced are not real emotions, nor 
that reading literature in the right circumstances cannot generate fellow-feeling that spurs readers 
onto prosocial action. In fact, I find simulation theory to be of invaluable help in forming a coherent 
theory of the emotional powers of fiction that are awakened within us, which originate in our 
neurological processes designed by evolution to strengthen social bonds (Hesslow 2012, although 
some reservations are expressed in surveys of ST and mindreading such as Michlmayer 2002, and 
Goldman’s version of simulation is critiqued by Carruthers 2009). 
 
According to narratologist David Herman, one of the prime ingredients of stories is the 
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element of “what it is like,” the experiential component of cause-and-effect relationships as they 
unfold in a storyworld inhabited by characters (Herman 2009, 21). In this respect, the greatest 
value of stories is that they can convey to us how (other) people would feel in particular situations 
as they undergo events that are worth telling for some reason. This is, granted, a rather mundane 
expression of complex reasons for writing and appreciating fiction, but perhaps a more ethical take 
would be enlightening. Insofar as novelists can convincingly present believable fictional mental 
functioning, their novels will be more likely to garner empathetic investment on the part of the 
reader for the purposes of some dramatic function. Again, the entire project of modern, critical 
literary theory is an argument that engagement with the aesthetic experience is strongly affected 
by the social circumstances of the writer and the reader (class, gender, race, sexuality, age, etc.) 
but when the connection is made, despite these differences, fiction humanises characters, showing 
their standpoint to the reader, establishing some common ground which is rooted in our strong 
capacity for empathy. This ethicognitive view of literature demonstrates why some fiction is more 
effective and memorable than other pieces, it shows how it can move people emotionally and to 
social action as well. The motor and higher-level mental simulation that occurs during reading 
texts are of profound importance to understand literature as an aesthetic effect. If our emotional 
responses to fiction sound paradoxical, it is only because we are taught to categorise the real and 
the fictional as separate entities, and we perceive them to be much further apart than they really 
are to our psyche. We do not really believe that characters in novels exist for real, but we can still 
simulate the emotional rollercoaster of a romance or the thrilling game of master spies outwitting 
evildoers in mystery novels since we understand them to be fictional minds. 
While there have been a few sober and passionate critiques of an empathetic emotional 
response to fiction (see Keen 2007, 145–168), the enactive imagination still remains our primary 
method of experiencing fiction, even though this method of engagement might prove to be self-
deceiving in some cases. In light of evidence from neuroscience and experimental psychology, 
there is more truth in the phrase ‘I feel for you’ than we would think or dare acknowledge. Part of 
what makes fiction gripping to consume and produce is that we become, for however short a time 
and in however imperfect a fashion, another person. What happens to the characters, in some 
important sense, happens to us. In the case of fiction, this amounts to us instinctively feeling as 
one with other, only quasi-existing beings. At present, this ability is attributed to our ToM, but the 
way ToM has been used as a travelling concept in literary studies is worth further inquiry. 
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Theory of Mind began its rise to fame in bona fide literary criticism in the pioneering work 
of Lisa Zunshine, notably in her book-length study Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the 
Novel (2006), in which she began to survey the importance of our mentalising abilities for 
understanding literature. She produced creative interpretations as to how intricately mind-reading 
infuses and colours our enjoyment of particular fictional genres. In her treatment of ToM, Zunshine 
cites Baron-Cohen’s Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind (1995) as a starting 
point of her investigation and faithfully reports the accepted clinical picture that autism is 
characterised by “a reduced interest in fiction and storytelling” (8). She offers a possible 
explanation: “[p]erhaps fiction presents a challenge to people with autism because in many ways 
it calls for the same kind of mind-reading […] that is necessary in regular human communication” 
(9). Recognising the sliding scale of the severity of autism, she observes that an impaired mind-
reading ability “varies across the whole spectrum of autism cases. [… I]f we include within that 
spectrum people with Asperger syndrome [sic], […] we can say that a ‘dash of autism’ does not 
necessarily preclude people from enjoying fictional narratives” (12). Following changes in the new 
DSM-5, the APA no longer recognises the individual diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndrome, 
subsuming all cases under the wider umbrella term of ‘autistic spectrum disorders,’ but the ICD-
10 still does, so today Zunshine can safely have her cake and eat it, too.  
Following the recital of the clinical picture, she brings up Christopher Boone from The 
Curious Incident as a fictional example of somebody with Asperger’s who is a partially successful 
mind-reader in her view, stating that the book “is a much-needed reminder about the complexity 
of the issues involved in the relationship between autism and storytelling” (12). By her own 
admission, Zunshine uses autism “mainly to provide a vivid hypothetical example of what it means 
not to be able to attribute minds” and says that “the bulk of my argument [about the ordinary use 
of ToM in understanding fiction] does not rely on it” (11). To demonstrate just that, and in response 
to criticism by disability studies scholars, in the Kindle edition of Why We Read Fiction she cut 
out the “Theory of Mind, Autism, and Fiction: Four Caveats” section of her book, and drastically 
reduced the number of references to autism on the whole (a follow-up piece, co-authored with 
Ralph James Savarese has recently been published, serving as Zunshine’s mea culpa and a call to 
interdisciplinary work (Savarese and Zunshine 2014)).  
Critiquing the accuracy of Zunshine’s portrayal of the autistic mind is secondary to this 
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more telling excision, an elision of the integral part autism played, for good or ill, in the burgeoning 
of academic interest in social cognition and literary scholars’ willingness to import theoretical 
concepts from cognitive psychology. Simply put, thoughts about autism, whether right or wrong, 
are formative in the history of cognitive literary studies, yet not enough attention has been paid to 
the relationship between autism and storytelling, or how the paradigm case has been used to 
validate the direction literary theory took when it adopted ToM as a subject of analysis.  
One of the purposes of this section is to develop a constructive criticism of how the ToM 
idea was appropriated for literary purposes and to rearrange the pieces as necessary in order to take 
a second look at the complexity of issues that Zunshine hinted at. This shall be accomplished by 
merging the perspective and sensitivity of disability studies with arguments from cognitive literary 
theory, which irons out some of the inconsistencies (and sometimes outright errors) in portraying 
autism in scholarly writings. I then to turn towards a narratological investigation of autism novels, 
where discourses of empathy, disability and neuropolitics supply important counternarratives to 
the more damaging representations of the condition in fiction and science. 
Whether or not a mind is deemed unreadable, whether or not a person is considered a closed 
book, whether we choose to respect unreadability or work hard at bridging hermeneutical impasses 
are decisions which are definitely shaped by the science of interpersonal relationships and its 
biocultural constraints and affordances. Zunshine is correct in saying that “cognitive evolutionary 
psychology does offer us a principally new way of approaching fictional narratives, [seeing them] 
as endlessly experimenting with rather than automatically executing given psychological 
tendencies” (155, emphases in original). It is for reason that I see the analysis of autism fiction 
best served by a biocultural approach. Nonetheless, while Zunshine dedicated a whole chapter to 
the significance of (and a genre-defining concern with) mind-reading in detective novels, she 
didn’t extend her interpretations to Haddon’s The Curious Incident, which is notable for 
Christopher’s intense preoccupation with crime fiction, and which begins as a mystery of who 
killed the family dog, Wellington. I intend to revisit Haddon’s novel in greater detail in a separate 
chapter to rectify such an omission and to take a second look at Christopher’s narrative, exploring 
his worship of Sherlock Holmes, and how mind-reading and autism are implicated in the tale. 
That being said, what Zunshine states is just as important as what she omits. In her lucid 
and refreshing account of detective fiction, she claims that because murder always warrants an 
explanation, it it not merely a whodunit but a whydunit mystery as well. Killers will deny their 
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heinous acts in speech and behaviour, and everyone might have a potential interest in 
misrepresenting what they know or have done, thereby putting our metarepresentational skills to 
the test. She thus reinterprets the whole detective genre, stating that it might be seen “as a chronicle 
of the writers’ experimentation with the question of whose minds the readers should be allowed to 
read and when they should be able to read them” (138). Both the perpetrator’s, the suspects’ and 
the detective’s mind can be strategically concealed to heighten narrative tension and sustain 
readerly attention. After noticing that the history of the detective genre is replete with private eyes 
who are lonely figures and seldom engage in long-term relationships, so the romantic side plot of 
a crime novel is usually undercut by an ascetic singleness, she distinguishes between two different 
kinds of mind-reading, which I term ‘suspicious’ and ‘harmonic’ mind-reading to hypothesise that 
“the kind of mind-reading expected from the reader of the detective novel is indeed not particularly 
compatible with the kind of mind-reading expected from the reader of the story focusing on a 
romantic relationship” (143), because it requires a different set of interferences.  
The suspicious mind-reader seeks to uncover a hidden plot of concealed motives without 
the need to become affectively involved in the fate of the people concerned (impartiality, after all, 
is a prized asset in detectives). The harmonic mind-readers seek to attune themselves to their 
prospective partners to “figure out how the person that you have a crush on feels about you and 
what you should do based on your far-from-perfect understanding of his/her state of mind” (145), 
caring for and affecting the other person’s feelings. Zunshine adds that detective stories in recent 
years have tried to mix the romantic plots and the investigation with varying degrees of success, 
but the added elements are always subplots, featured in the story “without making it compete with 
the main type of mind-reading expected from its readers (148, emphasis in original) so that readers 
will never be overwhelmed by two different kinds of mind-reading and can immerse themselves 
in the exercise of only one. These thoughts on concealing the mind of characters and the different 
motivations behind suspicious and harmonic mind-reading will appear as themes that make novels 
like The Curious Incident and House Rules challenging texts for the literary critic to analyse. 
In more recent times, Jennifer Barnes has studied autism’ relationship to literary expression 
and storytelling, conducting a sociological experiment with undergraduate students and people 
living with autism. This research has been critical of the established paradigm that the avoidance 
of fiction depends upon ToM difficulties. Summarising her results, she states that while autists did 
not avoid them as such,  
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they showed no preference for social stories, but demonstrated a significant preference 
for nonfiction over fiction. From the perspective of autism research [...] the fact that 
individuals with ASC preferred true texts [...] suggests that theories of fiction that 
focus solely on theory of mind and the social content of stories may be incomplete. 
Our ability to suspend reality and enter into imaginary or pretend worlds may also play 
a key role in the appeal of fictional stories [...], allowing fiction and nonfiction to battle 
it out based on content on relatively even grounds. (Barnes 2012: 312) 
 
The picture emerging from studies that connect fiction and autism is noteworthy because 
they shed light on what makes counterfactual narratives of nonexistent people so intriguing for 
humankind. Regrettably, they echo a long-prevailing sentiment in research that autism can be 
envisioned as a portent or omen for neurotypical people, showing them what life would be like 
without an intact theory of mind or skills of pretence. The ensuing discourse all too often veers 
into discussing what autists lack that NTs have, rather than how the differences between the two 
populations can be bridged (Haldane and Crawford 2010).  
 
 The approach that best describes the scope and methodology of this dissertation is 
postclassical narratology. Defined against poststructural narrative theory and as a continuation of 
the classical method of narrative analysis, postclassical narratology’s intention is to aid literary 
interpretation by expanding its horizons and clarifying its contexts in an interdisciplinary setting, 
“open[ing] the fairly focused and restricted realm of narratology to methodological, thematic and 
contextual influences from the outside” (Alber and Fludernik 2010, 2). These goals range from 
fine-tuning concepts of classical narratology with targeted criticism through an interest in the 
impact of sociological identities on narratives all the way to examining transmedia storytelling. 
Autism fiction is a subgenre of illness and disability narratives that invites knowledge synthesis 
across disability studies, psychology, literary theory and narratology to understand the web of 
signification invoked by the presence of autism in the story. This section focuses on the study of 
narrative as it appears in the writing of narratologists, offering good mid-level strategies for 
reading autism fiction, based on criticisms of mimetic models of mindreading.  
One dominant paradigm is that of Monika Fludernik’s “‘natural’ narratology” (1996), a 
theory of narrative grounded in prototypical cases of oral storytelling, jokes, anecdotes and other 
short personal narratives. They are investigated using a hybrid method of sociolinguistic, discourse 
analytical and classical narratological concepts to argue that people use an everyday, mimetic 
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model of communication as a foundation to interpret instances of storytelling. She uses the term 
narrativisation for this hermeneutic attitude, describing the  
 
attempt [of readers] to re-cognize what they find in the text in terms of the natural 
telling or experiencing or viewing parameters, or they try to recuperate the 
inconsistencies in terms of actions and event structures at the most minimal level. 
This process of narrativization, of making something a narrative by the sheer act of 
imposing narrativity on it, needs to be located in the dynamic reading process where 
such interpretative recuperations hold sway. (Fludernik 1996, 25) 
 
Fludernik contends that this holds even in experimental fiction, non-realist prose, 
postmodern fabulation and other cases of reduced narrativity in aesthetic texts. She examines 
narrative prose to identify the mental functions which are activated in the reader’s consciousness 
during the consumption of the text. Commenting on the role of experientiality and the human mind 
in her model of reading, she acknowledges that “consciousness plays a crucial role. It both 
mediates narrativity and constitutes one of its signifiers” (279), an intersubjective translation of 
experience. Categorically stating that “all narrative in my definition of the term fundamentally 
represents another’s consciousness” (279, emphasis in original) reinforces the sense of empathetic 
communication between conscious agents, as in genres of oral storytelling, since it resembles the 
sharing of personal experiences and evokes sympathy for the fictional subjects of the story. 
 
Narration involves the conscious re-cognization of one’s experience […]. In natural 
narrative’s dynamics of evaluation versus the reliving of personal experience […], the 
factor of memory and of imaginative projection is very strong, and it mediates what 
was experienced in body and mind and transfers it to the here and now of narrative 
[…] transmission. Literary narrative extends this […] by allowing a more sophisticated 
and also more variegated reshaping and projection of narrative experience. By placing 
natural schemata and natural parameters at the foundation of its theoretical 
architecture, Natural Narratology centrally incorporates consciousness as the basic 
factor of human cognition, emotion and experience. (Fludernik 1996, 279-280) 
 
In hindsight, scholars of narratology can see the results of an early syncing of their field 
with the sciences of the mind. Narrative is being reconstituted in Fludernik’s work as a form of 
fictional mental functioning, which simulates phenomenological stimuli of embodied experience 
for its aesthetic effects. She defines reading as an active, empathetic reconstruction and 
reinterpretation of the narrator’s and the characters’ life-world. This is as mimetic a conception of 
narrative as one can possibly get, not too far from Kendall Walton’s idea of mimesis as make-
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believe (Walton 1990) or Marie-Laure Ryan’s interpretation of narrative as virtual reality (Ryan 
1997). One major gain of literary theory from ‘natural’ narratology was the renewed vigour with 
which narratologists started anew at assessing the affective aspects of text-reader interactions, 
mostly mind-attribution to fictional entities. This was palpable in the work of David Herman 
(2003, 163-192), Alan Palmer (2004) and others, who rely on the Theory of Mind paradigm of 
folk psychology to explain the activities of interpreting character and narration. 
Palmer’s Fictional Minds (2004), albeit a precursor to Zunshine, is a more thorough 
attempt to read literary action as the product of thinking, interactive minds, which inspire the 
analytical purview of my work. He writes: “narrative fiction is, in essence, the presentation of 
fictional mental functioning. [... T]he study of the novel is the study of fictional mental functioning 
and […] the task of theorists is to make explicit the various means by which this phenomenon is 
studied and analyzed” (5). His book is one long argument against the critical tradition after 
modernism, which sees the novel as the terrain of private thought, an inner life impenetrable by 
the characters of the storyworld to which readers only gain access thanks to the writer’s efforts.  
His emphasis on “the social nature of thought” (11) builds on Uri Margolin’s contention 
that we should consider fictional characters as “non-actual individuals” (Margolin 1989), 
favouring our natural inclination to treat fictional characters as endowed with personhood. In his 
view, understanding any person in a novel requires interpreting fictional people’s experiences in 
concert with their character, that is to say, their habits, beliefs and customs: “It is through the 
central linking concept of dispositions that characterization and thought presentation can be seen 
as different aspects of the same phenomenon. However, within narrative theory, dispositions 
belong to the subject area of characterization, and mental events belong to the subject area of 
thought presentation” (Palmer 2004, 43, emphasis mine). Disposition is a rather useful concept for 
autism, bringing to light the less deterministic and more humane vision of the autist’s preferences 
and idiosyncrasies, in other words, the defining behavioural repertoire and psychological profile 
that makes autism so recognisable and yet so individual. Without being hyperbolic, living the life 
of an autist is all about accommodating a strongly circumscribed disposition to the ill-fitting 
sociocultural environment one inhabits. Taking a whole-mind approach to understand the autist’s 
character, then, invites the scholar to identify how this internal disposition is expressed in mental 
events and social relationships on the narratological level.  
One of Palmer’s contributions to the revision of classical narratology is to take up arms 
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against narratologists’ previous privileging of free indirect discourse as the most artful way of 
presenting the mental life of characters because it makes narration ethically more transparent:  
 
A free indirect perception reading takes responsibility for subjectivity away from the 
narrator, where it initially appears to be, and gives it to a character. Internal focalization 
readings can naturalize as a character’s perception a good deal of discourse that 
appears at first sight to be pure narratorial description. By this means, the whole 
consciousnesses of characters can be expanded to include descriptions of aspects of 
the storyworld that are seen from their perceptual, cognitive, and evaluative point of 
view. This interface between characters and their storyworld is a highly informative 
way to link the internal consciousnesses of characters to their external social and 
physical context. (Palmer 2004, 49)  
 
He urges us to re-evaluate thought report as more than a clumsy way of telling what 
characters feel, to read the descriptions of rooms and situations as inextricable from the focaliser’s 
mental disposition. Due to their acute sensitivity to stimuli, their pattern-seeking and unique sense-
making strategies, an autistic focaliser can show how the text conveys neurological difference. 
Palmer asserts that we do an injustice to the richness of our mental lives if we continue to 
believe that every mental movement takes the form of inner speech, since it also harbours the 
“danger that the observation of literary conventions can easily harden into convictions about how 
the mind actually works” (74). He argues that the value of cognitive science here is to show that 
the linguistic stratum of consciousness is a thin layer atop a much thicker region of non-verbal 
consciousness. Because some autists are completely non-verbal, while others experience 
difficulties with linguistic expression, the very same thinking that attributes consciousness only to 
verbal performance is apprehensible in literary analysis and the understanding of autism. The 
‘fictional minds’ approach, then, is a natural ally to autism novels, for both can foreground 
previously neglected ways of thinking, and they enter into debates about the nature of sociality 
and mental functioning with newfound vigour, albeit in different domains. 
Even so, Palmer is not free from utilising disabling language and uncritically adopting the 
mindblindness paradigm. Discussing our experience of others as continuously minded beings 
despite the fact that we don’t follow people’s lives 24/7, he writes: “Our real-world cognitive frame 
enables us to construct a continuing consciousness for the absent person unless we suffer from an 
abnormal condition such as autism that causes ‘mindblindness’” (199). Here and elsewhere, 
references to autism are tactically used in cognitive narratology as a scholarly version of step two 
in the narrative prosthesis thesis: “a narrative [in this case, of the normate mind-reading of fictional 
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minds] consolidates the need for its own existence by calling for an explanation of the deviation’s 
origins and formative consequences” (Mitchell and Snyder 2000, 53). Cognitive literary studies 
that seek to explain why we care about literary characters have, time and again, resorted to ToM-
based arguments about our faculty for appreciating literature without the sensitivity to the 
problems with the rhetoric of mindblindness and its privileging of normate mind-reading. 
When narratology emphasises the transparency of literary mind-reading, most scholars in 
the field remind readers that the seemingly immediate access to the character’s thoughts are 
strategically occluded when plot or characterisation demands. Ellen Spolsky writes that both tragic 
and comic effects can be produced by inaccurate mind-reading:  
 
Our greatest literary texts explore just these failures of inference and of mind-reading 
[…]. They display mis-attribution of intentionality, failures to recognize the emotional 
entailments of actions, and the gaps between received communal norms and the values 
of an individual hero or heroine, often defined precisely by their standing outside the 
community. The virtual certainty of some failure of mind-reading or inference is not, 
then, a mark of the human (the human track record being weighted towards success 
rather than failure), but of the literary—that is, the tellable. (Spolsky 2010, 48, 
emphasis added) 
 
Even though Spolsky’s comments on inferential accuracy in the real world is there to 
explain typically developing people’s successes, her thoughts also support a reading of how autism 
becomes tellable. If we take Spolsky’s lead, we begin to see that the condition is narratively 
productive due to the ample potential for mind-misreading, which is just as virtually certain in 
autism as it is in fiction. This aspect will be salient when I discuss the tragicomic effects of the 
courtroom drama in Picoult’s House Rules.  
Beyond ordinary failures of mind-reading, H. Porter Abbott further identifies totally 
“unreadable minds,” blank ciphers whose existence already implies a “conundrum,” “arousing 
narrative desire” (Abbott 2008, 448). His readings of 20th c. literature which feature strategically 
occluded minds supply a handful of narrative uses to which these ‘unreadable’ minds are put, with 
one nineteenth century exception. Abbott’s treatment of the unreadability of the fictional mind 
shares some resemblance with Ato Quayson’s notion of disability serving as a hermeneutical 
impasse (see Chapter 7). While it is just one representational method for Quayson, this 
unreadability serves as the fundamental basis of interpretation for Abbott, who strongly advocates 
against readings which naturalise the inescapable otherness of the unreadable mind.  
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There are three interpretative moves that frame such unreadable characters, he claims. First, 
when we exercise our capability to think typologically, we essentialise and stereotype a fictional 
person based on the character’s predictable behaviour. Or one can see them “as a function in the 
characterization of another” (451), which is to say, seeing them in the supportive role where the 
focus is on another, major character. Finally, “shifting the mode of reading from determining who 
[the character] is or how he functions to determining what he stands for[, so t]he unreadable 
character is read neither as a character nor a function, but as an idea” (452, emphasis in original), 
in other words, a symbolic reading. These strategies are eerily similar to the standard interpretative 
heuristic outlined in Mitchell and Snyder’s narrative prosthesis thesis. On the surface, it appears 
as if two different strands of narrative investigation, disability studies and cognitive narratology 
have stumbled upon the same techniques of narrative display for problematic characters, with 
otherwise little connection between disability narratives and stories of the unreadable mind.  
But, oh, when we actually look at his nineteenth century example, we find that Abbott 
bases his ideas about the unreadable fictional mind on a work of no less significance for disability 
studies than Melville’s “Bartleby, the Scrivener,” followed later by a discussion of Coetzee’s Life 
and Times of Michael K, a text discussed as an example of intellection disability in Quayson (2007, 
147-173). In fact, Stuart Murray’s impeccably argued reading of Bartleby as autistic is the most 
convincing archaeological ‘finding’ of autism in a canonised literary piece prior to the construction 
of the autistic kind in psychiatric discourse (Murray 2008, 50-60).  
It turns out that we cannot separate the contemporary fascination with autism and the new 
narratological trends that bring mind-reading to the foreground, after all. Not that Abbott does not 
try; he begins his argument about unreadability by acknowledging that the inability to mind-read 
can be a result of “pathology” (2008, 48). He brings together autism (he even mentions The 
Curious Incident by name) and psychopathy as two examples of a pathological unreading of the 
mind in realist fiction (what a company for autists to be in!), but he excludes these instances and 
takes “the mind that defies all efforts to read it” (449) as his proper subject. Are there any fictional 
minds like that? If the character is given enough textual space to excite the interpretative mind of 
a reader, aren’t they given an opportunity to be understood? If the readers think that reading 
characters as people is an interesting interpretative exercise, won’t their minds become more 
readable? Bartleby’s signature phrase, ‘I prefer not to’ is read by Abbott as a 
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motif of such transcendent bizzarerie that it seems to come from outer space. Its 
combination of quaint diction, subjunctive formality, affectless politeness, together 
with the granitic resolve of its speaker’s attendant behavior, takes Bartleby one step 
too far from any kind of plausible integration of character – an implausibility that only 
grows with its insistent repetition. (452) 
 
Although he refuses to acknowledge it as an identifiable (and very human) character, the 
descriptive richness with which Abbott infuses these four short words of Bartleby is at once the 
antithesis of an unreadable character and a perfect description of how a 19th century author would 
have seen high-functioning autism. Abbott well-meaningly advises students of ‘unreadable’ minds 
that the ethical approach would be to read them “in a full acceptance of their insistent 
unreadability” (463), by which he implies that any attempt at explaining their actions or 
understanding their mindset would be an act of naturalisation. It also means that assessing these 
characters as unreadable minds “preclude empathy […] for empathy necessarily involves the 
presumption of a readable mind” (463). Contrast this with Stuart Murray’s comment on a new 
Marxist reading of Bartleby, where he says that understanding the protagonist “as having a 
neurobehavioural condition stresses his humanity […]. It is all too easy to see Bartleby as a figure 
‘who scarcely qualifies as a human being’ […]. What such a criticism ignores, because it is blind 
to the nature of its presence, is that a disabled difference might be a different kind of humanity” 
(58). I see that Abbott does not deny Bartleby’s humanity, but he becomes the victim of his own 
mindblindness when he does not scrutinise the narrator’s view of Bartleby and understands the 
odd scrivener as an unreadable character while he had the necessary information from reading 
Zunshine’s account of autism to suspect that Bartleby might be disabled.  
What then, are we to make of these Other minds in literature? Is the acceptance of 
difference as unreadability ethically sufficient from the narratological perspective? Answering the 
latter question first, I would prefer not to accept any strategy whose end product is a sophisticated 
articulation of ‘we cannot possibly know one another, I respect your difference, but see it as 
unbridgeable otherness.’ Autism fiction presents a subtler picture of mutual difficulties in 
connecting neurotypes. That is a picture of communicability, and an interpretative gap that points 
towards the possibility of empathy.  
Which is not to say that textual representations of autism are 1:1 accurate scientific models 
of autistic cognition. Far from it. As Ellen Spolsky says, “[t]heories of mind, then, and the 
cognitive theories of wired-in connectivity between people on which they are based, are 
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particularly interesting in the study of narrative interactions, not because they promise a reality-
based way of understanding characters or narrative that we didn’t already have, but because they 
are situated on the border of the cultural and the personal” (Spolsky 2010, 48). Writers who infuse 
neurologically different characters with a life story similarly create a space for the personal and 
the cultural to meet at. But once we recognise that difference, we can proceed further, driven by 
our representation-hungry minds to make sense of others, and we seek out imaginative 
explanations for the behaviour of the Other, which fosters understanding and mutually intelligible 
interaction. One of the things that I aim to prove in this work is that this is a huge part of what 
autism novels do: making autism a readable and reading condition for both parties involved. 
 
If we accept that our intersubjective lives are dependent on the neurobiological processing 
of biosemiotic signals that hint at the internal dispositions of other subjects (and the evidence from 
psychology indicates this to be the case (Decety and Ickes 2009)), we can argue that such 
interpretative exercise is woven into the social fabric of all societies and all social encounters. 
These encounters make people read the other person’s body as a site of social meaning. They evoke 
intentions and emotions in both subjects, and there will be inevitable responses generated in both 
readers of the social body. It might be for this very reason that Norman Holland responded to 
Herbert Simon’s foundational essay “Literary Criticism: A Cognitive Approach” (Simon 1994) on 
the pages of the Stanford Humanities Review by stating: “reader-response already is cognitive 
criticism” (Holland 1994). The 1994 Summer issue, featuring Simon’s writing, Holland’s reply 
and another thirty-two responses of acceptance and critique was the first time the academic literary 
establishment had engaged in earnest with cognitive science’s promises for literary theory, as well 
as the risks of reductionism and the charge of obviousness.  
Holland pointed out that Simon’s cognitive view is reader-centred, giving ‘sovereignty’ to 
the reader (Nell 1988, 39-45) to interpret the text and bring one’s personality to the fore when 
reading for pleasure. He wrote: “I wish my colleagues in criticism and theory would accept Herbert 
Simon’s offer of cognitive science. […] American reader-response critics will find his ideas 
completely congenial” (Holland 1994). Holland’s recent work, Literature and the Brain (2009) 
integrates the findings of neuroscience and psychoanalysis in a synthesis that is accessible and 
insightful. It gives further support to reader-response criticism’s claim that interpretation is a 
creative act, similar to writing because “a literary text contains intersubjectively verifiable 
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instructions for meaning-production, but the meaning produced may then lead to a whole variety 
of different experiences and hence subjective judgments” (Iser 1978, 25). Holland clarifies the 
nature of this interpretative activity: he sees it as an act of creative simulation that arouses strong 
emotional responses because we are not compelled to act upon them (2009, 68-71). We attribute 
psychological meaning to the characters in a fictional work by bringing our own interpretative 
strategies to the work, derived from our psychological histories (126-272). To Holland’s mind, 
this combination of inactivity and simulation is the most important neurological reason why we 
cease reality-testing, investing belief in the fictional world, akin to Coleridge’s ‘poetic faith.’  
Holland’s reader-response criticism also borrows the rhetorical, prosthetic role of autism 
to discuss the pleasure of creating and consuming literature. For all his diligence to work through 
the implications of neuropsychology’s progressive research programme, Holland still talks about 
how “victims of autism” (emphasis mine) are subjected to neuroscientific inquiry, since they are a 
kind of “specialized population,” distinct from ordinary people (but hopefully, no more so than 
left-handed people, the other group specified by Holland 2009, 14). In the section on unbalanced 
brains (284-286), he warns the reader about the constraints imposed upon the brain by the 
developmental processes of the human body and claims that extraordinary creativity in one domain 
usually comes with trade-offs in other domains.  
The examples illustrating this statement range from autistic people and savants to gifted 
children, art students and even elderly patients with dementia. But it is used to a curious rhetorical 
effect: while he portrays people who experience dementia as gaining some creative skill: 
“sometimes, as ordinary mental abilities deteriorate, new talents emerge, say, for painting” (285), 
high-functioning autists are stripped of their creativity in this discourse, despite their prodigious 
talents. Holland notes that HFAs “can often execute astonishing feats of arithmetic or musical 
composition or visual art. […] Typically, autistics’ brains have sacrificed emotional intelligence 
for some other kind. As a result, most neuroscientists agree that autistics, for all their talent, are 
not creative as we usually use the word” (Holland 2009, 285). This damaging representation is not 
supported by any references or citations, so we have to take Holland’s word for it — never a good 
sign in a book that is otherwise so generous with citing scientific papers. For Holland, creative 
individuals “do not simply have a talent. They have an individual style […] linked to their core 
identity, itself embodied in corticolimbic pathways in the brain” (287), and in his logic, this 
excludes autistic people, as if they did not have a core identity or a functioning psyche.  
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What do we make of this, especially since Holland also quotes Colin Martindale’s 
summary that the mental processes characteristic of creativity, primary-process cognition is 
“autistic, free-associative, analogical, and characterized by concrete images as opposed to abstract 
thought” (Martindale 1986, 456 in Holland 2009, 286)? Are autistic people merely talented, or are 
they the prime example of artistic, creative thinking? There is evidence that autistic children 
spontaneously produce narratives with a personal style expressing their situated perspective 
(Stirling and Barrington 2007, 133-172). Further evidence supports the claim that despite their 
eidetic memory or other extraordinary skills, autistic artists filter their perceptions to enhance those 
aspects of the artwork’s subject that are most salient for them (Koo 2008), so the exclusionary 
move by Holland is not warranted by the available research. Still, positing creativity as 
paradigmatically ‘autistic’ misses the point that literary texts depend upon the frequent use of 
structuring metaphors, abstract thinking and the representation of intersubjective thought 
processes, which pose a challenge to the majority of autistic individuals. This example shows that 
even though cognitive approaches to literature supply literary theory with illuminating arguments 
and new knowledge, the new version of reader-response criticism is not free from using autism as 
a crutch to support their arguments. Holland contrasts domains of ‘normal’ life and abilities like 
creativity with the raw ‘talent’ of a Stephen Wiltshire, who paints elaborate cityscapes from 
memory. Martindale’s strategy (also endorsed by Holland), on the other hand, is to romanticise 
said talent as the epitome of creativity, presenting autism as a pre-logical, unself-conscious, one 
might say primal or naive form of perception. In both cases, the experts deny the conscious artistic 
agency of the able autistic person in order to preserve the autonomy of normate creativity. 
How should we evaluate these interactions between literary theory and autism, what are 
their merits and drawbacks? The approach grounds the persuasive power of literary texts in the 
imagination, the cognitive processes that facilitate meaning-making. That is why Holland calls it 
a “reader-active” model of interpretation, as the similarities between interpretations depend upon 
shared cognitive schemata, common assumptions that guide our language use. The differences that 
emerge are attributable to readers’ personal histories, their associations with certain phrases or 
social situations that construe, reinforce or violate those schemata that have developed prior to the 
act of reading (Holland 2009, 171-210). If theory of mind is a central allure of literature, the 
approach gives a compelling explanation for the non-academic consumption of narrative fiction. 
Furthermore, it gives literary scholars a new terminology for interpretation. It imports 
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psychological concepts to reveal the functions of literary phenomena that were previously 
underdetermined by theory, such as the attribution of personhood to literary characters, the reason 
for emotional responses to fiction, the simulation of story-worlds, the skills and faculties of the 
readers that directly impinge upon the aesthetics of reception, and so on. 
Regarding autism, cognitive approaches highlight the importance of social phenomena like 
empathy, mind-reading, pretence or metaphoric language use for their literary effect we create via 
reading a novel. This also underlines the difficulty autistic people experience when they have to 
navigate the fictional and the real world, which are guided by neurotypical assumptions. These can 
impede the integration of neurominorities by the presuppositions that different neurotypes bring 
to the table about the purpose of social exchange (even when represented in a novel) or the values 
of reading certain kinds of books (fiction vs. non-fiction, say, or genre fiction vs. the realist literary 
novel). Such assumptions in current cognitive theory about the value of certain forms of literature 
operate by methodically excluding autistic presence, or holding it up as an extreme, which theorists 
contrast with normate expressions of the literary.  
When literary autism is present in a cognitive work, such as “Bartleby” or The Curious 
Incident, they are shown to be extremes, the constitutive outside of regular literary works of art, 
perhaps experimental, but definitely anomalies. Literary theorists, though well-read in some areas 
of the cognitive sciences, still neglect a more thorough investigation of ASCs and novels about the 
condition in order to state their case more powerfully, which has the deplorable effect of 
misrepresenting autism in scholarship. If we take the observations of disability studies into 
account, it confers a plethora of advantages on the cognitive critics that they would rather ignore. 
The richness and heterogeneity of personalities that autistic people bring to the table of literary 
criticism is best understood by complementing the interpretative foci of cognitive criticism with 
the sensitivity to the theoret(h)ical attention given to autism in disability studies. Their arguments 
about how to cooperate across neurotypes also raise the awareness of critics to the problems with 
the strict typological thinking of much cognitive criticism, which originates from an experimental 
psychology that aims to reconstruct the precise functioning of the brain based on the differences 
between clinical and non-clinical populations. The ethically responsible view on the functions of 
representing disabled difference enables critics of autism fiction to meaningfully discuss the 
artistic, rhetorical and compositional choices involved in featuring characters on the autistic 
spectrum that pure-bred cognitive commentators are yet to address in their work. This dissertation, 
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then, weaves together these different approaches to continue the work that Lisa Zunshine and 
Ralph James Savarese have started when they saw that cognitive literary criticism and disability 
studies have a lot to talk about (Zunshine and Savarese 2014). 
 
Making the Autistic Story Tellable 
 
There is an unspoken agreement between reader, writer and publisher, maybe the only thing 
they unanimously agree upon, about autism fiction: that autistic lives are worth telling. It might be 
a curious consensus, given that autism has been treated for so long as a disorder with no interiority, 
a reduced state of awareness and diminished consciousness. The experiential quality that infuses 
lives with meaning was missing; there was nothing the readers could sink their mind-reading teeth 
into. Rocking back and forth doth not a good narrative make.  
As Thomas Couser has noted, parent memoirs of autism have sprung up in the 1960s and 
70s, which could deliver the emotional ride, the ups and downs of struggling with autistic children, 
paving the way for later “autie-biographies” (Couser 2009, 5). Non-fiction writing was essential 
in developing the narrative patterns that generated an autistic interiority, among them the plot of 
‘overcoming difficulties’ (often presented from within the able autistic subject) and the ‘refraction 
of differences’ story (contrasting an autist with a neurotypical counterpart). Indeed, the successful 
narrative embedding of autism inspired Stuart Murray to observe: “The ‘overcoming’ narrative is 
so dominant in the representation of disability that it almost seems that there is no alternative. If 
those with disabilities don’t struggle against the limitations their conditions impose and make us 
all the richer for it, then what exactly is the story?” (Murray 2008, xvi). When written discourse 
enabled new ways of talking about the condition, autism became tellable as a lived experience, 
albeit in pre-conceived narrative structures, such as the overcoming narrative or the American 
conversion narrative (Fisher 2008, 51-64). 
In discourse analysis and narrative theory, tellability denotes the attention-worthiness and 
personal motivation for telling a story. It began its life in the sociolinguistic analyses of William 
Labov’s work (1972), but it was soon picked up by narrative psychologists and narratologists as 
well, and it contributed to the theory of ‘natural’ narratology. “The function of the story is to find 
an intentional state that mitigates or at least makes comprehensible a deviation from a canonical 
cultural pattern,” writes Jerome Bruner (1990, 49-50). A story reflects upon the obstacles of one’s 
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life, dilemmas of how to explain and evaluate turns of events that are meaningful to the people in 
the narrative situation. As such, the overcoming narrative might not just be prototypical of illness 
and disability narratives, but narratives in general: it is emotionally fulfilling to see our troubles 
resolved and then share them. This finds its echoes in the evolutionary argument that narrative is 
an adaptation for problem-solving, which aids cooperation by extending the empathetic circle of 
its receivers (Boyd 2009, 188-208). In this case, autism fiction becomes tellable because it is non-
canonical or atypical, and the mutual mind-occlusion across neurotypes requires vicariously 
experienceable tales to construct schemata of “autistic sociality” (Ochs and Solomon 2010).  
Tellability is a scalar concept; a person can evaluate events in their life as it relates to their 
well-being, desires and goals, some being life-changing, others mind-numbingly mundane. This 
evaluation is followed by another judgement: is it worth sharing with other people? Would it 
delight them; would they learn from it? How relevant is it to the community created by the speech 
act? These questions are automatically and instinctively decided in natural conversations because 
we are gregarious, social animals, and potential Gricean breaches are soon smoothed over by 
reparative talk. Tellability “can be concentrated in a single, precisely identifiable feature — the 
point of the text, such as the punch line or the piece of information wanted by the hearer — or it 
can be the effect of properties that operate throughout the narrative, structuring interest in the story 
as a sequence of peaks and valleys” (Ryan 2005, 590).  
Such narrative performance in autism is impaired – most autists are not predisposed to 
personal yarns about their experiences if they can help it. And when they do, the stories carry 
peculiarly autistic features. Their tellability and relevance are not clearly articulated, the speakers 
omit necessary knowledge their partners do not share and seldom reflect upon the speakers’ own 
perspective (Capps et al. 1998, Loveland and Tunali 1991, Tager-Flusberg 1995). Despite their 
aversions and troubles of putting their experiences in narrative form, they still soldier on. These 
children use personal narratives as technologies of the self, with which they can negotiate their 
(disabled) identities and avoid distressing events, manage the rewards they get or express their 
own opinion. “For children diagnosed with autism, such narrative interactions may take on special 
resonance regarding the ways in which they interface, display, and rework everyday 
understandings of typicality, disability, and difference in tandem with social and moral meanings 
and implications of such” (Sirota 2010). If autistic children find something worth telling, it is 
usually within the realm of their deep-seated interests or their capabilities, which are scripted 
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through family conversations as the central narrative themes of their lives. The inflexibility in the 
narrative scripts autistic children use and their relative inability to gauge an event’s tellability can 
lead to social isolation and bullying (Dean et al. 2013; Carter 2009). This demonstrates both the 
community-building power of good judgements of relevance and tellability on the one hand, and 
autistic people’s struggles to authenticate their experiences in social situations where neurotypical 
participants (the children’s ‘peers’) refuse to be generous conversational partners on the other.  
That gesture of social exclusion and the quest for identity is one of the conflicts that make 
autism tellable, and as a result, metafictional, too, since autism novels are fundamentally about the 
problems of telling one’s story, offering an insight into the narrative condition of humanity. As 
Michael Bérubé’s remarks, “[m]indedness is so obviously a necessary condition for self-
representation and narration that it should be no surprise to find various depictions of damaged 
mindedness serving […] as meditations on the possibility of narrative representation” (Bérubé 
2005, 572). Himself no stranger to, but largely sceptical of the cognitive paradigm, Bérubé finds 
narrative self-awareness to be an overarching theme and an important stake in the representation 
of (intellectual) disability, producing a valuable aesthetic effect. Deeming stories of cognitive 
disability tellable “enables a potential democratization of narrative representation, just as the 
expansion of autobiography to persons not ordinarily considered entitled to it represents a 
democratization of that genre” (Bérubé 2005, 575) – a worthy goal if there ever was one. 
 
Are Autism Novels Unnatural Narratives? 
 
Although a major movement within the field, not everyone is on board with the ‘natural’ 
or mimetic paradigm of narrative. Unnatural narratologists, for example, position themselves 
against this model of the narrative situation. Jan Alber and his colleagues have been collaborating 
on the interpretation of texts, passages, poetical vehicles and narrative designs that do not easily 
yield themselves to the mimetic standards of analysis developed by Fludernik. Their theoretical 
stance, first articulated in Alber et al. (2010) and crystallised later in A Poetics of Unnatural 
Narrative (2013), is to warn their fellow narratologists that  
 
[m]any narratives defy, flaunt, mock, play, and experiment with […] core assumptions 
about narrative. More specifically, they may radically deconstruct the 
anthropomorphic narrator, the traditional human character, and the minds associated 
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with them, or they may move beyond real-world notions of time and space, thus taking 
us to the most remote territories of conceptual possibilities. (Alber et al. 2010, 114)  
 
This analytical stance makes intuitive sense in the case of fantastic and experimental, 
postmodernist fiction, but less so for realistic fiction that deals with autism. In an SF/F novel, 
magic, computer simulations or the supernatural elements of the story can rearrange the 
spatiotemporal organisation of the storyworld, and the ontological hierarchies of representation 
can be gleefully questioned, as written narrative is not bound by the laws of physics, only the limits 
of the human imagination. Yet, they would be jarring distractions in an autism novel, which locates 
its characters in a specific sociohistorical place in the actual world.  
For my corpus of autism fiction, the stories are firmly set within our world, portrayed in 
the mimetic mode. Time, too, proceeds in an orderly fashion, albeit filtered by narrative 
conventions and the attention of the person experiencing its passage. I am happy to report that my 
narrators, despite their stigmatised identity, are well within the boundaries of humanity. Still, the 
discriminatory diegetic discourses which disable their fictional lives question their relationship to 
the ‘traditional human character, and the minds associated with them’ because of their atypical 
mental functioning. It creates a defamiliarising effect due to the underlying differences of the 
represented autistic mind. Insofar as unnatural narratology’s programme studies “(1) the ways in 
which strange and innovative narratives challenge mimetic understandings of narrative and (2) the 
consequences that the existence of such narratives may have for the general conception of what a 
narrative is and what it can do” (Alber et al. 2010, 115), my dissertation investigates whether (1) 
the autistic mind can be considered ‘unnatural’ in this narratological sense but it does not reflect 
upon (2), for my conclusions will be inherently conservative about narrative identification and 
empathy, both being established functions of narrative.  
The authors are admirably clear in defining what they mean by unnatural minds:  
 
Unnatural minds appear in many different narratives. The reader is typically cued to 
evoke a mind, but this process is obstructed, disfigured or in other ways challenged by 
identifiable and describable features of the narrative. […]. The differences between the 
rather diverse forms of unnatural minds may be sketched out as a continuum ranging 
from well-known and thus conventionalized cases of unnatural minds to the most 
bizarre and opaque cases found in experimental fiction. In between these extremes, we 
find a wide range of narratives that clearly facilitates the reader’s inference of a mind 
while at the same time either imbuing this mind with abilities that transgress those of 
human minds or deconstructing one or more of the key elements of a working human 
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mind. (Alber et al. 2010, emphasis added)  
 
Even if the authors speak of omniscient narration and impossibly omniscient ‘limited’ 
focalisers (e.g. first-person narrators) as prominent examples of an unnatural mind at work, the last 
clause captures the facet which enables me to treat the autistic mind as a threshold case for 
unnatural fictional minds. An autistic mind is indisputably a working human mind, but its 
principles of understanding the world does deconstruct the assumptions supplied by our theory of 
mind, which governs the perceptions of social norms in the neurotypical community. As long as 
the character’s perceptions of the represented world, their inferences drawn from that context, their 
emotional response or their physical actions substantially differ from how an anthropological 
model reader would react to that situation, we are witnessing an unnatural mind at work in the text. 
Further support for the inclusion of the autistic mind within the scope of the unnatural 
comes from Stefan Iversen; he identifies “certain types of subversive, arresting, strange, and odd 
minds that one encounters in narratives” as the proper domain of narratological inquiry about 
unnatural minds (Iversen 2013, 94). It would be an understatement to say that oddness is the main 
draw of the represented autistic mind for neurotypical readers. Contrasting unnatural narratology 
with the advances of cognitive approaches to literature, Iversen shows that Alber’s work continues 
the cognitive programme by facilitating the interpretation of strange minds, which Iversen calls a 
“renaturalizing” strategy (95), whereas he puts Abbott’s work as exemplifying the 
“nonnaturalizing” (96) tendency, a respectful approach that does not erase the basic unreadability 
of unnatural minds. He creates a rough-and-ready threefold typology of unnatural minds based on 
what kind of reading they invite: 1.) a mind that becomes naturalised is explained diegetically to 
be the way it is by the narrative devices of the story; 2.) a mind that remains impossible is non-
mimetic but conventionalised by the genre in which it appears (such as tales of human-beast 
transformations in comic books) and there are instances 3.) in which neither of the two options 
above prove to be a successful strategy to integrate the aberrant mind into the story, thus it becomes 
an unnatural mind proper, described as “a presented consciousness that in its functions or 
realizations violates the rules governing the possible world it is part of in a way that resists 
naturalization or conventionalization” (97, emphasis added). 
The question returns, with some urgency: Does the autistic mind fit into this latter 
category? To a degree, both of the evasive strategies are used in middlebrow fiction to enable the 
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empathetic reception of the autistic mind. Like Ato Quayson’s ideal category of “disability as 
normality” (2007, 52), autism novels explain disability as neurological difference, a naturalising 
strategy that anchors said difference in the mind. But the actions the autistic protagonists face 
cannot be explained “with the aid of text-external cues such as knowledge of how actual minds 
typically work” (Iversen 2013, 97, emphasis added). Neither can autistic minds be interpreted as 
artefacts of genre conventions, like science-fiction robots’ positronic brains, and thus be 
allegorised. However, autism fiction gives “text-internal clues” (97) that seek to enlighten NT 
readers about autists’ behaviour, often in a bluntly didactic sense, at the very least making their 
minds readable, and possibly ‘natural’. Even so, Iversen uses clear and precise language to address 
narrative relativism as the benchmark of unnaturalness: “the unnatural is unnatural compared with 
the naturalness set forth by the specific narrative, not compared with some sort of global 
naturalness, whatever that might be” (98). Autism fiction plays with the boundaries of normality, 
and even when its aesthetic effects serve to humanise (or naturalise?) the autist, the effect itself 
depends upon the neurological differences outlined by the narrative. Iversen’s survey of 
psychology and narratology might help us decide if we’re on the right track. 
To state the case for the place of unnatural narratology against mainstream cognitive 
literary studies, Iversen launches into a stimulating review of the dominant mind-reading 
paradigm. He builds his account on criticism coming from the interactionist school of folk 
psychology, notably Shaun Gallagher and Daniel D. Hutto’s work. He recites the standard account 
of cognitive criticism, citing evidence for mindblindness in autism and he reproduces the theory-
theory vs. simulation theory debate’s claims without mentioning that hybrid approaches exist. 
Ultimately, he identifies the assumption of similarity from self to other and from actual to fictional 
minds as the lynchpin of the simulationist claim. Rallied under the banner of being Against Theory 
of Mind (Leudar and Costall 2009), the philosophers and psychologists whom Iversen cites argue 
that the dominant paradigm is a “closet Cartesianism” (Sharrock 2009, 191-208). They insist that 
modularist claims are underdetermined by the current scientific evidence and the hegemonic rule 
of ToM is a result of the control that can be exercised in the experimental setting or its adaptability 
to different groups rather than its validity (Hutto 2009, 241-238).  
The alternative they offer is the “Narrative Practice Hypothesis” (Hutto 2007, 2008), which 
posits that instead of theoretical hypothesis testing or innate simulation, children simply learn to 
understand their fellow human beings as social agents by participating in interactions with their 
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caregivers, using language to refine their mental-emotional vocabulary and expectations about 
internal states. They present the premise that other minds are occluded and unknowable as a false 
claim, because people’s embodied behaviour and social engagements with others offer enough 
insight into the workings of other minds (Gallagher 2008). Based on these assertions, it logically 
follows for Iversen that we do not apply the same practice to real and fictional minds: “in real life 
we rarely read minds, whereas in fiction we have no choice but to do so,” thereby rejecting the 
ToM as a universal heuristic for intersubjectivity in real life. He calls upon folk-psychological 
motivations for behaviour in the consumption of fiction since these attributions “normally happen 
effortlessly; but narratives that stray from or disrupt or subvert the norms or rules of our folk 
psychological competences pose an interesting methodological challenge” (Iversen 2013, 103). 
That they do, and autism is not ruled out by this definition, for it is one case where the 
protagonist goes against the grain of typical readers’ native psychological competences. Especially 
not when we consider the autobiographical writings of HFA individuals, whose lived experiences, 
as another contributor to (Leudar and Costall 2009) observes, closely mimic the standard ToM 
narrative of interpersonal epistemology. Autistic people’s social condition and their algorithmic 
understanding of everyday situations suggest that, at least,  
 
they do resort to an intellectual theory-driven approach in their efforts to make some 
sense of what are to them confusing and unpredictable social encounters. […] In the 
absence of sustained experience of mutual empathic engagement with other people, 
and their difficulty in reading social and affective signals, these individuals find 
themselves in a position where they have to intellectualize social interactions. 
(Williams 2009, 165) 
 
Whether simulation theory would offer a suitable alternative for typically developing 
individuals is not discussed by Williams, but her chapter on autism rejects the Theory-Theory 
approach for NTs and it helps the scholar to make sense of Iversen’s critique of the cognitive 
paradigm, as well as the unnaturalists’ claim for the inadequacy of ToM discourse. What Iversen 
does not address is whether the ToM approach might be useful for other populations.  
I would contend that despite the present lack of consensus about the mental mechanisms 
for social epistemology, the people who are certainly amenable to ToM-based readings are 
precisely the autistic characters. Iversen cites Abbott’s paper on “Bartleby, the Scrivener” (Abbott 
2008) as the par excellence unreadable, and therefore, unnatural mind. He takes the scholar’s 
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assessment of Bartleby’s bizarrerie at face value, without applying his knowledge of the autism 
spectrum to the character, an omission that is repeated with Williams’ chapter in criticising the 
ToM approach. The systematic inability to connect the dots between neurologically different 
characters and the awareness of autism as a foil for effortless mentalising that haunts the whole 
cognitive enterprise is reproduced in full by the unnaturalist school here.  
An autistic mind is not an “impossible mind” in the sense Iversen uses for his analysis of 
a transformation narrative (2013, 104-109), yet it also cannot be fully naturalised in autism fiction. 
Nor can it be conventionalised as a staple of a genre. Its invisibility for the study of unnatural 
minds should be attributed to its borderline status: not quite insane or mad, not quite occluded but 
far from transparent, defying the natural interpretative strategies for social exchange, yet real and 
mimetic. Like Abbott, the unnaturalist school would prefer to not read autism into Bartleby – doing 
so would count as a naturalising strategy. But the anomalous status of neurological difference 
could work as a land bridge between the unreadable and the unnatural, the anti-mimetic and the 
disabled. Just like the human-animal transformation narrative, the autism novel “dislocates the 
distinction between the mind as an intramental phenomenon and the mind as a social phenomenon 
in an instructive way, especially with regard to the distinction between internal and external minds” 
(109), and the examination of limit cases must inevitably reposition cognitive literary studies 
within a more inclusive framework. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONTEXTUALISING THE AUTISM NOVEL IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE: 
CONSTRUCTING FASCINATING NARRATIVES 
 
“We are here to care for the garden 
The wonder of birth 
Of every form most beautiful” 
– Tuomas Holopainen (Nightwish 2015), “The Greatest Show on Earth” 
 
Choosing the Right Novels 
 
If we see autism as a ‘disease du jour,’ a mirror of an electronic decade or two, it no doubt 
explains the surge of interest in popular fiction devoted to the condition, but seeing it only as the 
disease of the day risks underinterpreting its success. Autism in literature might not sound like a 
vast, inexhaustible topic, but this very popular interest assured that writers rose to the hermeneutic 
and empathic challenge of presenting a convincing version of the autistic mind for a neurotypical 
readership. Hence the rise of the middlebrow autism novel, which is targeted at female readers and 
the supporting family of autists, especially mothers and spouses, and gives them an opportunity to 
step into the shoes of their autistic loved ones.  
The new genre is an easy treat for disability scholars, too, who tend to interpret disability narratives 
on the basis of an ethical commitment to equality in representation, hunting for inaccuracies, 
decrying stereotypes and championing difference. Still, as Irene Rose eloquently put it in 
connection with The Curious Incident’s success:  
 
I suggest that it is time that a thorough exposition of the novel and its contemporary 
climate be undertaken to explore how the novel managed to be so effective in 
responding to its cultural moment that it was subsequently enabled to cross over from 
fictional to ethnographic status. Furthermore, I suggest that this requires a move far 
beyond the notion of reductive representation or stereotyping and the theoretical 
foreclosure such a position engenders. (Rose 2008, 56)  
 
This dissertation has already responded to Rose’s challenge, and I intend to explore some of the 
typologies and foreclosures the attitude of literary disability scholars have attempted to institute. 
Since my dissertation examines autistic mental functioning on the textual level, this leads 
me to analyse novels which feature at least one point of view character on the spectrum. From this 
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still admittedly large pool, I have striven to select those which have already generated some critical 
response in literary disability studies in order to engage in dialogue with current scholarship. The 
final objects of my study, Mark Haddon’s The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time (a 
young adult book), Elizabeth Moon’s Speed of Dark (a science fiction novel), Claire Morrall’s The 
Language of Others (a British novel of manners hewing closest to highbrow literature) and Jodi 
Picoult’s House Rules (a multiperspectival legal drama) are high-profile works. I have chosen them 
to showcase how different novels articulate their thematic and compositional position on autism 
despite a shared Anglo-American cultural discourse.  
These four case studies branch out to different aspects of autistic lives, and I use them to 
develop separate theoretical problems for cognitive literary studies. Haddon’s Curious Incident is 
curious because it is the most self-reflexive and experimental novel, demonstrating a certain 
disability of the narrative itself, which explores the fringes of storytelling when it is filtered through 
Christopher Boone’s Asperger’s Syndrome. Compared to Incident, Moon’s Speed of Dark is a 
more straightforward narrative that thematises neuroethics in a near-future setting, whose autistic 
protagonist, Lou Arrendale has unique perceptual abilities and social difficulties which foreground 
the ‘social norms of cognition,’ a concept I employ to accommodate a critical ethicognitive reading 
of the autistic mind at work, both figuratively and literally. The most mature protagonist we meet 
is Jessica Fontaine in Morrall’s The Language of Others, who has to mitigate the damage inflicted 
upon her during a disastrous, abusive marriage, in which her autism plays a significant role. Central 
to my interests here is the depiction of interpretative ambiguity in social understanding, the 
consumption of fiction, as well as questions of vulnerability and violence. Finally, Picoult’s House 
Rules is an excellent case study for the strategic use of frequent POV shifts in a bulky novel written 
from the perspective of five different characters, which prominently features representations of 
deep intermental thinking and the social mind in action in the service of empathic engagement. 
 
Reading Strategies for Interpreting Autism Novels:  
The Literal, Figurative and Suspicious Mode 
 
The pioneering work of Ian Hacking has been a springboard for most culturalist accounts 
of how autism was construed as an entity, and his thoughts are a wonderful starting point to 
produce a theory of context. As a historian of science researching ways of ‘making people up,’ 
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Hacking has been studying modern autism as a kind-making exercise in carving human nature at 
its psychological joints. For him, this includes every sort of writing dedicated to autism beyond 
the scientific, including autobiographies and fiction. Reviewing his essays on literary works about 
autism yields several conclusions that will affect my own analysis of narrating the condition. His 
paper “Autism Fiction: A Mirror of an Internet Decade?” (2010b) comes with a cautious question 
mark attached to the title, but it is shed when Hacking begins writing in earnest. Painting with 
broad brush-strokes, he surveys thirteen novels to evaluate and categorise them thematically 
according to how they treat autism. After setting up categories for solid journeyman writing, 
exploitation fantasy, and young adult science fiction with an autistic twist, he singles out Mark 
Haddon’s Curious Incident as a trend-setter book, which fits into no specific box. Then he moves 
on to so-called ‘retroactive fiction,’ which actually turns out to be a set of retroactive readings of 
older fictional pieces – a method about which I have my reservations.  
 Crucially for my own corpus, he creates the largest category in his taxonomy for the 
“autistic computer geek” or “techs are autistic” theme (Hacking 2010, 648), where two of my 
selected novels fall, Moon’s Speed of Dark and Morrall’s The Language of Others. Although he 
admits that this category is the only one to directly address the Internet decade, he nevertheless 
attempts to connect all the novels included in his survey. His conclusion is a strongly limited 
reading in my view: although the “connection between autism and the Internet is connected in only 
a loose way with banal chat about techs having autistic traits, [even in the silly novels] there is the 
recognition [that] new ways to communicate [change the life of the autistic hero, a recognition] of 
a communicative life other than the ancient neurotypical one” (653-4). This is a reading that erases 
how autism contributes to the discussion of the relationship between social interactions and their 
corporeal and technological mediation.  
Further proof for this tendency is supplied by Hacking in the final paragraph: “Now read 
the entire genre […] as about creatures who can become fulfilled only by [the Internet]. Thus the 
attraction for the subsidiary theme, of the nerd as autist and the autist as nerd. [… T]he role of this 
trope […] is not to tell the truth about autism. It is to reflect an aspect of our times that we are only 
beginning to think about” (654). This is a highly suspicious reading, one that grafts autism onto 
these fictional works to direct attention away from the sensory world and the mental processes of 
autistic individuals to other concerns. Favouring such a contemplation of the (im)possibilities of 
communication instead of an empathetic attention to personality replays the logic of autistic 
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cognition and structuralist narratology, where people and characters are viewed as functions in a 
greater structure, even if the two strategies of reading are not related per se. 
The phenomenon of autism has become an omen, a warning sign that something in our 
culture has gone awry, and this shift in society contributed a great deal to the prominence of the 
condition. But Hacking tries too hard to historicise autism and therefore produces an allegorical 
reading. Other scholars have attempted this route, with similar success. Kirby writes that today’s 
society is a “digimodernist” one, in which a “universal autism” produces “a social system identical 
with (pseudo)autistic traits [whose] individuals [are] assimilable to autists” (2009, 229). 
Surprisingly, he also embraces the converse of the argument, that autism is also a “ready-made 
antithesis of the peculiarities of today’s world” (231). He attributes this to other demands: the 
demand to be hypersocial and urban spurns the solitude and silence of the autistic person; digital 
capitalism – with its flexible multitasking and precarious workplaces – goes against the autistic 
person’s need for constancy, ritualistic sameness; the drive to become popular and to express one’s 
self in the present with no regard to deep learning or a knowledge of the past clash with the 
monomaniac, in-depth, nerdy awkwardness of autism, and many other cultural symptoms are 
marshalled in to argue that contemporary social life excludes autistic subjectivity (231-233).  
Personally, I find the argument that autism fiction is more enlightening when read 
metaphorically (to express general anxieties about communication in an Internet era) to be a 
misleading interpretation, as it explains little about the aesthetic function of the condition. It is also 
a rehashing of Mitchell and Snyder’s wider thesis about disability’s role in narratives, which 
suggests that “[disability’s] function in literary discourse is primarily twofold: [it] pervades literary 
narrative, first, as a stock feature of characterisation and, second, as an opportunistic metaphorical 
device […] Disability lends a distinctive idiosyncrasy to any character that differentiates the 
character from the anonymous background of the ’norm’” (2000, 47). Even if Hacking suggests 
that it is the authors who use autists as ‘opportunistic metaphorical devices,’ I would contend that 
it is rather the analytical lens used here that distorts its object of study. 
 Hacking’s metaphorical and suspicious interpretation instructs us to consider one, 
presumably counterintuitive kind of reading, one of reflection upon neurotypical self and society, 
that closes down other interpretative routes (like disability as an embodied, enminded experience) 
which produce empathetic readings of the protagonists. Even in his earlier work on autistic 
biographies, Hacking maintained that “that the autobiographies do not so much describe the mental 
- 112 - 
life of their autistic authors, as constitute it by choosing words from ordinary language to be 
applied in connection with their behaviour” (2009, 1472). This is an insight I find merit in, since 
prior to the publication of these autobiographies, autists were perceived as the exact opposites of 
speaking subjects, who could not authoritatively talk about their lives, so these lived experiences 
are constituted linguistically on the pages of these autobiographies. I still fear that Hacking’s 
conception of life-writing also implies that there is nothing to be described prior to the act of 
writing, only behaviour, as if there were no referents (experiences) to the words.  
In fact, as virtual autobiographical snippets, autism novels with internally focalised 
narrators often make references to earlier episodes from their mental lives that had puzzled the 
protagonists until they learnt the problem-solving shorthands to interpret neurotypical behaviour 
(this will be most palpable in Morrall’s Language). These areas of experience also include – 
despite all notions of a discursive, performative ex nihilo creation of culture – an embodied, non-
linguistic layer of mental life that is prior to its verbalisation. Obviously, no analysis of novels can 
prove that people on the spectrum have a qualitative understanding of their experiences, but this 
way, Hacking subscribes to a notion of logocentric consciousness that only exists insofar as it is 
expressed in words. This is epitomised in his subchapter heading called “texts not people” (2009, 
1468). This is where we most differ as, following Alan Palmer, I shall approach characters in the 
novels I am about to explore as virtual people, or, more precisely, fictional mind(-bodie)s in action.  
One of the benefits of the cognitive narratological approach is that we begin to notice a 
deficit in literary studies. Scholars have a tendency to glean consciousness from speech, usually 
textual speech, without evidence from other disciplines which observe and interpret non-linguistic 
human behaviour. This is why I feel the need to anchor a critical discourse on the aesthetics of 
autism novels in results obtained from cognitive psychology and the neurosciences, two fields 
which investigate the qualitative dimension of human life, even in its neural correlates, and give 
us explanations that move beyond hermeneutic interpretations.  
My goal in amalgamating empirical observations with interpretative claims is not to 
subjugate literary analysis to one particular conception of a very plastic human nature. Instead, I 
hope to bring two valuable, but divergent strains of thought into conversation with one another. 
One is literary scholarship and its traditional ethical concerns with power and our sensitivity 
towards the relationship between thought and language, our emphasis on individuality and group 
solidarity. The other is cognitive psychologists’ and neuroscientists’ exacting, methodologically 
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rigorous, empirically supported and often hotly debated research about the functioning of the 
human mind, which eliminates more implausible theories to zone in on a probabilistically true 
account of how our mind-body affects our experiences. As William E. Connolly aptly observes, 
our conceptions of scientific truth influence our vision of what to expect of other people, and 
ongoing debates about what is a normal and/or acceptable range of (neuro)diversity have a 
significant effect on how groups of people interpret one another. Connolly developed the twin 
concepts of the body/brain/culture network and multidimensional diversity, to name a tangled web 
of corporeal interactions that shape our lives, and a desirable way of relating to different segments 
of the population, respectively (Connolly 2002, 1-22) to which scientific understanding massively 
contributes. The authors of the autism novels I investigate also recognise that the discourse of 
autism is symbiotically intertwined with its scientific image. There can be no talk of autism without 
some recourse to scientific knowledge, may it be a rebuttal, a critical reassessment or an illustrative 
validation of its findings. As a literary scholar, I participate in Hacking’s thought experiment to 
see what comes of analysing the “form of words that represents how the autist felt, or seems to 
remember feeling” (2009, 1473), but I cannot ignore scientific truth claims about living, diagnosed 
people, about human empathy and emotional responses to other people, whether real or fictional. 
Hacking builds up a strong theoretical edifice to interpret autism in his book called The 
Social Construction of What? (Hacking 1999). It revolves around the idea that kind-making can 
be a one-way street, when a new category does not change the object of observation (for example, 
discovering quarks and dolomite). These are non-interactive (or indifferent) kinds, like most of the 
natural scientific concepts. There are others instances, where concepts forged in the research 
process have a tangible effect on the object of study (such as abused children or autists); they are 
interactive kinds, which usually populate the books and papers of the human and social sciences. 
He locates autism as a borderline case for this classification, since the psychological literature 
suggests that the condition is rooted in our brains and biology, while autists are human beings who 
respond to the way their environment treats them. He writes: “Here we want to say both that 
childhood autism is […] a certain biological pathology P, and so is a ‘natural’ kind or an indifferent 
kind. At the same time, we want to say that childhood autism is an interactive kind, interacting 
with autistic children, evolving and changing as the children change” (Hacking 1999, 119). This 
double nature of autism – both as an ingrained set of behaviours and as the changing experiences 
of autists – will constitute a curious dynamic in how characters understand the effect of autism on 
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their lives. The culture created by the difference of autists and their thought styles, to appropriate 
Ludwik Fleck’s term (1979), can teach us to defamiliarise our own and to appreciate their original 
contributions to our repertoire of human behaviour.  
Just as literary critics can learn a thing or two from neuroscientists about culture, so can 
literary scholars reveal that the neurological research of cognitive functions “show us how the 
inwardisation of culture, replete with resistances and ambivalences, is installed at several levels of 
being, with each level both interacting with the others and marked by different speeds, capacities, 
and degrees of linguistic sophistication” (Connolly 2002, 6). Both thinkers’ insistence on the 
importance of interaction, internality and the attention to verbal expression links Hacking and 
Connolly as useful theorists for interpreting autism novels. The supervenient and interactive 
structure of genetics and their environment, evolved psychology, cultural ideologies, individual 
behavioural strategies and personal history come together to imbue flesh-and-blood autistic people 
with unique and collective identities. These have to be recreated in fictional form for novels about 
autism to appear plausibly authentic and psychologically compelling for the reader.  
In analysing novels, literary critics should incorporate the findings of the extensive 
scientific literature on autism, for two reasons. Minimally, so as not to mischaracterise the current 
literature as excessively derogatory of autistic abilities and as emphasising deficits over strengths. 
And more optimally, to judge the history of science in the making with a more constructive eye 
towards the standards of evidence required by the experimental procedures. Indeed, autism’s main 
feature is this inwardisation of personality, and the ambivalent nature of autists has certainly helped 
to generate an enduring fascination with the condition. A fascination that is begat by the need to 
scientifically explain the condition through the ethnographical description of autists and by writing 
the imaginative, emic accounts neurotypical writers produce for consumption. I investigate how 
the mutual dependence of scientific and literary discourses shape our tradition of images of autism. 
In doing so, I also heed the call of Hacking to arrive at an interpretative framework about specific 
forms of kind-making, which in this study will be the proximate causes of the emergence of autism 
fiction: “We need a detailed example to get some sense of how, in ordinary life, we select and 
organise new kinds. We need an example of evolving tradition, not evolution over a thousand 
years, but evolution over a few decades” (Hacking 1999, 130). In my opinion, the representational 
methods of the novels are an instructive case study for the evolving tradition of autism fiction that 
elicit readerly empathy while creating a more neurocosmopolitan community. 
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Writing about J. M. Coetzee’s Life and Times of Michael K. (2007 [1983]) and reading the 
protagonist’s silence as a sign of autism, Quayson asserts that “the project of identifying autism in 
writing that does not explicitly set out to present itself as dealing with that condition is an elusive 
and fraught process” (2007, 152). He cautiously maps out the territory of autism and yet, once he 
begins to enumerate works suspected to feature autistic characters, and the need to add to the list 
takes over, caution is thrown to the wind: “once we begin to think of such silent characters as 
illustrating aspects of the autistic spectrum, we begin to see how widespread autism features in 
literary writing” (2007, 153, emphasis mine). The problem is that Michael K. would probably not 
be diagnosed as autistic, given that a) nonverbality is not, in and of itself, a sufficient condition for 
diagnosis and b) a great deal of the autistic characters are far from mute: they can experience the 
world narratively (evidenced by internally focalised discourse) and they can converse with other 
characters. Quayson problematically equates an almost mutistic silence with autism: “in the case 
of the representation of the autistic spectrum, the point of interest is not so much that the thoughts 
of the autist are dialogized […], but that this orientation is performed against the autist’s desire 
for absolute social silence and separation from social intercourse” (154). Alas, this characterisation 
can only account for one group of autists, the ‘aloof’ group, who do indeed shy away from 
extended social intercourse, whereas people with autism who fall into the ‘active, but odd’ or the 
‘overly formal’ group are happy to socially engage others.  
To my mind, Michael K.’s autism is not at all proven or consistently argued for by 
Quayson. When he suggests that “[t]he main difference between an autist and another character 
that chooses to cultivate their solitude-in-silence is that the autist elects silence as a way of 
completely disavowing or at the very least sharply attenuating social interaction” (155, my 
emphasis), it implies a false sense of deliberateness, a choice, as if autists used their silence to 
achieve a purpose, and their silence becomes a symbol in this kind of reading. This is certainly not 
the case with a varied group of people, who might or might not experience a delay in language 
acquisition, might or might not develop echolalia as an intermediate stage of communication and 
might or might not improve verbal skills in the course of their lives. Michael K. certainly does not 
live up to the classical nonverbal autist’s image. He might be a man of few words, but he does use 
sociopragmatically appropriate, neurotypical language to achieve particular social goals. While he 
is characterised in the book as intellectually disabled, that disability is unlikely to be autism. 
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Quayson downplays the alternative interpretations which would anchor his occasional silence in 
his broken family and institutional upbringing, writing that “[e]ven though […] it would seem that 
silence was imposed upon him as a parental and educational injunction to good behavior, it is also 
evident that the injunction to silence is further assimilated to his own desire to avoid social 
interaction of all sorts” (164-165, my emphasis). And yet, precious little evidence is given that he 
desires to avoid all social interactions versus his desire to escape oppressive and inhuman 
interactions with people, more or less the only kind he experiences throughout to novel. 
Despite Quayson’s interpretative weakness in reading a particular postcolonial novel as a 
case for autism, Aesthetic Nervousness does give scholars an important taxonomy of functions 
disability can serve in novels. His provisional typology of disability representations (36-53) is 
more useful in making nuanced distinctions between the functions of disability in literary texts 
than Mitchell and Snyder’s thesis. I shall only be discussing those categories which pertain to the 
four novels I am interpreting. The most straightforward cases Quayson starts out with are the works 
“in which [disability] acts as some form of ethical background to the actions of other characters, 
or as a means of testing or enhancing their moral standing” (36), partially overlapping with Stuart 
Murray’s ‘narrative refraction.’ In this topos, the neuroatypical character is meaningful only in 
terms of what “other characters learn from their proximity to the condition. All the films [Murray 
analyses] use the refraction narrative of paired impaired/non-impaired characters not only to 
explore ideas of difference, but also to illuminate for majority audiences questions of individual 
responsibility, behaviour and knowledge” (Murray 2008, 123). Quayson calls this set of 
representations disability as null set and/or moral test. 
The second set of depictions of autism are closely linked to the first, but they emerge in 
response to the colonial vision in the nineteenth century where “disability representations [are] 
used to raise a different set of problems, sometimes going well beyond concerns with social 
hierarchies and relationships to embrace the confluence of imperialism and the production of 
various Others” (37), including race, gender, sexuality, and social identity as a function of moral 
choices, but the moral test is balanced out with the presentation of alterity. Quayson names this 
strategy disability as the interface with otherness (race, class, sexuality, and social identity). This 
is complemented by the second meaning of Murray’s narrative refraction. Acknowledging his debt 
to the narrative prosthesis, Murray fine-tunes the earlier concept by highlighting that “the 
representations [refraction narratives] contain are characterized by a focus on ontological and 
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‘human’ difference that frequently depicts an individual with autism in relation to an individual 
with ostensibly typical (non-impaired) behaviour and mediates an idea of the human by a refractive 
comparison of the two” (Murray 2008, 13, emphases added).  
Quayson creates a group for stories where disability signifies a transgression from the 
realm of the profane to the realm of the sacred, defining a temporally-ordered pattern, a “shift from 
innocence to ritual transgression and contagion on to sacredness,” “marking [the disabled 
characters] with ritual danger, so that they have to be driven out to avoid the total destruction of 
the rest of the community,” “while […] the wider society [desires] to acquire or at least gain access 
to a boon that these disabled characters possess and which is seen as critical for the well-being of 
the society (46). This aspect of disability as signifier of ritual insight will appear in a more modern, 
technicised format in several of the autism novels under analysis. The tech-savvy autistic nerds 
often possess highly developed coding and pattern-recognition skills that NTs see as almost 
supernatural. Some of them will want to exploit autistic skills for industrial purposes while 
neutralising the more challenging facets of neurological difference that renders autists disruptive 
of the standards of normal society. 
Varying degrees of verbality in autism and a general difficulty of mutual intelligibility also 
predestines autists for their disability to appear as inarticulable and enigmatic tragic insight. 
Quayson notes that “the recognition of the tragic ethos by the disabled female character coincides 
precisely with their inability to speak of the terrible tragic knowledge to which they bear witness. 
All that is left is a series of fragmented enactments of the self, posing an enigma for the characters 
[…], the reader and spectator” (48-49). A variation of this topos will be apprehended in Morrall’s 
The Language of Others, albeit with a twist: Jessica Fontaine’s emotional expressions and attempts 
at communication are channelled into music from an early age, and it is only later on that she 
realises that her own inability to connect to other people is rooted in her Asperger’s, which she 
passed on to Joel and could not articulate to herself until the end of the book. 
Still, the two most useful categories among Quayson’s nine are the ones that drive readers’ 
needs for more empathetic, interpretative engagement and capture the autism spectrum at its most 
diverse. He names disability as a site of a major hermeneutical impasse in some cases, “a manic 
urge to interpret, provoked by the disability, which nevertheless does not lead to any 
enlightenment” (49), with the disabled characters being a “mocking enigma” (50). Finally, there 
are an increasing number of works in which “the disabled characters are completely normalized 
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and exist within the full range of human emotions, contradictions, hopes, fears, and vague ideas, 
just like any other character” (51), that is, which treat disability as normality, and it is “used as a 
pointed critique of social hyprocrisy and indeed of social institutions in general” (52).  
I would argue that all the four books in my corpus belong to this trope, since their 
protagonists are fully developed characters and we gain a great deal of insight into their inner 
workings. Their actions and thoughts are critical of their social environment that stigmatises 
autism, but that does not mean the rest of the categories are of no use to us whatsoever. Actually, 
most of the tropes and functions of disability listed by Quayson appear in my corpus in one fashion 
or another, mostly expressed through the neurotypical characters who interpret the autistic 
hero(ine)s along the lines of earlier stereotypes. Even so, the authors shape their story to make 
significant thematic points unrelated to disability which nonetheless gain their meaning from their 
interaction with it in ways which Quayson has observed. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE CURIOUS EMERGENCE OF THE NEUROLOGICAL OTHER AT THE TURN OF THE 
MILLENNIUM: MARK HADDON’S REPRESENTATION OF THE AUTISTIC MIND 
 
“I want to travel where life travels, following its permanent lead  
Where the air tastes like snow music  
Where grass smells like fresh-born Eden  
I would pass no man, no stranger, no tragedy or rapture  
I would bathe in a world of sensation” 
– Tuomas Holopainen (Nightwish 2011), “Song of Myself” 
 
No-one was really prepared for the popularity of The Curious Incident of the Dog in the 
Night-time (2002). It was a brave decision for Mark Haddon, an acclaimed author of children’s 
literature, to write a book for adult readers from the perspective of a cognitively disabled teenager. 
Published at the height of the MMR vaccine scare, it broke new ground, as few novels have sought 
to portray autists before, let alone featured a protagonist on the spectrum. But following the Decade 
of the Brain between 1990 and 2000, the changes of the DSM (IV in 1994), as well as the passing 
of the Individual with Disabilities Education Act in the US in 1990 and the enactment of the 
Special Education Needs and Disability Act in the UK in 2001, both countries were aware of the 
rise of disabled people participating in the public realm.  
Upon publication, reviews were glowing. It was hailed in The Guardian as “a funny book, 
as well as a sad one [that] demonstrates the rich idiosyncrasies of the autistic brain” and “brilliant” 
(Moore 2003) – on the pages of The Telegraph, Christopher was introduced as “a wonderful 
fictional creation; a believable, oddly lovable character and a moving education in difference” by 
later poet laureate Carol Ann Duffy (Duffy 2003). No doubt, its success owed much to being 
written at the right time and the right place, but reviewers agreed upon the freshness and originality 
of the conceit. In their minds, the book represented autistic consciousness from the inside to 
comment upon the state of society and sociality on the new millennium. 
The novel itself does not use the words ‘autism’ or ‘Asperger’s Syndrome’ anywhere 
within the body of the text. Its protagonist, 15-year-(and-3-month-and-2-day)-old Christopher was 
never labelled disabled by the author. In a recent interview, celebrating the Olivier Award-winning 
stage adaptation of the novel, Haddon continued to express his view, calling it “‘my dogged 
position[,] that it’s a novel about difference’, not about disability, adding that he thinks ‘the 
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disability, if you want to call it that, is not something that an individual possesses, but is a quality 
of the relationships between people’” (Rustin 2013). His view resonates nicely with the social 
model of disability, reproducing its main argument in a concise phrase. As for Christopher, he 
considers himself to have “Behavioural Problems” (Haddon 2003, 59), a wider and less 
stigmatising term, and the capitalisation implies that even this expression was probably borrowed 
from a professional or a parent. Yet, his problems place him on the spectrum, and the paratextual 
discourse of the book — including the blurbs and the reviews, the interviews and the praise — 
never fails to designate the main hero as a young man with Asperger’s. In fact, despite Haddon’s 
protestations (he is often invited to talk about autism, on which he is not an expert), it would be 
unwise to de-emphasise Christopher’s impairments. His troubles with sensory and social 
adjustments to the world do replay the grand themes of autistic difference. Seeing his own brain 
and self as a machine, Christopher is a creature of extremely circumscribed habits and passions, 
he is emotionally detached, honest to a fault with no regard to other people’s feelings and 
oversensitive to sounds and smells. He dreams of a world with no social relationships in his spare 
time, when he is not researching chaos theory or preparing for his A-level Maths exam. 
Christopher lives in Swindon with his widowed father, Ed, as her mother has died of heart 
failure. Christopher attends a school for children with special needs (whom he merely deems 
“stupid” (56), unlike himself), where they learn life skills such as “Reading and Tests and Social 
Skills and Looking after Animals and What We Did at the Weekend and Writing and Maths and 
Stranger Danger and Money and Personal Hygiene” (192). His life of routine, set in stone by his 
desire for security and predictability, is shattered when he finds out that the neighbour’s dog, 
Wellington was stabbed to death by a garden fork. His great, empathetic love of animals prompts 
him to investigate this gruesome murder, imitating his fictional role model, Sherlock Holmes. The 
impromptu investigator immensely enjoys his newfound task, in which he can explore a world 
within the well-defined boundaries of a social script, that of detective fiction, much to the chagrin 
of his father. The young detective records his reasoning and evidence in a book he writes for their 
class, encouraged by Siobhan, one of the tutors at her school. The investigation is often hindered 
by his interfering father, who is greatly upset and wishes his son “to stop this ridiculous bloody 
detective game” (72). As Christopher begins to uncover the mystery, he finds out that his mother 
had been conducting a petty love affair with Mr. Shears prior to her death, leading to the 
deterioration of the Boones’ and the Shears’ marriage. 
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One day he carelessly misplaces the diary, only to be found by Ed, who reads it and realises 
that his son has knowledge of the affair, a revelation that leads to an altercation between the two, 
forever souring Christopher’s filial relationship. Ed throws the book out into the rubbish, but when 
Christopher cannot find the notebook in the bin, he searches his father’s room. He eventually finds 
his notebook, and as a bonus, several of her mother’s letters, written well past the point of her 
supposed demise. In them, she confesses that they did not get on well with the boy’s father, and 
they fought a lot over Christopher. She wrote that she felt lonely, which brought Mr. Shears and 
Christopher’s mother together, and the two moved to London. The discovery of his father’s 
duplicity sends Christopher into an autistic meltdown. When Ed finds his son, he attempts to set 
things right by confessing everything, not even omitting that he was the one who stabbed 
Wellington in anger. The shocking disclosure alarms Christopher, who decides that his father had 
become a de facto murderer, and he would rather escape from home and live with his intemperate 
mother than his otherwise placid father. 
Having solved the mystery, the second half of the book chronicles Christopher’s harrowing 
journey from Swindon to London, a trip he is quite ill-equipped to handle. He has to navigate the 
unknown streets of Swindon, dodge the police his father sent after him, board public transportation 
on his own and find his way to her mother’s address, the only truly ascertainable fact about her. 
Following the great, but troubled reunion, Ed appears on the doorstep of the London home, 
pleading for forgiveness. Christopher is more concerned with his A-level Maths exam coming up. 
Although her mother cancels the exam, he can, in the end, sit for the test, and in spite of his jangled 
state of mind, he is informed after a couple of days that he passed the test. The book concludes 
with Ed giving a golden retriever puppy to Christopher as a token of his good intentions, while his 
son feels elated for finishing his book and he speculates about his future career as a scientist. 
Like most middlebrow literary novels following the nascent tradition of this tale, the story 
ends reassuringly well – Christopher is confident about his achievements, affirming the ability of 
high-functioning autists to handle themselves in real life, but on their own terms. Surveying the 
academic reception and the critics’ opinion of the novel, Irene Rose contends that  
 
while Haddon’s characterisation makes use of the cultural resonances of Asperger’s 
syndrome, it does not reduce his protagonist merely to the pathologisation of this 
diagnostic criterion. Indeed the complexity of the novel’s structure enables the reader 
to become enamoured of Christopher and his personality quirks while at the same time 
not presenting his impairment as inconsequential. (Rose 2008, 51) 
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The author treats its protagonist as a true literary hero, overcoming adversity and foiling 
people’s plans to contain him; Christopher becomes an autotelic individual and a spokesman for 
the values he lives by, giving insight into the workings of the autistic mind. The tale would be half 
as gripping, though, if it were narrated by a typically developing teenager. As Stefan Freißmann 
comments on Christopher’s limited capacity for grasping narrative events: “the discrepancy 
between the narrator’s report and the reader’s inferences based on this report is one of the driving 
forces of the plot and the source of suspense” (Freißmann 2008, 414). 
Christopher’s naivety and his difficulties with developing flexible scripts for adaptive 
behaviour puts him as years younger than most of his peers when it comes to socialising. His 
disability also manifests itself in the language he uses — The Curious Incident is a considerably 
simpler text than a regular novel. Elena Semino has explained this in corpus-linguistic terms: in 
the domain of everyday life, Christopher exhibits underlexicalisation, a reduced vocabulary, 
whereas he shows signs of overlexicalisation within the scientific sphere, a very detailed, fine-
grained vocabulary. She supports these observations by showing that the novel has a much smaller 
type-token ratio (the complexity of vocabulary used) than most regular novels (Semino 2014, 284). 
The young protagonist’s narrative style is pared down to its essential features, a bare-bones 
storytelling reflective of his ineptness at producing narrative (after all, this is the first time he takes 
a stab at writing an extended tale): “Then I detected in the utility room. Then I detected in the 
dining room. Then I detected in the living room, where I found the missing wheel from my Airfix 
Messerschmitt Bf 109 G-6 model under the sofa” (Haddon 2003, 115). Almost every plot-
advancing sentence begins with the unanalytical ‘and’ or ‘then’ conjunction, and in some inspired 
cases, ‘and then’, recalling E. M. Forster’s old observation, hardened into a narratological 
commonplace: “‘The king died and then the queen died’ is a story. ‘The king died, and then the 
queen died of grief’ is a plot” (Forster 1985 [1927], 86). Christopher’s storytelling often hovers on 
the border between “proto-narrative” (Freißmann 2008, 408) and a fleshed-out plot. The 
relentlessness of underinterpreted life as ‘one damned thing after another’ pervades Christopher’s 
chronicle of events, which reveals the inadequacy of an annalistic account.  
As Hayden White noted, today’s reader of mediaeval annals is put off by “the annalist’s 
apparent failure to see that historical events dispose themselves to the percipient eye as ‘stories’ 
waiting to be told, waiting to be narrated” (1987, 10, emphasis in original) – he could have easily 
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said the same about this autistic narrator. Commenting upon the use of the word ‘and,’ White 
writes: “this small narrative element, this ‘narreme,’ floats easily on the sea of dates which figures 
succession itself as a principle of cosmic organization” (18, emphases in original), an unyielding, 
monotonous march of unplotted events, carrying the seed of narrativity within them, but not 
actualised. Semino cites Leech and Short (2007, 162-167) on the frequent use of ‘and,’ who 
observe that “very unusual mind styles” can be created in prose with the limited narration of the 
kind seen in The Curious Incident. They illustrate this with Benjy Compson, a cognitively disabled 
person’s narration as an example, demonstrating the strong link that connects mental impairment 
with the production of a disabled narrative (Bérubé 2005, 575). 
Christopher’s narration is a lot more eventful than the annalistic style would suggest, 
because he does have recourse to some narrative scripts and schemata. It could be argued that it is 
a chronicle, rather than an annalistic telling. Like the chronicle writer, Christopher “seems to wish 
to tell a story, aspires to narrativity, but typically fails to achieve it. […] It starts out to tell a story 
but breaks off in medias res, in the chronicler's own present; it leaves things unresolved or, rather, 
leaves them unresolved in a storylike way. [… T]he chronicle represents [historical reality] as if 
real events appeared to human consciousness in the form of unfinished stories” (White 1987, 9). 
Indeed, Christopher’s story at 15 has barely started, and although he ‘finds out’ who killed 
Wellington, it was not due to his own detective skills, making it one of the many unsatisfactory 
resolutions. There are telling opportunities in Christopher’s narration that would offer the 
possibility of narrativising, say, his parents’ relationship, but that story never really concerns 
Christopher enough to weave it into his tale as anything other than background noise.  
One conspicuous example comes during the episode when Ed cathartically realises that he 
has made a fatal mistake by trying to shield Christopher from the fallout of his failed marriage: 
 
“I was going to show [the letters] to you when you were older.”  
Then he was silent again. 
Then he said, “It was an accident.” 
Then he was silent again. (143) 
 
The paucity of social information that Christopher manages to convey in his story bespeaks 
his undeveloped ability to attribute mental states to other people, including his most immediate 
family. We get virtually nothing, not even a wild guess as to what went on in Ed’s mind, only his 
silence, which also foregrounds Christopher’s silence on socially relevant information, something 
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his mind automatically filters out. As a fictional autist, Christopher practices what Bertil Romberg 
has called a “behaviourist” narrative strategy (Romberg 1962, cited by Genette 1983, 219), 
presenting the action as objectively as he can, because he is afraid of telling ‘lies.’ This category, 
however, extends far beyond the intentional communication of falsehood in his eyes to include 
counterfactual thinking, metaphors and even speculation about other people’s minds. By way of 
an example, he reports the following conversation: “Mr. Jeavons said that I liked maths because it 
was safe. […] And what he meant was that maths wasn’t like life because in life there are no 
straightforward answers at the end. I know he meant this because this is what he said” (78). 
Christopher ascertains the speaker’s intentions in the bluntest fashion, and he prefers not to 
interpret others whenever he can help it. Instead, he takes people’s views for granted and lives 
with the consequences for as long as he can. He writes his book accordingly. 
This behaviourist strategy is usually described as an externally focalised, objective mode 
of narration, “presenting only overt, surface behaviors of the characters and omitting narratorial 
commentary on more or less fugitive internal states (dispositions, thoughts, attitudes, memories, 
etc.), as the characters’ conversation unfolds in the story [and] a rich context of felt experience 
emerges” (Herman 2009, 147). The narrator who engages in behaviourist telling does not have 
access to the characters’ minds or chooses not to analyse the actions of the characters in mental 
state terms. In fact, we can read such a narrator as if they did not exercise and/or did not have an 
intact Theory of Mind. But unlike the canonical case of Hemingway, this effect is ‘hardwired’ into 
the limited narration of Christopher. In light of this, I thoroughly agree with Frießmann above that 
the aesthetic effect of The Curious Incident depends upon the discrepancy between what 
Christopher perceives (the ‘thin’ description of neurotypical culture) and what the readers 
conclude (reconstructing the ‘thick’ description of the scene, well beyond Christopher’s grasp). 
This is a function of how readers interpret novels, as Alan Palmer recognises: “the behavior of the 
characters only makes sense when it is read as the manifestation of an underlying mental reality. 
Furthermore, the reader uses a variety of information about a character from which to infer the 
underlying mental reality that over the course of the novel becomes that character’s embedded 
narrative” (Palmer 2004, 140). But we also have to realise that The Curious Incident is a rare 
example of an internally focalised behaviourist narrative.  
To be precise, the narrator is not completely behaviourist about his own internal states of 
mind, since he sparingly uses the few mental state terms he understands, eg. “ ‘happy,’ like when 
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I'm reading about the Apollo space missions, or when I am still awake at 3 a.m. or 4 a.m. in the 
morning and I can walk up and down the street and pretend that I am the only person in the whole 
world” (2). Even in his own case, he often appears unable to express his mind in conventional 
language that describes his emotions; when contemplating his future life as an astronaut, he 
describes the physical pain he felt when he injured himself on the playground, then adds “But this 
hurt was inside my head” (164). It is also surprising that Christopher seldom uses emotional 
expressions on their own — they are nearly always followed by an anecdote, an embedded 
narrative that conceptualises the raw feel of the event. He cannot take these emotions as self-
evident, because he is unaware that their meanings are accessible to the community of English 
speakers. This goes to show that in spite of his inability to use common mental state terms, he 
nonetheless illustrates them with (rather precise) snippets of autobiographical memory to construct 
himself as an embodied and enworlded narrator.  
The moment we go beyond Christopher’s mind and into the social world, though, the 
behaviourism becomes painfully evident. When he encounters a police officer, he describes his 
action mid-conversation like this: “The policeman closed his mouth and breathed out loudly 
through his nose” (23) rather than using the common phrase ‘sighing,’ which does not appear in 
the book. After the fight with his father, Christopher blacks out, and when he regains 
consciousness, he describes Ed in the following manner: “And Father was standing on the carpet 
a meter in front of me looking down at me and he was still holding my book in his right hand, but 
it was bent in half and all the corners were messed up, and there was a scratch on his neck and a 
big rip in the sleeve of his green and blue check shirt and he was breathing really deeply” (104). 
He spends little time discussing his father’s state of mind, but his position a metre away matters, 
and so is his gaze, as does his outward appearance that might give a clue as to what had happened. 
But Christopher prefers not to dwell on any actual physical injury the two might have caused to 
each other besides some bruise on the neck. The only things really ‘hurt’ are the notebook and the 
check shirt. Christopher does not evaluate what happened in the intervening scene of domestic 
violence or how it affected the two of them; he accepts these as natural facts and continues to 
follow the fate of his notebook, which will promptly land in the rubbish bin, or so Christopher 
surmises. Likewise, when Christopher recounts Ed’s pack of lies to her mother in London, the 
narration continues: “And then Mother said, ‘Oh my God.’ And then she didn’t say anything for a 
long while. And then she made a loud wailing noise like an animal on a nature program on 
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television” (236). As usual, Christopher’s way of understanding people is through comparisons 
with non-human animals, who, by Christopher’s admission, are easier to understand because they 
have fewer mental states. But the comparison is striking because it comes at an emotional high-
point in the novel, when the adults experience almost traumatic emotions, changing the way they 
understand others and how they behave.  
Having access only to the outward actions of other characters, Christopher’s narration is 
not only behaviouristic, it is disabled in the Bérubéian sense: “some of the ordinary functions of 
narrative are here inoperative” (Bérubé 2011, 470). In this case, it is the function of the narrator to 
provide insight into the fictional mental functioning of characters to explain their motivations, and 
consequently, the power of the narrative to provide an organic cause-and-effect structure to felt 
experience. That the anthropological model reader, who is familiar with the conventions of 
ordinary narrative, can still make sense of the story, interpret the reactions of the characters and 
empathise with them in a disabled narrative is no mean feat. This is partially attributable to the 
vastness of social scripts and schemata the typically developing reader acquires and has access to 
during the reading process (Stockwell 2002, 75-89; Stockwell 2009, passim). Story and character 
disposition can be gleamed from severely underreported and misreported instances of narration 
thanks to the adaptability of social scripts from one context to another, a fluidity which is aided by 
the human mind’s capacity for cognitive blending (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, Mithen 1996).  
When there are no easy ways of linking distinct events or passages of text together into a 
coherent narrative, readers still interpret the snippets by assembling some larger macrostructure of 
the story, as J. Yellowlees Douglas showed in an extremely gappy form of literature, the hypertext:  
 
First, they read through the individual fragments and attempted to articulate from them 
a global view of what the narrative might look like as a whole. Next, they attempted 
to find causal connections between actions or events from among the fragments to 
establish sequences or chronologies for what had happened. Finally, they tested these 
between themselves according to either their own life experience or their knowledge 
of other narratives. (Douglas 1992, emphasis in original) 
 
In other words, readers of the gappy hypertextual stories performed very much the same 
mental exercises as the autistic children who do pass the Strange Stories test or other ToM-related 
test batteries which examine reading comprehension and tacit social knowledge. Christopher is 
fascinated by computer games, as we shall see later, which have emerged from the ergodic 
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narratives of hypertext. Textual (and later, graphical) adventure games feature narratives that are 
halted by puzzles, but if the interactor comprehends that the narrative moves forwards when a 
puzzle is solved, it invites a problem-solving attitude. Readers, sometimes effortlessly, sometime 
laboriously make connections between the two sides of the gap because they know that reading is 
a puzzle, and they have to supply their own narrative scripts and schemata to the examination with 
the textual evidence. The autism novel presents the autistic character as a puzzle to be figured out, 
showing a mind-style qualitatively different from the neurotypical conventions. But the format of 
the detective story and other genre conventions help Christopher and the reader to construct a 
coherent story despite the many gaps in their perception of Christopher’s social world. 
While it is true that The Curious Incident is celebrated for its efforts to articulate the autistic 
experience, the reasons for functioning differently are never given in the storytelling sections of 
the book. They are confined to separate expository chapters, during which nothing happens. 
Disabled difference halts the narrative, showing that autism is not simply a cognitive disability, 
but it specifically has a “narrative impairment” component (Belmonte 2008, 168-171). In more 
precise terms, it is the production of coherent and relevant storytelling structure that is impaired 
(which might be fictional and factual) on the performance side, while on the competence side, 
fiction’s social aspects and its status as make-believe cause difficulties in the comprehension of 
the text and in the willing suspension of disbelief. Thus, the unique mind of Christopher creates 
opportunities for Haddon to dwell on the different functions of narrative and socialisation. In some 
instances, he directly enters into a dialogue with the cognitive sciences. 
One such arena is the computer metaphor of the human mind’s operations (although 
Christopher would call it a simile instead of a metaphor). Take the young detective’s comment on 
the verbal behaviour of a police officer as an example: “He was asking too many questions and he 
was asking them too quickly. They were stacking up in my head like loaves in the factory where 
Uncle Terry works. […] I sometimes think of my mind as a machine, but not always as a bread-
slicing machine. It makes it easier to explain to other people what is going on inside it” (8). Here, 
old-fashioned cognitive scientists and Christopher are entirely of one mind. One popular and 
widespread shorthand for understanding how the mind works is to treat it as a computer, or more 
precisely, a Turing machine, “a complex, multipurpose machine that processes information 
quickly and accurately [according to a set of specified rules]. [… B]oth computers and humans 
can compare symbols and can make choices according to the results of the comparison. 
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Furthermore, computers have a processing mechanism with a limited capacity,” like humans do 
(Matlin 2009). Christopher talks about how the flurry of questions come towards him linearly, as 
if on the conveyor belt of a machine – he processes the questions in a rigid sequence, and must 
understand one to go to the next. He cannot seem to activate different mechanisms to answer 
questions fluidly, perhaps in an alternative order that might be more convenient for him.  
Christopher’s account is reminiscent of the now outdated view that the mind employs serial 
processing to make sense of the world around it. In contrast, newer approaches view the typically 
developing mind as a system capable of “parallel distributed processing,” with different modules 
active at the same time (McLelland and Rumelhart 1986). Christopher reflects on this when he 
talks about how he can’t understand jokes and doesn’t like most of the jokes he can understand. 
The pun “His face was drawn, but the curtains were real” requires the activation of three different 
meanings of the word ‘drawn,’ as Christopher conscientiously explains, and “If I try to say the 
joke to myself, making the word mean the three different things at the same time, it is like hearing 
three different pieces of music at the same time, which is uncomfortable and confusing and not 
nice like white noise” (9). Christopher’s hyper-arousal, his impairment in selecting relevant 
information and his discomfort with the cognitive demands of polysemy are consistent with 
findings about irregular neural connectivity in certain modules in autism and the resulting inability 
to coordinate these faculties (Belmonte and Yurgelun-Todd 2003). Christopher is fond of the 
computer simile because his disability makes him more conscious of the mental efforts everyday 
life requires. A mechanistic view of the mind strips it of its more foreboding emotional and 
cognitive content, so he focuses his attention on the processes rather than its contents. 
Christopher uses other similes for expressing his felt experience of mental life: 
 
My memory is like a film. That is why I am really good at remembering things, like 
the conversations I have written down in this book, and what people were wearing, 
and what they smelled like, because my memory has a smelltrack which is like a 
soundtrack. And when people ask me to remember something I can simply press 
Rewind and Fast Forward and Pause like on a video recorder, but more like a DVD 
player because I don't have to Rewind through everything in between to get to a 
memory of something a long time ago. And there are no buttons, either, because it is 
happening in my head. (96) 
 
Christopher’s honesty, combined with his nearly eidetic memory positions him as an ideal 
narrator who faithfully records the events that had come to pass, and it establishes his authenticity 
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as a storyteller. He can record the stimuli of his entire sensorium, including the olfactory 
experiences, which anchors him in his narration. In his neologistic coinage, the ‘smelltrack’ of his 
memories functions as a focal point. I would call such sensory focalisation ‘naricularisation,’ to 
build on the names of focalising strategies for the other senses in film theory, ocularisation and 
auricularisation (Schlickers 2009), a concept that will be deployed in the analysis of Speed of Dark, 
too. Christopher discusses such memory retrieval in mechanistic terms, as operations happening 
to discrete data, unchanged by the act of recall.  
Haddon probably relied on Temple Grandin’s autobiography Thinking in Pictures to 
imagine this feature of Christopher’s mind, because this is essentially how she conceptualises her 
cognitive faculties: “Words are like a second language to me. I translate both spoken and written 
words into full-color movies, complete with sound, which run like a VCR tape in my head. When 
somebody speaks to me, his words are instantly translated into pictures” (Grandin 1995, 3, 
emphasis added). Christopher uses the repertoire of recordings to more than just remembering – it 
becomes a coping mechanism: “this is also how I know how to act in difficult situations when I 
don't know what to do” (97). The result, however, must be necessarily inflexible, because the re-
enacted scripts are executed with perfect accuracy and are never tailored to the situation at hand. 
Nonetheless, he recognises that other people have mental landscapes, and he compares himself to 
his grandmother, who is suffering from dementia: 
 
And Grandmother has pictures in her head, too, but her pictures are all confused, like 
someone has muddled the film up and she can’t tell what happened in what order, so 
she thinks that dead people are still alive and she doesn’t know whether something 
happened in real life or whether it happened on television. (99) 
 
Christopher positions himself as the opposite of her grandmother, because he can 
distinguish between reality and its representations, he has a strict sense of linearity in narrative 
sequencing and he regularly updates the information he has on others. Thus, he becomes a more 
able narrator by using another disabled figure as a source of narrative prosthesis. 
On the other hand, his near-eidetic memory of factual events comes at a cost: Christopher 
experiences significant distress when he deals with the uncertain array of future events and the 
territory of the counterfactual. He feels lost in time without his self-devised schedule, which plans 
his day down to the minute scale, and yet Christopher still calls it an “approximation” (192), as he 
would prefer an even more exact mapping of time, similar to his spatial maps. Throughout the 
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book, readers are treated with fairly detailed floor plans and maps of the Swindon street where 
they live, Twycross Zoo, Swindon train station, England, and the Willesden area in London. One 
peculiarity of the maps that Christopher draws is that they are never oriented towards North, with 
some rotated 90° to the left and some upside down, both to conserve space on the page, but also 
to emphasise Christopher’s unique view of the world (and maybe his facility with mental 
rotations). Julie Brown, who wrote about the writing process of his students with Asperger’s notes 
that the disjointed, collage-like editing style of writers on the spectrum owe much to the difference 
between the visuo-spatial cognitive style of autistic authors and the abstract, linear Denkstil that is 
required to write conventional novels (Brown 2009, 14-17). That would explain not just the 
abundance of illustrations, but the documentary, ultra-realistic descriptions as well. 
Unlike space, time feels less mappable to this teenage Holmes: 
 
when you put something down somewhere […], you can have a map in your head to 
tell you where you have left it, but even if you don’t have a map it will still be there 
because a map is a representation of things that actually exist so you can find [it] again. 
And a timetable is a map of time, except that if you don’t have a timetable time is not 
there like the landing and the garden and the route to school. Because time is only the 
relationship between the way different things change […]. And it isn’t a fixed 
relationship like the relationship between our house and Mrs. Shears’ house […]. (193) 
 
Christopher feels that mimetic representations with real referents provide him with a grip 
on the daunting task of modelling reality in three dimensions. The fluidity of living in time teaches 
him that he cannot expect a full, 1:1 mapping of narrative’s spatiotemporal landscapes. Although 
he has a hard time accepting it, he knows that he has to make choices in what he represents (hence 
the constant anti-mimetic, almost Brechtian or Magrittean references to the self-conscious 
fictionality of representations that Christopher shares with the reader). He muses that temporality 
constrains the amount of knowledge we can attain about the future, and shares a diagram with the 
reader about the unknowability of times to come. He considers time to be a mystery that no-one 
has figured out yet (195), but he still feels that the unpredictable future can be conquered with 
timetables and other life-ordering practices. He is viscerally aware that “[t]he task of a mind is to 
produce future, as the poet Paul Valéry once put it. A mind is fundamentally an anticipator, an 
expectation generator. It mines the present for clues, which it refines with the help of the materials 
it has saved from the past, turning them into anticipations of the future. And then it acts, rationally, 
on the basis of those hard-won anticipations” (Dennett 1996, 56-57). I am sure the presentation of 
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the mind as the quintessential detective of the future would intuitively appeal to Christopher. 
Christopher experiences uncertainty about the future and its unexpected actualisations with 
a characteristic nausea. When he arrives at Paddington Station and gets off the train, the new 
surroundings overwhelm him. Entirely unlike the small city of Swindon (Pop. 157.000 in 2001), 
the bustling metropolis of London is teeming with people and posters, advertisements and 
amenities, a torrent of textual and social information that taxes Christopher’s mind. Just like the 
abrupt shift in genre from a (failed) detective story to a picaresque adventure, breaks in the 
canonical course of events end in mental breakdowns. Oftentimes, the eventfulness of narrative is 
just too much for Christopher, as when he boards the London Underground:  
 
And then I couldn’t see the walls anymore and the back of someone’s jacket touched 
my knee and I felt sick and I started groaning really loudly and the lady on the bench 
stood up and no one else sat down. […] And then more people came into the little 
station and it became fuller and then the roaring began again and I closed my eyes and 
I sweated and felt sick and I felt the feeling like a balloon inside my chest and it was 
so big I found it hard to breathe. (216-217) 
 
It’s as if Christopher experienced not “illness as narrative” (Jurecic 2012) but ‘narrative as 
illness.’ He is constitutionally warding the narrativity of new situations off by anti-narrative 
techniques such as keeping set timetables and demarcating a world of the familiar which he dares 
not breach unless absolutely necessary. New sensations become events as the effects of sensory 
overload turn into narrative overload. The need to process so much information has a physical 
effect upon him: it makes him groan, thereby filtering out the ‘noises’ of the environment in the 
wake of a panic attack, which he narrates in great corporeal detail.  
Notice that he never uses any expression that might be construed as a mental state term, 
rooting his sensations in the body rather than its higher-order representation, the mind. During this 
scene, Christopher’s mind-body becomes a source of resistance, a bulwark against the 
unpredictability of the big city. From a theoretical perspective that meshes well with Daniel 
Punday’s corporeal narratology, which is built on the foundation that “the ability to narrate will 
depend on the ability to imagine a body that resists narrative closure. In other words, before we 
can have stories that move through a narrative trajectory within some overarching pattern, we must 
be able to think about bodies in a way that allows them to resist that pattern” (Punday 2003, 94). 
Never mind narrative closure, Christopher even resists a free-form narrative opening, vastly 
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preferring the rigid (albeit very entertaining) structure of a detective novel. His own adventures 
into the frightening world outside also oppose narrative closure and ordering — at the end of the 
book, Christopher reports a tomato alarm going off, a tree being hit by lightning, and getting an A 
on his A-level Maths exam as narratively equivalent (in fact, he dedicates much more space to 
narrate the removal of the lightning-struck tree than to his happiness over his success). 
The possibility of being moved, both spatially and emotionally, upsets Christopher’s way 
of life and generates narrative friction. Having to constantly update his game plan (an executive 
function) tires him a great deal, so he does simple non-narrative tasks, such as doubling 2s (i.e. 
calculating 2 to the nth power) to reduce the arousal caused by narrative events. This happens, for 
example, when he finds out that her mother is alive: “I doubled 2’s in my head because it made 
me feel calmer. I got to 33554432, which is 225, which was not very much because I've got to 243 
before, but my brain wasn't working very well” (149). Even this performance diminishes when he 
is told that Ed killed poor Wellington: “I tried doubling 2’s again, but I couldn't get past 215, which 
was 32768. So I groaned to make the time pass quicker and not think” (153). 
 A more elaborate example comes from the part where Christopher intends to board the 
train to London, but is unable to cope with the sensory complexities of the Swindon train station. 
Formulating a new plan, he clears his mind by describing the mathematical problem known as 
Conway’s Soldiers and explains its solution — over no less than two and a half pages, complete 
with illustrative figures and procedures that lead up to the explanation that one cannot reach further 
than the fourth row (on a finite board, that is; for reaching the fifth row on an infinite board, see 
Tatham and Taylor n.d.; Taylor 2010, both publications directly inspired by Haddon’s novel). The 
upshot of this is that he is so engaged with the mathematical puzzle that he no longer worries about 
changes in his environment. However, before reaching row four, he is disturbed by a policeman. 
As he reports: “The lady at the café says you’ve been here for 2½ hours, and when she tried talking 
to you, you were in a complete trance” (185). Haddon’s wit lies in showing that diegetic time 
passed while reading the expository passage, at roughly a page per hour. Pages describing 
Conway’s peg army, which were thought to be non-narrative and outside the diegetic realm of the 
events, is in fact embedded within the storyworld, unlike most expository passages in the book. 
The solution to the mathematical problem is a device to stave off narrativity by a game of much 
simpler rules and a different kind of complexity than human interactions. If one discrepancy was 
between the objective and the social knowledge that Christopher (fails to) represent, and the 
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discrepancy between what he perceives and what readers infer from that is the other, the third 
tension is definitely between narrative and non-narrative ways of thinking. 
Nowhere is the drive to halt the narrative more palpable than in the numerous lists and 
digressions that Christopher throws at the reader, expressing his own associative mind’s 
preoccupation with ordering the world in a more comprehensible way. When he is arrested by the 
police officer and driven to the station, Christopher peers out of the police car, up at the Milky 
Way, and immediately leaves narrating his curious predicament in favour of talking about the 
Milky Way, the solar system and a dispassionate contemplation of humanity’s extinction for 
several pages (11-13). Or, upon hearing that his mother has died of an unexpected heart attack, 
Christopher is only concerned about knowing what kind of a heart attack it was, an embolism or 
an aneurysm, giving a short lecture on the physiological differences between the two (36-37). At 
various points of the novel, Christopher gives impromptu lectures on constellations (156-157), 
describes a tourism ad at length for no discernible reason (218-220), and informs the reader about 
the chaotic mathematics of animal populations (125-128).  
He is clearly aware that most of these excursions into the territory of the irrelevant 
constitute hindrances to his narrative. When he reports that one of his schoolmates’ brother got a 
tattoo, he remarks: “this is what is called a digression, and now I am going to go back to the fact 
that it was a Good Day” (33). But that never stops him from expounding on his favourite topics, 
confounding the readers’ expectations. One purpose these digressions serve is the implicit criticism 
of neurotypical standards of coherence in the production of narrative. As Chambers notes in his 
analysis of Tristram Shandy: “Any digression enacts […] a criticism, because, once one has 
digressed, the position from which one departed becomes available to a more dispassionate or 
ironic analysis: it must have been in some sense inadequate or one would not have moved away 
from it” (Chambers 1999, 15). In Christopher’s tale, the second look is more dispassionate than 
ironic: The Milky Way digression rewards him with the vision of the Earth devoid of human life, 
and thus, troubling sociality.  
The thoroughly dispassionate view of life Christopher espouses is opposed to the 
anthropocentrism that governs much of contemporary humanist appraisals of the mid- and long-
term future for our species. It’s as if Christopher adopted a posthuman worldview, an object-
oriented ontology (OOO), such as the one developed by Ian Bogost. As the theorist describes his 
speculative realist project: “OOO puts things at the center of being. We humans are elements, but 
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not the sole elements, of philosophical interest. OOO contends that nothing has special status, but 
that everything exists equally […]. OOO [draws] attention to things at all scales (from atoms to 
alpacas, bits to blinis) and pondering their nature and relations with one another as much with 
ourselves” (Bogost 2012, 6). This decentring of the human being, he suggests, is apprehensible in 
the work of several contemporary artists and artworks, among them Stephen Shore, who took 
colour pictures of objects, presenting their brute materiality as a mysterious interobjectivity 
without their immediate usefulness to human beings. “Just as eating only oysters becomes 
gastronomically monotonous, so talking only about human behavior becomes intellectually 
monotonous. […] Like Bartleby, we can simply declare, ‘I would prefer not to’” (132-133), writes 
Bogost. This mention of Bartleby should give us pause, since he is read by Stuart Murray as an 
autistic character. The philosopher appears to equate object-orientedness with Bartleby’s 
resistance to the narrative conventions that propel his movement, as his interests lie elsewhere, 
outside of humanity’s hustle and bustle of intentions. If we accept this, the focus on objects that 
describes the usual autistic predilection then becomes a natural ally to the object-oriented alien 
phenomenology Bogost advocates.  
One technique with which he illustrates the unique state of object relations is ontography,  
 
a general inscriptive strategy, one that uncovers the repleteness of units and their 
interobjectivity. [… It] involves the revelation of object relationships without 
necessarily offering clarification or description of any kind. […] The simplest 
approach to such recording is the list, a group of items loosely joined not by logic or 
power or use but by the gentle knot of the comma. Ontography is an aesthetic set 
theory, in which a particular configuration is celebrated merely on the basis of its 
existence. (Bogost 2012, 38)  
 
This form of ontography is tailor-made for the autistic perception of objects in their full 
vibrancy. The objectivity of Christopher’s narration is foregrounded not just by the mimetic fever 
of maps, but by the persistent compulsion to capture the multiplicity of the world in lists. He 
faithfully records such mundane details as what he had in his pockets at the police station: 
 
1. A Swiss Army knife with 15 attachments including a wire stripper and a saw and 
a toothpick and tweezers 
2. A piece of string 
3. A piece of a wooden puzzle which looked like this [image omitted in dissertation] 
4. 3 pellets of rat food for Toby, my rat 
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5. £1.47 (this was made up of a £1 coin, a 20p coin, two l0p coins, a 5p coin and a 2p 
coin) 
6. A red paper clip 
7. A key for the front door (Haddon 2003, 16) 
 
Haddon is experimenting here with the relevance of quotidian doodads to the telling of the 
narrative and the personality of the teller. No explanation is given as to why these objects are 
important, and the list doesn’t move the plot forward — it does the exact opposite. The narration 
stutters due to the intensive desire to write the world without leaving anything out, if possible. The 
most overpowering example of Christopher’s inability or unwillingness to separate the world into 
relevant and irrelevant comes during his stint as a ‘proper’ detective, examining his father’s room 
for the notebook of his investigation:  
 
I started by looking under the bed. There were 7 shoes and a comb with lots of hair in 
it and a piece of copper pipe and a chocolate biscuit and a porn magazine called Fiesta 
and a dead bee and a Homer Simpson pattern tie and a wooden spoon, but not my book. 
Then I looked in the drawers on either side of the dressing table, but these only 
contained aspirin and nail clippers and batteries and dental floss and a tampon and 
tissues and a spare false tooth in case Father lost the false tooth he had to fill the gap 
where he knocked a tooth out when he fell off the ladder putting a bird box up in the 
garden, but my book wasn’t in there either. (116-117) 
 
This massive, monotonous enumeration describes random knick-knacks that might be 
related to one another, but we will never really know how. What matters is their existence and 
their alienness, their non-identity with the notebook and other narrative efforts of sense-making. 
Bogost calls these ensemble pieces “Latour litanies,” “litanies of surprisingly contrasted 
curiosities” (Bogost 2011, 38), which epitomise the goal of object-oriented ontology, 
“incompatibility,” as these lists “remind us that no matter how fluidly a system may operate, its 
members nevertheless remain utterly isolated, mutual aliens” (40). This basic quality of 
relationships mirrors the autistic experience of otherness and isolation, the experience of people 
who sometimes think of themselves as machines. 
Christopher is an ardent fan of science fiction, the de facto genre of alterity and alienness, 
the genre where the boundaries of humanity are explored in depth (Roberts 2006, 17), as it becomes 
apparent in his many references to SF novels and films, like Frank Herbert’s Dune (1965), Close 
Encounters of the Third Kind (1977), the Star Trek series, or Blade Runner (1982). Ridley Scott’s 
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Blade Runner is particularly interesting, since it thematises empathy as an essential prerequisite of 
humanity, a topic dear to the heart of SF author Philip K. Dick, whose 1968 novel Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep? was the basis of Scott’s film. 
The tech-noir movie is set in future Los Angeles. Human-like androids were built and 
shipped to the stars to colonise space, but some of the more advanced models have gone rogue, 
and it is the job of Rick Deckard to find these androids and kill them. He is aided in his job by 
sophisticated technological equipment for an empathy-detecting procedure, the Voigt-Kampff test, 
which supposedly distinguishes between humans who can feel empathy, and androids who can 
only mimic the outward expression of empathy without undergoing the emotion. The empathy test 
and the ostensible emotional detachment was similar enough in autism and the world of fiction 
that one psychologist working with autists wrote: “the science fiction author anticipated present 
techniques in psychometrics. Certainly, a practicing psychologist will experience a déjà vu in the 
testing scenes in the novel, and in their presentation in the film” (Lauffer 2004). It is easy to see 
why Christopher might be drawn to fiction that complicates the binary definitions of human and 
non-human. Whereas Blade Runner might be an example of a film where the line is blurred, he 
criticises some fictional works that imagine alien beings as humanoid:  
 
aliens, if they exist, would probably be very different from us. They might look like 
big slugs, or be flat like reflections. Or they might be bigger than planets. Or they 
might not have bodies at all. They might just be information, like in a computer. And 
their spaceships might look like clouds, or be made up of unconnected objects like dust 
or leaves. (87)  
 
Aside from the plethora of references to other SF works, like Edwin Abbott’s Flatland 
(1884) or Arthur C. Clarke’s Rendezvous with Rama (1973), in this passage Christopher argues for 
radical conceptions of alterity that incorporate different subjectivities and objectivities, vesting 
assemblages of natural or abstract objects, such as data, with the possibility of an alien 
phenomenology very much like the one Bogost tries to envision. 
One interesting off-shoot of Christopher’s appreciation of science fiction that goes against 
the received wisdom about autism is that it is an appreciation of a genre of fiction. It just happens 
to be a kind of popular fiction that is deemed to be less prestigious by the art-culture complex. 
Furthermore, Christopher actually wants to write a novel, not just any book. Of his reading habits, 
he confesses that “[m]ostly I read books about science and maths. I do not like proper novels” (5). 
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He even quotes from a ‘proper novel,’ a heavily metaphorical passage from Virginia Woolf’s The 
Waves (1931), and claims that he does not know how to interpret the poetic language therein. He 
is not alone. Haddon has confessed that Woolf is one of his favourite writers, but she “sometimes 
got a little too carried away” (Haddon 2003) when it came to the possibilities of linguistic 
expression. It is very likely that Christopher would have appreciated ‘proper’ novels with less 
focus on the interiority of the characters, perhaps the behaviourist novels of Hemingway.  
Christopher’s fiction-writing aspirations are especially notable because a number of writers 
have suggested, with varying degrees of success, that the Anglophone literary tradition was 
particularly conducive to a kind of Aspergic writing.1 An instructive case for this kind of argument 
is Phyllis Bottomer’s So Odd a Mixture (2007), which hopes to prove that Jane Austen’s Pride 
and Prejudice was a hotbed for literary autism. This would be a notable reinterpretation of the 
literary canon, since autistic difference is a relatively underresearched area in nineteenth and early 
twentieth century fiction. However, the case for Pride and Prejudice’s autistic characters is less 
than satisfactory. Bottomer often resorts to the tactic of offering two different explanations for the 
characters’ behaviour, one mundane and common-sense, the other more oblique but plausible, and 
then she routinely dismisses the conventional answer in favour of the one more ominously 
suggestive of autism. Take Mr. Collins’ reading habits as an example: instead of choosing the 
fashionable but reviled genre of novel, he opts for reading a book of sermons. Bottomer is quick 
to point out that his lack of novel reading might merely be in line with “the opinions of his period 
and his profession” (40-41), not to mention his gender, but she eschews this interpretation in favour 
of claiming that he doesn’t read novels because he is an autist and therefore has a strong preference 
for non-fiction. While this might be prima facie a conceivable argument, Bottomer continues by 
remarking that “Amusingly, Mr Collins would have been particularly bewildered by the novel in 
which he himself appears!” (41), which holds water, but demonstrates how Bottomer misses a 
rather obvious point: Austen deliberately uses her character to comment upon the social standing 
of the novel in her day and age, an obvious metafictional dig at Georgian literary sensibilities. 
Christopher’s narrative is an honest, self-reflexive work that acknowledges the constructedness of 
                                                          
1 Phyllis Ferguson Bottomer’s So Odd a Mixture: Along the Autistic Spectrum in ‘Pride and Prejudice’ (2007), 
Michael Fitzgerald’s The Genesis of Artistic Creativity: Asperger’s Syndrome and the Arts (2005) and Julie Brown’s 
Writers on the Spectrum (2009) do not constitute an exhaustive list, but they are a fair sample of how second-rate 
scholarship has tried to enlist neurological difference in its own skirmishes in the culture wars. 
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the text and his unease with fiction. Taking a make-believe approach similar to Bottomer, I am 
sure Christopher would be appalled if he found out that someone else was writing a fictionalised 
account of his experiences. Like the characters of Pride and Prejudice, Christopher is never 
explicitly described as having an autism diagnosis. That doesn’t mean, though, that we can 
approach a work written before the ‘discovery’ of autism with the same interpretative inclusiveness 
as with those that were written well after the prominence of Asperger’s syndrome. I suspect that 
Haddon has deliberately written Christopher to be a ‘highly recognisable type of child’, to use 
Asperger’s words again, and he could not expect readers to ignore autism as an interpretative 
frame. In my view, Bottomer’s parabolic efforts to read Austen’s text as an autism novel are not 
sufficiently scholarly, but she wrote with a very different audience in mind. 
Nonetheless, in her otherwise thorough and illustrative vignettes of the social awkwardness 
and oddities of the Bennetts, Mr. Darcy, and Fitzwilliam/DeBourghs, Bottomer makes a 
conceptual mistake. No matter how painstakingly she integrates every quirk of character to argue 
that these belong to people the autistic spectrum, she ignores another source of Austen’s poignant 
wit: Pride and Prejudice, after all, is a novel of manners. It is a genre of writing that was borne on 
the wings of the increased social mobility of Georgian England, when whole classes of people 
were thrown into an uneasy flux, resulting in social awkwardness on a much grander level due to 
the mixing of the aristocracy and the rising bourgeoisie. In a genre that thrives on 
misunderstanding, obliviousness to social customs and breaches of etiquette, it makes little sense 
to explain the faux pas of the characters as due to neurological difference, when it can be much 
more parsimoniously argued that they arise from societal and genre conventions. Christopher’s 
story lies on the border between young adult fiction, detective fiction and the venerable old genre 
of the novel of manners, and for this reason, we need to be very careful in categorising it as only 
a piece of autism fiction. Genre conventions can lead the writer to exaggerate certain traits for 
comic or tragic effect, and the underlying humour and dramatic irony of much Christopher’s 
written output can easily give the impression that Haddon sought to create a caricature of high-
functioning autism in order to see how it works in a modern novel of manners. This would also 
explain why readers with Asperger’s tend to complain about the unrealistic depiction of autism. 
Christopher himself asserts that The Curious Incident “is a murder mystery novel. Siobhan 
said that I should write something I would want to read myself. […] In a murder mystery novel 
someone has to work out who the murderer is and then catch them. It is a puzzle. If it is a good 
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puzzle you can sometimes work out the answer before the end of the book” (5). For someone who 
regularly experiences other people’s minds as inaccessible, working out the intentions behind the 
actions of various characters in the novel might be a worthwhile and enjoyable exercise. Analysing 
detective fiction as a genre devoted to mind-reading, Lisa Zunshine remarks: “The entire history 
of the detective genre thus can be viewed as a chronicle of the writers’ experimentation with the 
question of whose minds the readers should be allowed to read and when they should be able to 
read them” (Zunshine 2006, 138). Although she does not scrutinise The Curious Incident as a 
detective novel that problematises mind-reading, Haddon extends the mind-concealing paradigm 
to its logical conclusion – Christopher is explicit about his own mental functioning but utterly inept 
at reading other people as perceptively as his hero, Sherlock Holmes.  
Still, his mind-reading difficulties do enable a detective novel to form on the pages of the 
book. As Zunshine claims, “[i]t turns out that it does not really matter whose minds we are reading 
as long as there are some strategically concealed minds to read and as long as the topic of such a 
reading is highly focused” (2006, 141). Here, the protagonist-narrator’s intellectual disability 
presents as many ‘strategically’ occluded minds as Christopher can meet: unless he specifically 
asks for what they meant, neurotypical people’s motives and intentions are a closed book to him. 
That is why he is drawn to classic detective fiction, which depends on a final éclarissement, the 
Big Reveal at the end of the story for its foremost artistic effect, the ‘aha!’ moment. Christopher 
is also keen to distil the genre-constitutive narrative devices that writers employ, such as the 
detective “Trying a Different Tack” (49) or finding a “Red Herring” (40), and he tries to identify 
them with great enthusiasm. He learns about the strategic occlusion of minds from detective 
fiction, and uses that knowledge to get closer to the full understanding of his situation when he is 
‘interrogating’ Mrs. Alexander:  
 
So I asked her the same question again, because in a murder mystery novel when 
someone doesn’t want to answer a question it is because they are trying to keep a secret 
or trying to stop someone from getting into trouble, which means that the answers to 
those questions are the most important answers of all, and that is why the detective has 
to put that person under pressure. (74)  
 
His correct assumption and the application of principles derived from fiction reward him 
with a crucial bit of information: that his father had been “doing sex” with Mrs. Shears (76) prior 
to her mother’s ‘death.’ The way Christopher learns to appreciate and use the tropes of detective 
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fiction teaches him a lot about people and their minds, gaining practical knowledge in an area that 
is impaired due to his undisclosed ASC, and he direly needs this knowledge to fulfil his goals. 
Haddon portrays Christopher as an avid reader of Sherlock Holmes stories, presenting a counter-
discourse to clinical accounts of autism, which often describe the lack of fondness for fiction as an 
indicator (and a direct result) of impaired ToM ability.  
For Christopher, these tales are enabling narratives, crystallising stereotypical instances of 
mind-reading, letting him peek into the thought processes of others and allowing him to do well in 
the social situations he finds himself in. He hails Sherlock as his role model, and “if I were a proper 
detective he is the kind of detective I would be. He is very intelligent and he solves the mystery 
and he says: ‘The world is full of obvious things which nobody by any chance ever observes.’ But 
he notices them, like I do” (92). In the same passage, Christopher refers to Holmes’ ability to 
detach his mind at will and his puzzle-solving, pattern-seeking skills as inspiring qualities in 
Doyle’s character. These skills inspired one literary scholar, Lisa Sanders to survey the Holmes 
stories and argue that the protagonist’s depiction is consistent with living on the spectrum. Features 
that make him a candidate for literary autism include: his straightforward and blunt communicative 
style; his repetitive, restricted and stereotypical interests; an isolated social life; and the lack of 
literary knowledge, except for a profound interest in sensational literature, the pop culture of its 
period (Sanders 2009). Such speculation, the new reimaginations of the famous detective on TV 
and the current high profile of autism have led the National Autistic Society in Britain to 
acknowledge and promote Holmes’ able autistic identity (Dixon 2013).  
These new interpretations of Sherlock do not mean that he was intentionally portrayed as 
disabled, but it does speak to a certain affinity between contemporary views of neurological 
difference and the figure of the quirky detective, whose lack of social graces and powers of 
observation are united in a character which criticises the deceptions and double-dealing that 
decency has inscribed into the heart of society. ‘Everybody lies,’ says the tagline of House MD., a 
show featuring another modern Holmes, which Christopher can easily agree with. This suspicion 
towards normal sociality is often coupled with the vulnerability of the autistic or physically 
disabled male in contemporary popular culture as an alternative to the hegemonic masculinity that 
defines normality, and as Kérchy Anna suggests: “the allure of these characters stem from the fact 
that they appear corporeally inaccessible, inseducible, reluctant [to engage in romance] and they 
are socially independent” (Kérchy 2013, my translation). House and Christopher both continue the 
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Sherlockian tradition of disabled brilliance and social (corporeal or mental) inaccessibility, whose 
suspicious reading of the world conform to the requirements of the male detective in crime fiction, 
but their vulnerability makes them more endearing for today’s readers and viewers. 
The appreciation of fiction is not the only domain in which Christopher defies the 
diagnostic definitions of autism. Pretence and make-believe have long been understood as areas of 
impairment, and Christopher expresses a degree of discomfort with counterfactual thinking: “there 
is only ever one thing which happened at a particular time and a particular place. And there are an 
infinite number of things which didn’t […]. And if I think about something which didn’t happen I 
start thinking about all the other things which didn’t happen” (24), which makes his head hurt. 
Unable to select relevant scenarios for thought experiments which would offer him strategic 
footholds in life, this imaginative difficulty also bleeds into narratives that invite simulated 
perspective-taking: “I find it hard to imagine things which did not happen to me” (5). This does 
not mean, however, that Christopher is bereft of imagined scenes that would delight him or offer 
psychological coping strategies in times of crisis. Although he would never admit it, when he is 
locked in a police cell, his mind wanders to the scary territory of the non-actual: “I wondered how 
I would escape if I was in a story” (17), a mental act that not only requires planning future actions, 
but also to pretend that the actual laws of the real world do not hold, and Christopher can imagine 
himself as a hero of a story who is resourceful and outwits authority figures. In spite of his 
vehement denial that the “pictures in [his] head” (98) are only of actual events, he does day-dream 
on more than one occasion, and his fantasies are notable for their content. For example, he 
imagines his future life as an astronaut, something he knows is very unlikely to happen given his 
proclivity for insubordination: 
 
I would be able to look out of a little window in the spacecraft and know that there was 
no one else near me for thousands and thousands of miles, which is what I sometimes 
pretend at night in the summer when I go and lie on the lawn and look up at the sky 
and I put my hands round the sides of my face so that I can’t see the fence and the 
chimney and the washing line and I can pretend I'm in space. (65-66) 
 
Christopher admits that he uses pretend play to envision himself in a world better suited to 
his interests and needs. He dreams about being in environments that minimise social contact with 
other human beings, such as astronaut life: “I would have to talk to other people from Mission 
Control, but we would do that through a radio linkup and a TV monitor, so they wouldn’t be like 
- 142 - 
real people who are strangers, but it would be like playing a computer game” (65). He also dreams 
about being a Nemo-style submarine captain, imagining “that I am the only person inside it […] 
and I can control the motors and move anywhere I want to […] and I can never be found” (100-
101). The common themes in these pretend scenarios is the reduction of social information and the 
emphasis on the agency gained by machines, drawing from fictional forms and new media to 
present a world more suited to autistic sociality. These themes will resurface in the chapter on 
Speed of Dark, whose protagonist eventually goes into space. 
Christopher also uses make-believe to reduce anxiety, controlling the world by narrowing 
it into one of its representations, so that he can use a problem-solving mindset honed in fictional 
settings: “I was scared again, so I tried to pretend I was playing a game on my computer and it was 
called Train to London and it was like Myst or The 11th Hour, and you had to solve lots of 
different problems to get to the next level, and I could turn it off at any time” (189, emphasis in 
original). The two games Christopher mentions are adventure games, non-violent games that focus 
on puzzle-solving, using objects in the protagonists’ inventory to combine them with elements of 
the game world. Myst might be appealing to Christopher because it is a game with a scheme of 
social interaction close to his heart. As one of the designers, Robyn Miller explains it:  
 
Any characters you meet, they communicate to you and you don’t get to communicate 
to them. […] At any point in time when this person is talking to you, you can just walk 
away. […] In terms of a one-way communication with whatever characters you come 
across—them speaking in this monologue style—we tried to feature it as much as 
possible with a one-way device of some sort. (Morganti 2013)  
 
These adventure games are very object-oriented — progress through the game depends on 
using objects on other objects or people (although from the perspective of the player, the two might 
be seen as identical classes), and the player succeeds if she thinks mechanically. A prominent 
ludologist commenting upon textual adventure games has suggested that these games project a 
kind of “autistic detective agency,” something Christopher intuitively grasps and enjoys (Aarseth 
1997, 115). Such acts of pretence contradict mainstream, normative views of autism, and Haddon 
gives Christopher a tool for survival that revises the clinical picture. 
Christopher’s eagle eye for perceiving his surroundings in a much higher definition than 
regular minds is a product of his detail-oriented cognitive style. Such a fine-grained view of the 
world compels writers to alter regular narrative strategies and paint the world with more accurate 
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brushstrokes. During his reassuring spell as a criminal, the young detective is content to describe 
his cell in arresting detail: “It was nice in the police cell. It was almost a perfect cube, 2 meters 
long by 2 meters wide by 2 meters high. It contained approximately 8 cubic meters of air” (17). 
Describing the dimensions of the cell, immediately perceivable to claustrophiliac Christopher, is 
far from conventional in most novels, and Haddon portrays him as a person confident in a space 
that would feel cramped, overpowering and profoundly disturbing to most people.  
The degree of detail supplied by Christopher is a violation of pragmatic principles, because 
the “granular partitions” (Bittner and Smith 2003) that neurotypical conversation mandates are 
inaccessible or hopelessly vague for the fictional autistic mind. Christopher answers that he is 15 
years, 3 months and 2 days old (7), because he does not find stating the years as a sufficient answer. 
He prefers to observe the Maxim of Quality under any circumstances instead of operating under 
the principle of cooperation, devoting a greater effort to say only as much as necessary (Maxim of 
Quantity) and as closely related to the conversation as possible (Maxim of Relevance), according 
to Elena Semino’s analysis (Semino 2014). This obsession over detail extends to social scripts that 
are common knowledge to most readers. Here’s how Christopher tells the story of buying a ticket:  
 
And I watched 47 people do this and I memorized what to do. Then I imagined a red 
line on the floor and I walked over to the wall where there was a poster which was a 
list of places to go and it was alphabetical and I saw Willesden Green and it said £2:20 
and then I went to one of the machines and there was a little screen which said PRESS 
TICKET TYPE and I pressed the button that most people had pressed, which was 
ADULT SINGLE and £2:20, and the screen said INSERT £2:20 and I put three £1 
coins into the slot and there was a clinking noise and the screen said TAKE TICKET 
AND CHANGE and there was a ticket in a little hole at the bottom of the machine 
and a 50p coin and a 20p coin and a l0p coin and I put the coins in my pocket and I 
went up to one of the grey gates and I put my ticket into the slot and it sucked it in and 
it came out on the other side of the gate. (212-213) 
 
There is literally nothing in his report that ‘I bought a ticket to Willesden Green from the 
machine and entered the Underground’ would not cover sufficiently for the reader to imagine the 
actions involved. Whereas his ToM-impairment leaves Christopher silent about a great deal of 
socially relevant information, when it is coupled with his problems in planning and love of detail, 
it generates loquacious passages that contribute nothing to the reader’s mental picture of the events. 
Except for one thing: that buying a ticket is new and challenging, because it involves social scripts 
Christopher is unfamiliar with, so he has to narrate the obvious in punishing detail.  
- 144 - 
One of the vehicles by which Haddon curtails some of the narrative’s idiosyncrasies that 
come with disabled storytelling is the introduction of Siobhan as an editor of Christopher’s text. 
She is the special education teacher who encourages the young detective to start writing, thereby 
shaping Christopher’s text, to create the book in the format the reader receives. This layered 
textuality gives Haddon the option to feature the manuscript of the investigation as a diegetic object 
that Ed Boone can read, threatening to destroy the narrative edifice that Ed created in order to 
shield Christopher from the vagaries of relationships. Although Siobhan initially offers to “help 
with the spelling and the grammar and the footnotes” (34), this is underplaying the effect she has 
on the presentation of the material.  
As an editor, the device places the onus of responsibility on her to reorganise Christopher’s 
narrative, translating between the expectations of the neurotypical audience of the book and its 
autistic author’s preferences. Since she constantly supplies Christopher with insights into how 
other people would approach the book, her role is normative, foregrounding unspoken assumptions 
about what constitutes a good narrative, what makes events tellable. Christopher comments upon 
this configuration with inimitable bluntness: “Siobhan said that the book should begin with 
something to grab people’s attention. That is why I started with the dog. I also started with the dog 
because it happened to me and I find it hard to imagine things which did not happen to me” (5). 
Defamiliarising the storytelling situation, Christopher is unwilling to rely on literary conventions, 
for he does not have an access to the tacit framing of fiction that neurotypical readers already take 
for granted. He highlights personal experience as a qualitative element of a good story, evincing a 
degree of compliance with the social norms of narration.  
Soon, however, significant differences surface in AS and NT judgements of what could 
grab people’s attention. After describing how he found Wellington, Christopher shows the story 
to his teacher: “Siobhan read the first page and said that it was different. […] She said that it was 
usually people who were killed in murder mystery novels. […] She said that this was because 
readers cared more about people than dogs, so if a person was killed in a book, readers would want 
to carry on reading” (5-6). The earnest editor is careful to not disparage the writer’s efforts while 
she observes the necessity of sustaining human interest by appealing to the emotions of the reader. 
Though the motivation of the killer is still there for the reader to think about, human death is just 
a better motivator of attention, and our evolutionary inclinations to follow the fate of our 
conspecifics is so deeply ingrained that it even affects our feelings about what is worthy of fictional 
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attention (Boyd 2009, 44-45 and 178-179).  
Haddon’s inclusion of this difference can probably be accounted for by remembering the 
connection between autistic and animal subjects. Siobhan gently tries to normalise Christopher’s 
narrative, but she allows it to proceed because his interest in animals can be harnessed to educate 
Christopher about becoming a more autonomous human subject. Inspired by Temple Grandin’s 
work, animal studies scholar Cary Wolfe asks: “instead of seeing the non-human animal as merely 
a prop […] for allowing the disabled to be mainstreamed into liberal society” — like Christopher 
does when he becomes a narrating subject by expressing empathy toward a dead dog and his 
adoration for his pet rat, Toby — can’t we see the commingling of disabled people living with 
animals “as an irreducibly different and unique form of subjectivity […], neither ‘disabled’ nor 
‘normal’, but […] a shared trans-species being-in-the-world”? (Wolfe 2008, 122). This is the 
difference that eludes Siobhan, who instead reminds Christopher of other, more successful 
strategies of arousing attention in his readership. 
Siobhan enthusiastically educates Ed’s son about other norms of literary expression, such 
as descriptions. The alternative approaches to composition are also apprehensible here:  
 
Siobhan said that when you are writing a book you have to include some descriptions 
of things. I said that I could take photographs and put them in the book. But she said 
the idea of a book was to describe things using words so that people could read them 
and make a picture in their own head. […] She also said that I should describe people 
in the story by mentioning one or two details about them so that people could make a 
picture of them in their head. (85) 
 
Siobhan well-meaningly attempts to sway Christopher towards a kind of narrative more in 
line with the established conventions of fiction, appealing to the audience’s ability to envision the 
setting and scenes where the action takes place as a big draw for consuming novels. This dispute 
reiterates the mental simulation arguments concerning the enactive imagination of the reader 
(Goldman 2006; Caracciolo 2011) and complements it by the discussion of what the words 
‘interesting’ and ‘different’ mean for Siobhan and Christopher – it is ‘different’ to write about a 
dog’s murder, but not the preferable kind of ‘different,’ like the non-canonical knowledge of 
objects and places that would fill a narrative world with life. 
Evidently, writing obvious routines of ordinary human life that readers can infer from their 
knowledge of folk psychology and social customs aren’t worthy of fictionalisation: “So I started 
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walking, but Siobhan said I didn’t have to describe everything that happens, I just have to describe 
the things that were interesting” (232). Siobhan’s effect on the content of the narrative is 
substantial, advising Christopher to include material he might not otherwise see as important and 
omit some that Christopher would not think of leaving out. The only reason this sort of editorial 
meddling does not turn into the kind of ventriloquistic ‘facilitated communication’ is because of 
the recurring metafictional intrusion of the editor: neither Christopher nor Siobhan wants to erase 
the presence of the guiding hand, and this honesty authenticates the autistic voice that does not 
elide the collaborative nature of the finished product. 
As to Christopher’s idea of including pictures in the novel, the two seem to have reached a 
compromise. There are well over fifty illustrations within the novel, including maps, drawings, 
patterns, diagrams and emoticons that give the readers insight into just exactly what Christopher 
meant or saw (after all, what is the use of a book without pictures… or conversations?). But this 
dogged mimeticism is tempered by Siobhan’s relieving editorial moves that ease the burden of 
reading Christopher’s tale, who will not filter target stimuli from his mind, who cannot figure out 
what needs to be told and what can be omitted without the fear of ambiguity. 
This ongoing tension between the model reader and the diegetic author about what is 
tellable informs the very end of the book, too. Mindful of wider society’s aversion to seeing pages 
of formulae in print, Siobhan advises Christopher not to include his answer to the A-level maths 
question in the body of the text: “[S]he said I could put the answer in an Appendix, which is an 
extra chapter at the end of a book which people can read if they want to. And that is what I have 
done” (260). What Siobhan instinctively knows is that a maths proof is, above-all, non-narrative – 
it neither moves the plot forward, nor does it relate to Christopher’s experiences. Her respect and 
Christopher’s insistence both shape the structure of the book, reaching another compromise: the 
proof does end up in the appendix, and gives Christopher the last word, “QED” (272), proving that 
he can adapt to society and that he is right.  
Another proof of sorts comes from the other ending of the novel, which is the existence of 
the book itself. Here’s how Christopher expresses his confidence in himself: “And then I will get 
a First Class Honours degree and I will become a scientist. And I know I can do this because I 
went to London on my own, and because I solved the mystery of Who Killed Wellington? and I 
found my mother and I was brave and I wrote a book and that means I can do anything” (268). 
Christopher cherishes his adventures (in hindsight) and triumphantly asserts his agency in a social 
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environment that would never presume so much competence from a disabled teenage boy, who 
cannot lead a life of his own, according to the logic of disability. He has proven them wrong, and 
his determination speaks volumes about the need to rethink the abilities of autists. The very volume 
he has produced flies in the face of the accepted image of autists avoiding imagined narratives. 
Haddon’s book, despite its evocation of savant tropes and stereotypical instances of autistic 
behaviour, does actually subvert many of the stereotypes that it features, and he uses them to 
emphasise that ASCs can be a source of different ability, not just disability. 
In this chapter, I have tried to do justice to the many themes that are explored in The 
Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-time. I have argued that the unique mind of Christopher 
as a focalising character affects the narrative strategies of the story to a remarkable degree. Haddon 
uses autistic narration to comment upon the problems of narrativity, alternative conceptions of 
socialisation and alterity itself. I began with noting that neurological difference conditions the 
responses of the reader, who is more familiar with the social customs than the book’s inept writer, 
and therefore would surmise more from the gappy narration that omits crucial information which 
would help Christopher understand the minds of the characters. As an extended meditation on 
tellability and narrativity, The Curious Incident often veers into the territory of the annalistic and 
chronicle-like histories that Hayden White identified as proto-narratives, reflective of 
Christopher’s hardships in constructing a well-made story. One feature that eludes Christopher is 
other people’s expressions, which he cannot seem to interpret or even see as data to interpret in 
most cases. I have suggested that Haddon’s book is a rare case of an internally focalised 
behaviourist narrative, insofar as Christopher often makes recourse to corporeal similes to express 
mental state concepts, and he doesn’t seem to have direct access to his own emotions or other 
characters’ feelings, so they are judged solely by their outward appearances. Discussing this 
narrative impairment and the preference for object-based interactions has led me to analyse 
Christopher’s similes of the mind and computers as examples of a direct engagement with 
cognitive science, pointing out the inadequacy of the old model of the mind as a general-purpose 
computer that processes information sequentially.  
This brought me to contemplate the medial metaphors for cognition that Christopher uses 
besides the computer, identifying the ‘smelltrack’ of his memories as another focalising strategy, 
naricularisation. Christopher’s mimetic memories crowd out the flexible problem-solving skills 
that are necessary for a more relevant response to distress, and the ability to think in 
- 148 - 
counterfactuals. One section of the chapter was therefore devoted to Christopher’s anxieties about 
representing spatiotemporal relationships, in which I contended that the novel is the story of how 
he comes to terms with the inadequacies of representations, something that Haddon depicts in a 
playful, self-reflexive style. Following this, I have argued that Christopher reacts to narrative 
events (the ones which shatter Christopher’s cosy world of routine) in a way that is debilitating, 
so I have inverted Ann Jurecic’s expression to claim that he experiences ‘narrative as illness.’ I 
have introduced Daniel Punday’s idea of a body that resists narrative to show that Christopher 
actively tries to resist such events by autistic meltdowns. It is also useful to factor this resistant 
mind-body into the interpretation of the expository sections of the book, which help Christopher 
counter the confusing tide of plot.  
The non-narrative lists and digressions chop Christopher’s narrative up into discrete, more 
manageable blocks, and it enables him to speak his mind about topics that are dear to him, offering 
a Shandean, digressive critique of the neurotypical desire for coherence as an artificial imposition. 
This is also a critique of the social mind, and Christopher’s perceptions of reality are conducive to 
an ‘object-oriented ontology’ that Ian Bogost has developed to understand the interobjectivity of 
material phenomena. The list of objects that recur as a focal point in Christopher’s narration bear 
more than a passing resemblance to Bogost’s ‘Latour litanies,’ which juxtapose objects without 
positing any specific relationship between them, to highlight their alterity. 
The alien phenomenology naturally leads to Christopher’s fascination with science fiction, 
the popular genre that devotes more fictional space (pun intended) to the exploration of other kinds 
of thinking and being than the anthropocentric one. I bring Christopher’s familiarity with staples 
of SF fiction such as Blade Runner to argue that a) empathy towards otherness and the boundaries 
of humanity are core topics of the genre, providing the viewers and readers with literally alien 
configurations, and b) that his appreciation of detective and science fiction qua fiction is a 
subversion of the accepted clinical picture of fiction-avoiding autists. Furthermore, he adopts the 
tropes and devices of detective fiction to respond more adaptively to his narrative situation, which 
turns them into socially enabling narratives. Contrary to his own conception of being literal and 
reality-minded, this slow adaptation to counterfactual thinking is also palpable in his vivid use of 
pretence to imagine social niches that would be more suited to his preferences. Pretence sometimes 
takes the form of a mediating representational model that strips Christopher’s reality of its more 
bewildering features, like when he imagines the journey to London as a computer game that 
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favours his strong suit, abstract problem-solving. The journey narrative is notable for painstakingly 
detailing the familiar social scripts which present challenges for the autistic protagonist, who 
cannot tolerate vagueness and strives for perfect mimeticism. The excesses of description are 
somewhat toned down by the editorial agency of Siobhan, who attempts to reconcile Christopher’s 
narrative style with the neurotypical norms dictating the storytelling conventions of most books. 
The textuality of the book is altered as a result, which comes to represent a compromise position 
with the assertion of disabled difference. It is the metafictional visibility of the editorial hand that 
saves the young detective’s manuscript from becoming a product of ‘facilitated’ writing, which 
would supplant the autistic perspective with other, non-disabled agendas. 
The next chapter continues with an analysis of Elizabeth Moon’s Speed of Dark that builds 
on a number of themes that I have begun to articulate: the importance of alterity in science fiction, 
the experimental focalising techniques of the author to present autistic thinking or the cognitive 
scientific view of the mind, whose meaning is contested by the characters. The reading will focus 
less on narrativity, and will pay more attention to the ethical stakes of how society deals with 
disabled difference. I shall take concepts and interpretative strategies from Nicholas Dames’ The 
Physiology of the Novel (2007), to make the case for a neuropolitical reading of attention and 
descriptive granularity, the pleasures of music and temporality as they relate to the social norms 
of cognition. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THINKING AT THE SPEED OF DARK:  
ELIZABETH MOON’S LESSONS IN BIOETHICS AND NORMATIVITY 
 
“We must avoid intellectual stagnation, which retards the progress of medical 
knowledge, but we must be moral. Biotechnology can be used for noble, frivolous, or 
evil purposes. Decisions on the ethical use of this powerful new knowledge should not 
be made by extremists or people purely motivated by profit. There are no simple 
answers to ethical questions.” – Temple Grandin (1995, 236) 
 
In my reading of The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-time, I have sought to 
identify the critical consequences of writing a novel that participates in current discourses of 
disability and the sciences of the mind. I have looked at how narrative is structured, how it halts 
and digresses when the autistic teller becomes conscious of his novice skills as a story-teller, and 
how that awareness plays into postmodern notions of self-reflexive textuality, narrativity and 
tellability. I have explored the influence an autistic character’s scientific knowledge has on his 
worldview and his self-image through his use of similes, which are marked by their peculiar 
originality in autism. I have analysed the technological metaphors of brain function that the novel 
brought on board to explain Christopher’s cognition, elucidating some of the social nuances that 
Christopher fails to pick up on. I have established the relevance of the alien, object-oriented 
phenomenology that places objects and people on the same ontological level to the autism novel 
and Christopher’s thinking in particular.  
This chapter continues on this track. The mediatised metaphors of cognition are a central 
concern of Elizabeth Moon’s Speed of Dark, and I will argue that our understanding of the brain 
is crucial to properly evaluate the novel, especially its controversial ending that cures the 
protagonist. The role of the adaptationist, modular view of the mind is essential in the debates 
about why Moon made her protagonist, Lou take an experimental neurological treatment to 
normalise his autistic brain. This adds a strong ethical component to several literary scholars’ 
criticism of the novel, who argue that such an ending is unsatisfactory, since it does not question 
the neurological status quo and does not integrate people with atypical brain development as full 
members into society. Thus, my reading will be more oriented towards ethics than my treatment 
of The Curious Incident, with the intent to write an ethically inflected cognitive analysis of the 
novel that interprets Lou’s final decision from a perspective that integrates insights from 
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neuroethics and disability studies.  
I introduce Nicholas Dames’ term ‘the social norms of cognition’ (SNC) and reconfigure 
it to show that Lou’s mental functioning is derived from the normative discourse of psychiatry that 
Eva Vakirtzi has exposed in her genealogy of discursive power in the classification, treatment and 
research of autism. The appropriate level of attention, its temporal duration and the details 
observed by the attentive mind were of prime interest to Victorian neurologists as well as Moon, 
who presents a critique of normative standards of cognition (neurohegemony) but also a criticism 
of a too facile refusal of enhancing the mind technologically. The ethical background to this 
investigation is Catherine Malabou’s What Should We Do with Our Brain? (2008), a book-length 
essay that critically evaluates neuroplasticity in its many forms, and the possibilities inherent in 
the changing brain. Although this reading will be more contextual than the previous, I take the 
narratological idea of ‘granularity’ and develop it further to encompass the aesthetic effect of a 
granularity mismatch in the descriptions focalised from the perspective of neurotypical characters 
and Lou. I also carry on with cognitive narratology’s interest in mind-reading, drawing upon 
Blakey Vermeule’s notion of “situational mindblindness” (2010), Alan Palmer’s focus on the 
social mind in action and Lisa Zunshine’s attention to the benefits of storing storied information 
‘under advisement,’ metarepresentationally in order to get at the core of the novel: Lou’s desire to 
re-appropriate his mind, a battleground between the neurodiversity movement and the normative, 
reconstructive neurosurgery of the medical establishment.  
To begin with, let’s have a look at one of the guiding principles in my reading of Speed of 
Dark, the cognitive norms that demarcate a territory of cognitive cultural hegemony. In his 2007 
survey of the history of Victorian reading practices and physiological novel theory, a forerunner 
of cognitive literary theory, Nicholas Dames devised the concept of the ‘social norms of cognition’ 
to investigate the novel’s opposing roles in Victorian and contemporary discourse. In the former, 
it is pictured as a force shattering the attention and cognitive alertness of the reader, whereas in the 
latter, it is perceived as a tool fostering empathy and civic virtue in an age of electronic media 
antithetical to prolonged attention. Dames’ concept contextualises the cognitive features of the 
novel, like the readers’ attention or its duration, highlighting the historical shifts of their social 
values (19-20). Dames dedicates separate chapters to a.) the theme of attention in the period’s 
fiction, b.) the temporal experience of duration, specifically music’s relationship to the novel, c.) 
‘units of consciousness’ as theorised by nineteenth century psychophysics and connected to the 
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themes of organic wholes and finally, d.) to the accelerated comprehension of texts with the 
method of speed-reading and eye-tracking studies of reading. These topics might seem disparate 
at first and devoid of ethico-political concerns about novel reading, but Dames cogently argues 
that Victorian attitudes towards fiction stem from the theorists’ appropriation of physiological 
research to draw conclusions about the novel’s effect on the consciousness of the reader. 
Although Dames sought to write a prehistory of novel theory, I believe his analytical foci 
are probing enough to apply it to the autism novel. Besides the obvious centenary leap, I find our 
era’s anxieties about information technology, our ethical dilemmas in dealing with neurological 
difference and the rise of cognitive neuroscience to be a fruitful matrix in which Dames’ research 
could be revamped to generate an ethicognitive literary reading of Speed of Dark. I coin this term 
to suggest a way of adjusting cognitive literary criticism to pay more attention to ethics when we 
investigate the portrayal of atypical minds. 
Moon’s thematic handling of autism reprises physiological novel theory’s interest in 
attention, units of consciousness and the speed of comprehension as she presents Lou Arrendale’s 
attention to patterns and his keen senses. These traits are melded into a master figure of 
characterisation which foregrounds Dames’ social norms of cognition. I have altered his definition 
of the expression to suit my ends: in my use, it describes not the shared historical assumptions 
about the values of novel-reading, but a set of cultural standards about what is appropriate to 
perceive and communicate in a given society ― a kind of cognitive manners. Inspired by Bruce 
McConachie, I call this neuronormativity a form of “cognitive cultural hegemony” (McConachie 
2010), a dominant model of how to conduct social affairs in an unevenly distributed web of 
sociopragmatic and embodied knowledge. Because the condition is a spectrum that organises the 
perceptions of its subjects, one could posit that the irreducible heterogeneity of autism produces 
different social schemata from those of the dominant culture.  
Building on the pioneering work of Raymond Williams, McConachie reminds us “that a 
dominant culture reproduces itself, in part, by analogically transferring concepts and schemas to a 
network of practices” (2010, 145). The philosophical idea that the mind is read (like a book) 
because it can see other minds (METACOGNITION as VISION, to use the capitalising style favoured 
by conceptual metaphor theory) produces ways of thinking that derive from (near-)universal, 
species-dependent experiences of sight as a source of information about the world. These 
experiences congeal into an understanding that those who do not interpret their social and material 
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life-worlds according to the cognitive norm are blind in some real but metaphorical sense. Another 
essential metaphor explored in the book is old-school cognitive psychology’s metaphor of the mind 
as a computer. As a biotechnological data analyst working with computers, Lou is directly 
immersed in algorithmic pattern-seeking as a form of life at work and in his hobbies. My intention 
here is to assess how these hegemonic norms of cognition define the autistic character’s fictional 
life, and how the mutual misperception, indeed, miscognition of NTs and autists contribute to two 
of the central themes of the novel: cognition as pattern recognition in data and a shared but 
bridgeable mindblindness towards the other neurotype. 
To better evaluate how the SNC operate at heart of the novel, a little summary is in order. 
Speed of Dark is set in the near future, somewhere in the United States. Crucially, what makes this 
book science fiction is the biomedical novum that researchers have found a cure for autism, a 
method of treating potentially autistic foeti in utero and thus eliminating autistic infants. The story 
follows the life of Lou Arrendale, a high-functioning autist born before the cure who is able to lead 
a productive life as a disabled person, thanks to effective early intervention therapies, which taught 
him daily living skills and enough pragmatic language use to work in the data analysis department 
of a pharmaceutical company.  
His department, ‘Section A,’ is notable for exclusively employing autists, trained in pattern 
recognition necessary for the creation of new, complex biochemical formulae that will be used in 
medicine. ‘Section A’ was set up for two reasons: they perform substantially better than 
neurotypical employees, plus the company gets a tax break for employing them. On the downside, 
they can only operate under working conditions which upper management considers to be severe 
fiscal burdens. Lou and his colleagues work in an environment that soothes their senses and 
provides the right sort of distractions to help them focus: classical music plays in the background, 
a private gym is set up for them so they can ease the stress of ‘passing’ at the workplace and the 
fatigue brought on by hard cognitive labour (see Goffman 1963; for the application of stigmatised 
identity in autism, see Gray 1993, Durig 1996, 123-150). It is the contention of Gene Crenshaw, 
an executive in the company, that these are superfluous costs, and by “cutting the fat, getting back 
to the lean, tough, productive machine” (Moon 18) they can improve the bottom line, so ‘Section 
A’ has to be scrapped. He funnels the autistic employees into a new, experimental treatment 
programme that would cure them and thus eliminate their need for disability perks.  
Lou also practices fencing as a hobby, a sport he admires because of its civilised conflict, 
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and he does excel in it, thanks to his eye for patterns. The various thrusts, parries, feints and 
legwork crystallise into a unique kinetic fingerprint of his partners in Lou’s mind, and he enjoys 
reading these fingerprints immensely. In his words: “What I like is learning patterns and then 
remaking them so that I am in the pattern, too” (34), implying that fencing is an interpretative 
sport. Lou fast becomes a formidable opponent, winning the admiration of Tom, the leader of the 
fencing group and Marjory, another regular, who is also a researcher of developmental disabilities 
at the local university. She is one of the more vocal allies of Lou, someone who treats him with 
sympathy. This rubs another fencer the wrong way, the volatile Don, who rapidly grows jealous 
of Lou for spending a disproportionate amount of time with Marjory. Not content to let it slide, 
Don takes action so that he can win Marjory’s heart and remove Lou from the picture. He 
vandalises Lou’s car on several occasions, at one point even placing an IED inside, which could 
have exploded in Lou’s face. As a final solution, he assaults him physically, carrying a lethal 
weapon. Lou is shocked that Don, someone whom he considered to be his friend, could do such a 
thing. We are informed that Don will most likely be convicted and a “programmable personality 
determinant,” or PPD chip (284) will be inserted in his brain to erase his violent temper. 
Lou also participates in life at ‘the Center,’ a local support institution to people with various 
disabilities, both physical and intellectual. They provide legal counsel, scientific information, 
daytime activities and classes as well as other practical forms of assistance. It’s a place where 
Section A meets up every once in a while, but Lou notices that in recent months, his activities and 
social sphere has changed so much that “very little in the Center now interests me” (158). Lou 
does not attend most events, until the promise of the new treatment begins to circulate among the 
autistic community. In response, the Center organises meetings to help the community make sense 
of what the scientific papers and procedures mean, albeit not without ulterior motives. Lou 
explains that the counsellors “always encourage us to do everything to become more normal. I 
think they will say we should want this treatment even if they think it is too dangerous to try while 
it is still experimental” (157). Lou finds that the lecture given to Section A by the lead investigator, 
Dr. Ransome, was not sufficient, and decides to get himself up to speed by reading up on what 
would happen to him, literally taking a crash course in brain surgery (or functional neuroanatomy). 
The legal drama comes to its apex when Pete Aldrin, the NT leader of Section A confronts 
Gene Crenshaw over the company’s pressure to transform its autistic employees into 
neurotypicals. Section A themselves cannot make up their minds about the treatment: some, like 
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Linda, are very firm about embracing their autistic identity and argue the treatment would change 
their personalities, turning them into someone different. Others, like Cameron, are more willing to 
participate in the experiment, hoping to become more charming conversational partners. Aldrin 
creates a scandal about pushing human subjects into Stage I clinical trials of the neurosurgical 
procedure. The net result is that members of Section A are free to choose their destinies. Linda and 
Chuy (also members of the workgroup) are reluctant, while other friends of Lou, like Dale and 
Bailey would never agree to the treatment out of a desire to conform. In the end, Eric, Dale, Bailey 
and Lou decide to participate in the programme, with varying results: Lou’s treatment is 
successful, as is Eric’s and Dale’s. Bailey, on the other hand, “made a juicy tidbit for the media. I 
didn’t know how badly it went for him until I saw the news archives; they never let us see him” 
(423), as Lou admits. Linda also concludes that it is worth participating in the trials after meeting 
her old friends. Chuy accepts himself as he is and sees no benefit to the treatment, so he chooses 
to resist the procedure and remains his old self. Lou eventually uses his new in-between identity 
to go into space and work as an astronaut, but misses the old spark that connected her with Marjory.  
The ending is an ideal point to start discussing the effect of the novel. Lou’s decision to let 
go of his autistic identity has been the focus of many critics of the book, and not without reason. 
Simply put, in our own world, where autism is understood to be a lifelong condition with no option 
to ‘cure’ it, autism advocates assert that living on the spectrum is a valuable form of life, and 
attempts at curing people is tantamount to stripping them of their integral selves. This position is 
taken by Lou when he meets one of the former autists, Joe Lee, who was given gene therapy: “If 
you give a deaf child hearing, he is no longer one of the deaf […]. If you do it early enough, he 
never was. It’s all pretending otherwise” (14). Lou is acutely aware of the result of separating the 
disability from the person — it is a negation of their identity.  
One thing to note here is that while Lou is personally addressing Joe Lee, narratologically 
speaking, we can interpret it as more than his personal opinion. Alan Palmer views such statements 
as the one quoted above to be a result of shared minds working together: “there is a certain sort of 
double-voiced discourse that may look like an expression of opinion by an intrusive narrator but 
that on closer inspection turns out to be the expression of a consensus, a shared view within a 
particular social group” (Palmer 2004, 84). Further support for this interpretation comes on the 
next page of the novel: “Joe Lee should know better [than to claim that he is autistic]; we’ve told 
him again and again” (15). Lou is channelling the opinion of the whole of Section A, the rest of 
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the autistic workgroup, who might be the last of their kind. They know full well that the cure 
erodes their community and personality. And yet Moon, the parent of a young man with autism, 
chose to include the miraculous cure within her tale. 
On the clichés of disability in fantastic fiction, Jane Stemp comments that  
 
[m]any other world fantasies hold out the image of magical cure for wounds and 
disabilities; many science fiction titles present the cures not as magical but as 
‘miracles’ of science. […] Partly the habit must be due to tradition: […] science fiction 
writers, however willing to cast a satirical eye on earlier notions of ‘progress,’ seem 
reluctant to abandon the hope that a perfected medical system will yet cure all the ills 
of the world. (Stemp 2004) 
 
These words, written a little while after Speed of Dark was published, offers some insight 
into why Lou’s story is so replete with the ‘chance to choose’ theme. It is a compelling frame to 
place autistic characters in, whose lives are marked by their alternative cognitive strategies for 
interpreting the world. Taking the treatment or staying autistic is an ethical dilemma that can be 
explored across different characters so that the final choice of Lou will be more palatable for the 
normate reader — it feels less determined by its ableist thrust. 
Some literary scholars compare the novel to C. S. Friedman’s This Alien Shore (1998), 
examining “whether or not these two works of speculative science fiction, with the possibility of 
conceptualizing new worlds, extend the borders of community” (Arndt and van Beuren 2013, 90), 
in other words, whether the transformative imagination of the writers contribute to a more 
neurocosmopolitan society. They come to the conclusion that by taking the cure, Lou conforms to 
an ableist view of humanity, something detrimental to the idea of a neurodiverse community: 
“Moon reinscribes a conceptualization of disability as deficit that we must challenge in 
representations of disability in science fiction” (Arndt and van Beuren 2013, 103). While I do not 
dispute this interpretation of the novel, it feels woefully inadequate to judge a work exclusively on 
the basis of how much it promotes a certain vision of society, no matter how preferred. The ethical 
arc and dilemmas presented in Speed of Dark are more deeply penetrating about neuroethics to be 
forever committed to the pile of failed representations of autism. This is the sort of criticism which 
has inspired Michael Bérubé to state that  
 
The Speed of Dark explicitly opens and closes with the question of who knows what 
about whom, and who is thereby authorized to ask questions and validate answers. […] 
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Whether or not one is happy with Lou’s decision – and some readers have objected to 
it – the point remains that the novel opens with a Lou who does not understand the 
larger narrative structuring his life, and ends with a Lou who does. (Bérubé 2011, 471-
472) 
 
If we accept the premise that narrative consciousness and self-fulfilment are the basic 
driving forces of the novel, then the book might be rehabilitated (in the legal sense of the word). 
It is not only about understanding the stakes of the narrative, but about neurocosmopolitanism, 
described as “the feeling of being at home with all manner of neurologies”, a “neuro-mobility and 
mixing” which implies that “[b]oth autism and neurotypicality must cease to be strictly themselves 
in the participatory presence of the other; the anthropologist on Mars must become, at least in part, 
a Martian” (Savarese 2013a, 191-205). Although Savarese obviously imagines 
neurocosmopolitanism in a society where autism is not cured, for Lou, the treatment does function 
as a ticket to a neurocosmopolitan space. He does not lose his “Lou-before” self entirely after the 
treatment: “I am Lou enough. Lou-before and Lou-now, Lou-before lending me all his years of 
experience, experience he could not always understand, and Lou-now assessing, interpreting, 
reassessing. I have both — am both” (416). This new being, “the unknown” (416) is a 
neurocosmopolitan subject, whose two identities intertwine. 
This connects back to the framing device of questions the novel opens with. In a fit of dire 
ignorance, Lou is inundated with questions at the psychiatrist’s office about his personal life, his 
hobbies and sex life. Lou alludes to these questions with the metaphor of darkness and light. 
Darkness is a knowledge that reinforces the status quo, “[s]omething more tactile and muscley 
than just lack of knowledge. A sort of will to ignorance” (107), as Tom interprets it. In this schema, 
light is a transformative, critical form of questioning received knowledge. The questions Lou poses 
and his reinterpretation of old metaphors invite the readers to re-evaluate this earlier meaning: “It 
bothered Lou-before that the speed of dark was greater than the speed of light. Now I am glad of 
it, because it means I will never come to the end, chasing the light. Now I get to ask the questions” 
(426), he concludes, acknowledging that this darkness is also a precondition of new knowledge 
and that it will never entirely go away. Regrettably, the plot suggests that Lou’s brain functions 
have to be normalised before he can fulfil his goals, a move that will surely not score extra points 
with Arndt and van Beuren and their fellow scholars. Why not learn more about the agenda behind 
the neuroscientific research instead, or its relationship to space exploration? There is a lot of 
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speculation going on in Section A before the treatment but it is never explored in greater depth.  
Still, Lou is written to be motivated by his experiences and aspirations for a life less limited 
by the social norms of cognition. Seen from an anti-rehabilitationist angle, it is a lamentable choice, 
one that does not transform society’s attitudes towards neurominorities. His eventual choice to 
undergo neuromedical therapy after all workplace pressures have been relieved implies that he can 
play the system to his own ends: by evading pressure, battling the company he works for and re-
appropriating his brain to work in space, he proves to be adept in manipulating the social 
institutions that have disabled him.  
Whether this ending, which emphasises self-fulfilment in a society that has already ‘cured’ 
autism is in agreement or conflict with the ideals of collective liberty or a transhuman future is a 
contentious issue, and Speed of Dark presents both sides of the argument. In our own world, the 
International Genetically Engineered Machine, a synthetic biology competition that involves 
university under- and postgraduates is reflective of a certain culture of thinking about neuroethics. 
One spokesman for the group at UCL, which discussed medical neurogenetic engineering and its 
relationship to various neurodevelopmental pathologies, writes that in their circles, “viewing 
humans as immutable biological entities is not particularly helpful,” and “seeing GE as morally 
acceptable depends upon not seeing nature as a model to which we must conform” (Bates 2013, 
5). Although it dubiously describes ASCs as “illnesses” as a result of “faulty genetic information,” 
the paper suggests, more empathetically, that  
 
in the case of adult with milder ASDs, the sudden ability to “correct” neuronal function 
in their brain and remove even some autistic symptoms could have a fairly drastic 
change to their personality, something they may be very unwilling to undergo, which 
is why such GE interventions, if developed, should perhaps not be advertised as a 
“cure.” (7)  
 
The author(s) note that “[t]he ability to see the world differently as a result of a mild 
pathology can be useful” (Bates 2013, 7), which is a view increasingly voiced in the scientific 
community that now speaks about the boons of high-functioning autism with a certain pride. The 
group also discusses the promising impact of NGE on society: “The basic idea of selfhood and the 
fear of change is not just constrained to the individual level. If the use of NGE […] were to become 
widely used in the future, we may find ourselves increasingly confronted with the question of what 
we consider neurotypical and how far should an individual be from its guide posts to warrant 
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medical NGE treatment” (Bates 2013, 17, emphasis mine). A positive reading of this document 
implies that the horizons of neurotypicality and atypicality might gradually change. Within this 
lies the potential for a more inclusive society as the social norms of cognition are transformed by 
the era of synthetic plasticity. As the young neuroethicists warn their colleagues, “the level of 
mastery sophisticated NGE represents may leave inadequate cultural space of alternative ways to 
live human life in society. [… W]e should not be so keen to embark upon the ethic of the 
sportsman, that of control, perfection, competition and dominancy” (Bates 2013, 19). An even 
more straightforward position is held by Simon Baron-Cohen, who in no uncertain terms declares 
that just “because someone is neurologically different, this does not mean they need a treatment or 
a cure. They may need support […], but their difference includes their excellent attention to detail 
[…] and treating them for their autism might risk them losing such superior skills” (Baron-Cohen 
2015, 1762). As is evident from the standpoint of biology and developmental psychology, having 
a humane eye towards the ethical challenges that curing autism embodies is a necessity. The 
complexities of our human concepts of ‘natural’ and ‘artificial,’ fallacious appeals to ‘the natural,’ 
our intuitive notions of personhood and a justified anxiety about tinkering with our brain are just 
some of the factors that makes exploring this topic in a novel so intriguing, and renders Moon’s 
resolution so controversial in autism advocacy groups.  
The novel’s initial rationale for curing Section A, however, is hardly fit to bear the weight 
of the book’s central narrative tension. It is suggested that the private gym, the music players, the 
room decorations and the separate offices are heavily taxing the company’s resources. But it is so 
wildly implausible that these ‘perks’ of Section A could constitute anything more than a negligible 
financial burden on the firm, that it stretches credibility in my view. Nonetheless, the novel adeptly 
demonstrates the conflict between a profit-oriented company and its disabled employees. It also 
suggests a tension between government regulation and private industry’s willingness to maximise 
utility. Incentivising companies to employ neurominorities so they can extract better data for 
scientific research, the government uses the enlightened template of ‘affirmative action’ to harness 
the abilities of the autistic mind. The pressure to conform to basic standards of functioning provides 
the narrative with the ‘thrust’ that jostles the current, progressive employment status quo. In the 
words of Crenshaw: “Things cannot go on like this, Lou. Change happens” (Moon 27). Even in its 
very narrative configuration, Speed of Dark activates the same antagonism I have observed in my 
previous analysis, the clash between an autistic preference for sameness and the narrative situation, 
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which depends upon changes and conflicts to generate a tellable story. 
As the novel unfolds, Lou becomes more and more aware of the shenanigans involved in 
maintaining the neurological standard of normate cognition. The NT technocrats of the novel, like 
Crenshaw and Dr. Ransome are fine examples of situational mindblindness, which denotes “a 
trope of dehumanization, albeit a very complex one: the point of it is to deny other people the 
perspective of rational agency by turning them into animals, machines, or anything without a 
mind” (Vermeule 2010, 195). This notion further underscores Duffy and Dorner’s observation 
about the rhetoric of scientific sadness – the autistic characters are all too aware of the 
dehumanising nature of the experiment the company tries to coerce them into. They also see the 
benefits of the enabling work environment that upper management deems to be costly and 
ineffective, epitomised by Crenshaw, who cannot fathom why people like Lou would not want to 
become normal. Crenshaw mindblinds himself to Section A, a conscious strategy that makes his 
employees little more than expensive machines, a source of additional costs that could be remedied 
with neurological repair. Here, the novel resonates with Melville’s “Bartleby, the Scrivener,” the 
short story which has already been discussed as a narrative of a neuroatypical mind entering the 
fictional fencing piste and fighting for recognition even though the narrator is unable to mind-read 
him (Murray 2008, Pinchevski 2011, Savarese 2013b).  
Resistance to neuroconformism leads to a genuine dialogue between NT and ASC 
characters. Section A discusses the risks of the treatment with the management, and Lou calls out 
the medical researchers on their underhanded tactics to get the autistic subjects’ compliance. 
Cognitive narratology’s interest in minds deftly handles Speed of Dark by curating the novel as a 
literary drama of mindreading that keeps dilemmas about cognitive difference and neuroethics in 
its purview. Dames’ social norms of cognition will enable us to see the double standards which 
affect the descriptions of Lou’s surroundings, his bodily sensorium and his understanding of the 
social world that he shapes and is shaped by.  
Speed of Dark wears its interest badge in asymmetrical mind-reading proudly on its chest. 
The readers get their first glimpse of Lou in the psychiatrist’s office, where he is assessed to see 
that he is fit for work. Setting the scene up as a clash between normate scientific knowledge and 
autistic cognition, Lou states: “I have read the book, so I know what it is I do not understand. What 
I haven’t figured out yet is the range of things they don’t understand. The normals. The reals” (2, 
emphasis in original). Here in the office, Lou’s abilities are largely framed by the deficit model of 
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autism, one that describes him in terms of what he cannot do or know. Even so, the deficit model 
grants Lou some awareness of what is expected of him and how he can cope with those norms.  
Lou gets a hermeneutic handhold on normate cognition, but he is interested in turning the 
tables on neurotypicals, to describe their cognition as a lack, too, which would balance the power 
asymmetry of mind-reading that favours normate culture. In Lou’s words: “If normal people really 
can do all the things that are claimed for them, it would be helpful to have that ability… but I am 
not sure they do. They do not always understand why other people act as they do. […] I have been 
oblivious like that, so I recognize it in others” (315, emphasis added). It is worth stressing that 
Lou’s awareness of his ToM deficit becomes a source of identification with NTs – he calls attention 
to neurotypical obliviousness or mindblindness, removing it as an exclusively autistic trait and 
simultaneously showing that he is capable of empathetically shifting perspective. When Dr. 
Fornum advises Lou about social customs, it is Lou’s autism that allows him to see through the 
illusionary norms that few people actually follow perfectly: “She has told me that Everyone knows 
this, and Everyone does that, but I am not blind, just autistic, and I know that they know and do 
different things” (4, emphasis added). Mindblindness is strongly implicated in this, since Lou 
refuses the labels of both visual and cognitive blindness towards other people.  
He produces a counterdiscourse in which NT people become blind by ignoring 
individuality in favour of applying normate assumptions to heterogeneous groups of people. In 
fact, autism becomes a strength not just due to Lou’s superior pattern recognition skills, but 
because he can see through the commonsense notions of what the SNC would dictate, recognising 
contradictory evidence when he encounters it. As a quick way to prove how foundational these 
societal norms are, the words “appropriate” and “inappropriate” crop up 20 times in the book, 
“polite” and “impolite” appear 21 times and “should” a whopping 163 times! 
Even so, Lou has severe difficulties with interpreting beliefs and behaviour. The text is 
littered with honest expressions of incomprehension when he faces various social situations. For 
example, when Lou is fishing for social information from Marjory about how the fencing group 
feels towards Don, he reports: “ ‘Tom and Lucia both sounded angry with Don,’ I say. She gives 
me a quick sideways glance. I am supposed to understand it, but I don’t know what it means” (37). 
After Don wrecks Lou’s car, Miss Kimberly, the neighbour thinks she will have to move; the 
reader picks up on the idea that she feels unsafe when crimes are happening in the neighbourhood. 
In contrast, Lou asks to himself: “why does she have to move because my tires were slashed? No 
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one could slash her tires, because she has no tires. She does not have a car.” (151), missing the 
wider social context and Miss Kimberly’s state of mind.  
Narration in the few sections that feature an NT point-of-view character shows more 
complex cognitive processes, and it betrays fewer signs of uncertainty. In the short interlude 
between two Lou-focalised sections, Tom observes how the fencing group manages the built-up 
tension in the wake of Don’s outbursts: Marjory “sounded prissy, which meant she was more than 
just annoyed […]. Tom could tell Marjory wanted to yell at Don. […] Tom listened without joining 
in. He knew the signs: any moment now Lucia would tackle Marjory about her feelings for Lou 
and for Don, and he wanted to be far away when that happened” (63-64, emphasis added). These 
passages show the readers that mind-reading confidence can go up radically in a text where 
neurotypical assumptions about cognition are easily available as an interpretative framework. 
The author is adept at demonstrating that the difference in mind-reading abilities is never 
an all-or-nothing affair. When Don is revealed to be the person behind an attempt on Lou’s life, 
the whole fencing group is appalled by the turn of events. Lucia in particular is in a state of shock, 
and upon expressing her vengeful sentiments, Lou is taken aback by Lucia’s flare-up. He gives 
voice to his consternation: “Should I have known about her, the way she thinks she should have 
known about Don? If normal people expect to know all about one another, all the hidden things, 
how can they stand it? Doesn’t it make them dizzy? ‘You can’t read minds, Lucia,’ Marjory says. 
‘I know that.’” Lucia replies (292). This textual moment is important for two reasons. First, 
because it acknowledges what all critics of mindblindness agree on, namely that despite autists’ 
marked impairment, the NT population can just as easily fall wide of the mark every now and then 
when it comes to empathic accuracy. Second, because Lou also feels that the social norms of 
cognition are confusing – they suggest that people will be accurate mind-readers most of the time, 
so they can expect adequate performance by default, but mountebanks like Don can conceal their 
minds with hostile intent. Lou is caught in the double bind of aspiring to rise to the level of NTs 
while knowing full well that it can never protect him from such villains. Tom’s mind-reading 
shows another one of its handy functions: it enables people to gauge whether social interactions 
are going well to evade unpleasant arguments, where expectations to manage “group intermental 
thinking” (Palmer 2004, 218-239) would require more cognitive effort than the individual is 
willing to handle. In this instance, it would take Tom too much effort to understand everyone’s 
feelings and thoughts on the conflict between Don and Lou and to make the right decision that 
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would dissolve tension among the fencers.  
Tom can use his mind-reading skills to identify a minor squabble between two members 
of the club and ignore it by metarepresentationally storing everyone’s opinions “under 
advisement” (Zunshine 2006, 132). Lou has a harder time protecting himself from the maelstrom 
of confusing NT behaviour, and he cannot suspect that Don’s actions are questionable even within 
NT social norms. ‘Knowing the signs’ means a world of difference between directing the course 
of social interactions and being caught up in them, powerless. This is why Lou is proud when he 
can exercise his improving sociocognitive skills in the midst of her row with Emmy, a fellow 
autist: “[Emmy’s] voice is hostile. I can tell she thinks this is what I think and that she thinks I am 
wrong, that Marjory is not in love with me. I am […] happy that I can understand all that in what 
she says and how she says it. Years ago I would not have understood” (88). Lou is constantly 
getting better at assessing social situations, whereas other characters’ failures bring the point home 
that “even when [cognitive adaptations] function properly, at no point do they guarantee a smooth 
sailing through concrete complicated situations” (Zunshine 60, emphasis in original). 
Minding others is so essential in Speed of Dark that Lou revels in the moments when he 
can break free from illegible minds. After choosing the treatment, he takes one final walk around 
Harper Falls, a natural preserve. In relief, he comments: “I can feel myself relaxing. Trees do not 
care if I am normal or not. Rocks and moss do not care. […] I do not have to think about myself 
at all. […] No one who minds is here” (397-398). Lonely self-communion and a desire for a mind-
less world propel Lou towards his goal of working in outer space, but employment on a space 
station is based on a requirement of neurotypicality, so paradoxically, Lou is cured of autism to do 
the kind of work that would suit him the most. This ironic twist showcases the disabling legal 
background which enforces the social norms of cognition and invites neurominorities to assimilate. 
In the scene, Lou directs the reader’s gaze towards NTs’ default tendency of attributing 
mindedness even to inanimate phenomena: “Water has no mind, water cannot think, but people – 
normal people – do write about raging rivers and angry floodwaters as if they did not believe in 
that inability” (399). Literal-minded Lou hits the nail right on its head; while autists are seen as 
mindblind, NT people can be just as fallible and become victims of their own inclination towards 
minding others when they attribute intentionality and a psyche to things that are not sentient.  
It would not be entirely out of place to call neurotypicals mind-hallucinators, using the 
language of abnormal psychology to emphasise the labelling function mindblindness serves in 
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disqualifying autistic cognition. This mind-hallucination is called “hyperactive agent-detection 
device” in the cognitive sciences (Barrett 2000, 31-32), which would explain the pantheon of 
personified metaphors and supernatural agents that the human mind has conjured up to see the 
world as a product of humanoid action and intent. This might also be the reason behind 
Christopher’s blunt atheism and his demystified view of the world, but not Lou’s conformist 
Christianity. After the cure becomes a concern for Lou, readers learn that he goes to church, as 
much for the ordered ritual as for spiritual guidance.  
In one scene, John 9 is read to the congregation, the Biblical story about the blind man 
waiting by the Pool of Siloam. The healing story fills Lou with doubt. On one hand, he feels 
strongly that “I do not think I need to be healed, not of autism. Other people want me to be healed, 
not me myself” (341). He muses that some people who wait by the healing pool might do so 
because their friends and family might see them as burdens. This does not concern him. On the 
other hand, including the ultimate unreadable mind in the equation, Lou asks: “Maybe God thinks 
I would be better if I weren’t autistic. […] What if God wants me to be something other than I 
am?” (343). Here he attempts the impossible, to understand the mind of Yahweh, whose mind is 
by definition occluded to mortal human beings, if He exists at all. The ethical conundrum stumps 
the parish priest as much as Lou, but the pastor replies, after some contemplation: “whether God 
wants us to pursue every hint of a cure of conditions we have or acquire… I don’t know that. Only 
if it doesn’t interfere with who we are as God’s children, I suppose” (347).  
Now, the author’s politics and her choice to place Lou in a congregation to convince him 
to take the cure might be debated, but for the literary scholar, the more interesting question is: how 
does a genuinely unreadable mind warp the fabric of the plot? It appears that for Moon (and 
therefore, Lou), the uncertainty of an unreadable mind alters one’s sense of personhood, and the 
hypothetical intentionalism that comes with a person trying to enter the mind of a god could inspire 
someone like Lou to enhance his mind-reading abilities, even if he did not express a specific hope 
for reading a divine mind. Moon’s presentation is more problematic because, given our knowledge 
that people with more difficulties in mentalising are less likely to believe in a personal god 
(Norenzayan et al. 2012), how plausible is it that Lou would be an active member of a church? 
Isn’t he rather acting as an author stand-in who muses about her religious stance on the need to 
cure disability and takes the easy way out by accepting that it is the will of a deity, to whom all 
human beings have the same mind-blind relationship?  
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This is not easy to resolve, as it would require an ethical background in philosophy and 
theology I do not claim to have, but it is sufficient to note that Lou first entertains the desirability 
of a cure by appealing to a supernatural agent he cannot ever hope to understand. Such an 
empathetic gambit depends upon skills neither he nor even the head of the congregation possesses. 
In attending church and contemplating the mind of the Christian God, Lou experiences a basic, 
dogmatically defined mind-blindness that pushes him to understand human minds more, wanting 
to know what their intentions are and what it’s like to be them. 
Neurological difference in Moon’s text does not limit itself to the representation of mind-
reading. Autists are characteristically sensitive to certain stimuli, and Moon represents this in the 
narrative text so that readers will have a better feel for the lived experiences of an autistic body 
and consciousness. As David Herman points out, from a cognitive-discursive standpoint:  
 
narrative affords a discourse environment optimally suited for the world-picturing 
process, since that environment shares crucial elements of structure with raw feels. 
Hence stories point beyond […] the impossibility of inspecting the very mechanisms 
by which inspection […] is made possible. Enacting and not just representing ways of 
experiencing […], stories capture and sustain our interest because of how their 
structure maps on to the mind’s own engagement with the world. (Herman 2009, 157) 
 
The autism novel as a subgenre of middlebrow literature makes for a particularly engaging 
reading because of the promise that readers will be granted an ‘inside-out’ view of autism; readers 
report a heightened narrative empathy towards people on the spectrum after reading autism novels 
(Caracciolo, 2014), and focalisation is a storytelling technique designed to create just that effect 
(Bal 2004, Bálint 2012, Kuiken and Miall 2001).  
One instructive technique which brings autism to life is the focalised description of Lou’s 
surroundings. Cognitive narratology can capture some of the attention to detail involved in this 
process by investigating the degree of granularity, in other words, the level of detail within 
descriptions, and what elements of the storyworld are backgrounded and foregrounded (Herman 
2009b). Coincidentally, research conducted on atypical cognitive granularity implies that due to 
the relatively smaller size of microcolumns and larger brain volume in autists, their detail-oriented 
processing style creates a granularity mismatch between the ASC and NT communities. 
Individuals with ASC “have difficulty and inefficiency in learning and using the language of the 
standard granularity. This would also be applicable to virtually all artifacts, such as architecture 
and social conventions. [… B]ecause of the granularity mismatch they fail to connect their 
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motivation with what they microscopically perceive from the surroundings” (Kozima 2013). I 
propose that we are seeing the tacit cognitive hegemony of neurotypical readers challenged when 
we observe this granularity mismatch. Autism novels function as defamiliarising narratives about 
how the norms of cognition become barriers to the neurocosmopolitanism Savarese sets as the 
means of integrating neurominorities (Savarese and Zunshine 2014). 
 In Speed of Dark, Moon’s attempts to depict a finer-grained sense of perception are 
manifested by the painstakingly precise detailing of the diegetic world. In an instructive example 
at the beginning of the novel, sitting in the psychologist’s office, Lou vividly conjures up the 
olfactory atmosphere of the room in a rare example of concentrated naricularisation (cf. 
Christopher’s “smelltrack” of events in the previous chapter): “Her office has a strange blend of 
smells, not just the paper and ink and book smell, and the carpet glue and the plastic smell of the 
chair frames, but something else that I keep thinking must be chocolate” (3). Later on, when he 
returns to work and someone calls for an order of pizza, another array of sensations is triggered: 
“I can suddenly smell everything in the office: the paper, the workstation, the carpet, the 
metal/plastic/dust/cleaning solution… myself” (8). Descriptions like these do not exactly facilitate 
a sensory immersion of the reader into the story-world, their function is to represent how someone 
with a keen sense of smell can register minute olfactory traces.  
The onslaught of detail in everything from smells to sounds or images in Speed of Dark is 
a testament to the perceptual refinement enabled by a higher cortical density. Just read this 
description, which evokes the narrative strategies of nouveau roman writing:  
 
The floor in the hall is tile, each tile streaked with two shades of green on beige. The 
tiles are twelve-inch squares; the hall is five squares wide and forty-five and a half 
squares long. The person who laid the tiles laid them so that the streaks are crosswise 
to each other—each tile is laid so that the streaks are facing ninety degrees to the tile 
next to it. Most of the tiles are laid in one of two ways, but eight of them are laid upside 
down to the other tiles in the same orientation. (154)  
 
These boring and skippable descriptions also contribute to the heightened awareness of 
Lou’s material surroundings and his all-encompassing interest in patterns, which reinforce the 
“cognitive estrangement” that Darko Suvin regards as the hallmark of science fiction (Suvin 1979, 
4). By ratcheting the degree of granularity up in Lou’s descriptions way further than NT readers 
are used to, Moon convinces the audience that it is no wonder that autists try to find ways of 
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negotiating the mental burden that comes with so many details vying for attention.  
Granularity mismatch is also a viable explanation for another feature of Lou’s thinking: his 
impaired ability to read emotions from other people’s faces. When looking at someone’s eye, the 
amount of detail Lou encounters is just infinitely richer than the neurotypical categories 
distinguished by law. As he puts it: “When I first went to get my state ID card, the form asked for 
eye color. I tried to write in all the colors in my own eyes, but the blank space wasn’t big enough. 
They told me to put ‘brown.’ I put ‘brown,’ but that is not the only color in my eyes. It is just the 
color that people see because they do not really look at other people’s eyes” (86). Typically, this 
can become an obstacle to socialisation when people judge others’ emotional states based on their 
facial expressions, including that tell-tale region, the eye. Indeed, the “Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Test” is a method for gauging a specific form of social intelligence, which is used in 
experiments to provide insights into one’s emotion-reading skills (Baron-Cohen et al. 1997, 2001). 
In the novel, facial expressions are a focal point, intended to showcase Lou’s perceptions:  
 
Her face is shiny. That used to bother me, when people were very happy and their faces 
got shiny, because angry people also get shiny faces and I could not be sure which it 
was. My parents tried to show me the difference, with the position of eyebrows and so 
on, but I finally figured out that the best way to tell was the outside corners of the eyes. 
(30)  
 
Owing to the author’s intentionally restricted vocabulary when putting this into Lou’s 
mouth, readers can notice that Lou picks a minor detail to differentiate between the two basic 
emotions, which are easily separated by NTs because of their biosemiotic context. Lou has to 
compensate for the lack of an immediately apparent higher Gestalt. In spite of a compensatory 
strategy that works for one particular problem, Lou is prone to stumble at ambiguity in other 
circumstances: “The man behind her has an odd expression on his face; I can’t tell if he agrees 
with her or not” (90). This does not mean that he cannot recognise any emotions – rather, it 
suggests that it is an achievement for him to piece together all the little bits to form a coherent 
whole: “I look at [Emmy’s] face, with the physical signs of anger all over it—the flushed skin, the 
bright eyes between tense lids, the square-shaped mouth, the teeth almost together” (158).  
But even Lou has his particular strengths in face-based emotion recognition. His social 
history allows him to recognise some quite complex emotional states, for example the doctor’s 
disingenuous expression when he prepares Lou for the upcoming surgery: “His face crinkles into 
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an expression that is supposed to convince me he believes it, but false sincerity is an expression I 
know from childhood. Every therapist, every teacher, every counselor has had that expression in 
their repertoire, the worried/caring look” (334). Lou’s ideological situatedness in the institutional 
framework of disability informs his particular strengths. Narrated in this way, his recognition of 
the worried/caring look is perhaps the softest form of indictment against the care workers who 
support people with autism, but it is an indictment nonetheless. It also shows that Lou can identify 
a facial expression related to the concealing of minds, false sincerity, meaning that he is far from 
gullible or naive. But then why does he not perceive Don as a troublemaker? A likely explanation 
is that he is more able to generalise his suspicions toward people in an unequal power relationship 
with him (Gene Crenshaw, the scientists involved in his neurotherapy) than toward those whom 
he identifies as ‘friends’ based on shared interests, like Don. For Lou, ‘friends’ is a discrete 
category with little granularity, whose boundaries cannot change unless proven violently 
otherwise, such as when Don assaults Lou and plants the explosive device in his car. 
I have already suggested that it is not enough to see this granularity mismatch as a simple 
difference, since it is inextricably tied up with the social norms of cognition when those with ASCs 
are taken to be intellectual disabled. During a conversation with Tom, Lou muses about the 
differences in the perception of autists and NTs. Tom “is easy in his body […] he sees and hears 
and tastes and smells and feels what others do, so his reality matches theirs” (380) and if there is 
one thing Lou disprefers, it is asymmetry. His final decision to undergo neurological treatment can 
be chalked up to how the social norms of cognition percolate down to Lou’s self-worth.  
As the events unfold, he realises that his brain can be a source of his social adjustment, and 
he wants to unleash this potential within him — another risk to take, surely, but definitely not a 
risk that Lou takes just to conform to neurotypical standards. He understands that his brain is 
changing already, although slowly, and he wants to think both faster and further, as light travels 
into the darkness at the speed of, well, light. In her long, meditative essay about neuroethics, 
philosopher Catherine Malabou distinguishes between three different forms of neuroplasticity 
(developmental, modulational and reparative), which together constitute the promising 
potentialities of the brain to change. Developmental plasticity is the neuronal genesis, as the brain 
forms itself in the first fifteen years of life, which she calls a “restrained or ‘closed’ signification” 
of plasticity, “the sculpting of a determinate form” (Malabou 2008, 19), after which the trajectory 
of the brain becomes less determinate. The second field of action, modulational plasticity occurs 
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as the brain rewires itself to modulate synaptic efficiency, either to strengthen or ‘forget’ 
connections, which is necessary for adaptation, learning and memory. As Malabou calls it, this is 
the “history” of the brain, which remains malleable, always capable of “changing difference” (24). 
Finally, reparative plasticity is the capacity of the brain to heal itself after neuronal damage, the 
ability “to build natural prostheses” (27; the disability metaphor is poignant in this context).  
The question she derives from these three fields of action is highly relevant to the ethical 
conundrums that Speed of Dark presents to the reader: “Are We Free to Be High Performing?” 
(29). The three types of plasticity intimate a vision of a brain that is actively restructuring itself, 
adapting to the challenges that individuals face in their lifetimes. The developmental constraints 
which steer NT people to a more social existence and ASC people to more systematised ways of 
knowing, the learning processes that guarantee new strategies of interpretation and the reparative 
function that heals the brain are already there to help Lou make better sense of the world as time 
goes on. He also feels this in his heart: “I am changing already. A few months ago, I did not know 
that I loved Marjory. I did not know I could fence in a tournament with strangers. I did not know 
I could learn biology and chemistry the way I have been. I did not know I could change this much” 
(Moon 2002, 219). Many of the experiences recounted in the book have taught him much about 
socialisation as he acquired new skills and had to face new forms of struggle.  
Even so, he is not ‘free’ to be high performing, he is fast-tracked onto a form of 
performance that is still unknown to him and the scientists who administer the treatment. His 
freedom to re-form himself comes from his self-taught knowledge of neuroscience. This does not 
obviate his sense that his brain functions create obstacles to his flourishing: “I am sideways to the 
world, feeling happy when other people think I should feel devastated. My brain is trying to grow 
toward the light, but it can’t straighten back up when its pot is tipped” (277). Lou wants to 
experience what neurotypicals do, to become the neurocosmopolitan person I have alluded to at 
the beginning of this analysis. “Creating resistance to neuronal ideology is what our brain wants, 
and what we want for it,” as Malabou says (2008, 77), and this drives Lou to learn everything 
about what is happening to his brain before he goes under the knife. In his case, resistance is not 
refusal, but the re-appropriation of his brain’s plasticity. 
His yearning to join the rest of the world is more than a case of eliminating a granularity 
mismatch. It is Lou joining a shared sensory and social experience of humankind — an 
understandable desire, even if disability scholars who are suspicious about rehabilitation would 
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see this treatment as a technology that enforces compulsory able(-bodied)ness (McRuer 2006 301-
308). This view generates an “image of the disabled as beings to be rehabilitated [versus assisted],” 
which “signifies that society sees itself as a single order to be maintained; it sees itself as having 
the duty, the mission, the task of voiding disparities into its norm” (Stiker 1999, 121). Lou’s 
ultimate decision stems not from neuroconformism, but from an act of agency (granted, in an 
individualist framework) to wrestle a bit of neuropower from those who wield it: “They do not 
want us stupid and helpless. They do not want to destroy our minds; they want to use them. I do 
not want to be used. I want to use my own mind, myself, for what I want to do” (2002, 378).  
The novel does not really show us the struggles involved in Lou’s fight to get into space, 
or any of the prejudices that post-treatment individuals face, and this omission ought to be 
criticised, since it implies that once you become part of the neuromajority, every privilege comes 
to you automatically (autism aside, how many among the currently 7 billion people on Earth would 
be able to withstand the gruelling training to become an astronaut?). What we do see is a Lou 
trying to wrestle the power invested in the neurosciences from those who wield it against them, a 
struggle to understand the stakes and effects of the experimental procedure. 
When the research team first gives the lecture to the interested parties in Section A, the 
protocol is presented hastily, buried under a mound of information and condescension.  
 
That’s just some background […]. It’s probably too much for you, but you’ll have to 
excuse my enthusiasm. There’s a simplified version in your folders, including 
diagrams. Essentially what we’re going to do is normalize the autistic brain, and then 
train it in an enhanced and faster version of infant sensory integration, so the new 
architecture works properly. (205) 
 
Or so the lead scientist claims, and leaves at once, without answering any questions Section 
A might have. The dismissive attitude towards the autistic subjects betray some unease on the part 
of the team about the possible mishaps during surgery and the following procedure, otherwise they 
would have explained everything in a manner that would be easily grasped by Section A. 
Afterwards, Lou is subjected to a battery of tests. The way they treat him at the clinic is another 
fine example of medical power at work: “The needle to draw blood doesn’t really hurt, but I do 
not understand what my blood and urine have to do with how my brain functions. No one even 
tries to explain” (262, emphasis mine). Note that the procedures as described here violate many of 
the standard procedures required for the patient to give their informed consent, so it is very likely 
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that Moon is exaggerating for effect. It is hard not to resent this impersonal attitude that positions 
autists as compliant subjects, who are being treated like lab rats. 
Discussing the treatment, Lucia asks him something that could be the pivotal question of 
the entire book: “Lou, it’s your mind. Do you think you understand it?” (209). Lou is unsure, but 
he knows the explanations have to come from his own research, because the scientists are not 
interested in enlightening their test subjects. He starts with downloading basic textbooks to learn 
the technical terms and to familiarise himself with brain regions. Fortunately, many of his fencing 
partners are also employees at the university. Lucia has access to neurology textbooks, and she 
inspires Lou to take the treatment seriously. Even he admits that  
 
I have never before set out to learn all about the way my own brain works. […] I was 
almost sure I would not be able to figure out what the books said. But it is actually 
easy. I think I could have completed a college degree in this if I had tried. All my 
advisors and counselors told me to go into applied mathematics, so I did. They told me 
what I was capable of, and I believed them. They did not think I had the kind of brain 
that could do real scientific work. Maybe they were wrong. (206)  
 
Lou’s new education in neuroscience is a quest to defy the expectations of his teachers and 
to determine his future path in life instead of the one set out before him. It also makes him into a 
more critical thinker, capable or re-evaluating other people’s opinions about himself. 
The plot thickens as Lou is given another book, a (fictional) work on Brain Functionality 
by Cego and Clinton (’cego’ is Spanish for ‘blind,’ perhaps a play on the word ‘mindblindness,’ 
or the blindness of the neurotypical researchers who see little of the complexity of the mind). The 
zealous Lou even reads the preface, where he finds something of interest: “I am surprised to find 
the name of the company I work for in [the acknowledgements]. They provided assistance with 
computational methods. Computational methods are what our division develops. […] When this 
book was written I was not yet working there” (217). It appears that the very knowledge that would 
save Lou is implicated within the work that his firm does for a living, which would also explain 
why Section A is the first group to be tested with the new procedure. 
Just like Haddon, Moon presents autistic difference in a technological context. She keeps 
comparing the mental functioning of human beings to the data-processing functions of the 
computer. This persistent pattern of parallelisation might be the product of the Information Age’s 
fascination with cognitive science, but Moon rewrites the tired metaphor from Lou’s perspective 
when he begins to learn about the science behind cognition:  
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When I was in school, they taught us that the brain is like a computer but not so 
efficient. Computers do not make mistakes if they are correctly built and programmed, 
but brains do. From this I got the idea that any brain […] was an inferior sort of 
computer. This book makes it clear that brains are a lot more complex than any 
computer and that my brain is normal […] in many ways. My color vision is normal. 
My visual acuity is normal. What is not normal? Only the slightest things… I think. 
(260) 
 
He realises that the metaphor is not adequate to describe the degree of difference between 
brains, autistic or otherwise, and computers, but the cautious ‘I think’ is evidence of a degree of 
self-reflection about the blind spots of Lou’s cognition. Lou’s presentation of his intact faculties 
suggests that whatever differences he experiences are rooted in very specific functions of the brain, 
and he sees the value of the computer metaphor. He uses it when he describes the differences 
between his mental organisation and that of the ‘cured’ Joe Lee, who insists that his brain works 
the same way despite the therapy he received: “If we were computers, Joe Lee would have a 
different main processor chip, with a different instruction set. Even if two computers with different 
chips do use the same software, it will not run the same” (15). The argument runs similar to how 
an autism advocate explains the alternative forms of cognition on his personal site:  
 
Let’s call the simple system SWODIN and the more complex system XUNI. Our story 
begins with the law of Murphy. As one might imagine, shit always goes wrong and 
nature forgets to include the manuals this time. This leads to the users of Swodin being 
in advantage of the few Xuni users, because actually the system is quite user-friendly 
and easy to learn. After they master it completely however, there is little room for 
further development, or specialisation, but hey, they have been lucky. The Swodin 
system comes with [one] built-in network protocol, so the Swodin computers easily 
communicate with one another. To their even greater luck, there are plenty of Swodin 
users around, so they set of[f] on the happy and cheerful business of chatting to each 
other. 
 
In the middle of all this Swodin happiness was Jamie. Jamie had been given a Xuni 
computer. He hadn’t really chosen this, as a matter of fact he didn’t even know about 
the existence of other operating systems. He started poking around a little bit to explore 
his computer. As he found out, without [a] manual, a Xuni computer wasn’t fun. It was 
utterly complex to use and everything had to be built from scratch. Jamie spen[t] hours 
and hours of very hard work, to get the basics functioning. [… T]he others, who could 
see a computer in the network, did not understand why Jamie was never answering to 
their chatting attempts. It seemed his computer wasn’t even making connection 
properly. (Naja Melan 2006; the two operating systems allude to Windows and Unix) 
 
- 173 - 
The little parable proves that the computer metaphor of the mind does not cloud our view 
of the human mind’s social functions. If the metaphor is extended further, it can express alternative 
visions of life, the nature of neurological differences. Autistic people actively develop that 
metaphor to describe the hardships of communicating across neurotypes. 
As Lou devours the book, he notices some oddities in the organisation of the brain. “I 
wonder why the main language center is in the left brain when there is a perfectly good auditory 
processing area in the right brain. Why specialize like that?” (Moon 2002, 218). Lou is struggling 
with the idea that the human brain is a series of adaptations, each organised to serve a specific 
need: the modular view of the mind. He has his share of companions in the humanities. Stephen 
Dougherty argues that whereas the scientists in Speed of Dark are confident about the modularity 
of the mind, the book “betrays considerable ambivalence about modularity and other computer 
metaphors” (Dougherty 2010, n.p.). This is an exaggeration — Lou uses the computer metaphor 
with the knowledge that no metaphor can completely encompass the many functions of the mind. 
He is also aware that the state of scientific knowledge and the characters’ experiences are 
demonstrating the validity of the massive modularity of the brain. The book is critical of the 
institutional matrix that coerces autists to become neuroconform, but not of modularity.  
Dougherty delivers a dichotomic template of response when he claims that the reader’s 
opinion of the work “depends in part on how seriously s/he take[s] the idea that the mind/brain is 
a computer. If the reader takes it seriously, then it more or less follows that Lou should have the 
operation. If cognition is computation, and autism is a processing failure, then repairs are in order” 
(Dougherty 2010, n.p.). Not quite. The reader’s response is affected by many factors, but her view 
of the mind does not determine her response to the novel at all. One could perfectly well believe 
that the hardships associated with autism are remediable in the social sphere and still respect an 
autistic individual’s wish to change neurotypes if his autistic mind-set conflicts with his self-image 
and desires; in this respect, the operation is no more objectionable than a sex-change operation for 
those who wish to realign their misgendered bodies with their personality and aspirations.  
What is more, the computer metaphor could be true, but that would still allow some room 
for resistance to neurosurgery if one’s views on collective liberty would mandate that no single 
technological innovation should be used to reduce neurodiversity and compromise the self-worth 
of other individuals who adhere to the identity group the person left. The computer metaphor of 
human cognition or the adaptationist modularity theses do not mean that autism is a processing 
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‘failure’ as such. That is a wrong conclusion, given the alternative Dougherty proposes: “if one 
rejects that there is a proper speed and an appropriate level of intensity for human perception of 
the world, then matters are quite different” (Dougherty 2010, n.p.). Here the scholar evokes 
something similar to a set of social norms for cognition that defines the desirable rate of 
functioning. But if normal cognition is set up as a standard, deviations from it cannot be 
automatically categorised as processing failures. Even if we demarcated an appropriate range and 
speed of human cognition as a norm, the novel in no way contests the modularity of the mind — 
its premise is built on this foundation. The ‘reconstructive’ neurosurgery and the following 
interpersonal therapy is not critical about the scientific understanding of autism that Dougherty 
identifies. What it does critique, though, is the patchy neuroethics of its fictional society. Here, I 
would like to return Nicholas Dames’ idea of the social norms of cognition so we can avoid some 
of the assumptions and conclusions that Dougherty bases his argument on. 
Speed of Dark’s questions concerning the granularity of cognitive processing are fuelled 
by the same curiosity that electrified Victorian medical discourse about whether consciousness can 
be broken down to discrete units. Surveying the physiologically inflected criticism of the era, 
Nicholas Dames argues that such units of consciousness on the phenomenological level were 
linked to a perceptual threshold of “just noticeable differences” that physiologists eagerly wanted 
to quantify (2007, 178-182). The quest to find the threshold amount of information that our minds 
register as difference is a normative one, and it is because they sought to establish this social norm 
of what counts as acceptable sensitivity that we can speak about a hyper- or hyposensitivity to 
certain classes of stimuli in autism. For example, Lou comments on his olfactory sensitivity by 
saying that “[n]oticing smells is not appropriate” (Moon 2002, 3) after the rich description of 
fragrances he gives that adds texture to an otherwise drab office. Descriptions of faces, too, take 
on an ideological charge when an autist’s stare meets the medical gaze:  
 
When she […] looks at me, her face has that look. […] I call it the I AM REAL look. 
[…] She is real, she thinks, so she know what I need and don’t need. It means she is 
real, […] and I am […] not completely real, even though I can feel the nubbly texture 
of the office chair right through my slacks. (4)  
 
In this excerpt, Dr. Fornum’s normative ‘I AM REAL’ gaze is Lou’s expression for the 
superiority of an embodied representative of power/knowledge in a medical context. I would 
suggest that when Lou narrates the office chair’s coarse fabric, he intends to undercut this 
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ideological inscription by that ‘even though,’ which reveals the dynamics of narratological detail 
in Speed of Dark. The normative realism of broad brush strokes, the ‘Everyone knows this, and 
Everyone does that’ mentality is pitted against the perceptive realism of finer, detail-oriented 
descriptions. If it is a normativised mind of Lou-after that triumphs in terms of character 
development, then stylistically speaking, the more memorable, more original narrative strategies 
are those of Lou-before’s perceptive realism, which defamiliarises those ‘just noticeable 
differences’ that Victorian neurologists were after. We can therefore note that this strong affinity 
between physiological novel criticism’s interest in the units of consciousness and narratology’s 
investigations of descriptive granularity is not a matter of coincidence, but a result of a sustained 
inquiry into the social norms of cognition, albeit with different theoretical investments. That is 
why Dames’ term can migrate into the field of cognitive literary theory. 
Dougherty contrasts the ‘computer metaphor-adaptationist massive modularity’ construct 
with his position, “a fully embodied and intercorporeal perspective; one, that is, that refuses to 
treat the mind/brain as a computer processor” (2010, n.p.). This is a false dichotomy that originates 
in the author’s misperception of cognitive science’s methodological stances or the scope of 
processing. An embodied and intercorporeal perspective, such as that provided by social 
neuroscience, can and does utilise the computer metaphor to conceptualise interpersonal processes 
like empathy and empathetic distress (Decety and Lamm 2007, 2009). A neurophenomenological 
investigation of autism can and does treat the brain as an information processing system with 
specific subsystems for different tasks, i.e. as a modular organ (Glezerman 2013). In the same 
article, Dougherty further asserts that: “the theory of modularity […] entails a certain style of 
thinking about thought that has real consequences for our broader thinking about culture and 
sociality. Although modularity is an enormously influential theory in the cognitive sciences today, 
it is [not] conducive to the style of thinking about thought that Moon mainly promotes in her novel” 
(Dougherty 2010, n.p.). We are thoroughly in agreement that how we think about the brain’s 
relationship to culture has consequences, however I find myself at odds with him on just what the 
consequences are. As an affective neuroscientist summarises the opinion of his discipline:  
 
In fact, when one compares the underlying processes of brains and digital computers, 
there are only modest relationships between the two. While computers obey a few rigid 
logical rules, biology carries out many subtle functions created by aeons of 
evolutionary selection. Brain rules do not follow the simple constraints of digital logic; 
rather, they reflect processes that have been refined for the multiple purposes of 
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adaptive fitness. (Panksepp 1999, 82) 
 
So, pace Dougherty, the modularity thesis actually subverts the notion that we are simple 
computers, yet the metaphor retains its explanatory power when understood in context, as it sees 
the brain as system capable of second-order representation that can be simulated computationally 
(Cleeremans et al 2007). When he characterises the modularity thesis as an adaptive, biologically 
innate and functionally specialised view of the brain, Dougherty is generally right, but he 
concludes that this “leaves very little space for theorizing the connections between minds, brains, 
experience, and culture, precisely because it cedes so much in the first place to instinct, or to the 
notion of the program” (Dougherty 2010, n.p.). Nothing could be further from the truth. 
Panksepp must have been thinking of people like Dougherty when he suggested that “[t]he 
reason many scholars who know little about modern brain research are still willing to assert that 
human behavior is not controlled by instinctual processes is because many of our operating 
systems are in fact very ‘open’ and hence very prone to be modified by the vast layers of cognitive 
and affective complexity that learning permits” (Panksepp 1999, 122). Baron-Cohen is chided by 
Dougherty for hypothesising the ToMM as an innate module, when the psychologist actually 
claims “[t]he available data allow us to interpret the theory of mind deficit in autism as strong 
evidence for modularity of social intelligence, but may not justify a rich innate module such as 
Leslie’s ToMM. Rather, a ToMM may be the result of both innate and acquired factors in 
development” (Baron-Cohen 1999, 185, emphasis added). With a certain glibness, Dougherty 
quips that it would be “very convenient to have such a module in our brains, and undoubtedly it 
would save a lot of trouble. But it simply does not jibe with the fact that we must all learn about 
other people (and ourselves) through lived experience” (Dougherty 2010). Mind you, the lived 
experience of intersubjective encounters would never be encoded as such if there were no specific 
brain networks devoted to processing this information as social. For precisely this reason, the 
phenomenological turn in the cognitive neurosciences have sought to integrate ToM-based 
explanations of autism in embodied and enactivist accounts of social (mis)cognition (Klin et al 
2003, De Jaegher 2013), and cultural variations and critical voices have been given more time and 
attention in neuroscientific research and theory (Lillard and Skibbe 2004, 282-289; Choudhury 
and Slaby 2012).  
I am harping on Dougherty’s failings because throughout his criticisms of the perceived 
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deficits of modularity theory to explain autism, he consistently portrays cognitive 
neuropsychology as an autistic form of doing psychology, which is unwilling to attend to the rich 
interpersonal modalities of social life and he misrepresents Speed of Dark in his final verdict: 
 
My hunch is that if Moon’s cognitive science inputs had been more up to date, the 
novel would not have been so torn between the very human lessons that the characters’ 
interactions body forth and the distinctly inhuman lessons that the science (fiction) 
promotes. The fact that Lou is cured of his autism and becomes less of a social creature 
is an unsettling outcome that, […] is underwritten by the modular model of cognition 
[…] that Moon’s novel fully embraces only in its final pages. (Dougherty 2010) 
 
Clearly not, but the corresponding criticism about cognitive science ‘inputs’ is applicable 
to Dougherty himself. He is right, the novel does pivot on the ethics of neurosurgery and curing 
disability, and as Moon expresses it in an interview: “Any therapies that change brain function can 
be misused—though what constitutes misuse is presently the hot topic in this part of bioethics. 
[…] Fixing a neurological problem is one thing; enhancing one’s own performance is another; 
imposing the requirement to enhance someone else’s performance . . . slides over into mind control 
of a very literal kind” (Moon 2004, 351). But what progressive critics, such as Arndt and van 
Beuren or Dougherty tend not to appreciate is that there can be genuinely differing viewpoints on 
what constitutes a desirable personal outcome and a life worth living. They criticise Lou’s choice 
based on their political views of collective liberty (shouldn’t Lou rather choose to remain as before 
and affirm the abilities of autists all over the globe?) rather than the motivations of the character.  
They also refuse to accept the book as an honest depiction of real alternatives and different 
viewpoints (some do not take the treatment, sometimes it fails) that gives more room for discussion 
than novels which are closer to the politics of the authors. Moon addresses these concerns when 
she talks about her experiences of being an autism mum in the interview:  
 
One of the great challenges for any parent of a child with disabilities is how to love 
the child as he/she is, and yet remain open to change that may be beneficial. Some 
people come down hard on one side or the other of this: the parents who insist that 
they would never want their disabled child to be cured because that would invalidate 
their love for the child as he/she is, versus the ones who insist that everyone should 
leap at every chance at a cure. I can’t. […] If/when such therapy becomes available, it 
will have to be [my son’s] decision. (Moon 2004, 350) 
 
Individual responsibility and decisions, of course, are shaped by the collective ethical 
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landscape, but we should not negate an individual’s willingness to transcend themselves in the 
hope that it might have some oblique impact on collective identity, and especially not in a novel 
which has de facto cured autism already. 
What Lou eventually learns about reading Cego and Clinton is not the importance of mental 
modules for pattern-seeking and social cognition, but something far more important about the 
ethics of scientific research. Digesting the density of an entire field’s knowledge about the brain 
leaves more questions than answers in Lou. Why does he have a particular preference for some 
patterns but not others? Why does a particular, narrow sort of investigation seem to crowd out the 
desire for knowledge that truly alters our own worldview, the titular speed of dark being faster 
than the speed of light? As Lou expresses it: “The book answers questions other people have 
thought of. I have thought of questions they have not answered. I always thought my questions 
were wrong questions because no one else asked them. Maybe no one thought of them. Maybe 
darkness got there first. Maybe I am the first light touching a gulf of ignorance. Maybe my 
questions matter” (279-280). This is a turning point in the book, where Lou begins to use his 
capabilities and his potential to change as tools for critical thinking that could spearhead his 
improvement, becoming a fully realised agent, rather than just an obedient, docile mind.  
He also becomes a critical reader of neuroscience, and when Dr. Ransome gets into the 
nitty-gritty details the next time he briefs Section A on the protocol, Lou is able to sense that there 
is something profoundly wrong going on with the procedure. First of all, he recognises some of 
the slides Dr. Ransome uses. Ransome claims that the illustrations accompanying his talk are “the 
normal brain’s activity pattern when picking a known face from a photograph of several faces” 
and “the autistic brain’s activity pattern during the same task” (308). Using his superior memory, 
Lou remembers differently… accurately. It was not presented as a selection task, but “it was 
normal brain activity when viewing a familiar face. A composite of… yes, I remember. Nine 
healthy male volunteers recruited from college students” (308). Lou explains that a ‘composite’ is 
a computer-generated drawing, very much like the social skills stimuli that Ransome shows 
Section A so that they know what kind of post-surgery retraining they’ll receive – in other words, 
artificial images, which bear no resemblance to any one individual. 
Ransome is misinforming potential volunteers to secure a viable study cohort for this 
clinical trial, something that would definitely not be approved by any self-respecting ethics 
committee, and Lou can identify that it occurs, but he is not sure what this misconduct means. He 
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does express a healthy dose of doubt about the procedure: “All the pictures look posed, and the 
people may not even be real people. […] We are supposed to become normal, real people, but they 
expect us to learn from these unreal, imaginary people in contrived, posed situations” (312). Lou’s 
concerns about the usefulness of artificial stimuli to jumpstart social learning is relevant. It’s the 
problem of ecological validity, i.e. whether the images Lou and his colleagues receive in treatment 
would be similar enough to natural situations. The way he questions the design of the protocol is 
a critical reading that emphasises his resistance to the medicalising model of autism. 
There is also the matter of time and speed, always critical for the validity of the tests. We 
soon find out the reason why the scientists put such pressure on the company’s workforce to 
become volunteers. Initally, Dr. Ransome explains that they want to start the treatment on the 
whole group at the same time because “the data are more comparable if the subjects—if you—are 
all close in time,” but immediately afterwards, other kinds of anxieties surface: “I mean, suppose 
something happened that changed things between the time the first two started and finished… 
something that affected the rest of you—”, which might sound like an almost convincing 
impression of someone caring about their study participants’ well-being, but Ransome blurts out 
that the actual concern is another kind of change, “something political that changes attitudes…” 
(313). So it is not even scientific accuracy that requires the coordination of the treatment 
programmes, but the ability to experiment at all before government legislation would impose 
restrictions on human testing for this neurosurgical procedure. Moon’s depiction of the 
underhanded ethical moves the study team make in order to go on with their pursuit of data is a 
plausible scenario, reinforcing the story’s vision that the social norms of cognition are malleable 
and subject to damaging misuse if they are defined without the inclusion of neurominorities. 
Speaking of attention, let me now consider another line of inquiry addressed by Victorian 
physiological criticism that is particularly appropriate to Lou’s story: attention. In The Physiology 
of the Novel, Dames browses Thackeray’s work for instances when either rapt attention, absorption 
or its opposites (inattention and distraction) appear in the text, establishing its relationship to 
Victorian attitudes toward work. In his chapter on “distraction’s negative liberty” (Dames 2007, 
73-122), Dames characterises attention as a mental alertness that has productive power, used in 
learning and reading for edification as a heightened state of receptivity. He recognises that  
 
Victorian physiology […] continually stressed the limitations of attention, to such an 
extent that their picture of attentiveness seems far closer to our contemporary category 
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of ADD: a […] temporally restricted capacity that [easily] becomes distraction. This 
scientific conceptualization of attention was often spurred on by the conditions of 
Victorian factory labor, where the perdurability of concentration was so evident: the 
longer that attention must be paid, the less effectively it will be paid. Victorian 
physiology’s goal here [is] the explosion of the myth […] that “more” attention was 
always possible. (82)  
 
In this context, Dames portrays fleeting attention as a source of relief, a respite from the 
demands of the text, and describes “alertness as a state of inattention to something else” (91). 
Contrast this with the world of a data analyst like Lou, who lives and breathes information; 
for him, attention is linked to pattern recognition. When a concern for patterns appears as a theme 
in the narrative, it signals that Lou is paying full attention: “For the project I’m on now, […] Bach 
is perfect, the complex patterns mirroring the pattern I need. I let the place in my mind that finds 
and generates patterns sink into the project, and […] all I have to do is pay attention and ensure 
that the pattern remains symmetrical or asymmetrical or whatever the particular project calls for” 
(Moon 2002, 8). Lou is absorbed in his work, but often it is not so much a drudgery as being paid 
to exist in a state of permanent flow.  
It is not as if Lou could turn it off and relax by being distracted. His pattern-seeking mind 
is fully functioning in idleness, as at the restaurant where they go with Section A after work: “I am 
watching the beer sign blinking in the window. It comes on in three segments, red, green, then 
blue in the middle, and then goes off all at once. Blink, red. Blink, green, blink blue, then blink 
red/green/blue, all off, all on, all off, and start over. A very simple pattern, and the colors aren’t 
that pretty […], but still it’s a pattern to watch” (10). Here, attention manifests itself by an increased 
granularity of the descriptions, but it points us towards an attention that is constantly operating on 
the textual level, and becomes a theme of its own. Whatever is narrated through Lou’s filtered 
perceptions is by definition an evidence of attention. Thus all the passages that politicise cognitive 
differences in attention are also comments on the narratological structure of the novel and its 
strategies for representing pattern-seeking minds. 
For Lou’s mind, an unpatterned world is unpredictable, hard to process, a triumph of noise 
over signal. During his walk in nature, the last hurrah of his autistic cognition, he gazes into a 
waterfall, watching the droplets: “I concentrate on the water, seeing its pattern, the order in chaos 
and chaos in order” (Moon 400). Distraction is not a negative liberty in Lou’s eyes, not a freedom 
from the hard, taxing labour of attention, for attention is his default mode of operation, a constant 
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heroic effort to make the world a more predictable, intelligible place. If inattention is a saving 
grace for Lou at any time, it is most useful when he is flooded with sensory stimuli. He talks at 
length about his childhood perceptions, linking attention and duration as parameters of cognitive 
processing: “my infant nerves needed a stimulus to persist longer before it would bridge the gap. 
[I was] lucky that techniques were available to provide my neurons this needed duration of signal. 
Instead of being labeled with an ‘attention deficit’ […], I was simply given stimuli to which I could 
attend” (49). In this passage, the use of ‘simply’ is the element most critical of our current 
medicalising models of disability, suggesting that a pragmatic treatment, an early intervention 
programme can minimise the disabling effect of cognitive differences in attention. 
Lou’s attention at work and on the fencing piste is aided by simulated auditory patterns 
that regulate his mental processes. Lou replays music in his head that fits a particular problem, in 
essence scoring social situations, which gives him the right tempo for a solution, underscoring the 
connection between his atypical mental pace and the duration of actions. Dames claims in his 
interpretation of elongated form, taking Daniel Deronda as a case study, that physiological novel 
theory was deeply influenced by contemporary musicology. He identifies “[m]elody and rhythm; 
the recurrence or repetition of thematic material over long stretches of intervening time and space 
(or, the leitmotiv); boredom and cognitive exhaustion” (Dames 2007, 127) as common concerns in 
the reception of Wagner’s music and Eliot’s novel. They signify a thoughtful experimentation with 
the audience’s and the characters’ attention, a reflection on the cultural anxieties about 
technological development (steam-powered transportation) and its effect on cognition. It is 
profitable to think of autism novels like Speed of Dark as updated versions of a similar nervousness 
about ubiquitous computing and atypical cognition in our time, which would also explain the 
pervasive presence of mental music. The fencing scenes illustrate this point well:  
 
It is like a dance: step-step-thrust-parry-step. Tom talks about the need to vary the 
pattern, to be unpredictable, but last time I watched him fight someone else, I thought 
I saw a pattern in his non-pattern. […] Suddenly I hear the music of Prokofiev’s 
Romeo and Juliet, the stately dance. It fills my head, and I move into that rhythm, 
slowing from the faster movements. Tom slows as I slow. Now I can see it, that long 
pattern he has devised because no one can be utterly random. Moving with it, in my 
personal music, I’m able to stay with him, blocking every thrust, testing his parries. 
And then I know what he will do, and without thought my arm swings around and I 
strike with a punta riversa to the side of his head. (Moon 2002, 33, emphases added) 
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Lou adapts music to serve as a method of social cognition, of learning about the actions of 
his opponent. Fencing fast, he cannot tease out the pattern that guides Tom’s attacks and feints. 
The change in tempo, ordained by the rhythm Lou perceives in the progression of phrases (the 
actions during the assault, but I intentionally evoke the musical sense as well), gives Lou an edge, 
where the more sustained attention span can win him the bout in the long run. The prediction of 
behaviour on the basis of pattern is the very foundation of cognition, and through hard work, Lou 
proceeds in deducing some form of order from the chaos, but it takes time. Lou encrypts his 
intentions by falling into rhythm with the music, which serves as a generator of pseudorandom 
patterns that are harder for Tom to perceive. A constant musical accompaniment of life is a second 
nature to Lou that frees his mind to see his opponent’s intentions. 
Consistent with Dames’ research on musical and novelistic temporality, Lou listens to 
mental music when reading scientific literature, too. Bruch’s violin concerto No. 2 in E Major is 
described in one of those rare poetic passages that Moon reserves for Lou’s least narrative 
experiences. He says: “The long sweep of this music, which obscures the rosetted patterns [Bruch] 
brings out, helps me find and build the long, asymmetrical components that find rest in fluidity. 
[…] I think it will be good music to have in mind while I am reading Cego and Clinton” (228). 
Indeed, this is the vision of the brain that is most espoused by textual evidence, not the mechanical 
computer analogy that Dougherty suggests – long, asymmetrical components finding rest in 
fluidity. The dynamic music of a mind in constant conversation with its environment.  
Lou builds and re-enacts this process, making figurative and literal (synaptic) connections 
between his personal identity and the scientific ability to further shape one’s mind. This is the same 
neuroplasticity that informs Malabou’s hopefulness about the organ to defy the enduring pattern-
instructions that genetics creates over unendurably long periods of time. Dames argues that some 
passages in Eliot’s novel “demonstrate her worry that duration can in fact be too much, even if the 
scope of those temporal limits is unknown and possibly unknowable” (2007, 164), which bathes 
Speed of Dark’s ending in a new light. The organic neuroplasticity that rearranges the autistic brain 
to attend to social stimuli and habituate itself to sensory information might just take too long for 
said brain’s proud owner to re-learn life. This is why some members of Section A haggle over the 
inclusion of a life extension procedure if they undergo the experimental treatment. “If I have to 
start over, I want more time to be that other person. To live”, says Dale, throwing a juicy bone to 
the scientists: “I want to have time to live as a normal person. As many years as I have lived 
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autistic. More. […] It will be more data. […] Longer follow-up” (Moon 2002, 364). The complex 
negotiation between identities old and new, choice and coercion, between present investment and 
future data dictate different strategies of managing the unparalleled power of the novel’s 
neuroscience to restructure the human mind. The extended duration of life is just one consequence 
of humankind’s desire to experience human subjectivity in ever more creative, fluid ways. 
Whereas in Lou’s former life he only catches glimpses of an affective life he wishes he could 
experience instinctively, after the treatment (and in his later, neurocosmopolitan years the book 
closes with), it is the shared jokes, wit and picking up on social nuances that Lou gets to appreciate 
– a side of life previously inaccessible to him. 
But even before the surgery, Lou senses that his intense focus on inanimate patterns and 
normal people’s obliviousness to the order of objects has a symmetrical counterpart:  
 
I remember things like what percentage of cars in the parking lot are blue because I 
pay attention to color and number more than most people. They don’t notice, so they 
don’t care. I wonder what they do notice when they look at a parking lot. What else is 
there to see besides the rows of vehicles, so many blue and so many tan and so many 
red? What am I missing, as they miss seeing the beautiful numeric relationships? (277) 
 
As he finds out when he begins to read some neuroscience, it is social stimuli to which he 
cannot attend, the people in the parking lot, the web of status and relationships we weave from 
interactions. The social norms of cognition, being social and consequently networked, select a 
norm that prioritises the cognition of the majority, neurotypical socialisation skills and minded 
thinking, which help coordinate NTs’ affairs, allowing stronger cooperation among wider groups 
of people and an improved predictability of NT reactions for those who possess normate mind-
reading abilities. Those who fall outside of the norm become mysteries, requiring an interpretative 
apparatus to facilitate communication between neurotypes. 
Autism novels like Speed of Dark latch onto our interpretative interest in other people. The 
mindblindness paradigm presents the condition as an “enigma” (Frith 1989), which contributed 
much to the hermeneutical gap between autists’ responses to their environment and the 
neurotypical assumptions derived from their own interpretative horizon. In this chapter, I have 
ventured to find common ground between scientific accounts of the cognitive difference in autism 
and humanists’ curiosity to interpret everyone on their own terms, free from the damage poorly 
applied metaphors can cause. I have sought to demonstrate that the narrative devices to convey a 
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sense of autism are extensively involved in my redefined version of Dames’ concept of the social 
norms of cognition, which describes the standards governing our understanding of human 
behaviour and the limits of what experiences can be politely shared between people.  
It is worth keeping in mind, though, that Speed of Dark only provides one neurotypical 
author’s impression of living with autism, a mother of an autistic child. Even if Moon and other 
writers research their topics meticulously and their forewords never fail to thank the autistic first 
readers who have supplied comments to their work, these gestures do not make the books 
‘authentic,’ and neither should this be taken as a criterion of analysis. Autism novels are virtual 
autobiographies, and they cannot be substituted for self-reported or experimental evidence about 
how an autist’s mind actually works. The poetic devices themselves are worthy of study to show 
how they perpetuate or redesign our way of seeing other human beings, particularly those who 
have to find common ground between two differing cognitive styles. These novels encourage 
people to have the patience and courage to listen sympathetically and “think other-wise” (Wolfe 
2008) across neurotypes. 
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CHAPTER 9 
VULNERABLE MINDS: CLAIRE MORRALL’S NOVEL OF NEUROCOSMOPOLITANISM  
AND NURTURING A NERDY NEXT GENERATION 
 
“[I]n dream we speak our own language; when we wake, the language of others. 
Surrendering our sleep is difficult not so much because it requires us to interrupt our 
fantasies as because it forces us to assume the language of others, to begin to talk . . . 
[...] This is the burden and the strain of consciousness: that we must speak a borrowed 
language.” – Irving Massey (quoted in 2009, 63) 
 
I would be the first to admit that Claire Morrall’s The Language of Others is a bit of an 
odd-one-out in the corpus, for several felicitous reasons. First, this is the only novel I have found 
which features a female protagonist, the pianist and part-time librarian Jessica Fontaine. Secondly, 
this is also the novel which explores the segment of the autistic spectrum that comes closest to 
neurotypicality. Like most writers who tackle high-functioning autism and Asperger’s Syndrome, 
Morrall explores the subject because the question of neuropolitics fascinates her. As she explains 
in an interview: “The side of Asperger’s I wanted to write about was the milder form, where it is 
arguable how abnormal you are. […] What is ‘normality’? I would argue that everybody has an 
element [of autism] in them” (Kean 2008). Thirdly, unlike The Curious Incident, Speed of Dark 
or House Rules, Morrall’s take on neurological difference is more subtle, and most of the 
mannerisms that the other novels embrace, like savantism, meltdowns or intensely scienticised, 
obsessive interests are eschewed in favour of a more lyrical tone and characterisation, a realistic 
depiction of bullying and abusive relationships. The ambiguity of autistic behaviour is important 
from the perspective of narrative design, too, because many of the heavier-handed strategies for 
representing autistic difference (an enhanced sensory perception and direct expository passages 
addressing the readers, lecturing them on the facets of autism) are absent – its expression comes 
out more forcefully in the social situations Jessica has to navigate. 
Told in three different time periods, we follow Jessica’s story from childhood until the birth 
of her grandchild. The first, narrated in the third person, presents Jessica’s early years in Audlands 
Hall, a dilapidated country manor that was purchased by her father, Roland at the insistence of her 
wife, Connie. The vast, labyrinthine structure of the crumbling stately house is the perfect place 
for the young Jessica: spacious, with nooks and crannies in which she can play in blissful solitude 
while her sister, Harriet and her cousins, Philip and Colin can play with the other children. Connie 
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organises sack races, treasure hunts and other diversions for the children, which don’t interest 
Jessica, who prefers to wander around in the remote corners of her home. After a successful 
renovation effort, Connie organises an evening ball, complete with a piano quintet. The music 
enchants Jessica so much that she starts to mimic the musicians, which Philip and Colin mock and 
they they begin to bully her physically. Hiding her wounds, she asks for piano lessons. In her 
teenage years, the abuse continues, especially by Philip, who tries to seduce and kiss Jessica despite 
her protestations, upon which he breaks one of her fingers. 
The second chain of events relates the story of her education at the Barber Institute of Fine 
Arts, where she studies piano and encounters Mary, another student, with whom she becomes fast 
friends. She also meets Andrew Courtenay, a psychologically wounded, Byronic violinist. 
Although very talented, his mother, Miranda’s strict training regimen left him contemptuous of a 
disciplined life of practice, feeling railroaded into a success over which he had no control. 
Excessively controlling himself, superficially charming yet calculating and ruthless, Andrew 
seduces Jessica with his expressive interpretation of Tchaikovsky, Sibelius and Beethoven, and 
the two begin a troubling relationship. Andrew turns out to be severely immature, preferring the 
life of a couch potato, engrossing himself in comic books, animated cartoons and spinning tall 
tales in front of his family to please his domineering mother. He drops out of university and 
convinces Jessica that getting married is the right move, while everyone in her immediate vicinity, 
friends and family included, caution her about Andrew’s darker side. Andrew arranges an 
immediate honeymoon trip to France, leaving in the middle of the wedding reception, Bilbo-style.  
On their honeymoon, Jessica is threatened with physical violence when Andrew finds out 
that she has dared to take a walk alone. Soon, Jessica becomes pregnant and gives birth to Joel, a 
constantly crying, disturbed child, who appears to take after his father in his dictatorial attitude to 
love. However, as Joel develops into a schoolchild, Jessica finds him to be emotionally remote 
from the family, preferring to immerse himself in the world of technology, rapidly developing 
computer skills and a passion for sculpting plasticine cats named after famous composers. 
Meanwhile, Andrew’s oppositional behaviour sees him moving from one job to another. This 
makes him depressed, desperate for attention and, ultimately, so fed up with Jessica’s growing 
expertise at handling him that he initiates divorce. 
The third time period covers Jessica’s life eight years after the divorce. As a single mother, 
Jessica supports herself from her meagre income as a librarian. Andrew re-enters the scene, and 
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tries to win back the emotionally hardened Jessica’s favours, who is more determined than ever to 
shut out Andrew once and for all. In the intervening years, Joel has grown up, now on the cusp of 
manhood. The twenty-three-year old has started a company designing violent video games 
featuring anthropomorphic cats. He is still at home, single-mindedly programming, sculpting and 
relying on her mother to do the household chores for him. When Jessica learns that Andrew’s 
father, Donald is dying, the erstwhile couple meets so that they can attend to Donald at his 
deathbed. Andrew proposes that the two should get back together. Jessica rebukes him, and 
discusses their past with Miranda, who reveals that her tiger mother approach to childrearing was 
a response to his own brother’s dissolute lifestyle, who died penniless in a derelict house.  
Jessica also finds out from Joel that he has a girlfriend, Alice, and they are engaged. When 
Jessica meets Alice, the young lady informs her that Joel possesses a fortune from video game 
sales but she loves him for who he is, a quirky but charming fellow. Having aged considerably, 
the wheelchair-bound Roland and arthritic Connie decide to sell Audlands Hall, and throw one 
final party. After a row between the young couple, Alice surprises Jessica by forgiving his son so 
easily, and tells her that Joel is living with Asperger’s syndrome. The revelation compels Jessica 
to reinterpret her whole life. Previously puzzling elements and events fall into place in her mind. 
Andrew appears at the party, his trusty violin at the ready, climbs atop the highest roof of Audlands 
Hall, and falls to his death. In the final scene, Joel presents his mother with her grandson while she 
muses about her survival in a chaotic social world where nothing is as it seems, and enjoys seeing 
the baby, ending the novel on a note of bittersweet contemplation. 
In my reading of The Language of Others, I want to focus on a set of interlocking themes 
that deal with autism and its relationship to sociality. First among equals is the representation of 
fictional mental functioning, so I investigate the narratological apparatus of reporting the 
character’s gaze, facial expressions and corporeality. Zooming out a bit, I next consider the 
depiction of sociopragmatic interaction between Jess or Joel and other neurotypical characters. 
Morrall’s book situates autism predominantly in the private domain, investigating its hereditary 
nature as the author traces the effects of autism within the family. The uniting voice is Jessica’s, 
who sees herself becoming a keener-eyed reader of people and situations due to her traumatic 
experiences. I read this autobiographical view of the self in the context of the fictional imagination 
and the social hermeneutics of interpreting oneself, which is a catalyst of Jessica’s character 
development, as she learns to be neurocosmopolitan. Joel and Andrew’s relationship allows the 
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writer to express the way masculinity and adulthood are imbricated in the discourse of autism and 
I shall be commenting on Jessica’s normative interpretation of adequate masculinity when she 
narrates Joel’s life and achievements. As a pianist, the height of joy for her is to play with her 
fellow alumna, Mary, and music takes on the role of conveying and experiencing emotions which 
she cannot always put into words. Music also stands in stark contrast with her and her family’s 
attitude to reading fiction, which Morrall uses to display an autistic form of distant reading and a 
discomfort about fiction. As a form of pretence, both fiction and playing roles are attempts to 
(re)inscribe people into social positions and Jessica experiences the power of created roles first-
hand as she struggles to survive and assert herself in the face of Andrew’s Machiavellian powers. 
Finally, I explore Joel’s figure, the autist-as-nerd, since his anxieties about communication and 
sociality are foregrounded in the technocultural landscape of the new millennium. I conclude that 
Jessica’s methodical contemplation of the condition of humankind enables her to become a critical 
reader of everyday social situations. 
 We first catch a glimpse of Jessica as a child, as she roller-skates through the Long Gallery, 
one of the spacious hallways of Audlands:  
 
Her brown eyes, flickering with feverish excitement, were focused ahead of her for a 
change, shaken out of their normal downwards slant. Today she had to look where she 
was going. She almost laughed out loud. This was joy. Air rushed past her, a wind in 
her ears that banished the outside world. She was exhilarated by the freedom of her 
solitude. (1)  
 
Morrall captures Jessica at a moment of intense personal joy, joy in autistic aloneness, 
excited by the raw kinaesthetic feeling that dulls the onslaught of sensations. The author creates 
the ‘autism effect’ by bringing attention to Jessica’s gaze: she looks ahead for a change, where she 
would generally cast her eyes on the floor. Who would not look into the distance, anticipating 
where they were going? Unlike other children, who are eager to see the world, when Jessica looks 
ahead to the future, she is shaken from her usual habitus. And yet, she does not quite commit 
herself to laughter, the emotion cannot become manifest, socially perceptible. Already, the reader 
begins to sense that this is no ordinary child, but someone who takes pleasure in the immediate, 
the present, has trouble mediating her emotions, and is most comfortable in experiencing the world 
in smaller chunks, blocking out the unwanted bits. Such an autistic presence soon becomes more 
palpable when Connie invites Harriet and Jessica to gaze at the majesty of their fully lit lustre. As 
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Connie and Harriet start down the stairs, they notice Jessica,  
 
who was still on the staircase with her eyes on the chandelier. She had crouched down 
and was peering through the balustrades, still mesmerised by the candles […]. Light 
danced and shimmered over her face, changing with every passing moment, 
illuminating her round eyes and creating shining highlights in her glossy plaits. 
[…] ‘Go and play with the others now, Jess,’ [Connie] called. […] 
But Jessica didn’t move. (34) 
 
Autistic presence is construed on two different levels: Jessica’s intense, mesmerised gaze 
at the dancing lights of the candles, because she cannot disengage her attention from the spectacle, 
and her unresponsiveness. The autist is present, but she is not compelled to obey the social 
interpellations issued by her family, she won’t be integrated. This is also apparent in how the other 
children blissfully enjoy all the running to-and-fro and guessing the clues in the treasure hunt, 
while Jessica finds a means of solitary enjoyment. As Kanner writes: “He just is there, and if 
sometimes he happens to stroll as far as the periphery of a group, he soon removes himself and 
remains alone” (Kanner 1943, 247). The idea of autistic presence, the strangeness of neuroatypical 
behaviour is the central experience from which the clinicians begin to build their description of 
autism, and Stuart Murray uses ‘presence’ as a key concept to refer to autists’ distinctness, their 
inassimilability into easy social life. He observes that analysing this presence is an ethical task, as 
it allows the recognition of “the possibility of centrality and agency, of the occupation of the 
narrative foreground, and – potentially – that the person with autism might have some say in the 
definition of terms through which he or she is seen” (Murray 2008, 32). Gaze as a tool of social 
attention wields a certain regulatory power, but in everyday life, it is also a form of basic respect 
– you pay attention to others and recognise their existence – and a vehicle for adding non-verbal 
commentary to one’s words and actions.  
Autistic presence is often evoked by the uneasiness of meeting someone’s gaze, as when 
Jessica meets Andrew for the first time: “We looked at each other. Or I assumed he looked at me 
while I looked at the violin under his arm. I couldn’t meet his eyes. I tried, but only got as far as 
his mouth” (Morrall 2008, 19). Jessica narrates her discomfort with reciprocating attention. One 
reason for her discomfort might be that the eyes tell no stories for her. When she does meet 
Andrew’s gaze at another point in her life, the reader gets to see the richness of detail Jessica 
perceives in his unfathomable orbs: “All I could see was his eyes, right in front of mine, still and 
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expressionless green, surrounded by a clear, innocent white, his eyelids pale pink and edged with 
long pale eyelashes. How did people read expression in eyes? They were just physical objects. 
There was nothing there that could speak” (127). Since she can only see the details and does not 
see the face as a Gestalt, she is oblivious to the clues and expressions that carry social information.  
Jessica prioritises the verbal, very much the same way the readers can only extract narrative 
information from the text, and cannot read what is not spelt out for us. As such, hermeneutic 
impasses like this, when the narrator is unable to extract sufficient information from the 
environment (which would be available for a ‘normal’ character) suggest some neurological 
difference. It is also a metatextual gesture that signals a more general unease with interpreting 
people’s bodies as objects that betray their intentions and emotions. “I often make mistakes with 
identification,” Jessica admits. “After all, there isn’t a lot to go on. Two arms and two legs, two 
eyes, a nose and a mouth” (97). In Morall’s portrayal of how Jessica perceives others, the 
materiality of the face and the human body is often seen as a non-signifying, merely receptive 
medium, which strikes the neurotypical reader as jarring and counterintuitive. 
Jessica continues to be fascinated with the question of corporeal signification throughout 
her life. The Long Gallery, where she skated as a child, is host to several busts of the Roman 
emperors. Jessica inspects the physiognomy of Caligula in a philosophical mood: 
 
I've often studied his face, looking for signs of his nature. Can you tell what kind of 
man he was? Is there something in the bone structure, the set of the nose, the size of 
those blank eyes? Did his cruelty embed itself into his face, mark it and brand it so that 
posterity could recognise the evil, or was he born with those features, merely reflecting 
the genetic shape of his ancestors? What can you read from people’s faces? Can you 
tell anything about them at all, or are we doomed to misread, misunderstand, misjudge? 
(165) 
 
The anxieties expressed by this enigma also touch upon the question of whether nature or 
nurture shapes human character more, a dilemma that haunts the discourse of autism. I would argue 
that this ambiguity and Jessica’s awareness of social misinterpretation speaks of a wisdom that 
was accentuated by her life as a victim of abuse and a person living on the autistic spectrum. It is 
a wisdom that allows her to be a critical reader of physiognomic character. As she says: “I don’t 
believe in blond men now. I always imagine an arrogance lurking beneath those shining curls, a 
cold ruthlessness concealed behind the gold veneer” (7). For Jessica, reading the mind is a fraught 
exercise, but one that instils in her a gentle hermeneutic scepticism about the existence of ‘correct’ 
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interpretations of character.  
Her growing socio-cognitive acuity, and Harriet’s misreading of Philip’s intentions 
suggests that it is a folly to assume that one can assess people accurately all the time. For Jessica, 
though, understanding people takes effortful cogitation until the end of novel: 
 
I’m learning to unravel the riddle of other people. When I was a child I hardly noticed 
their existence, the treasure hunt that went on without me. As a teenager I began to 
realise there were clues but I couldn’t find them. In my years with Joel and Andrew I 
could read the clues, but they didn’t make sense. Now, finally, with my new 
understanding, I’m getting there. The treasure of perception is just around the corner. 
(365) 
 
The passage hails very close to the theory-theory account of social knowledge. Some 
psychologists, such as Emma Williams (2009), defend the notion that while typically developing 
individuals do not use explicit rules of inference to judge other people’s behaviour, autists might 
be doing just that: “it is in engagement with other people rather than in thought that people 
normally and fundamentally know other people as intentional beings” (Reddy and Morris 2004, 
657). When Williams focuses on the autobiographical writings of ten autistic individuals, she 
identifies the “enigmatic” quality of social interactions, difficulties with picking up cues from 
others and a rule-bound algorithm of interpretation as key phenomenological themes in their life-
writing, which support a TT view of autistic social cognition (Williams 2009). All of these features 
are present in Jessica’s life in one form or another. 
Jessica sees Mary as the epitome of mind-reading: “She knows everything and still gives 
the impression that she can read your thoughts, but nobody seems to mind very much. People 
always like her” (167). Harriet is no less of a role model: she’s two years younger than Jessica, 
“but she was frighteningly like a middle-aged woman. Where did she get all that common sense, 
her ability to judge situations and assess people so accurately? […] What did Harriet know? 
Seventeen years old, the world’s greatest oracle, in training for the post of guru to anyone who 
would listen” (114), she observes, with a mix of awe and sarcasm. Just by looking at Harriet or 
Mary, the reader might see metacognition as universally beneficial. But in the figure of Andrew, 
the author reminds the readers that the mind-reading Jessica covets is a double-edged sword, and 
it can be a weapon of exploitation, too.  
Andrew can manipulate Jessica by a strategic display of readability, opening up in front of 
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her. When he storms out of the concert hall and breaks down crying over living a life created for 
him, he invites Jess’ sympathy and grants her some insight into what goes on in his mind:  
 
Now that I’d seen into his deepest thoughts, I was tied to him for the rest of my life. I 
could see his flaws. I knew he was unreliable and insecure. But I had never loved 
anyone before. Every time I had doubts, I thought back to that night on the station, the 
way he had cried, and I was hit again by those extraordinary emotions. Irresistible, 
unstoppable. (83)  
 
He uses this power to ‘elevate’ Jessica into the enviable position of a mind-reader and 
thereby chain her for himself, securing his marriage proposal. In retrospect, Jessica can see what 
made Andrew so successful and irresistible: “He was witty, I suppose, clever with words, able to 
read a situation and recognise other people’s weaknesses” (371), or more accurately, read minds. 
He is socially savvy and sufficiently Machiavellian to take advantage of Jessica. In this respect, he 
is entirely unlike Alice, who is “so much more certain than I was at her age, so capable. She has 
natural, instinctive skills, an ability to read people and manage them. She’s never had to peer 
through fog or translate from a foreign language to make sense of the world” (353). In fact, Joel 
and Alice’s marriage serves as a counterpart to the Jessica-Andrew relationship that goes beyond 
the mere sharing of initial letters: both ‘J’s share a neurological make-up that makes them 
vulnerable to social deception, while both A’s are ‘managing’ types, who exercise their mind-
reading ability upon the ‘J’s to nudge them in the direction they want. But Alice allowed Joel to 
follow his passions without undue compromises and only convinced Joel to tone down the violence 
in the computer games to create family-friendly software. In a rather telling move, Andrew 
criticises Jessica about her lack of social insight: “You think you know me, but you don’t. You 
can’t penetrate beyond what you see. You’re blind, Jess and you don’t even know it” (278), he 
says before an argument that gets physical, using the language of mindblindness. On the other 
hand, instead of blaming him for his shortcomings, Alice “has taught [Joel] how to be generous, a 
previously underdeveloped aspect of his personality” (367), and she is supportive of Joel’s quirks. 
The interpretative uncertainty of Asperger’s also manifests in Jessica’s verbal behaviour. 
In conversation, everyday phrases become stumbling blocks when Jessica attempts to engage in 
small talk. When she tells Harriet that he has a new boyfriend, problems of interpretation arise: 
 
She grabbed me by the arm. 
‘What’s he like?’ Harriet said. 
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I was confused.  
‘Andrew? What’s he like?’ 
Like? I didn’t know what she meant. 
‘Is he tall, dark and handsome?’ 
‘Well,’ I said, thinking. ‘He’s tall but not dark. He’s blond. I don’t know if he’s 
handsome. How can you tell?’ (22) 
 
The mundane polysemy of words like ‘like’ bring a range of interpretative options to the 
conversational partners. Harriet wants to know what to expect of Andrew, whether he is a strong, 
masculine presence that would make an ideal boyfriend for Jessica in Harriet’s eyes. When she 
answers, Jessica can easily correct Harriet on the obvious physical features, but she is more 
uncertain about his good looks. There is no acid test of handsomeness, and for Jessica, it might not 
even be a concern when someone can play the violin with such talent that it steals her heart. This 
passage also shows how a person is constituted in speech due to intermental processes which would 
help Harriet in evaluating whether Andrew’s a good match for Jessica, but the presence of 
neurological difference complicates the easy sharing of intermental frames of reference. 
This level of indeterminacy is not limited to subjective assessments, it pervades Jessica’s 
conversations in more ordinary circumstances. For example, when Andrew asks, visibly awed by 
the majesty of Audlands Hall: “‘So which bit do you live in?’ he said. I couldn’t decide what he 
meant. Was he talking about me personally? My bedroom? Or which bit did we all live in? What 
did he mean by ‘live’? The kitchen? Or the drawing room? I didn’t know how to answer” (24). 
The range of options that dizzies Jessica are natural products of the pliable language use that 
characterises everyday conversations. Speakers usually rely on others to find the relevant meaning 
of the words in a particular situation by a shared set of conventions about speakers’ intentions that 
would fit their present circumstances, in which they are guided by the principles of relevance 
theory. These are less accessible to Jessica because of the ‘touch of autism’ that Joel inherits.  
This tacit knowledge about what conversational topics can be addressed directly and what 
proper manners forbid to speak of complicate Jessica’s understanding of the implied messages. 
One time, Andrew implies that he is an ‘experienced’ man:  
 
‘I had plenty of admirers in my first year,’ he said, whenever I asked. ‘There were lots 
of people in the hall to do things with.’ 
What things? Who? Where were they all now? He only ever had casual conversations 
with the others students — he wasn’t part of a special group. (28) 
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Such a token euphemism for Andrew’s sexual conquests (and judging by Andrew’s 
personality, the word ‘conquest’ is indeed apt) leaves Jessica thoroughly confused and falsely 
believing that the admirers only approached Andrew socially. Such misunderstandings indicate a 
very basic vulnerability that exposes Jessica to the machinations of more experienced mind-
readers. Jokes, teasing and conversational implicatures create a speaking community based on the 
ability of the speakers to mean more than what they say. In this world, Jessica is a perennial 
foreigner. Or rather, she was until her relationship with Andrew: “At the door, she turned and 
looked at me over [Andrew’s] shoulder. [Mary] put both thumbs up and winked. I didn’t know 
how to react. People didn’t have little intimate conspiracies with me about boyfriends. I had always 
been excluded from that world” (28), Jess recognises. It reminds us that McConachie’s cognitive 
hegemony need not be a consciously cultivated relationship — it develops in a system of reciprocal 
interactions, and when unwritten social conventions are breached or not reciprocated, an 
unconscious labelling and hierarchy is constructed by the neuromajority. This passage might also 
offer a tentative explanation for why Jessica stays in an abusive relationship for so long. Her 
marriage to Andrew rewards Jessica by including her in the world that approves of her sociability: 
“Me and Andrew and Mary. I had a boyfriend and a girlfriend. I was just like everyone else” (56), 
which is a reassuring, unstigmatised position to be in. It fills Jessica with a feeling of normality 
that she did not often experience prior to Andrew. 
Her effortful attempts to blend in and master the game of sociopragmatics puts a strain on 
her marriage that becomes clear to both when they finally separate. In this conversation before her 
divorce, Morrall shows us Jess at her most optimistic and equally clueless state: 
 
‘It’s the end of the road, Jess.’ 
‘What road?’ 
He didn’t reply. [...] 
 ‘I don’t understand what you want.’ 
‘No, that’s the trouble. You don’t understand much, do you?’ 
‘That’s not fair. I work very hard to understand you.’ 
He looked at me with contempt. ‘Quite, My point exactly. You work very hard at it. It 
doesn’t come naturally, does it?’ 
But if you don’t understand people, what can you do? Surely it’s better to make an 
effort, to pretend, to work at it? There must be something to be gained from trying. 
(267-268) 
 
Andrew terminates the relationship to maintain his position of power in a situation that is 
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otherwise face-threatening: he cannot hold a job for more than a few weeks, he leads a dependent 
life and is unable to find his place in a marriage that was based on control from the get-go. 
Meanwhile, Jessica has been adapting to Andrew, and has managed to handle his domineering 
personality, slowly wrestling away the emotional control that gave Andrew the upper hand.  
Jessica does not immediately understand his figurative speech because she cannot think of 
a frame in which she and Andrew are separated, albeit her preference for literalness heightens the 
emotional disconnect. Andrew interprets this mistake as a form of callousness, a further erosion of 
control that is the final straw. Andrew strikes back against this by emphasising Jessica’s social 
naivety, which masks Andrew’s overwhelming desire to stay in the driver’s seat rather than to 
adapt to a more egalitarian marriage. He frames his failings as Jessica’s, and her (undiagnosed) 
autism becomes a scapegoat for the failure of their relationship. But her further empathy and 
concessions would have lead to her complete emotional dissolution as an individual.  
Jessica is right, there is something to be gained from trying, from pretending. Most 
enactivists would agree: pretending is exactly how the self learns to construct social narratives, but 
for that competence to develop, it requires a supportive environment, unlike Jessica’s marriage. 
Andrew does not give any positive reinforcement – he only approves of her because she willingly 
occupies her socially prescribed position as his wife. Living the life of a traditional married couple 
is of great emotional value to Jessica, since the enactment of familiar schemata supplies an autistic 
person with a sense of predictability and reassuring routine. She would experience a deep distress 
without that, because she craves a set practice of life. 
Morrall also shows the vulnerability of autistic people to normative social standards when 
Jessica attends a parent-teacher meeting. Joel’s skills become the topic of the conversation: “‘He 
really must learn to be more tidy,’ she said. This seemed a minor complaint to me. […] ‘You might 
like to have a look at other children’s work. […] His letters were a bit wonky, but I thought he was 
doing well until I saw the other children’s work. I couldn’t believe their neatness. It seemed so 
unnecessary” (227-228). Joel’s handwriting might be an indicator of minor neurological 
dysfunction that is a “part and parcel of autism spectrum syndromes” (Gillberg and Kadesjö 2003, 
64), but a school system that focuses on such minor discrepancies rather than encouraging the 
student to work on more essential skills shows a strong normative component. Inculcating 
conformism is an integral feature of the institution’s disciplinary function, which allows Joel’s 
development to be “recorded, accumulated, and used to subject individuals in new ways,” while 
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this epistemological power also “generates a kind of clinical knowledge” (Deacon 2006, 183) 
about Joel’s autism. The unnecessary neatness exposes how this regulatory practice singles out 
‘problem children’ in the hope of homogenising them. That is why Jessica’s conversation with the 
schoolteacher can continue with the following assessment: 
 
 ‘He is still quite immature,’ she said. 
I almost let my mouth drop open to gape at her. Joel, immature? He could discuss 
concepts like personal space, self-control, excellence. ‘In what way?’ I asked. ‘I 
always ﬁnd him very mature.’ She crossed her legs. She didn’t understand about 
intelligence. ‘He doesn’t mix well […] with the other children or join in their 
playground games. He doesn’t play football. […] Perhaps you should encourage him 
to take an interest […], find some out-of-school activities. He needs that contact with 
his peers. Could you invite some of his classmates round every now and again, give 
him the chance to learn how to behave like them? He simply doesn’t have the social 
skills of most children of his age. […] Children do need to learn to think of others. […] 
I’m sure we’ll resolve all these little problems,’ she said and smiled, her mouth 
glistening with pink lipstick. 
They aren’t Joel’s problems, I wanted to say. They’re yours. He just doesn’t fit into 
your way of thinking.” (Morrall 2008, 229-231, emphasis mine) 
 
This is a direct encounter with the hidden curriculum of schooling: normative socialisation. 
If Joel were to commingle with his peer group, it would hardly benefit him as much as the 
schoolteacher believes, since he would be subject to ridicule and bullying, for children are 
incredibly quick to pick up this hidden element of education, and enthusiastically reproduce it in 
their own sphere. ‘Your way of thinking’ (the disciplinary model of education) can only understand 
‘maturity’ as a concept that tracks the social skills which would enable children to function in 
society without any further government expenditure. It is also a gendered normativity, which is 
evident from the teacher’s dismay at the horrible fact that Joel doesn’t play football. Football, a 
predominantly cooperative sport that relies on dexterity and deception, requires sophisticated 
mental models of the players’ intentions, a sensitive response to leadership, a keen eye for strategy 
and a measure of acting. Crucially, the athletic skills acquired on the playing field do not easily 
translate into everyday social knowledge, but playground football does integrate the young players 
into a social unit that depends upon intuitively learnt patterns of sociality for success.  
Morrall draws a parallel with another parent-teacher meeting, one from Jessica’s early life. 
Unlike Joel, Jessica was a well-rounded student, bright for her own age, with exceedingly good 
reading skills. When Connie comes to consult Jessica’s teacher, Mr. Kelvin’s praise overlooks 
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some more pressing concern: 
 
‘But does she understand what she’s reading?’ said Connie. He frowned. She thought 
he could read her disbelief and was dismissing her opinions without considering them 
properly. She felt herself flush. ‘Of course she does,’ he said. ‘If she can read the 
words, she can understand them. Words are the tools to comprehension.’ […] ‘But . . 
.’ Connie began, unsure how to express what she wanted to say. ‘Does she play with 
other children?’ Mr Kelvin’s gaze moved into the distance, a bored expression 
creeping into his eyes. ‘I have no idea, Mrs Fontaine. I think you should concentrate 
on her intellectual abilities and not worry about how well she can play games.’ (93) 
 
Connie knows about Jessica’s hyperlexia, that is, a precocious ability to read, which might 
not be accompanied by a reading comprehension that would be typical of her mental age. Connie 
is a more conventionally sensitive parent than Jessica will grow up to be, and she knows that her 
daughter’s social skills are lacking, so she attempts to steer the conversation in a direction that 
addresses her little girl’s problems with integration. I would like to suggest that the two parent-
teacher meetings are a good example of Alan Palmer’s claim that the mind is a socially distributed 
phenomenon: “This image is in the minds of others, but we are attributing it to this particular mind. 
Surely then, our identity is distributed among the minds of others. […] In a sense we are not so 
much what we say we are, but what we do” (Palmer 2004, 169). In autism novels, the situated and 
stigmatised identity of characters on the spectrum are not just inherent in the individual minds of 
the autistic protagonists, but are socially distributed in the minds of the neurotypical characters as 
well, who assess and react to behaviour they find unconventional in unique ways, governed by the 
social norms of cognition. 
Connie and Mr. Kelvin’s talk about Jessica shares a peculiar feature with Jessica’s own 
experiences at the parent-teacher meeting: the experts’ ignore the mothers’ concerns about their 
children. The main difference lies in their attitude. While Connie worries that Jessica won’t fit in 
and seeks help, Jessica couldn’t care less about the non-normative aspects of Joel’s childhood and 
she fights for his other skills to be recognised instead. The lack of imaginative play and social 
skills that raised a red flag for Joel’s teacher and Connie are a testament to NT society’s 
prescriptive view on the matter. Sport is just one venue of socialisation where children with autism 
suffer from the competitive, comparative ethos, supported by the social norms of cognition that 
define what counts as appropriate activity for children at any given stage of development.  
In Jessica’s own life, it was the treasure hunts organised by her mother that were similarly 
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‘pointless’ activities which tacitly reinforced the norms of socialisation: “The treasure was always 
a great disappointment to Jessica. It was usually only a few lollipops that had to be shared by 
everyone, but no one else seemed to mind. It was as if the real treasure was the hunt, the running, 
the fun” (4). Combining the same kinaesthetic thrill and concentrated effort for a common goal 
that makes football fun, such games are organised by the adults to create an environment where 
social learning can occur informally. The scenes where unspoken assumptions guide group 
intermental thinking shows that Morrall presents her autistic characters against a backdrop of 
normative child-rearing practices. This design thematises autistic people’s difficulties with 
interactions that don’t suit the characters’ development and create frustration with all things social. 
The force with which normative socialisation pervades Jessica’s adult life returns on the 
ill-fated honeymoon trip to France. Wishing to escape from the suffocating unfamiliarity of a new 
country, Jessica goes to the beach early in the morning, when she can commune with nature:  
 
There weren’t many people on the beach yet. A boat drifted lazily across the sea […]. 
It parted the still, glassy water, leaving an ever-expanding arrow behind it. I sifted the 
sand with my fingers and examined the tiny, multi-coloured grains. It was warm on 
the surface, but cold lower down. I dug into it with a piece of driftwood […]. It was 
pleasant sitting here alone, no one to speak to, no one to know me. (137) 
 
The scene recalls Lou’s lonely wanderings in Harper Falls, and the point is similar: the 
exhaustion that comes with social cognition and the negotiations of autistic life is best remedied 
by visiting unpopulated areas, where the primary sensory stimuli are not of human origin. ‘No one 
who minds is here,’ says Lou, ‘no one knows me here,’ echoes Jessica, and the relief from the 
constant barrage of socialisation is essential to remain sane in a world unwilling to accommodate 
the needs or accept the preferences of neurominorities. This brief respite is shattered by Andrew 
when Jessica comes home. He cannot tolerate not supervising her, so he twists her arms and 
threatens to hit her because of a quotidian display of independence. The forced sociality (and 
Andrew’s rebarbative idea of what counts as marriage) destroys the autistic pattern of oscillation 
that favours periods of intense aloneness to recuperate after social events, while Andrew’s 
aggressive, patriarchal behaviour symbolises the worst excesses of normativity. 
It is remarkable that although everybody believes Jessica and Joel to be quirky and socially 
awkward, readers have to wait until the end of the novel for someone to confirm that either of them 
might be autistic. Still, there is one brief glimmer of acknowledging their neurological difference. 
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Jessica’s mum, Connie brings up the topic in conversation with Cathy:  
 
Connie sighed, weakened by the intimacy of their circumstances. […] 
‘She is very difficult,’ she acknowledged. […] ‘Actually, I did try to talk to the doctor 
once, when she was younger. I thought she might be autistic.’ 
‘And?’ 
‘He laughed at me. He said if I’d seen the kind of autistic children he had to treat, I 
wouldn’t have suggested anything so ridiculous.’ 
[…] 
‘He should have retired years ago, He’s far too old to be practising. Find a younger 
doctor who’s more up-to-date.’ 
‘He must know what he’s talking about,’ said Connie. ‘He’s a doctor.’ 
‘Ask to see a specialist.’ (36) 
 
The two women have a shared vision of Jessica as a problem child, and Connie knows 
Jessica enough to have taken a mental step in the right direction, but she is not confident in her 
intuitions, so she consults the doctor, investing him with the discursive power to confer the 
diagnosis upon Jessica. In this conversation, the value of expert knowledge and the reliability of 
experts are contested as different clinical pictures and lay knowledge of autism clash in a shifting 
historical context of science. Judging by the age of the paediatrician, it seems likely that his idea 
of autism only covers the Kannerian type, bringing with him his working knowledge of the ‘70s 
and early ‘80s, when the English-speaking community of practitioners were yet to recognise 
Asperger’s contribution. Connie respects his refusal to diagnose Jessica despite her correct 
intuitions, acknowledging his status as a figure of authority who can apply the discourse of the 
DSM. Cathy, on the other hand, knows the difference between your tired old GP and someone who 
is knowledgeable about childhood disabilities, so she urges Connie to seek a second opinion.  
It is my conviction that the unprofessional attitude of the doctor and his dismissal of 
Jessica’s autism is the real story. In fact, I have found the novelist’s treatment of Jessica’s 
obliviousness to the similarities between herself and her son troubling until I have read the 
consultation scenes more carefully. By not enabling Jessica to live with an autistic identity, 
neurotypical sociality remains a mystery for her much longer than it should have been. Jessica 
could have learnt the language of Others more easily, albeit with a foreign accent, had she known 
that she was an autist. Indeed, Joel’s successes stem from her mother’s attention to his needs. 
Jessica’s difference comes into contact with expert knowledge near the end of the novel. 
Discussing the path her life took, she comments upon the psychological effects of asociality: 
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“Apparently, loneliness is a twenty-first-century disease which leads to alcoholism, drug-taking, 
depression, suicides. It’s better to be married if you want to live longer. I defy all of this research. 
I thrive on the emptiness of my house” (368, emphasis mine). Jessica’s case is exceptional, and 
the novel’s juxtaposition of an abusive marriage, autism and the scientific-journalistic complex 
that disseminates this normative knowledge invites the reader to conclude that the truth generated 
about autism is contingent and there are always exceptions to such truth claims.  
In autism novels, the power of expert knowledge is countered by the tacit knowledge of 
individuals who are affected by the condition. Jessica’s recognition of her own autism comes 
through her experiences with Joel and her conversations with Alice, whose brother is also an autist. 
When she finally talks to Jessica about Joel’s condition, the news rearranged her previous 
knowledge about herself as well. The revelation is cathartic. For Alice and her family, “it was an 
enormous relief, because everything suddenly made sense. It was so much easier once [my parents] 
realised that his behaviour wasn’t their fault” (334). Jessica puts it in more auditive terms: “There’s 
a roaring in my ears, a waterfall of immense proportions. Powerful and terrifying, but at the same 
time a release of pressure that has been steadily building up for years. It’s a shock, but a liberating 
one” (336). In Joel and Jessica’s case, autism is no longer a diagnosis or a stigma, but an enabling 
discourse that gives definition to disparate crumbles of experience, an interpretative framework 
which helps to interpret the language of others.  
The linguistic metaphor is further developed in Jessica’s own view of Joel’s remoteness: 
“When you talk to him, you always feel that something is missing, that you’ve lost a key point in 
the translation. No wonder he prefers to operate in his computer language, obsessively creating 
fantasy places where he has control over any threatening and unpredictable characters. It must 
provide him with security in an otherwise uncertain existence” (335). Even more notable than the 
divide between Joel and the rest of the world is the absence of a common language between Joel 
and Jessica. In this respect, they are utterly different from Moon’s Section A, who have their own 
private language and need not resort to much explanation when they conduct their affairs amongst 
themselves. Despite their shared neurotype, Jessica’s maturity and her past struggles to make her 
voice heard have granted her some fluency in Neurotypical, which Joel is yet to learn. 
The ignorance of the experts contributed heavily to Jessica’s lack of identification with 
Joel, who reads him for a long time essentially as an extension of his father rather than herself, 
when they are the ones who ought to be sharing a language. The other sort of language, the machine 
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tongue of programming is more intuitive for Joel because it only has semantics and syntax but no 
pragmatics – every command does exactly one thing, without any conversational implicatures. 
Jessica reads the algorithmic procedurality of virtual worlds as a privileged space of autistic 
existence, its predictability a relieving fantasy in itself. Her evaluation of the digital era is 
confirmed by scholars like Hacking and McConagh, who claim that autism became conceivable at 
precisely the point where technology gave birth to modernism, and its milder form rose to fame 
when the world started operating machines that mimic some aspects of autistic cognition (see 
Chapter 7). When Jessica starts to identify with Joel’s personality, she sees him anew: “He is 
undergoing a transformation, losing his blurred outline, beginning to make sense. It’s as if I only 
ever half-knew him” (338). Jessica’s half-knowledge and belated reunion with Joel originates from 
the dismissal of maternal expertise and the refusal to see autism as a spectrum condition, where 
milder cases matter, personally as much as clinically.  
What programming is for Joel, it is music for Jessica. During her performances with Mary, 
she joyfully immerses herself in melodies: “We sway with the music, […] and there’s a wonderful 
sense of working together that I don’t experience anywhere else in my life. We are one, 
instinctively knowing each other’s responses without discussion. […] We understand what is never 
spoken, what couldn’t be spoken because there is nothing to say” (52). Both music and 
programming are semiotic Others of natural languages, as they are outside the sphere of socially 
relevant interpretation. Just as in Speed of Dark, music is a tool for Jessica to get into a flow, very 
different from her experiences with the give-and-take of small talk. What allowed her to reach this 
level of fluency in solfeggio is the tenacity with which she practiced the tonal units of expression. 
In the detached tone of the heterodiegetic narrator, we catch a glimpse of how Connie relates to 
Jessica’s youthful practice:  
 
In the distance, twelve-year-old Jessica was playing scales. Up and down, up and 
down, automatic and energetic, quite inappropriate on this languid summer day. This 
wasn’t what Connie had expected when she’d agreed to piano lessons. Even when 
Jessica practised real music, with tunes that you could grasp hold of, she approached 
them obsessively, repeating sections so often that they ceased to have any meaning. 
The scales dominated, as if they had found a little niche in Jessica’s brain that had been 
waiting for their arrival, a mathematical corner that was thirsty for pattern and shapes. 
(143) 
 
It’s as if Jessica instinctively took to heart the ancient wisdom of repetitio est mater 
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studiorum. She repeats and repeats the basic building blocks of music, satisfied by the regularity 
of the scales, and takes the enjoyable phrases out of context, to utter them time and again in a 
musical echolalia until they are absorbed completely. The autistic joy of finding patterns, repetition 
and what Jessica has called ‘control’ and ‘security in an otherwise uncertain existence’ when she 
spoke about Joel is literally at her fingertips when she plays the scales (typing and playing the 
piano is surprisingly alike on the motor level). The character-bound narrator’s suggestion that this 
obsessive practice is ‘inappropriate’ is conveyed through what Alan Palmer calls contextual 
thought report, “the short, unobtrusive sentences, phrases, or even single words that describe an 
aspect of a character’s mind and that are often combined with descriptions of action or context” 
(Palmer 2004, 209-210). It is a comment that translates Connie’s NT expectations of what music 
would suit that ‘languid summer day’ — definitely something played allegro non molto.  
Jessica’s love of music, especially at its most rote and mechanical, has its counterpart in 
Lou’s fencing, who methodically learnt how to pick up on the subtle movements of his opponent. 
Their shared musicophilia indicates a preference for the non-social semiotics of notes that channel 
their emotions, even if Lou only uses music to guide his thinking, whereas Jessica expresses 
emotions through her performance. Her own perception that “[t]he other Jessica was unreachable. 
Music must have helped me to wake up” (346) uses the metaphor of CONVERSION as AWAKENING 
to enunciate her position as someone who can confidently find her way in life now.  
In her mind, this awakening and Andrew’s music is fused together, reflecting on this in the 
moments prior to Andrew’s death: “When I was a student, did I love the man or the music? The 
man, I used to think. The music, I think now. My emotions were too new then, too overwhelming 
for me to sort out” (359). For all his ghastly powers, Andrew did play on Jessica’s heartstrings, 
which helped her ‘emergence’ into the social world. Still, Andrew refused to play music for long, 
wasting his talent and not participating any further in Jessica’s belated Bildung. 
As Andrew turns away from music, he begins to appreciate the fictional, the narrative. 
During their time together, Jessica noticed how Andrew “spent much of his spare time reading 
[comic books], over and over again. […] But he read the comics earnestly, without laughing” (21). 
Not all media has this effect on him, however: “Every afternoon, we had to race back for children’s 
television. Wacky Races, Dick Dastardly, Penelope Pitstop. [… H]e would watch obsessively, 
grunting at every bizarre disaster, every punchline. I tried to join in, I really did, but I couldn’t 
understand them. There was nothing there that I could relate to” (21). The rhetorical direction of 
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the narration constructs Andrew as immature, preferring graphic novels and animated shorts over 
more highbrow fare, and his compulsion to watch them will return with Jacob Horner’s enthusiasm 
for forensic shows in House Rules. For a while, Jessica holds the view that Joel inherited his social 
awkwardness and nerdish preferences from Andrew, and that is why he turned to computer games. 
These ideas are symptomatic of the cultural ideology that equates realistic literary novels with 
complex characters, one which denounces new media and popular genres as immature and 
childish. Commenting on the consumption of fiction by autistic people, Julie Brown exhibits a 
similar prejudice: she labels the characters of the “Lord of the Rings, [fantasy] narratives, science 
fiction or Japanese comic books” as “superficial” (25) and therefore appealing to AS readers. To 
claim that characters in Tolkien’s epic or science fiction or manga are shallow and uncomplicated 
is based on extreme cultural myopia, betraying a commonly-held assumption that these genres are 
somehow less complex. Complicated psychological profiles or moral dilemmas are omnipresent 
in these media, and they require intact mind-reading skills to enjoy them. These pieces of art are 
indubitably fictitious, and appreciating even a simple cartoon such as Wacky Races does exercise 
one’s metacognitive skills. Jessica’s nonplussed reaction is juxtaposed to Andrew’s Schadenfreude 
and mirth at the misfortune of the racers, and from the vantage point of mind-reading, Andrew 
does come off as responding more ‘maturely’ than clueless Jessica. 
He is also a compulsive fiction-maker, who regales her mother with tales about Jessica’s 
fictitious Eastern European ancestry, the nobles who have fled from Russia after the Revolution: 
 
‘And there was a pair of sealskin gloves,’ said Andrew. ‘Jess keeps those safe at home.’ 
My thoughts were fluttering round my head, trapped and bewildered, not knowing how 
to find the exit. I knew what he was saying wasn’t true, but he sounded so convincing. 
Had my mother told him something I didn’t know about? Was he lying or just making 
up stories? (63) 
 
Gentle Jessica always gives Andrew the benefit of doubt, who mercilessly exploits this in 
order to please her haughty mother. Jessica’s doubt stems from the twin discomforts of moral 
dismay and the demand it imposes upon her to play along — an autistic honesty forbids her to 
continue this part of the conversation, ceding high ground to the grandiloquent Andrew. 
Jessica’s unease with fiction is a life-long trait, not just a form of resistance against 
Andrew’s mystification. In this scene from her childhood, we see her from Connie’s perspective 
at bedtime, which captures the difference between the two siblings’ attitude to fiction:  
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Connie sat on the end of her bed for a bit longer because she thought she ought to, 
without knowing what else to talk about. […] She knew she should keep trying, but it 
was such hard work, so unrewarding. She was looking forward to reading to Harriet. 
[…] Harriet would be waiting for her. She could tease her and they would giggle 
together and then she could read some of The Magic Faraway Tree. Harriet loved the 
goblins and the pixies and the fairies. She wasn’t contemptuous about them and didn’t 
demand proof of their existence. It was fun reading to Harriet. (95) 
 
Connie’s patient but fruitless lingering at the side of Jessica’s bed is a moving display of 
helplessness once her correct assumption that Jessica might be autistic is invalidated by 
paediatricians. The readers surmise from Connie’s desperation that Jessica is troubled by the 
inventiveness of Enid Blyton, and cannot accept the secondary world of the children’s book, where 
fairies and other flights of fantasy exist. Because Jessica cannot pretend and breathe a fictional 
world to life, she suffers through her bedtime stories. 
The irony of Jessica’s fate is that she eventually ends up being a librarian. Readers with an 
eye for Jessica’s dash of autism might be puzzled at her claim that “my interest still lies with 
books” (103), since she has never been too keen on them in the first place. According to her, “I'm 
good at recommendations because I read newspaper reviews. I get the story from the back cover, 
read the first page for the style and the last four pages to ﬁnd out what happens and I've got them 
sorted. […] I study the back of the latest Ian McEwan. I think I’ve got the general idea” (103-105). 
Her interest in books apparently does not extend to the actual artistry of the wordsmith much, since 
she cannot immerse herself in the storyworld, but she likes categorising them.  
Her colleague, Isolde is her polar opposite. She is seen with a new book every day, and 
enjoys almost everything she reads. “She lives alone,” Jessica tells us, and she imagines her “going 
to bed early, racing through the last exciting pages. She devours everything — literary novels, 
romances, thrillers, non-fiction” (103). The juxtaposition of Isolde and Jessica highlights the tinge 
of autism in the pianist-turned-librarian, who appreciates books as information, rather than as 
enjoyable narratives. Jessica’s skimming might prove jarring, because it goes completely against 
the current activity of the reader, who is bringing her to life at that very moment, imaginatively 
(re)constructing her virtual existence from the author’s instructions. 
Jessica’s interest in books is put into context when she confesses that she is a bit of a 
technophobe and everything in the past few years has changed “with the advent of computers and 
virtual knowledge” (103), but she cannot keep up with it. For all of Ian Hacking’s ingenuity about 
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reading autism as a reflection of a more technological age, the Aspergian Jessica does not really 
come off as nerdy in the way he uses the term: her social awkwardness is not coupled with 
technological aptitude or any obscure interests. Even her arthritic mother, who always tries so hard 
to be hip and in tune with the times, is more engaged with technology than Jessica. When she visits 
her parents back in Audlands, Jessica comments on her new pastime: “She’s discovered the 
Internet. [… S]he sits there nearly all day, wandering round the planet, exploring all those worlds 
of fun that she missed when she was younger, using her mind where she once would have used her 
legs. […] She’s calmer than she used to be and does all her talking in chatrooms. It seems safe to 
let her get on with it” (162). Connie’s new hobby is a venue for a more fulfilled life despite her 
rheumatism, offering imaginative mental trips, similar to how travel literature transported readers 
into the world of the unfamiliar and the exotic. Her social connections are also affected, as she 
finds new friends in chatrooms, and unlike the more hysterical discourse that tends to frame young 
people’s use of the Internet, Jessica sees her mother’s changed sociality as an improvement, thanks 
to her technological prowess that Jessica doesn’t share. As arthritis is a physical disability in its 
more severe forms, we could emend Hacking’s view on autism by extending the beneficial powers 
of the Internet to include people with physical disabilities in support groups, who get information 
and emotional support from fellow sufferers (van Uden-Kraan 2008, Lorig et al. 2008).  
To see Hacking’s prototypical autistic nerd, we have to look to Joel. He is the epitome of 
the start-up entrepreneur who is socially awkward and almost mythically adept in IT skills: “He 
formed his own company — ScarlattiSkills — at seventeen, and designs computer games. His 
ability must be an offshoot of his father’s neglected talent. Patterns, new ideas, fast thinking, 
alternative ways of seeing things” (13-14). Jessica never hesitates to connect father and son, who 
are positioned as others to her ideal of a self-reliant life, appearing as loveable burdens that 
encroach upon her personal space. She doesn’t discredit her son’s abilities, but she has different 
values about what is “lasting and worthwhile” (14), preferring something less frivolous, like 
Mahler and the Mendelssohns.  
The clash between the generations is all the more troubling because Joel’s lifestyle leaves 
little room for Jessica to breathe freely: “He never goes away. He doesn’t have any friends, only 
work colleagues. Something’s not quite right. He couldn’t get on with other children when he was 
younger, but why can’t he do it now? Twenty-three years is a long time to have no social life” 
(14). It is hard to precisely locate the source of that final judgement. On the one hand, it is clearly 
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issuing from Jessica’s mind, through whom the section is focalised. On the other, Jessica hardly 
had any more social life during her teenage years than Joel had up to this point. As a mother, 
however, she wants to make some room for herself in her life, getting some free time and the sense 
of agency that comes with it. Still, this expression of opinion is more than just an individual’s cry 
for autonomy; it is the expression of a group’s normative opinion as well, and a neurotypical group 
at that. As Palmer notes: “A particularly important function of intermental thinking […] is the 
formation and maintenance of group norms and conventions” (2004, 227). Jessica adopts an NT 
view of people on the spectrum in this passage, that their social awkwardness and reliance on 
caregiver support is a burden on the productive body and mind. This thought is shared by the 
neuromajority, and it shows how the mind is always a socially distributed phenomenon, as 
Jessica’s situated identity compels her to agree with the social norms of the neuromajority when it 
allows her a little more freedom. Mind you, Jessica’s obliviousness to her autism ‘helps’ in this 
struggle, which reinforces the narratologist’s claim that intermental thought demarcates the 
boundaries of social groups and norms. 
Computers and autistic people are joined in the popular imagination, and Jessica is not 
immune to that sort of thinking, either. As she pithily summarises, “Joel’s work is everyone else’s 
play” (170), which is an apt observation about the digital entertainment industry that spends a lot 
of work hours developing code that provides fun. If Ioan James is right, the same autistic mind-set 
which compelled Alan Turing to produce machines that manipulated symbolic language (James 
2006, 167-175) is apprehensible in Joel’s uncannily intuitive use of the computer. In a scene that 
brings The Matrix (1999) to mind, Jessica watches his son over the shoulder as he works his magic 
on the keyboard: “He tapped away, his fingers moving so fast that it was impossible to see what 
he was doing. […] He would press keys just to ﬁnd out what happened, and get excited by the 
chain of events that he had set off. The screen was filling with figures, symbols, meaningless 
threads of letters that could have been the work of an eight-year-old-genius or complete nonsense” 
(259). Computers are delightful pieces of machinery to many autistic users because of the 
contingency effects that result from the user’s actions — everything that happens is entirely within 
the control of the person operating the machine. In our childhood, we all depend upon contingency-
detecting mechanisms in our brain to endow ourselves with a sense of self as we correlate our 
bodily movements with changes in the environment. As typically developing brains mature, people 
move away from expecting and preferring perfect contingency to more imperfectly predictable 
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experiences, whereas autistic children continue to prefer an environment that leans closer to a 
perfect fit between one’s actions and their consequences (Gergely and Watson 1999, Gergely 
2001). The intuitive connection between autistic individuals and computers is elevated to a 
legendary level, quite unlike Naja Melan’s image of the hapless (presumably autistic) programmer 
who was given a Xuni computer which does not make much sense for its users until they spend an 
inordinate amount of time with it (see Chapter 8 on SoD). Jessica’s anxieties about Joel’s 
nerdishness and (a)sociality until he finds a girlfriend is a worrying representational commonplace, 
but his relationship with Alice not only redeems him in the eye of his mother, it also brings the 
revelation about Asperger’s for the whole family.  
Jessica herself found the confines of a heterosexual marriage to be very suffocating. In fact, 
her biggest victory is that she avoids Andrew’s traps after the divorce and stays independent. 
Andrew’s musical stunts to get more attention from Jessica ultimately fails when she points out 
that Andrew’s solo on top of the department store no longer felt “like a chore, something you’d 
been forced into” (248), thereby breaking Andrew’s master narrative about why he loathes playing 
music. Jessica’s final sigh of relief is a confirmation that she has changed: “I breathe in, taste the 
freshness and freedom of the air. I’m safe. I’ve grown up and walked beyond the role that Andrew 
created for me” (248). Pretence and role-playing are considered to be problem areas in autism, but 
the roles Jess were cast in during her childhood and marriage were foisted upon her, and continued 
to be ill-fitting until she shook them off. Andrew’s gender essentialism forced her to adopt a 
persona she does not feel comfortable in. In one instance, he urges her to wear lipstick, but when 
Mary applies it to Jessica’s lips, it just feels wrong: 
 
I held my lips apart, conscious of the artificiality of my pose and the sticky slithery 
texture of the lipstick. 
‘It’s horrible,’ I said. 
‘No,’ said Mary. ‘You look lovely.’ 
But I didn’t. I couldn’t bear the feel of it on my lips, the way it made me feel like an 
impostor. I resisted the urge to wipe it off, knowing how anxious Andrew was to 
impress his difficult mother. (58, emphasis added) 
 
An impostor who has her exaggerated gender role imposed upon her, to be precise. A 
thematically connected event in her childhood enhances our view on this. When she dances in a 
ballet show at school, and she sees herself with make-up on for the first time, Jessica exclaims, 
“[i]t’s not real. […] I hate it” (91). This is an expression of rebellion against roles Jessica abhors 
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and the performed aspects of femininity, but it is also productive to read it as a denunciation of 
make-believe performances in general, something that fits with autistic people’s preference for 
truthful representations. As Jessica grows into adulthood, however, she begins to reinterpret her 
femininity and sees the more empowering side of role-playing. As she is preparing for her 
marriage, the rituals of beauty give her courage and an added sense of agency: “Nail varnish, 
lipstick, mascara. […] I was no longer myself. I was capable of doing anything” (123). No longer 
seeing her made-up self as a depersonalised mask, she re-evaluates role-playing as liberating, 
looking forward to a married life that might help her defy other people’s expectations of what a 
strange, shy, socially awkward girl can do. “I loved the new person I’d thought that I had become 
in my wedding dress. I’d thought I would be able to forget myself for a while and act out a new 
role, transform myself into a traditional bride for a day” (126), she admits. Conforming with 
tradition does look appealing when the alternative is to fall victim to Andrew’s iron will and his 
idea of a honeymoon that feels more like a kidnapping.  
Passing as normal does require a certain amount of role-playing, but Jessica has always 
been curious about the element of performance in social events like parties, and her curiosity ties 
in with her new attention to people. Giving a concert at the Great Hall of her conservatory, she 
takes great pleasure in seeing people undergo a transformation for the night: “I was fascinated by 
the way people changed when they dressed up, became someone different. […] Skinny people 
became slim, fat people warm and shapely. I began to see what attracted people to each other. A 
glistening aura that was not normally on show. But then again, maybe they were able to appreciate 
the potential without all the dressing-up. Maybe I was the only one who couldn’t see it” (68-69). 
Respect for others is articulated in the lexical ‘upgrading’ of derogatory terms for gentler, more 
polite words, as if language itself dressed them up. In the concert scene, Jessica begins to tap into 
the unwritten rules of neurotypical sociality, supposing that the ‘glistening aura’ of politeness, the 
care for one’s self-image has a special allure for people.  
She places herself outside of the norm, as an observer who cannot manage status and face 
in the social world, but the conspicuous role-playing she sees at the concert grants her a moment 
of awareness about the values of gregariousness, and this epiphany will drive her to seek more 
occasions for social approval, including her devastating marriage. As such, thematising pretence 
and role-playing is a fundamental tool of Morrall’s book to convey the hidden and unspoken 
benefits of sociality, and we can follow Jessica’s development from an obliviousness to social 
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roles through her condemnation of the artificiality of gender roles and her later insecurity in 
playing them to her divorce and, later, creating room in her life for reassuring solitude. 
Occasionally, social encounters fill Jessica with anticipation and self-doubt, inspiring her 
to define her alterity more sharply: 
 
The Finnegans are always laughing. […] Sometimes the laughter energises me as I 
approach the front door, and I experience a strong desire to be part of it. At other times, 
like today, it makes me feel inadequate. […] I’ve been there with [the Finnegans] when 
some small event becomes suddenly funny. I can join in with them, seeing the situation 
through their eyes, and it all feels perfectly normal, but I can’t reproduce this sense of 
fun when I’m on my own. (45-46)  
 
Jessica interprets the contagious effect their laughter has upon her as a tool of inclusion 
which fuels the emotional reciprocity of a ‘normal’ life. Apparently, she can also take their 
perspective to share the joke, which is a big achievement. The emotional disconnect between 
Jessica’s receptivity to other’s emotions versus the ones she cannot reproduce evokes the reader’s 
sympathy and represents another stable feature of autism. By her own admission, she has “a brief, 
desolate picture of myself outside, peering in at everyone as they lean towards each other, 
communicating, lit by soft, intimate lamplight. How did Mary manage these cosy chats? Nobody 
ever told me anything” (67), as if people have to be educated how to communicate intimately, 
instead of an intuitive, instinctive process that typically developing people go through as they grow 
up. It is in these short vignettes of doubt and earnest quizzicality that Jessica’s autism is poignantly 
felt by the typical reader, who looks at social competences with a new eye.  
A moment of unexpected kindness can also place Jessica in a tight spot. The couple’s 
marriage, believed by both families to be a huge mistake, brings Andrew’s mother to a show of 
empathy towards Jessica that challenges Andrew’s account of her viciousness, which Jessica took 
more or less for granted until that point.  
 
When we got up to leave, Miranda grasped my arm briefly. ‘You will let me know 
what’s going on, won’t you? I want to help you both.’ ‘Of course.’ I was surprised by 
the small intimacy of her touch. She was trying to express affection in a way that was 
unfamiliar to both of us, and I felt the need to reciprocate, but didn't know how. (121)  
 
This subdued, but nonetheless surprising breach of Miranda’s prior character confuses 
Jessica for at least two reasons: she has to reinterpret Andrew’s mother as a more caring person 
than Andrew painted her, but also because of the physical contact, which, if unexpected, can be 
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distressing to autists. Reciprocating the act would involve Jessica opening up emotionally and 
finding the right gesture to accompany the mood, but without intimating that Andrew depicted her 
in a different light, another stumbling block that makes Jessica hesitate. As she later muses, when 
she talks to Harriet: “People put too much emphasis on discussing their feelings. […] In the end, 
they shape their emotions into whatever they think the other person wants to hear” (293). This 
bothers Jessica, as the conventions of polite discourse erode her sense of emotional integrity which 
defines her and endows her with an identity she worked so hard to establish.  
The encounter with Miranda left its mark on her, compelling Jessica to become a more 
critical reader of Andrew and Miranda’s social character: “Who wielded the more honest brush, 
him or her? I longed to see clearly through the accumulation of paint, the technique, the 
brushstrokes, to the canvas beneath. Why wasn’t it easier to go straight to the truth without having 
to scrape through layers and layers of camouflage?” (122). Jessica is tired of the constant 
masquerade of identity and positioning in ordinary life. She would prefer the face-threatening 
honesty that cuts through the façade of polite discourse, where everyone has vested interests and 
uses language to gain and maintain social influence. 
The climate of this subdued emotional life contributes to the greatest crises of sociality in 
her relationship with Andrew. These symptoms find their mirror image in Donald and Miranda’s 
marriage, who have such a deeply entrenched silence between them that it is hard to break down: 
“We don’t talk much. It’s difficult. There are too many spaces between us, too many years which 
should have been filled with conversations, arguments, reconciliations. Instead, everyone has 
retreated, built great edifices of protection that can’t be scaled, concrete surfaces that can’t be 
climbed. Nowhere to fix the rope” (252). The metaphor that Jessica uses is that of the unassailable 
fortress, which might recall Bruno Bettelheim’s The Empty Fortress (1967) and the critical book 
written in response by an autism mum, Clara Clairborne Park’s The Siege: The First Eight Years 
of an Autistic Child (1972 [1967]), both of which imagine breaking the ostensibly impenetrable 
social bubble of autistic people as a military operation to rescue subjectivity from its fortress. 
(Park’s daughter, called Elly in the book to protect her identity but actually called Jessica, might 
have been an inspiration behind the author’s choice of name for her protagonist).  
Morrall takes this iconic concept from the early years of autism research and advocacy, 
and shifts its meaning from autism to a wider concern, the breakdown of communication between 
spouses. Throughout the novel, Jessica keeps seeking a position that she could occupy in peace, 
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without the crises of sociality that have scarred her. As the book ends, a happy Joel and Alice visit 
Jessica, hugging her. Jessica reflects in silent self-communion: 
 
I have learnt to love Alice in a quiet, satisfying way. But I don’t need her. I don’t need 
anyone. I’m still the baby who didn’t want to be held, who was happy in an isolated 
corner somewhere upstairs in Audlands, out of earshot. I’m most comfortable without 
too much emotion. Whenever I step out into the wide avenue of normality, I’m cleverly 
disguised, a skilled impostor. (368) 
 
Who has she become, after all those years of musical joys, traumatic formative experiences, 
her forced socialisation, her drama of emotional emergence? Not the same kind of impostor when 
she first saw herself in make-up. No longer the insecure young woman who could be manipulated 
willy-nilly, who would succumb to the social norms of cognition that define her relationship with 
the neuromajority in absolute terms. This cleverly disguised impostor – while not entirely at home 
with the neurotypical world – has acquired the skills to pass. She has become neurocosmopolitan, 
a traveller between mindworlds, who can effectively manage her identity and carve out a nice for 
herself, “a place where I can breathe easily. Alone, surrounded by space, my hair blowing in the 
wind” (376). One great merit of the novel is Jessica’s quiet victory to define herself, so different 
from Christopher’s triumphant future or Lou’s ambiguous but dramatic ascent into space. 
To sum it up, Morrall’s goal to explore the boundaries of the autistic in fiction has been 
fulfilled through the narrative design, the affective colouring and thematic reinforcements of 
neurological difference, committing some of the more egregious stereotypes of autism to the 
rubbish heap. Jessica’s quest for personal space and emotional acceptance is a moving, but 
deliberately slow-placed narrative which devotes a significant amount of time to mind-reading as 
she practices interpreting people and becomes a critical mind-reader. She acquires the social skills 
to join the ranks of a neurocosmopolitan world. Morrall evokes autistic presence by the corporeal 
performances of Jessica, but also by showing the internal struggles to interpret a biosemiotic and 
linguistic realm, where meaning is underdetermined by the neuroatypical mind. Her battles to tame 
Andrew and stand up to him is a further dynamo of her improving mind-reading skills; their 
relationship is a struggle to define who does and does not become readable and when. As a figure 
conveying the power of cognitive cultural hegemony, Andrew’s masculinity cannot tolerate 
atypicality, and his expectation that Jessica should be more susceptible to his whims becomes his 
downfall. The destructive marriage has its counterpoint in Joel and Alice’s relationship, a healthier, 
- 212 - 
more supportive partnership that accepts and adapts to autism. 
The grand theme of vulnerability to the social norms of cognition surface in Jessica and 
Joel’s school career, as well as in their relationship with their parents, even though they cannot 
seem to find a common tongue. This is more surprising in the case of Joel, but their reliance on 
the language of others to communicate is due to the dismissal of their parents’ concerns by experts. 
In their view, the milder cases of autism should not be granted the same expert attention as the 
more typical ones, so they are interpellated as normal and expected to function as such. The forced 
sociality leaves its mark on both of the characters, in different gendered expressions: Jessica uses 
music and Joel learns programming to find areas of achievement where they can profit from their 
attention to detail, rhythms and patterns that avoid the pragmatics of ordinary language use. The 
echolalic practice of the scales and Andrew’s lyrical melodies coax Jessica out of her shell, 
experiencing emotional highs that otherwise remain muted within her. 
Besides music, the consumption of fiction is brought into the thematic purview of The 
Language of Others, questioning the connection between autism and invented worlds, non-existent 
characters. Andrew’s empathetic engagement with cartoons and comic books are contrasted with 
Jessica’s distant reading as a librarian, who only reads the blurbs and skims a couple of pages in 
order to categorise books. Joel’s game designs turn from violent shooters to educational software 
as Alice begins to subtly alter his vision of fun. Video games are read by Jessica as a medium more 
suited to the autistic mind, with its master themes of control and predictability. Although Jessica 
professes to be interested by books, in her own childhood, she could not tolerate fictional 
narratives, and her incredulity is definitely written to be a tell-tale sign of autism. 
Emotions, the ability to experience them or to liberate them, is a key to understand the 
subtle development of Jessica. As she matures, she gives up on sheer conformity and moves 
towards a hybrid position, she begins to handle her emotions better, which is consistent with the 
observed pattern of symptom amelioration for people with a milder form of autism. The family is 
the privileged site for the discussion and venting of emotions — it is also the most prominent stage 
for the crises of sociality that trouble Jessica. Such crises prod her to reassess some of the other 
people in her life, which instils anxiety in her, because she is loath to change her opinion of others. 
As a defence, couples attempt to lock their positions in place (e.g. Jessica and Andrew, or Donald 
and Miranda), but these never amount to a solution, creating a climate of silence instead. Morrall 
crystallises the image of the (empty) fortress from the early years of autism research to emphasise 
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the damaging effects of a social life that does not accept alternative patterns of interaction. By the 
end of the novel, Jessica emerges as a neurocosmopolite who can rest easier, knowing that she has 
found a place for her life that will be secure. She rejoices that the destructive spiral of emotional 
bullying and unresolved tensions are broken with Joel and Alice’s relationship and child. 
In the final analytical chapter on Jodi Picoult’s House Rules, Jacob Horner’s autism will 
be investigated in a more ethical and less affective context, but there are a number of recurring 
themes. Just as Morrall reflected upon fiction’s allure, so will Picoult interrogate its role in 
enhancing the autistic comprehension of normative social life, mind-reading skills and alternative 
scenarios. The same pretence that caused so much trouble for Jessica reappears in the polyphonic 
attempts of the characters to deceive one another and paint themselves in a better light. The 
metaphorical framing of autism participates in the diegetic interpretation of social situations in 
House Rules, such as when Theo, Jacob’s brother wants to conceptualise his relationship with his 
brother. The authorial strategies of eliciting empathy will form the core of my argument about the 
representation of Jacob’s trial, stating that the novel’s polyphonic structure places special demands 
on the reader’s affective allegiances to show that Jacob is in fact capable of similar perspective-
taking. Finally, I return to the philosophical underpinning of autistic subjectivity I have already 
brought to bear on The Curious Incident, Ian Bogost’s object-oriented ontology, to demonstrate 
that the power of ontography, anti-narrative lists and other elements of storytelling shape our 
perceptions of Jacob’s autism. 
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CHAPTER 10 
REACHING OUT, BEYOND EMPATHETIC BOUNDARIES:  
JODI PICOULT’S OPTIMISM ABOUT MIND-READING, AGENCY AND AUTHORSHIP 
 
“A mother visits her son, smiles to him through the bars.  
She’s never loved him more.” 
– Tuomas Holopainen (Nightwish 2011), “Song of Myself” 
 
Appreciating the many layers on which Theory of Mind organises the structure of House 
Rules necessitates a broad overview of the novel, with a fairly thorough presentation of the story 
and the ancillary themes that serve the narration of an autistic mind. Picoult’s novel is told from 
the perspective of five characters: Jacob Hunt, an adolescent living with diagnosed Asperger’s 
Syndrome in Townshend, VT; his younger brother, Theo; his mother, Emma, who writes an advice 
column for the local newspaper; Rich Matson, a detective working in Townshend; and Oliver, a 
farrier-turned-lawyer. According to Emma, Jacob was a healthy baby until age 2-3, when he was 
given his shots for multiple childhood diseases, after which he started exhibiting symptoms of 
autism. Following the diagnosis, Jacob’s father, Henry left the family to start a new life in the 
Silicon Valley as a programmer, while Emma has dedicated her life to ameliorate his son’s 
symptoms, sending him to the same school as his younger brother, Theo. In this effort, however, 
she has neglected Theo, who has struggled with tolerating Jacob’s quirks, turning him into a social 
outcast as well. Unable to cope with the lack of attention, he periodically escapes from home and 
enters other families' houses while they are not at home to imagine a life where he is appreciated.  
Jacob’s school years have been tough on him, too, as he tried with all his might to make 
friends in vain. This has not been helped by his pattern of interests, prominent among them his 
passion for forensics and crime scene investigation. In order to improve his ability to carry on 
conversations and make more people accept him, her mother hired Jess Ogilvy as Jacob’s social 
skills tutor. Jess has an abusive, brash but charming boyfriend, Mark, who is jealous of the attention 
Jess showers on Jacob and frequently teases him because of his neurological difference. 
One day, Jess is found dead in a culvert with a rainbow blanket wrapped around her. Her 
death occurred in the home she was housesitting. Rich Matson gets involved in the investigation. 
First, he begins to suspect Mark because of the history of abuse, but as soon as Emma sees the 
footage of Jess’ body on TV and recognises Jacob’s blanket, she informs the police that her son 
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might be implicated. Soon, Jacob’s obsession with crime and his neuroatypical behaviour becomes 
damning evidence in the eye of Matson, and Jacob finds himself going to court not as a witness 
but as a potential murderer. Emma hires the inexperienced lawyer, Oliver to defend Jacob, and the 
two adults develop a relationship. During the trial, pressure mounts on Theo, who has been keeping 
a low profile but was actually in the house the day Jess Ogilvy died, and he was the last one to see 
her alive. He flees to California and informs Henry of Jacob’s trial, in the hope that he can rekindle 
his fatherly instincts. The trial proceeds as planned; Oliver and Emma sees Jacob’s best defence 
in an appeal to legal insanity, something Jacob cannot handle because he cannot understand that 
such legal finagling and pious fraud is beneficial to him. In his own way, he tries to convince 
Oliver, Theo and Emma that their best bet would be to let Jacob tell the truth. Aware of how autism 
would be perceived by the jury, his mother has to restrain her frustrated son.  
As the trial comes close to ending and the Hunt family waits for the verdict at home, Jacob 
produces one of Jess’ beloved objects, an iPod, which prompts Jacob and Theo to reveal their 
relationship to Jess’ death. It turns out that Theo broke into the house Jess was in, found her naked 
under the shower, which shocked her and caused her to slip and fall, receiving a fatal shock to her 
head. Jacob was to meet Jess there for his tutoring, but when he found her body, Jacob recognised 
that Theo was on the premises and when he saw the chance to protect his brother, he altered the 
scene to make it look like a murder and turn it into a case he authored. In the end, it is implied that 
both boys will be acquitted if they testify. The novel ends on a note of reconciliation as the brothers 
listen to the iPod together, suggesting that both have learnt to empathise with the other. 
Despite the soothing conclusion, House Rules is a great deal more than a mix of moral pap 
about justice for all and loving our family despite our differences, a novel where the good guys 
always win. True, it is a work of middlebrow fiction, defined as a cultural register of narrative that 
is “attentive to style and literary merit, but […] also easily accessible and interesting to a wide […] 
college-educated audience […], the professional-managerial class” (Ho 2008, 13). It is a form of 
fiction which reinforces the views of the upper middle class, confirming its individualist view of 
the world. It suggests that conflicts  
 
can only be resolved (or not) due to the choices and commitments of the individuals 
within that institution: the bureaucrat who decides to bend or follow or fight to change 
the unjust rules, the members of the courtroom jury who might or might not allow 
existing biases to affect their verdict in the end. […] No matter how seemingly 
overpowering organizational life may be, they all have the freedom to make certain 
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decisions for themselves. (Ho 2008, 27-28)  
 
This pattern of individual heroism, whether it is company whistleblowing (Speed of Dark) or 
forensic self-sacrifice (The Curious Incident), is an integral element of the autism novels. The legal 
environment is also a stable feature of Picoult’s other books, but the novel explores neurodiversity 
in the nexus of five people with varying degrees of insight into Jacob’s condition. This produces a 
multiperspectival narration, which gives the reader a richer view of the NT/AS characters than 
single-narrator novels, as we can apprehend the conflicting cognitive biases of the protagonists 
and the personal histories that prompt such self-deceptions.  
Like other autism novels, the largest departure from the canonical course of events is 
Jacob’s idiosyncratic behaviour, which warrants explanations from Jacob in the form of expository 
material, ‘mini-essays’ and anecdotes within the narrative. These vignettes frame what can be read 
from Jacob’s habits, expression and words within an emic perspective. Autism novels thus become 
one of the primary sources of knowledge about the condition that translates clinical language. As 
Rita Felski writes: “That literary works yield limited perspectives does not prevent them from also 
serving as sources of epistemic insight,” so literature becomes a form of phenomenology, where 
“we come to know something of what it feels like to be inside a particular habitus, to experience a 
world as self-evident, to bathe in the waters of a way of life” (Felski 2008, 84, 92). Such 
informative use of literature is not at all surprising, given that reading scientific books is too 
abstruse and technical for the reading public to tell them what autism means for a family or a 
person in their daily lives. Despite the long tradition of declaiming against the mimetic and the 
referential in literary theory, texts can and do impart facts about life, which are embodied in stories 
about human nature and its interrelationship with human institutions. In House Rules, science is 
literally put on trial, as experts testify in court about autism and how it affects behaviour. 
But by far the most significant element that structures Picoult’s narrative is the strategic 
deployment of ToM, both as a scientific construct and as a practical ability that the characters 
make use of. The three elements of empathetic social engagement (pretence, ToM and altruistic 
behaviour) shape the narrative design of the book and provides one long argument that autists 
experience their lives meaningfully and act as rational agents. I shall be examining make-believe 
scenarios and acts of pretence that affect the plot or the characterisation of the protagonists in order 
to show that mind-reading skills and decoupling are portrayed as essential to social agency, 
forming the basis of altruistic behaviour. My main argument is that although Picoult rehearses 
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some of the standard tropes about autism, she also humanises the autistic character by writing 
scenes in which these components of empathetic social engagement (and their occasional, situated 
deficits) are found to some degree in both NT and AS people. She creates a counternarrative in 
which deep intersubjectivity and participating in a community of minds become tools for 
rethinking sociality along neurocosmopolitan lines, welcoming autists back into the fold of 
humanity where they belong, despite the deleterious effects of the ‘ToM deficit’ discourse. 
Most of the characters use pretence to create alternative scenarios which empower them. 
First of all, Jacob’s interest in all things murderous compels him to orchestrate a crime scene 
worthy of the fictional detective show he obsessively watches, CrimeBusters. At the beginning of 
the novel, Theo looks aghast at one such scene of his brother playing dead: “He is sprawled like a 
starfish in front of the fireplace. Blood covers his temple and his hands. For a moment, I can’t 
move, can’t breathe. […] This is not real, I remind myself” (3, emphasis in original). Even at this 
early stage, Jacob appears as the author of a murder mystery, carefully spreading clues and fake 
blood to test his family members as investigators. The novelist’s representation of Jacob in this 
scene already subverts received notions about autism, since Jacob sets a crime scene, which is a 
creative act of ‘writing’ fiction.  
He embraces fictionality and explores the troubles with representational fidelity through 
his special interests. Theo confesses that he was affected by what he saw, and he responded with 
an act of repulsive but wish-fulfilling pretence: “when I saw Jacob in the kitchen with his corn-
syrup blood and his fake head injury and all the evidence pointing to me, for a half a second, I 
thought: I wish” (14, emphasis in original). This initial plot point is recapitulated in Jess’ accident, 
the ‘murder’ the novel is about. The crime scene surrounding Jess’ body was set up by Jacob to 
suggest that Mark kidnapped her until Jacob revealed the location of Jess’ body and wrapped Jess 
in his own rainbow quilt, signing the scene as his. As an added, social bonus, “[a]fter all those 
years of Theo sticking up for me, I finally got to be the big brother” (600), as Jacob says, which 
implies that by guiding suspicion away from Theo, he gained a sense of agency he could only wish 
for, because his disability and his overprotective mum hindered his capacity to develop mature life 
skills. From its inception, House Rules establishes Jacob as a person capable of pretence and 
authorship, going against the assumption that autists lack imagination and disprefer fiction. The 
novel’s preoccupation with pretence becomes one of its master tropes, both in terms of pretending 
something is real or fictional, and in the more performative sense of pretending to be normal. 
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Pretence is everywhere. Emma writes the advice column for a local newspaper as ‘Auntie 
Em,’ an assumed name and role, which enables Emma to pretend that she has the authority to give 
expert advice to all and sundry. Rich, the detective is an avid reader of Auntie Em’s columns, who 
sees her as “forever coming up with the most practical solutions, as if the key to the great riddles 
of existence involves surgically cutting away the emotional component and looking at just the 
facts” (35). This is not at all how Emma handles the more ambiguous role of her own motherhood, 
where her decisions are nothing if not emotional, noting that “Real mothers admit it is easier to 
fail at this job than to succeed” (179). But among the Hunts, Theo is the person for whom make-
believe is the most emotionally fulfilling act. When he breaks into other people’s homes, he enacts 
elaborate scenes of normal family life: “I eat my sandwich and picture my mother coming out of 
the kitchen, carrying a big roast turkey on a platter. ‘Hey, Dad,’ I say out loud to the empty seat 
on my left, pretending that I have a real father instead of just a guilty sperm donor who sends a 
check every month” (15, emphases mine). In these one-man shows, not unlike playing with dolls, 
the empty suburban home is populated with the Norman Rockwell image of the ideal nuclear 
family that was constructed in the popular culture of the 1950s as a healthy, wholesome, normative 
space for the socialisation of white, middle-class America.  
Even the relatively minor characters in House Rules cannot escape from the grand game of 
performative make-believe. Oliver, the inexperienced lawyer has to act more like his seasoned 
colleagues, and has to put the best spin on his periodic legal blunders in front of Emma. His 
pretence of professionalism eventually leads him to woo Emma. When they become romantically 
involved, he even has to pretend he is no more than a lawyer in front of Jacob, in which he fails 
miserably and sends Jacob into a flying rage. Finally, in a morally ambiguous scene, Rich Matson 
pretends to be genuinely interested in Jacob’s conversation about crime scenes as if he is requesting 
Jacob’s assistance as an expert to cajole him into confessing Jess’ murder.  
The skill to pretend, as we have seen, is strongly dependent upon the imagination and ToM, 
cognitive functions which are stereotypically described as diminished in autism. But instead of 
contrasting a lack of imagination with ‘healthy’ fantasies, Picoult is careful to portray Jacob as a 
person who can appreciate fiction. He has no troubles following Flowers for Algernon, for 
example, but due to his own perspective on disability, he comments that the protagonist, Charlie 
Gordon “never should have had the experiment done,” since “if he never had the procedure, he 
would never know he was missing [his intelligence]” (312). He correctly infers a hypothetical 
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mental image of a fictional person with no qualms about his fictional status, and he has no difficulty 
in attributing mental state terms to Charlie. His perspective also makes him more than a mere 
consumer of fiction: he becomes a critical reader.  
In one of the ‘mini-essays’ which interrupt the flow of the narrative to give Jacob’s view 
on everything, he even goes one step further — he muses about what he would write: “If I were 
going to create a science fiction series on television, it would be about an empath—a person who 
can naturally read the auras of people’s emotions and, with a single touch, can take on their 
feelings, too” (185). (One wonders what Jacob would make of Lois Lowry’s The Giver.) Jacob 
demonstrates not only his desire to gain insight into the workings of another person’s mind, but 
also shows that he is far from inept at reading fiction. He observes that  
 
[a]nyone who cries at a movie is a closet empath. What’s happening on that screen 
bleeds through the celluloid, real enough to evoke emotion. Why else would you find 
yourself laughing at the hijinks of two actors who, offscreen, can’t stand each other? 
Or crying over the death of an actor who, when the camera is turned off, will dust 
himself off and grab a burger for dinner? (185) 
  
His line of argument bears an uncanny resemblance to how Colin Radford connected the 
tears shed by people who get emotionally involved in reading fiction to the empathetic imagination 
(Radford and Weston 1975, Radford 1977). Jacob gives his own opinion on the paradox of fiction 
from the alienating perspective of autism, and Picoult is no doubt using the pretext of the empath 
to practice ‘cognitive estrangement,’ the strategy identified by Darko Suvin in science fiction to 
defamiliarise our customs and ways of thinking. 
In the novel, Jacob is caught up in a web of multiple representations: due to the murder 
case, in legal and psychological discourse, but he cannot escape it in the cosier domain of the 
family, either. The vertigo that comes with this is nowhere more visible than in the passage where 
Jacob is watching himself as a child on video:  
 
As I’m watching, there’s a sudden streak of silver static that makes me cover my ears, 
and then there’s another segment of video. It’s been accidentally taped over my Oscar-
worthy autistic toddler film, and in it I am much older. […] Jess took the video. […] 
On television, it’s like I’m watching a make-believe show and Jacob isn’t me, he’s a 
character. It’s not really me who closes his eyes when my mother tries to take a picture 
on the front lawn. It’s not really me who walks to Amanda’s car and sits in the back 
like I always do. (488-489, emphasis mine) 
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Jacob finds it defamiliarising to see his younger self recorded in an embarrassing situation. 
The experience is heightened by Jess taping the footage – Jacob’s grief lends the scene an uncanny 
sense of mourning. But in the very act of estrangement, the factual, documentary recording sheds 
its verisimilitude and takes on the quality of fiction in the eyes of Jacob. He experiences himself 
as fundamentally ‘other’ and it could even be interpreted as a moment of self-consciousness of his 
status as a fictional character in our world. Despite the tantalising possibility of interpreting the 
scene in a postmodern manner, the simple diegetic situation leaves Picoult a moment to reflect 
upon the power of representational methods, even the truthful ones, to alter the perception of our 
selves. In this moment, Jacob is brought face to face with the permeable boundaries of 
representations, giving him an opportunity to see how he might appear to others, which also ties 
in with the larger theme of the book that portrays autism through multiple perspectives. 
Communicating lived experiences across neurotypes can be done in any number of ways, 
but a solid, reliable method to get your point across is metaphor. Although Douglas Biklen warns 
scholars that metaphors are ubiquitous in the field of autism and they can “simultaneously [ignore 
and minimise] the importance of the autistic perspective” (2009, 108), in autism fiction, the 
metaphor-generating power of the condition also signals a willingness to connect imaginatively. 
As Theo says, Jacob “may be freaking brilliant, but sometimes whatever’s cooking in his brain 
doesn’t quite translate onto the page. I guess it’s a little like being the world’s fastest bullet train 
but your wheels don’t fit the rails” (Picoult 2010, 314). Theo reaches the point of catachresis, 
heaping one convoluted metaphor on another in his effort to express Jacob’s struggles with 
neurotypical norms. Theo sees the autistic mind as a design incompatibility and a foreign tongue 
that needs to be translated somehow, articulated in a language that everyone can understand.  
The reader might notice another kind of perspective-taking through the use of metaphor 
when Emma visits Jacob in jail. When Emma urges Jacob to pick up the phone: 
 
Instead, he closes his eyes. He sways forward and rests his cheek against the window, 
spreads his arms as wide as they can go. I realize he is trying to embrace me. I put the 
receiver down and step up to the window. I mimic his position, so that we are mirrors 
of each other, with a glass wall between us. Maybe this is what it is always like for 
Jacob, who tries to connect with people and can’t ever quite manage it. Maybe the 
membrane between someone with Asperger’s and the rest of the world is […] a see-
through partition that allows only the illusion of feeling […]. (256) 
 
The wonderful trick in this passage is that although Emma interprets this encounter as 
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unsatisfactory, only an illusory sense of feeling as if through a membrane, it allows her to gain 
some insight into how it must feel like for Jacob to live among neurotypicals, and she develops 
genuine empathy towards her son. The scene is also notable for how the two achieve that 
empathetic resonance. The moment is preceded by Jacob pressing against the window, then Emma 
accurately reads Jacob’s intention and mirrors his posture – she has an ‘aha’ moment that very 
instant, re-enacting the mental actions necessary for empathy on the macro scale. Even if the 
metaphoric image of that partition suggests the impossibility of ‘truly’ touching one another, in 
fact, the most significant sense of human connection, visceral empathy becomes strong in the 
mother and her son. This connection is established in a key scene to suggest that despite the 
difficulties imposed by a neuronormative society, reinforcing that glass wall, intersubjective re-
enactment reveals something about other kinds of minds, so they can share the burden of existence 
with the empathisers and modify their preconceptions. 
Moments of unity like that, though, are only one side of the coin. Both Emma and Theo 
report occasional instances where they find themselves sacrificing (voluntarily or involuntarily) 
the human connections they so crave. As Theo complains: “The problem is, Jacob’s difference 
doesn’t confine itself to Jacob. It’s like the time my mother’s red shirt bled in the wash and turned 
all my clothes pink: my brother’s Asperger’s has made me different, too. I could never have friends 
over, because what if Jacob had a meltdown?” (119, emphasis in original). The social effects of 
living with an autistic person is metaphorised as a contagion by which the accommodations made 
for an inclusive lifestyle alter society, creating new blends. Although these new blends promise 
much to the critical readers who laud hybridity as a socially progressive form of identity, Picoult 
does not shy away from showing these hybrid identities as ‘tainted’ in Theo’s view. 
Often, there are passages in the text when we see NT characters recognising some of their 
actions to be almost autistic. Emma herself experiences social isolation, which engenders a 
newfound recognition that Asperger’s cannot be confined to the person with the diagnosis:  
 
I didn’t notice, at first, when my friends forgot to mention at whose house the next 
playgroup was taking place. I didn’t read between the lines when I hosted and two of 
the mothers begged off because of previous engagements. […] Isolation. A fixation on 
one particular subject. An inability to connect socially. Jacob was the one diagnosed, 
but I might as well have Asperger’s, too. (48, emphasis mine)  
 
This also ties in with Zunshine’s warning that mind-reading is not a binary ability, but a 
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gradient one, so NTs can just as easily misinterpret some situations. Emma’s recognition betrays 
her anxieties that could be shared by people who are in daily contact with Asperger’s.  
Neurological difference is not always valenced positively in the metaphors created by 
Emma: “It is hard to see your eighteen-year-old son clutching a stuffed toy. But that’s what autism 
is, a slippery slope. One minute, you convince yourself that you are so far up that hill you can’t 
see the bottom anymore, and the next, it’s covered with black ice, and you are falling fast” (133). 
The unpredictability of uneven development in Asperger’s does give you an image of a 
rollercoaster ride, with its ups and downs. The same dispreference of chaos is expressed by Jacob 
in another simile: “The best way I can describe [facing the unpredictable world] is like being in 
the path of a flash flood. [… E]ven when you see that wall of water rushing toward you, you know 
you are powerless to budge an inch” (67). Seen from the inside, autistic urges are experienced as 
a natural force, often outside of conscious control, provoking socially stigmatised responses. 
Nonetheless, metaphors help Jacob translate what he feels for NTs, especially in moments when 
he is completely withdrawn from the world. The text acquires a poetic tenor outside of the ‘comfort 
zone’ of narrative prose when he writes about his meltdown: 
 
This is where I go, when I go: It’s a room with no windows and no doors, and walls 
that are thin enough for me to see and hear everything but too thick to break through.  
I’m there, but I’m not there.  
I am pounding to be let out, but nobody can hear me.  
This is where I go, when I go:  
To a country where everyone’s face looks different from mine, and the language is the 
act of not speaking, and noise is everywhere in the air we breathe. I am doing what the 
Romans do in Rome; I am trying to communicate, but no one has bothered to tell me 
that these people cannot hear.  
This is where I go, when I go:  
Somewhere completely, unutterably orange.  
This is where I go, when I go:  
To the place where my body becomes a piano, full of black keys only—the sharps and 
the flats, when everyone knows that to play a song other people want to hear, you need 
some white keys.  
This is why I come back:  
To find those white keys. (110) 
 
Full of haunting repetition, this section jolts the reader out of the narrated sequence of 
events. The anaphoric rhythm of the sentences and the rhetorical commoratio of metaphors for 
isolation are haunting, heightening the musicality of its language. In the final set of sentences, 
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music, too, becomes metaphorical, implying that neurocosmopolitism is borne of the willingness 
to communicate and the desire for acceptance.  
The mental space of the meltdown is evoked later by Jacob, when the constellation between 
emotions, sociality and music is further elaborated: “Maybe this is why funeral dirges are always 
in a minor key; being on the other side of dead isn’t that different from having Asperger’s” (167). 
I do not want to write this passage off as a misguided metaphor gone wrong, although it is easy to 
see how autism is rather different from being dead. It would be fruitful to reinterpret this ‘other 
side of dead’ with being cut off from the world, similar to major depression. Even then, it might 
be ethically challenging to see autism placed as a halfway state between the fully living and the 
fully dead, implying a kind of hierarchy where sociality and communication is tantamount to life 
and any step ‘downwards’ into withdrawnness constitutes a step towards ‘being dead to the world.’ 
The sombreness of tone and the musical metaphors that Picoult selects here nonetheless bring 
conflicting emotions to the reader’s mind: the need to commiserate and the social unity in 
transcendence that the funeral dirge evokes in listeners.  
The pathos elicited by the poetic interlude fits like a glove into the rhetoric of scientific 
sadness, “a novelistic, poetically intensified account of sadness […] in which autistic people are 
mourned even as they are apparently explained” (Duffy and Horner 2011, 2002). Horner and Duffy 
see clinicians’ accounts of autism as emotion-laden stories with a poetic tinge, which hints at the 
permeability of novelistic and scientific discourses when autism is represented. There is a 
dialectical relationship between two genres of narratives in explaining autism from the outside and 
the inside. Both need the rhetorical strategies of the other to establish their authenticity (‘No, I 
haven’t made my image of autism up, I’ve read the textbooks and the papers’ and ‘No, I am not a 
heartless reductionist, I use poetry and storytelling to express how I feel pity for the suffering of 
these people’), while trying to distance themselves from the other (‘I am not judging, I am not 
labelling these people, I am just showing you how it must feel like’ and ‘I am not making this stuff 
up, here’s the data’). In both modes, the reader is requested to take the viewpoint of the narrator 
and to empathise with the autistic character.  
Medicine is a fertile source of metaphors for Jacob as well. In a stereotype-breaking move, 
he proves himself adept at setting up make-believe scenarios to express how he feels strong, 
visceral emotions that neurotypical people don’t feel: “Imagine what it would be like if someone 
sliced your chest with a scalpel and rummaged around inside you, squeezing your heart and lungs 
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and kidneys. That level of complete invasion is what it feels like when I make eye contact” (70). 
Recruiting the reader to participate in this act of imagination strengthens the image of a invasive 
surgical procedure, which would only be a routine act of eye contact for neurotypical speakers.  
 
Asking for the empathy of others is a recurring request in House Rules. Oliver wants the 
jury to sympathise with Jacob, Emma and Jess want Jacob to think of others, Theo wants 
sympathetic attention from his family and the author invites the reader to empathise with her 
characters. To sort out the multiple functions of empathetic narrative design, Suzanne Keen has 
developed a three-fold typology of authorial strategic empathising. In her definition, this 
“indicates the intentional (not always efficacious) work of narrative artists to evoke emotions of 
audiences closer and further from the authors and subjects of representation,” which occurs “when 
an author employs empathy in the crafting of fictional texts, in service of ‘a scrupulously visible 
political interest’” (83). Locating empathy in the political context is appropriate here, because both 
scientists and novelists are interested parties in garnering empathy for autistic people. Jacob 
himself is implicated in a juridico-medical discourse in which representation becomes a pivotal 
concern. I’ll be examining Keen’s tripartite system to show its usefulness and where its flaws lie 
when we need to account for Picoult’s strategic empathising work in creating Jacob. 
The first in Keen’s typology is bounded strategic empathising, which “occurs within an in-
group, stemming from experiences of mutuality, and leading to feeling with familiar others” (Keen 
2010, 83). This form of empathising can be exclusionary, as experiences define group membership, 
but the persistent reader can theoretically ‘read herself into’ the implied audience, whereas the 
disinvited reader “may not choose or be able to live up to the terms of the ideal audience projected 
by a narrative” (84). When a novelist writes a story “to more than one audience simultaneously, 
with a hope of bridging the gap between them,” they may do so with the intent to “reach—and 
change—the attitudes and beliefs of the target audience” (84), which Keen terms ambassadorial 
strategic empathy, that “addresses chosen others with the aim of cultivating their empathy for the 
in-group, often to a specific end [and it is] time sensitive and context and issue dependent” (84). 
Due to the timeliness of autism novels, ambassadorial strategies of evoking sympathy seems to be 
the way novelistic and scientific discourses attempt to frame the condition, but there are subtle 
differences in how emotions are aroused in the rhetoric of scientific sadness and the autism novel.  
The difference is in how broadcast strategic empathy is utilised in the two discourses. This 
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form of empathy “calls upon every reader to feel with members of a group, by emphasizing our 
common human experiences, feelings, hopes, and vulnerabilities” (84-85). As Keen observes, it is 
a legitimately universalising discourse, appealing to our shared psychological make-up. With the 
global market widening, it is no surprise that narratives which make use of broadcast strategies of 
empathy (i.e. middlebrow novels) are the ones that tend to prove successful around the world. Thus 
they become acceptable targets for the elite – who are distrustful of shared commonalities and deep 
emotional engagement – and cultural critics, who are wary of the power of fictional empathy to 
provide a canalised outlet of emotions, stifling social change generated by real-world solidarity.  
In an unlikely move, it is the detective Rich who becomes the mouthpiece for broadcast 
strategic empathy: “it’s never the differences between people that surprise us. It’s the things that, 
against all odds, we have in common” (291). With this move, he highlights the educational role 
novels play in promoting justified universalism across situated, embodied minds. Novelistic and 
scientific discourses resort to some form of ambassadorial strategic empathy when they feature 
autists, but novel-writers specifically want to win the hearts and minds of their readers, arguing 
that those on the spectrum are capable of empathy, whereas scientists usually deploy empathy to 
stir up the same thrill they feel upon finding a delicate theoretical problem. Autism researchers 
who have created the rhetoric of scientific sadness are addressing lay audiences to accumulate 
more prestige to continue research into the fascinating, puzzling life that autists lead. They do so 
with clearly defined group boundaries and they play on the estrangement effect to convey their 
own usefulness in unravelling the mystery to public audiences. As a result, their accounts will 
shade into bounded strategic empathy, because whatever fellow-feeling or pity they evoke in their 
audience could well end up directed towards the scientist. This is where the problem with Keen’s 
typology of authorial empathy becomes apparent, as it seems to assume that all writers or narrators 
speak for in-groups that they themselves represent.  
In the case of neurotypical writers and scientists, there has to be additional room for the 
counterpart of the ambassadorial strategy, an advocative strategic empathy in discussions of autism 
that appeal to feelings. It is a strategy in which members of the out-group who have made some 
in-roads into the culture of another group decide to evoke empathy on the behalf of the out-group, 
acting as mediators towards members of their own group, who are yet to feel empathetically 
touched by the values and experiences of the out-group. Advocates for the reasonableness of 
(o/O)thers provide an essential service to their in-group, who might be resistant to direct 
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ambassadorial strategic empathy, as they translate the experiences of the minority group into terms 
that are easier understood by the dominant group. In this effort, advocates might employ any of 
Keen’s strategies to profit from the extra social and cultural capital they hold within their in-group 
to break down barriers of inattention or wilful ignorance of the minority group’s concerns. This is 
the favoured strategy of most scholars and activists who speak up about political issues when they 
feel convinced by the arguments of another group about their full inclusion in the political sphere.  
On the other hand, speaking for someone else, and by extension, surrogacy in a wider 
context, has its fair share of problems in disability studies. As Michael Bérubé remarks, the field 
has been “too reluctant to acknowledge that with regard to people with severe cognitive 
disabilities, the surest way of recognizing their dignity is to recognize their guardians as people 
with the right and the responsibility of speaking for others” (2010, 103). This is not to say that 
autists cannot become capable of telling their own narratives, but we do have to acknowledge that 
the structures of thinking that inform an autistic person’s choice of words and topics might 
significantly differ from what proper argumentative discourse requires, especially in the legal 
context, which is the source of conflict in House Rules and Speed of Dark. The metaphors and 
metonymies by which autists articulate their experiences and neurotypical characters contextualise 
them in fiction are readily understood as part of an authorial strategy of advocative empathy. They 
anchor neurological difference in striking language that translates across neurotypes through the 
common language of the body and our perceptive capabilities. 
Such novelistic discourse also portrays the stance of the deficit model of autism, if only to 
set up a counternarrative against it, to better represent the neurotypical view. Emma says of Jacob:  
 
I think that’s the attribute I miss seeing the most in my son: empathy. He worries about 
hurting my feelings, or making me upset, but that’s not the same as viscerally feeling 
someone else’s pain. [… H]e’s learned empathy the way I might learn Greek—
translating an image or situation in the clearinghouse of his mind and trying to attach 
the appropriate sentiment to it, but never really fluent in the language. (82) 
 
Make no mistake, feelings of empathy are well-reported in the more ethnographically 
inclined works on autism, and self-reported in a wide circle of those living with the condition, too. 
But the capability of feeling empathy does not automatically entail that the person feeling it will 
give the routinised, normate responses expected of them.  
It is crucial at this point to distinguish between two sources of empathy. On the neural 
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level, empathy can arise from a person processing someone else’s emotional state, which is called 
cognitive empathy, because it depends on the cognitive awareness of others – it generates 
automatic, affective responses to the distress and joy of others. This is only one half of the equation 
though. There is also a more restricted level of empathy, rule-following empathy which, because 
it speaks to our basic capability for affective responses, has also been called affective empathy 
(Krahn and Fenton 2009), but I consider this latter version a misnomer. This form of empathy is a 
logical, algorithmic deduction of internal states, which retains autists’ demonstrable moral agency 
without the need to posit an unimpaired ToM mechanism.  
Understanding that Jacob’s prosocial behaviour is a form of rule-following empathy and 
not a cognitive one means that his empathetic skills can improve with autism-specific social skills 
education. Jess taught him how to interpret facial expressions, tone of voice and the pragmatic 
aspects of communication. Her work was useful in breaking down complex social expectations 
into simpler rules, albeit ones gradually rising in complexity. In Jacob’s own words: “What those 
doctors and books all say about how Aspies like me cannot feel anything on behalf of others—
that’s total bullshit. We understand when someone else is in pain; it just affects us differently […]. 
I see it as the next step of evolution: I cannot take away your sadness, so why should I acknowledge 
it?” (397). In this instance, Jacob is plain wrong, insofar as acknowledging one’s sadness does take 
away some of it — you ease the pain by sharing it with somebody who can empathise with you.  
He is nonetheless right to recognise that there are evolutionary reasons for the emergence 
of empathy as a basis of prosocial action (Decety et al. 2012). However, research in the animal 
kingdom suggests that it is a widely shared feature of social life in non-human animals, too, aimed 
at relieving the distress of conspecifics and promoting group cohesion. As Jaap Panksepp remarks: 
“the capacity to have affective feelings is an evolutionary birthright embedded within the intrinsic 
and ancient organizational dynamics of the mammalian brain, situated largely in subcortical realms 
known as the extended limbic system” (1998, 341). Pace Jacob, it is highly unlikely that in an era 
of global communication and easy travel our capability for experiencing empathy towards others 
would prove to be a hindrance in helping society prosper (Rifkin 2009). 
The expression of emotions is the greatest stumbling block Jacob faces during the trial, in 
no small part due to the Anglo-Saxon grand jury system, which relies on the social manipulation 
of emotion to specific ends: it operates on the principle that justice is served by convincing 
supposedly impartial members of the jury of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The novel’s 
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main tension is that the supposed ‘peers’ sitting in the jury box are of a different neurotype than 
Jacob. He astutely observes that this legal requirement “would mean [that] every single person on 
the jury should have Asperger’s syndrome, because then they’d really understand me” (Picoult 
2010, 297, emphasis in original), which calls attention to the ethical imperative that the proper 
representation of those with disabilities extend to the peer group on whose judgement their fate 
should lie. As we progress, we realise that the trial involves strategically revealing information to 
affect the jury’s reading of everyone’s minds, harnessing their ability to take other perspectives 
into consideration. Notice how Jacob tries to compliment Theo, and how he is shocked by Theo’s 
lack of receptivity towards a sincere, albeit indirect compliment: “I included [Theo] in a starring 
role in my crime scene, and he got furious. He was cast as the perpetrator … how could he not see 
that as the highest form of flattery?” (24). Such misunderstandings are plentiful in cross-neurotype 
communication, as social situations are evaluated differently in AS and NT mind-sets, which turns 
House Rules into a comedy of errors at times.  
The title itself is worth analysing as a piece of moral discourse — it implies the need to 
make the rules that govern social interaction explicit for Jacob, who cannot pick up on them 
instinctively. The five house rules, set up by Emma, tells Jacob to clean up after himself, tell the 
truth, to brush his teeth, to arrive in school on time and to take care of his brother Theo (24). The 
interpretation and observation of the rules matter a great deal for Jacob: “I don’t get into trouble 
because rules are what keep me sane. Rules mean that the day is going to go exactly the way I am 
predicting it to be. I do what I’m told; I just wish everyone else would do it, too” (24), he confesses. 
Some of those rules (because they are explicit, and come from the highest source of authority, 
Mum) conflict with the set of oblique rules that govern societies. Truth-telling with no respect for 
the context of the utterance and the people who hear it lands Jacob in a lot of trouble. 
Jacob expresses his wish that society would do away with the double standards of norms. 
Disability studies criticise the performance criterion of humanity (i.e. you have to act normal to be 
‘human’ in the eye of the dominant social discourses), and there are several moments in the novel 
when Jacob is instructed to produce the outward signs of felt emotions:  
 
I find Oliver staring at me. ‘Do you miss Jess?’ 
‘Yes. She was my friend.’ 
‘Then why don’t you show it?’ 
‘Why should I?’ I ask, sitting up. ‘If I know I feel it, that’s what counts. Don’t you 
ever look at someone who’s hysterical in public and wonder if it’s because they really 
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feel miserable or because they want others to know they’re miserable? It kind of dilutes 
the emotion if you display it for the whole world to see. Makes it less pure.’ (479-480) 
 
Jacob believes that there is a certain selfishness in the public display of emotions. He, who 
is less receptive to emotional contagion, feels that the display of emotions to affect others is ‘less 
pure’ because it is not felt for the sake of deep emotional involvement, but to curry favour and 
empathy, which could be put to Machiavellian ends. This is a technique that Detective Matson is 
thoroughly familiar with – he sees suspects who attempt to deceive him every day: “Maguire’s 
eyes fill with tears. I wonder if he really is sorry about Jess Ogilvy’s death, or just sorry that he’s 
been caught” (174). The stark contrast between detective fiction’s genre-defining suspicion vs. 
Jacob’s naive agnosticism towards deceptive behaviour thematises the power of the suspicious 
mind to misrepresent the mental states of others. Jacob’s response to a question at the trial is telling. 
He is asked as to what he would do if a witness told a lie: “How would I know? […] Only the liar 
knows he’s lying” (298). A suspicious mind with the ability to interpret nonverbal behaviour is at 
an advantage in all social contexts where deception is a viable strategy, and typical audiences are 
particularly fascinated by the drama of searching for clues of dishonesty on the face, as TV series 
such as Lie to Me attest. And therein lies one of the paradoxical pleasures of autism fiction. 
Novels like House Rules implicitly demand something remarkable from their readers: using 
their imagination to empathise with characters whose social information-processing systems have 
been impaired and thus have a hard time dealing with emotions. The greatest irony of an autism 
novel as read by a neurotypical is that with their greater repertoire of social scripts, NTs are more 
likely to anticipate gauche turns of phrases and social faux pas than the autistic protagonists. When 
the judge asks Oliver what he is looking for to better accommodate Jacob we take a peek into 
Oliver’s thoughts: “Sympathy for a client who is incapable of showing any himself…” (409). The 
lawyer’s free indirect thought responds to the same narrative tension that catalyses the action for 
Picoult. An additional twist to this is visible in the scene where Emma and Jacob try to reverse 
their usual strategy of presenting Jacob: instead of allowing him to pass as neurotypical, they have 
a pressing need to acknowledge his autism so the jury will acquit him. The alterity that the jury 
recognises in Jacob constitutes a minor victory:  
 
I watched the faces of the jury as they stared at Jacob, and I saw the same expression 
I’ve seen a thousand times before. That mental distancing, that subtle 
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acknowledgement that there is something wrong with that boy. Because he doesn’t 
interact the way they do. Because he doesn’t grieve the way they do. Because he 
doesn’t move or speak the way they do. (501, emphasis in original) 
 
It might be painful for Emma to see these people shutting Jacob out, but getting the jury to 
understand that his son processes internal states differently is essential to reach a proper, just 
verdict. Notice that Emma is able to read the inner psychological turmoil of the jury just from 
glancing at their facial expressions. This is exactly the capability impaired in Jacob.  
Jacob’s difficulties with mind-reading play into his moral dilemma that leads to the 
rearrangement of the crime scene. He has to give his reasons to two audiences, the diegetic jury 
and the real readers. Summing up the motives behind his actions in third person, he explains:  
 
Jacob Hunt neglected to realize, at the time, that he might be implicating himself in 
the murder. He neglected to consider that the scene he’d come across (at worst, murder 
at his brother’s hand, and at best, a death accidentally caused by Theo) might instead 
be a death by natural causes: a slippery floor, a skull fracture, and a hematoma. None 
of this, however, really matters. […] Think whatever you want. The only thing that 
really matters is this: I’d do it all over again. (602-603)  
 
Neglecting to consider the social interpretation of his actions and the possibility that Jess’ 
death was an accident do not constitute the same kind of mind-reading error – the neglect of other 
people’s inferences could be ascribed to an underappreciation of social mindreading, whereas 
coming to the conclusion that Theo caused Jess’ death and was therefore the killer is just the 
opposite, an attribution of intent on the basis of the available physical information. He does not 
regret his act to drive suspicion away from Theo and to implicate the abusive boyfriend, Mark in 
the murder, because he adhered to the house rules by protecting his brother. He demonstrated 
altruistic behaviour, both towards Theo and presumably towards Jess, too, when Jacob hides the 
body in the culvert and covers it with his quilt: “I think about her even when I’m not here; [that’s 
why] I bring my quilt. […] I think if she could talk she would have been really proud of me for 
wrapping her in it. Good job, Jacob, she would have said. You’re thinking of someone else for a 
change. Little did she know, that was all I was thinking about” (584). By constructing a 
hypothetical narrative from his own vantage point, he proves that the received wisdom on autism 
needs updating thanks to his selfless, altruistic acts. We have to take Jacob’s word for it that his 
oversight was the result of quick thinking in highly unusual circumstances. Given due time, if his 
family and the legal system listened and communicated with him earnestly, he could have easily 
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told them how Jess died. Which is an opportune moment to discuss another damning problem: 
nobody actually listens to Jacob’s story until very late in the course of events. 
Leaving Jacob’s role undetermined for as long as possible is necessary to sustain the 
narrative tension for 600 pages, but it is also a critical commentary on the unwillingness of society 
to accept the autistic perspective as a true account of any situation, or on his family’s willing self-
deception to keep themselves in the dark. For instance, there is a great deal of irony in Emma 
forbidding Theo to tell Jacob about Jess’ death out of fear for upsetting him, considering Jacob 
saw the events personally (135). All the more so, since informing him and having an earnest 
conversation about Jess’ death would have corrected the false assumptions the NT characters had 
about Jacob’s involvement in no time. Then again, we would not have the novel in that case.  
In the scene where Oliver and Emma first discuss the feasibility of the insanity defence, 
Oliver offers Emma the opportunity to involve Jacob in the decision-making process: “‘Why don’t 
we go ask Jacob?’ ‘No way,’ Emma replies. ‘Unfortunately, that’s not your choice,’” says Oliver 
in return, tongue-in-cheek (302). There is little doubt to my mind that, in her view, Emma tries to 
protect Jacob from distress, but she is also curtailing his agency to decide about his fate. Jacob is 
not allowed to drive a car because Emma would not risk Jacob meeting a police officer. She 
believes Jacob’s literal-mindedness would put him in trouble, but she does not consider teaching 
Jacob some explicit rules about an encounter with a police officer (84). Throughout the novel, we 
get the sense that Emma is prone to self-deception when it comes to Jacob’s capabilities. One time, 
Emma asks point blank whether Jacob committed the murder-that-did-not-take-place (369-371); 
Jacob, of course, tells the truth, and yet Emma keeps gathering evidence which proves to her that 
Jacob has been purposefully omitting events that would incriminate him. In inner speech, she 
attempts to explain Jacob’s partial truthfulness: “I’ve convinced myself that everything Jacob 
hasn’t told me has been an oversight, a typical Aspie side effect of having so much information 
that some of it gets lost or forgotten. I have convinced myself that this could not have been 
deliberate” (371). Emma is deluding herself when she thinks Jacob is incapable of withholding 
information if it protects his brother, Theo.  
Clearly, he also conceals his mind, despite having a hard time lying with a straight face. At 
the beginning of the novel, Jacob gets wind of a dead body found somewhere near Townshend by 
eavesdropping on a conversation on police radio. He rides his bike to the scene, but upon returning 
home, he is confronted by Theo: “If he asks, I’m going to have to tell him about the scanner and 
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the dead body and the hypothermia. And that makes me angry because right now I want to keep it 
all to myself instead of sharing it” (41, emphasis mine). Keeping it all to himself is a tortuous route 
to empowerment, but it makes Jacob’s reactions to Jess’ accident infinitely more plausible.  
As the plot develops, however, Jacob becomes more willing to share his motivations with 
his family. When he aces a math test, Emma believes it’s best to celebrate in style and allows Jacob 
to set up a fictional crime scene. The visiting Oliver disapproves of it, afraid of what the 
neighbourhood will think. As soon as Jacob starts to assuage Oliver’s fears, he starts comparing 
this fictional murder scene with what happened at the other house: “‘At Jess’s—’ ‘I don’t want to 
hear it,’ I interrupt, covering my ears. Every time I think I have a chance to save Jacob’s ass, he 
does something like this” (427), Oliver complains. We are lead to believe that people won’t listen 
to Jacob out of kindness. They resist the thought that he could be capable of murder, in spite of 
actions that might look like a rehearsal for the perfect crime.  
This silencing also shows that Jacob’s neurotypical allies don’t want him to narrate his 
whole story. Emma is so adamant to preserve the official narrative she has built up in herself that 
when Theo finally plucks up the courage to confess that he was the one who broke into the 
professor’s home, and he was the last person to see Jess alive, Emma just doesn’t want to hear 
him, and she misinterprets her son’s willingness to talk as worrying about Jacob (436). Picoult 
depicts Emma as the most active mind-misreader, who silences those around her to preserve her 
sense of agency as a mother and a protector of her children. In these scenes, the role of listening 
to others and representing their minds with great interpretative care show their centrality to the 
plot. Reading the novel as a tragicomedy of error through the lens of narrative mindreading yields 
more insight into the ethical dilemmas that are entailed in the relationship between the carer and 
the disabled person in a world which does not fully acknowledge the social difficulties of autists. 
In closing, I would like to draw attention to a couple of curious narrative strategies that 
modify the perception of Jacob’s neurological difference. Oftentimes, his personal sections feature 
digressions, asides and lists, similar to how Christopher interleaves his story with random facts. 
For example, Jacob lists twelve things he hates, which can also send him into an autistic meltdown 
(22-23), a list of some ten-codes used by the Vermont police on radio (30), a half-a-page’s worth 
of facts about forensics (114-115), a logical analysis of a prior conversation with Oliver, complete 
with premises and deductions (442) and a discussion on the love and mating habits of prairie voles 
(455-456). These digressions are information dumps, designed to break the flow of narration and 
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to show Jacob’s love for the actual, factual, ordered world of simple and straightforward meanings.  
Covertly, they are also meant to clash with the social, human-centric content of the 
narrative, asking us to subtly reconsider these lists as a form of Bogost’s ‘alien ontology’. He 
writes that such “ontographical cataloging hones a virtue: the abandonment of anthropocentric 
narrative coherence in favor of worldly detail. Quasi-ontographical prototypes are common 
throughout literature and the arts, where catalogs and lists pepper a narrative, disrupting a story 
with unexpected piquancy” (41-42). That piquancy is the alien perspective, but for Bogost, “the 
alien is not limited to another person, or even another creature. The alien is anything—and 
everything—to everything else” (34). Unlike in orthodox Marxism, where alienation is the root of 
all evil and a product of living in a class system, in the critical writings of Bogost, alienness is the 
original quality of all relationships between objects, both animate and inanimate. By decentring 
the interrelated (neurotypical) human being, whose primary mode of existence is the establishment 
of relationships, it elevates even the most remote autistic minds onto a platform where they are on 
equal footing with other modes of being: a flat social ontology. We might then understand Jacob’s 
inaccessibility, or his recitation of the Fibonacci sequence in one scene as a way of stepping outside 
the boundaries of narrative, escaping the anthropocentric world’s coercion to perform humanity. 
The other narrative strategy places authorship into its focus. The first thing one notices 
when reading the book is that the chapters are preceded by an account of a well-known serial killer 
or a murder case, describing the role forensic analysis played in capturing the killer. Noticeably, 
in the vignette of the first case, the otherwise objective assessment of Dorothea Puente shades into 
the subjective: “Puente began corresponding with a writer named Shane Bugbee and sending him 
recipes […]. Call me crazy, but I wouldn’t touch that food with a ten-foot pole” (1). This 
appearance of the ‘I’ in the description is all the more remarkable because in the subsequent nine 
cases, there is nary a subjective ‘I’ to be found until the last case, “My Brother’s Keeper.” The title 
is a reference to Picoult’s earlier work, an in-joke, but consider the passage, quoted earlier in 
context: “None of this, however, really matters. […] Think whatever you want. The only thing that 
really matters is this: I’d do it all over again” (603). These are the closing words of the novel as 
well. This final revelation that the most authoritative passages of the text originated from Jacob’s 
pen and point of view compels the reader to re-evaluate the narrative presentation of the work. 
Jacob might be the master narrator of his tale in more than one respect, gaining storytelling agency 
and a position alongside the heroes of forensic analysis, such as Dr. Henry Lee, his role model.  
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If the ‘I’ actually denotes Jacob rather than the author, it would suggest that the sections 
detailing the cases come from the notebooks he has written about Crimebusters to indulge in his 
all-consuming interest to set the world right. His factual storytelling, set in italic, and his enactment 
of fake and real forensic investigation in the story becomes a means for self-poiesis through what, 
in the clinical view, would be deemed an obsession about a stereotypical topic. Julie Brown argues 
that “a messy writing process,” or clumsy, illegible handwriting, “a ‘scrapbook’ cut-and-paste 
quality to the manuscript; a tendency to quote or refer to other texts excessively; a naive attitude 
toward plagiarism” (Brown 2009, 17) are common problems autistic writers face during the 
process. This fits Jacob and Christopher’s modus operandi and compositional attitude perfectly.  
The interesting question is whether Jacob could have narrated the whole book, including 
the parts that were ostensibly narrated by Emma, Theo, Oliver and Rich, too. Brown notes that 
because of their deficits in understanding people, writers with AS have a “lack of knowledge about 
human nature [which] makes creating characters problematic” (Brown 2009, 25). She claims that 
autistic authors get around this by either not creating any fictional characters, or by modelling 
fictional characters on people they know so they can get the richness down on paper (loc. cit.). I 
am not convinced that Jacob is able to create such a vivid interior life for the other four characters, 
but I would like to leave the option open for other scholars to argue for. Interpreting the final ‘I’ 
as evidence of partial authorship, it fits into an emerging paradigm of autistic characters who are 
yearning to tell their own tales and become capable authors, who can arouse the curiosity of their 
audiences, delivering satisfying stories about personal achievement and a triumph of the individual 
over the prejudices of society.  
In this statement, Picoult and other autism novels reiterate the generic promise of 
middlebrow literary fiction, which understands interpersonal conflicts less cynically than 
highbrow fiction – not as the result of glacially changing, conservative structures but as a product 
of the dynamic negotiations of human beings with personal convictions, extending their goodwill 
beyond their own communities. In Melanie Ho’s words, “the middlebrow represents a kind of 
optimism of the intellect: far from placating readers […] who were simply looking for light reading 
to make them feel better about their industrialized lives, middlebrow texts provided a venue for 
readers to think about issues relevant to self-development, social relationships, and even societal 
progress” (Ho 2008, 30). House Rules is an example of this rich optimism, founded on the belief 
of the benefit of empathetic human action. These voices are sorely needed in our times to recognise 
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the common humanity in us that extends beyond the social categories of difference – they extol 
the virtues of listening to others in our frail, precarious existence and praise the healing powers of 
prosociality in a world that exacerbates some of our most knee-jerk responses to difference. 
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CHAPTER 11 
FINAL OBSERVATIONS AND CLOSING REMARKS  
 
“The living were not merely within their own bodies, the dead were never really gone. 
We were somehow part of every person who had ever moved us or who had been a 
catalyst for change, and they were part of us, if we, in our rigid ideas of self, so allowed 
it to be.” — Donna Williams (2004, 166) 
 
If there is one thing I hope to have demonstrated in this dissertation, it is that we can no 
longer ignore autistic voices in cognitive literary studies. Although in her recent work, Lisa 
Zunshine and Ralph James Savarese have begun a conversation on a neurocosmopolitan literary 
study of novels, to my knowledge, the tools of cognitive literary studies haven’t been used for 
thorough, close readings of autism novels, where disability is in the foreground and autistic 
cognition is the driving force of the novel, giving it its unique voice. Another aspect that this 
dissertation sought to emphasise is the relevance and non-triviality of results coming from the 
experimental sciences, which enhance our understanding of fictional narratives. Psychological 
work has profoundly influenced autistic people’s identity and their coping strategies in a 
neuronormative world, but it has also helped to debunk widely-held misconceptions about the 
range of social skills within autism or the aetiology of the condition. Real-mind discourses have 
refined certain narratological practices, such as the privileging of inner speech or ‘unreadability,’ 
and I have cited such interdisciplinary work to reconfigure the transfer of knowledge between the 
cognitive sciences, disability studies and literary theory, illustrating their mutual benefit for the 
creation of an integrated, consilient way of reading the autism novel. 
When I began to investigate autism and its connection with literary theory and criticism, I 
had two initial assumptions. First, that autism spectrum conditions were now recognised enough 
to have become meaningful to ordinary people, creating a subgenre of literary works that articulate 
and refashion its meanings at a particular historical point in time, the post-millennial world. 
Second, I assumed that autism was researched widely enough that we need more self-reflection 
now on the meanings autism has accrued in psychological and literary theoretical work. To this 
came a third assumption as I began to grapple with the material: that, besides its ordinary meaning 
as a neurological condition, autism has become meaningful as something other than itself, a 
cultural barometer about affluent societies’ attitudes to technology, sociality and self-knowledge.  
During the arduous, but delightful writing process, these assumptions have taken on a shape 
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of their own. The contextualisation of the autism novel I have undertaken in Chapter 6 has been 
influenced by a widely shared understanding between writers, scholars and readers that autism is 
profoundly tied to our modern world. It may be read as a warning sign that humans are losing their 
social and empathetic skills while all this new-fangled machinery starts to dominate humankind, 
or maybe it is a token of a promising future which enables previously solitary people to construct 
communities and manage their techno-mediated identities more meaningfully, rearranging ossified 
social practices. These interpretations are all enabled by my critical reading of disability studies 
scholarship, which allows literary studies to contemplate them in interaction with one another. 
Similarly, the recognition of autism as an object of research prompted a certain attitude in 
the psychologists who study it: they conceptualised the condition as an enigma, waiting to be 
explained, which positioned them as authoritative experts with epistemological capital. The 
rhetoric of scientific sadness (Chapter 4) has been so influential that it has travelled almost intact 
from clinical research into the works of cognitive literary theoreticians, whose reliance of the 
Theory of Mind+‘mindblindness’ paradigm has constrained the range of meanings autism can take 
in a story. This has occasionally gone so far as to blind them to the shared humanity of able and 
disabled people. However, cognitive models of reading and practices of interpretation have an 
unparalleled explanatory power when dealing with literary texts. Bringing autism within the 
purview of cognitive literary studies strengthens the robustness of the theory, but only if we show 
awareness of the disabling theor(rh)et(or)ical baggage and shed it like outgrown snake-skin.  
Finally, the dissertation sought to find a healthy balance between the interpretative instinct 
to always read literary objects as something else (in the hermeneutics of suspicion: symptoms) and 
the ethical urge to take fictionalised autistic experience seriously, which sometimes amounts to a 
literalism actively discouraged in undergraduate introductions to literary studies. Since autism is a 
condition which is sometimes manifested in literal-minded language use, that knowledge brought 
with it a heightened awareness of how writing and literary reception were key topics the authors 
chose to reflect upon – they portray autists as people who consume fiction and aspire to be writers 
of their own stories themselves. I have striven to acknowledge the ethical stakes of representation, 
but I was more interested in what the figure of autism is used for in the novels, and how a 
semblance of the autistic mind-set is constituted by authorial techniques of narration rather than in 
whether the portrayal of autism is progressive enough or less stereotypical than usual.  
New, postclassical approaches of narratology focus on literature as a technology for 
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producing virtual minds and thus prove to be invaluable in assessing the figural and thematic 
effects of mental representation in literature. Literary works of art give us alternative lives, richly 
tapestried with imaginative experiences that delight us, startle us with their language and show the 
process of how social meaning is generated in the interpersonal conflicts of daily life. I have 
therefore adopted its basic tenets, like the assertion that novel-reading is almost always mind-
reading, or that attending to mindedness in literature reveals important clues about how literary 
fiction interacts with our notions of humanity and the evolution of the social sphere. 
Autism novels constitute a meeting point of the two cultures, the arts and sciences. These 
fictional narratives are steeped in science, both psychological and natural, for autism is both an 
object of social scientific research and a subject position that comes with a strong preference for 
lawful predictions and an algorithmic field of reasoning. Able autists are depicted as people who 
have an affinity for the impersonal structures of our existence and a drive to understand and predict 
complex systems. They map social interactions as flowcharts and hope that the situations they 
encounter conform to their acquired social scripts. They expand upon topics, usually of a scientific 
nature, that are tangential to the narrative situation, but offer an insight into their styles of thinking. 
The novels frequently deal with the psychological construct of autism, featuring scientists, 
psychiatrists, psychologists and other experts who assess, diagnose, support, experiment or 
perform surgeries on autistic individuals. Scenes in which autistic protagonists or their family 
consult with the experts allow the authors to show the kind of governmentality in action that 
disables neuroatypical lives. Lay protagonists form their opinions of such expert knowledge in a 
cautious, possibly sceptical tone. The science which underpins disabling practices toward autists 
are presented as instances of biopower at work, while the protagonists pursue avenues of inquiry 
which are shown to be critical of the conflux where technologies of control and unethical or 
outdated science meet. Autism novels strategically use and reinterpret scientific findings to 
imaginative, emancipatory ends, but we occasionally find examples, such as Speed of Dark, which 
use science to normalise autism, even as the protagonists embrace their autistic identity. For that 
reason, autism novels construct ethical scenarios in which disability, biopower, identity politics 
and the individual’s expression of atypical personality are refracted through the lens of science 
and the genre requirements of the middlebrow novel. 
Within recent literary criticism, cognitive literary studies and narratology, autism has 
become more prominent. In fact, the dissertation argues that autism has played a constitutive role 
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in the emergence, development and unprecedented visibility of mind-related research in the literary 
sciences. They imported the concept of Theory of Mind and other notions about minded life from 
cognitive psychology, speculative ideas about the phylogeny of the human brain from theoretical 
psychology and experimental results from the neurosciences to put ‘effortless’ mind-reading skills 
into the focus of fictional aesthetics and reception, revealing that it is a major theme of most novels. 
I have claimed that scientific, psychologically supported work in literary theory show us a vision 
of written fiction as a technology for producing simulated experiences. They effectively put us into 
the shoes of other, non-actual individuals with narrative instructions about how we should set the 
stage for the characters as they interact with the fictional world and one another. The concepts of 
ToM and simulation are intimately linked in research with spontaneous pretend play, make-
believe, imagining counterfactual scenarios and empathetic perspective-taking, all of which are 
necessary foundations for any successful reading of fiction. The current paradigm of research, as 
I point out, finds autistic individuals to be deficient in most of these areas compared to typically 
developing children and other mentally affected groups. These conclusions, summarised by the 
word ‘mindblindness,’ generated wonder and curiosity in literary scholars who search for the 
elusive qualities of literariness and continue to be fascinated by the reported imperviousness of 
some autistic people to the joys of literature. 
Autism novels critically comment on this widely-held belief, discussing the production and 
consumption of fiction by autistic characters. Jessica Fontaine’s work in the library and her 
skimming of blurbs, Jacob Horner obsessive enthusiasm for detective stories, Christopher Boone’s 
detestation of proper novels, Lou’s preference for neuroscience textbooks over imaginative works 
all derive from the received wisdom that fiction is not for autists. The novels I examined tended to 
subvert the idea that autistic characters shy away from literature or prefer less highbrow work out 
of some immature sensibility lurking within them. Christopher and Jacob use detective fiction as 
a tool of survival, giving them cognitive models of interaction which help them become more 
social. Lou uses Biblical stories to make a life-changing choice, and he takes control of his life as 
a result. Jessica’s son, Joel produces his own narrative world with the computer games he designs, 
establishing a sense of agency in a chaotic, unpredictable life-world. These characters further 
enhance our vision of the connection between fictionality and atypical minds, since they remap the 
borders of disability’s accepted cultural territory, emerging through the creative uses of fiction.  
Some characters are active writers, too, composing their own lives after novelistic patterns: 
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Christopher is an admirer of Sherlock Holmes and pretends to be a master detective. He adjusts 
his behaviour to better fit crime fiction tropes, and even produces an account of his adventures in 
a narrative book. Jacob Horner, another self-styled expert of crime, is likewise hinted to be at least 
a co-author of House Rules’ story, and he is a prodigious diary writer to boot. The production and 
consumption of fiction in these novels put the problems with authorship up for discussion. Chapter 
4 was dedicated to the question of reading autistic lives and the discourses affecting them critically, 
which is a recurring theme in the novels as well, primarily with Lou’s critical reading of normative 
brain science. Autism novels have found a sister discourse in the autobiographies, mostly because 
fictional writings tend to imitate the confessional, direct, reflexive tone of published self-writing. 
NT writers’ project a similar narrative voice on their disabled characters, giving them an illusion 
of interiority and depth the autobiographical works created since they began authenticating a new 
discourse about autistic experiences. But we have to recognise, along with Savarese and Zunshine, 
that autobiographies are not the royal road to understanding autism. They write: “we have 
extrapolated too much from Grandin: not all, maybe not even a majority of, so-called high-
functioning autistics or Aspies believe that they have difficulty reading other minds. For another, 
Grandin explicitly states that she has gotten better at this activity, which suggests that such a deficit 
is anything but strictly innate or hardwired” (Savarese and Zunshine 2014, 25). This proves to my 
mind that autobiographies have been given a free pass on critical reading, and this manifests in the 
uncritical adoption of visual thinking as an autistic paradigm in, for example, The Curious Incident. 
Both Grandin and other writers enunciate their own position and their own unique mind-set in 
these works, emphasising their experiences, so we should be careful about generalising to a reified, 
singular ‘autistic cognition’ from these writings. Fictional works in the novels reconfigure these 
themes to better coincide with the ethical stances the real authors espouse or wish to present, 
eschewing mimeticism for striking characters and clear exposition. The embedded narratives are 
metafictional devices which provide moments of self-awareness about the writing and editing 
process, making the novels less naive and more entertaining to read. 
In particular, autistic composition and narration challenges neurotypical conceptions of 
narrativity and tellability. This originates from the detail-oriented processing style typical in autism 
and an impaired sociopragmatical use of language. People with the condition experience 
difficulties with narrative production that would conform to NT standards. Unmotivated 
digressions, lectures on a favourite topic, a lack of contextual information provided, 
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mismanagement of time sequences, impressionistic associations that are not shared with the 
listeners all hamper the acceptance of autistic storytellers, and these identifying features have 
migrated to Christopher’s book and Jacob’s story as well. Even though these obstacles exist in real 
life, autistic characters are shown to be individuals who perceive more than that and seek patterns 
in sensory data neurotypical folks might not see, since their adaptive unconscious discards a lot of 
the irrelevant percepts as noise. Some autists see them as signals. The processing differences come 
down to the mismatch of cognitive granularity between ASC and NT populations.  
These differences appear in the novels on the textual level: descriptions focalised from the 
autistic perspective prove to be far more detailed, sometimes to the detriment of plot, betraying 
the narrators’ preference for the mimetic rendering of reality. The flow of the narrative is 
frequently interrupted with digressions, diagrams, and other non-narrative devices which makes 
the adept readers stumble as they try to figure out the significance of irrelevant textual elements. 
Lists are an obvious case: the non-hierarchical list describes no cause-and-effect relationships, and 
even if they characterise, they do not narrate, only enumerate. Through these stylistic 
idiosyncrasies, autistic characters perform their own identities in writing. Such processes of self-
reflection enable them to become critical readers of fiction, and their life histories push them 
towards being even more critical readers of social situations. 
In the novels, autists are constantly negotiating social demands. One might say that the 
central conflict defining the autism novel is the disabled individual’s resistance and adaptation to 
the demands of socialisation and normative narrative. They are usually aided by their families in 
this project, with less success than usual, because the normal social scripts for teaching good 
behaviour and adaptive problem-solving entail the use of abilities that are impaired in autism. 
Fortunately, there are supportive communities who manage some of the quirks that come with the 
condition: fellow autists, the empathetic – if troubled – family members and the enthusiastic 
communities the protagonists voluntarily seek out stand up for the individual in times of need. The 
role of the community is to mediate societal expectations so that they can transform social 
relationships between typical and atypical participants. Jessica relies on Mary and later, Joel’s 
girlfriend, Alice to make sense of the social world and to interpret her relationship with Andrew. 
Siobhan tells Christopher about the conversational maxims that influence written, novelistic 
communication, editing the manuscript to comply with some neurotypical expectations. Theo and 
Emma instruct Jacob how to behave in court and how to communicate effectively. Members of the 
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fencing club supply Lou with textbooks and the autistic people at the Center and in Section A 
discuss neurological discoveries and their ethical ramifications. These communities offer a vision 
of a more inclusive society on the micro level but, primarily, they function as challenges to the 
autistic character, who has to evaluate differing viewpoints constantly.  
The antagonists of the books, when they appear, are the characters and institutions that 
disparage and disdain autism – they might wish to erase this form of alterity, either by curing it 
away or by violently silencing it. This is not at all necessary from the writer’s standpoint. One 
could perfectly well imagine a detective novel in which the protagonist with Asperger’s seeks to 
apprehend a serial killer or an SF novel which just happens to have a brilliant character on the 
autistic spectrum, but the spaceship takes the fight to the Galactic Empire instead. The works I 
have analysed become autism novels by virtue of placing neuroatypicality into their centres, as the 
defining conflict which brings drama into the storyworld. Consequently, the resolution of the plot 
is almost always a gesture towards neurocosmopolitanism, a happy coexistence of typical and 
autistic people who project confidence due to their newfound identity as travellers between literal 
worlds and mindworlds, feeling at home in both. 
Synthesising the strands of knowledge as diverse as disability studies, cognitive 
neuroscience and literary scholarship is bound to find contradictions within contemporary 
conceptions of any phenomenon, and all the more so for a condition as controversial and 
fascination as autism. The dissertation’s strength lies in critiquing the underlying assumptions of 
the research programme of cognitive literary criticism and some beliefs prevalent in literary 
disability studies. One of the main arguments concerned Theory of Mind-based explanations of 
autism and I have concluded that they are neither exclusive nor sufficient to describe the full extent 
of the peculiarities that make up autism. Those cognitive literary accounts which insist too much 
on ToM as a dominant skill for reading, or that mind-reading is the sole reason fiction is interesting 
for us will never be a satisfactory explanation for the success of (autism) fiction to captivate the 
reader. Scholars and lay readers will always be delighted by the poetic language of the narrative, 
the vividness of the descriptions, the well-crafted metafictional moments and the puzzling textual 
elements, to name just a few other aspects which enhance the aesthetic experience. This 
necessitates the narratological thrust of my readings, as disability critics seldom attend to the 
micro-level techniques that articulate cognitive cultural hegemony or contest neuronormative 
ideals of narrative, but these can be extracted from the text with close reading. At the same time, I 
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have my reservations with the conclusions of those critics who vehemently argue that there is no 
substance behind ToM-deficits, that the deficit model is entirely flawed or that autism novels must 
first and foremost accurately and authentically depict the condition, taking no liberties with the 
autistic personality for the sake of story. I encountered ill-informed attacks on adaptationism and 
the modular view of the mind, which I hope to have debunked with recent, robust, relevant research 
that refutes the more vitriolic voices. To this date, working scientists and scientifically minded 
philosophers operate with a vision of the mind as a product of evolutionary adaptation that 
developed different systems for different adaptational problems, bringing in important, new results 
that improve the public understanding of autism as a human variety, not merely a disorder.  
Not that science was safe from scrutiny, though. I have examined the development of 
scientific descriptions of autism from Kanner and Asperger to Bettelheim and beyond, dissecting 
the DSM, up to its latest manifestation. I indicated that the diagnostic criteria have changed over 
the course of time, which gave Asperger’s Syndrome as an individual diagnosis some time to shine, 
only to be lumped back together with all other autistic spectrum conditions. I suggested that 
diagnostic labels have the power to stigmatise, but also to create a strong sense of identity, and 
when these are taken away, they can shatter people’s self-understanding. This incites activists to 
fight for the recognition of different flavours of autism. I have sought to qualify the claims of the 
neurodiversity movement, who demand that autism be defined as a source of different ability rather 
than disability. In the literary realm, narratologists have tried to respect the unreadable mind in its 
steadfast illegibility and argued that unnatural minds cannot be explained away or 
conventionalised. Yet, as I argue, the standards of what constitutes an unnatural mind in 
narratology rests on how we interpret cognitive scientific research: the critique of the ToM 
approach to social cognition and the promotion of the Narrative Practice Hypothesis, which holds 
that young children learn verbally, through storytelling. Further research is needed whether autistic 
protagonists can be read as a limit case for the unnatural mind, not exactly unreadable if you know 
who you are dealing with, but certainly a formidable interpretative challenge. I have left the option 
open for literary scholars to develop these ideas further.  
Another option would be to ‘simply’ read these characters as mere ‘unreliable’ narrators. 
After all, they do underrepresent and misrepresent the emotional states of other characters, and 
they fail to include common sense psychological explanations to everyday human behaviour in 
their narration. However, they are aware that they don’t know these things, and often comment 
- 244 - 
upon the impossibility of true interpersonal knowledge. Erecting these signposts, they construct a 
self-conscious account in which their limited view is acknowledged and honestly laid out for the 
reader to consider. In light of this, unreliability does not seem to me an appealing way to account 
for their peculiarities. Interpreting them as unnatural minds that challenge the conventions of how 
a working human mind is depicted in a story is a more productive reading, which problematises 
the social norms of cognition and their representations. 
This under- and misreporting is an important question for theories of reader response. In 
Chapter 7 on The Curious Incident, I have outlined the problem of the gaps that hinder the easy 
and effortless interpretation of the social situations that Christopher underreports. The first wave 
of cognitive literary sciences and the field of reception aesthetics have established a framework in 
which researchers found that readers bring their expectations to the reading material in the form 
of common cultural scripts and schemata of thought, which supplied them with interpretative 
frames that could be combined or blended together at will, producing novel cultural forms and 
flexible interpretations of behaviour. Because autistic people have a harder time learning social 
scripts, generalising them and using them flexibly in their everyday life, it should come as no 
surprise that fictional narratives, which rely heavily upon these skills, will be a problematic area 
for many people living with autism.  
However, reading comprehension is always a tough negotiation between the conventions 
of the genre, the opinions of the experts and the real-life experiences of flesh-and-blood readers. 
Autism novels are not an exception to our general reading strategies: we interpret neurotypical and 
autistic narration according to the same protocols and problem-solving heuristics. The only 
difference lies in the defamiliarisation and estrangement of the conventional tropes of mind-
presentation in autism fiction. NT readers will have a harder time with them, they need to make 
more of an effort to comprehend the mind-style of neuroatypical characters, but this only 
foregrounds the processes that readers already activate unconsciously during standard reading 
anyways. Even in such a complex electronic literary genre as hypertext fiction, readers arrange the 
gaps between story segments and descriptions with recourse to social scripts and schemata that are 
available to them to create a possible representation of the macrostructural story. Computer-based 
narratives and data manipulation are congenial to the autistic mind, with its algorithmic simulation 
of sociality and object-oriented puzzle solving, which is something I have discussed in greater 
detail in the Chapters 7&9 on The Curious Incident and The Language of Others, respectively. 
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Nonetheless, as I have claimed in connection with Hacking’s view that autism is the mirror 
of an Internet decade or the born-digital generation, we lose a lot when we begin to see autism as 
a reflection of our time, with no attention paid to the lived experiences of autists. A figurative 
reading that we are all a bit autistic has been available since the late 1980s with Rain Man, which 
is a tepid and unsatisfactory way of ‘including’ such disabled difference in society. On the whole, 
our world is no more autistic, less gregarious, less caring or shallower than the generations before 
us. Nor will we become more mindless or sociopathic, those husks of humanity that pervade the 
jeremiads of pessimists. To the credit of this age, it has enabled an autistic identity to assert itself, 
and we have more technological opportunities to interact with other people on a more social level.  
The figurative reading of autism as a symptom of societal ‘decay’ misses the fact that 
autism novels show their protagonists integrating into society neither because the gap between the 
normal and the pathological itself has closed, nor because the ideology of normativity has been 
superseded, but because society became more aware of differences, and built bridges between the 
two neurotypes without destroying the logic underpinning the norm. The autistic subject can 
function with more self-awareness in a more compassionate society, which sees the worth of 
autistic lives. This does not invalidate the very real, daily disturbances of contact, the temper 
tantrums and the meltdowns of autistic people, the frustrations and fears of alterity among adults 
and peers — as long as stigmatised identities exist and as long as autism persists, frictions will 
remain a powerful reminder that autistic difference is still with us. I do not wish to paint a rosy 
picture that autism has been accepted and society seamlessly integrated people on the spectrum. 
Similarly, these novels are not straightforward tools for inclusion and their main effect is not to 
show autism ‘as is’. They are imaginative examples of the many conflicts that neurological 
differences can create. They are opportunities for reflection and genuine empathy. They delight 
with their experimental techniques of presenting unique minds and depict believable characters in 
a world coming to terms with new social technologies in a relatively old medium, the novel. 
Let me now turn to the overarching picture that emerges from my investigations. There is 
an easily detectable frame which defines all of the protagonists’ journey, and it is one from 
ignorance to knowing: the frame of cognition. Knowledge about the self, knowledge about others, 
knowledge about the working of different kinds of human minds are central to all of the novels I 
have worked with. Speed of Dark is vocal and blunt about this: knowledge, what is known and 
how it is known is a pivotal narrative concern. Lou comes to know the workings of the human 
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mind and how it can be re-appropriated so he can achieve his goals. But in more subtle ways, the 
other novels feature this metanarrative as well: Christopher didn’t know who killed Wellington or 
whether her mother is alive, and he finds out both, albeit very-very awkwardly. Jessica did not 
know she and her son had Asperger’s, and that changed her own conception of the self. Jacob was 
ignorant about the perspectives other people had on his behaviour, Emma, the jury and the reader 
didn’t know how Jess died, and nobody knew how well Jacob would hold up in court. In all of the 
novels, acquisition of psychological and narrative knowledge guides the protagonists to gain more 
awareness of their own condition, with transformative results. 
Most of the transformation comes not from a mere information exchange, though. These 
people learn that they are able to do far more than they previously thought themselves capable of. 
Christopher can independently travel from Swindon to London, socialise with the neighbours, 
succeed at his maths exam and write a book. Lou can learn brain science, he can spot deliberate 
fraud in the lead scientists’ presentation, he can change how his mind works, he can stand up to 
authority and he can go into space. Jessica can divorce from Andrew (what a coup!), she can 
become a ‘skilled impostor’ and affect neurotypical airs when necessary, she can love and nurture 
her son, Joel, and she can find solace in comforting solitude, again, after her internal turmoil. Jacob 
can write a book, represent himself in court, take matters into his own hands and protect his brother 
with true altruism while participating in family life meaningfully. All these skills of coping with a 
neurotypical world show that disabled characters can exhibit agency that was previously denied to 
them by learning how to game the system without compromising their own goals and beliefs. Their 
agency is not just self-knowledge: it is the acquisition of patterns of behaviour and their appropriate 
execution in context. The autistic characters in these novels become the masters and mistresses of 
their own fate by rethinking what they can do, by destroying the barriers an able-minded 
civilization have erected, sometimes deliberately, sometimes unwittingly, to curtail disabled 
peoples’ power to determine the terms according to which they lead their lives. 
Knowledge and agency work in tandem to transform these people’s lives, and with it comes 
a new form of thinking: a neurocosmopolitan one. A neurocosmopolitan identity is by definition a 
hybrid identity. The autistic characters who have reached this state move comfortably from a 
socially situated autistic perspective to a temporary appropriation of neurotypical standards to get 
what they want, passing with effort, but passing successfully nonetheless. As Savarese says in his 
conversation with Zunshine, neurocosmopolitism signifies, among other meanings, “the effect on 
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autistics of the journeying I mentioned—what might be termed neurohybridity or mobility” 
(Savarese and Zunshine, 2014, 20). The NT characters who gain some insight into the working of 
the autistic brain are capable of walking a mile in their shoes, and as a result, they are more 
accepting of the quirks ASC people have. They are also capable of tailoring their social interactions 
with autists so their conversational partners can participate on equal terms in the discussions that 
take place. Oliver in House Rules acts more neurocosmopolitan by the end of the novel, Marjorie, 
Tom and Pete Aldrin in Speed of Dark all show more respect and treatment Lou differently as time 
goes on. Alice, Jessica and Joel in House Rules all adjust their temperaments to better suit a mixed-
mind world, and even Christopher’s mum and dad reconcile their differences with him.  
Neurocosmopolitism is put forward as a model in which NT privileges are surrendered for 
the benefit of autistic individuals and autists can express their collective preferences and alternative 
behavioural strategies in a less stigmatising social environment. “This ability to feel ‘at home’ in 
other neurologies,” writes Howard Sklar, “is one of the benefits of reading the life stories of people 
with intellectual disabilities, and it […] makes fictional representations of intellectually disabled 
characters compelling, especially from a neurocosmopolitan sensibility” (Sklar 2015, 244). This 
is eminently valid for autism novels, in which readers belonging to another neurotype can 
experience a plausible semblance of what it feels like to be neurotypical… or autistic. And that 
order is meaningful: we must never forget that both reading communities avail themselves of these 
narratives. NT behaviour is as dis/familiar and unpredictable to autists as are autistic actions for 
NTs. In any case, these confluences of interpretation are not here to help one community or the 
other to uphold and conform to a standard; instead, the narratives redefine the standard itself.  
 
There were a few avenues of research I have been unable to follow, because they would 
have departed from the central argument of the dissertation. First of all, I have regretted not 
tackling more novels. This is obviously the easiest way of extending the work that began here, 
simply adding novels and bringing the same reading strategies to the new texts – but this could 
prove to be the least inspiring way of contributing to the framework I have established in this 
dissertation, with no novel findings per se. Yet, the sheer volume of books can direct professional 
readers’ attention to larger themes and other narratological tricks of conveying neurological 
difference. On the other hand, the minute differences become more significant when it’s only one 
novel among many which depicts autism in another light. In this manner, simple addition and 
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comparison gains methodological significance as we take a step back from the intricacies of the 
individual texts and perform distant readings instead. 
Autism fiction is not only interesting as autism fiction, that is, as a novel dealing with a 
disabled way of life. Further research could find a lot of material in its other genre functions: 
middlebrow novels are still underresearched in academia, since scholars see them as rather 
predictable and lacking novelty value or literary qualities. But they are an integral part of the 
literary world – scholars would benefit from examining these novels more thoroughly as 
reinforcing certain middle class attitudes to family, nurture, work and entertainment in their 
sociological context. This would also open up the option to investigate the actual responses of 
readers on both sides of the empathetic gap. This work has been started by Marco Caracciolo, but 
his was a survey of reviews only, and the researcher cannot direct his inquiries towards specific 
aspects of the text that way. Empirical studies of reading autism fiction could elucidate the exact 
mechanisms of strategic empathising, as developed by Suzanne Keen. 
Having been educated in an institution with a strong gender studies programme, it would 
not be out of place to write on the gender aspects of autism fiction. This is something I have 
deliberately avoided, and for good reason: it would have required even more interdisciplinary 
research and it would have meant a profound reorientation of the dissertation’s structuring 
arguments. Not that the gender aspect would have made my other arguments invalid, and it was 
not deliberately downplayed – I have addressed unequal gender relations in Morrall’s story and 
my readings are informed by the central tenets of gender studies. It is just that the gender focus did 
not feel like a long, coherent theme running through the novels in question. Still, gender studies 
research can unearth, as it usually does, new threads of analysis and more works to consider; I 
would be delighted to read feminist critics writing intersectionist accounts of autism fiction. 
The theoretically-minded reader might ask: can this consilient and neurocosmopolitan 
mode of reading be used to interpret neurotypical narratives? One would have to make a very well-
argued case for it first. Generally speaking, I do not think that reading glasses for myopic people 
would be of much help to hyperopic eyes. This extension of the cognitive paradigm deals 
specifically with autism, and in a (slightly) wider context, intellectual disability, but it will be of 
precious little use to reading texts where such disability is not present. That being said, if – armed 
with this knowledge – a scholar should find characters with suspiciously similar traits in texts 
written prior to the 1940s, it would be a major victory for literary disability scholarship, as it would 
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suggest that there are more Bartlebys than we knew of before. While I have disparaged the 
overzealous inclusiveness with which certain scholars have tried to create an autistic canon, I do 
not deny that we could find early 20th or 19th century works in which characters could be recognised 
as autistic today. I would suggest that this project should be conducted with the utmost 
interpretative care and a healthy dose of humility about those findings, since there is a strong self-
confirmatory bias in literary canon creation. Once the hypothesis is set, it is damned hard to steer 
a scholar’s mind away from proving that everyone was autistic. 
The narratological approach I have taken yields insights about the workings of written 
fiction, but autism is present in other media. Characters with Asperger’s and autism pop up in full-
length feature movies, TV series, musicals and theatre productions. A transmedial investigation of 
fictional autism narratives would do a great service to literary scholars, as it could shed light on 
what changes in the ‘autism story’ from one mode of expression to another. An easy example 
comes to my mind: I have seen a Hungarian production of The Curious Incident at a theatre in 
Budapest. Being a very narratorial text, I was curious to see how the director handled the problem 
of the many digressive chapters that pepper the narrative, which should be ‘spoken’ by 
Christopher. In fact, half of these interludes were read by Siobhan from Christopher’s book, 
leaving him free to act out the physically demanding parts, which is a brilliant solution and a nod 
to the frequent metareferences to Siobhan’s interference with the text in the original. These sorts 
of observations, coupled with sound theory, could enhance our understanding of why books, 
fiction and pretence play a huge role in the lives of the fictional autists we have come to know. 
In my reading of the novels, they teach, above all, that attention to autistic people, caring 
for their viewpoint and transforming the world to suit them a little better makes all the difference. 
Likewise, reshaping cognitive literary studies to acknowledge and critically incorporate autism 
into its theoretical foundations improves the discipline and enhances our appreciation of literature 
as a phenomenon. So what does autism mean for the novel? A world of difference. Beautiful, 
shocking, sometimes painful, but above all, inspiring difference, and a moral obligation to respect 
and aid in word and deed those who are still not understood.  
In these final words, I have to admit, this dissertation has been a personal quest, too. 
Adventuring into the deepest caves and tiniest recesses of the mind, I have sketched out a map of 
the warped floors that make autism beautiful, disarming traps and turning back at the dead-ends 
that imperil the unwary heroes who search for the treasure of perception, as Jessica put it. I have 
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slain enemies such as Scientism, severed the head of Determinism, steered clear of Obscurantism, 
and the graduate student’s worst foe, Procrastination. I have stood before the monstrous Nex, and 
I have seen my fellow adventurers slain by a single, careless strike. Somehow, I was left alive, 
with an inkling of what insight the treasure might bring, but I hold no Holy Grail in my hands. 
Now, I stand in an inn, awaiting my call into the Wizards’ Tower, where I shall recount my 
adventures and be judged on the merits of my account. Let the adventures of discovery continue, 
with a compassion and curiosity that ennobles the soul. The road goes ever on. 
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GLOSSARY AND COMMON ABBREVIATIONS 
 
“Enter Ionia, the cradle of thought 
The architecture of understanding” 
– Tuomas Holopainen (Nightwish 2015), “The Greatest Show on Earth” 
 
adaptationism: The scientific view that the vast majority of physical, psychological or 
behavioural traits of complex organisms are the result of biological adaptation by natural and 
sexual (or possibly, group) selection. The view has caused some controversy in evolutionary 
biology and psychology, with implications for the study of the human mind. 
Asperger’s Syndrome (AS): A milder form of autism, derived from the name of Hans 
Asperger, the Viennese psychologist who first described children with autistic features on the 
Continent. This subtype of autism has been recognised in the DSM-IV but the new edition, DSM-
5 has eliminated it and subsumed people belonging to this category under the wider umbrella term 
of autism spectrum disorders (ASD). The other classification of diseases, the ICD-10 still retains 
the separate diagnosis of Asperger’s (F84.5). 
autism (ASD, ASC): Autism, or autism spectrum disorders are a set of changes in the 
human mind-body that puts it on a different developmental trajectory. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I conceive of autism as a distinguishable human developmental variety with highly 
heterogeneous expressions in individual human beings. Some psychologists advocate the use of 
the term ASCs, or autism spectrum conditions instead of “disorders” so as not to stigmatise autistic 
individuals. “People on the spectrum” is a synonym which emphasises the wide variety of different 
abilities and ranges of functioning autistic people exhibit.  
Broader Autism Phenotype (BAP): the phrase is used to illustrate the idea that parents 
and grandparents of diagnosed autists also show some autistic traits, albeit on the subclinical level, 
suggesting that two people with subclinical traits can, due to assortative mating, deliver children 
in whom these traits combine can develop more pronounced symptoms of autism. 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM): The so-called “Bible” 
of psychiatrists and psychologists, this volume, published by the American Psychological 
Association, is an encyclopaedia which taxonomically lists all the psychological traits, symptoms 
and syndromes deemed clinically significant by the community of psychologists. 
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fiction: Fiction is a genre of narrative which deals with the counterfactual, with events that 
did not happen in the primary world of humankind. It is often entirely a figment of the imagination, 
with elements, motifs, themes and characters that are not found in the reality of the writers and 
readers of the narrative. Even in its most realistic mode, fiction is devoted to the illusory reality 
effects that the discourse of documentary writings, such as autobiographies, histories or other 
accounts provide. A fictional narrative relies on the audience’s capability to imagine scenes which 
did not occur to imaginary characters who are described to behave in recognisably human ways. 
Often, this means that fictional characters act in accordance with real-life mental behaviour and 
physical actions which convey their state of mind and which help them to reach their goals, to 
resolve their internal and external conflicts as defined by the narrative design. Autistic people have 
a hard time conceptualising certain fictional narratives precisely due to their imaginative status, 
and they might exhibit difficulties in the narrative comprehension of the fictional character’s state 
of mind as a result of their own unfamiliarity with conventions of genre, fiction, and neurotypical 
scripts and schemata of behaviour. 
mirror neurons, the Mirror Neuron System (MNS): a set of neurons dedicated to the 
representation of actions of an organism and its conspecifics. Mirror neurons activate when an 
animal performs an action, or when it sees another animal perform it. The Mirror Neuron System 
aids in social and cultural learning. It is hypothesised to be related to the Theory of Mind-
mechanism and higher-order empathy. Its disorder is suspected to be playing a part in the 
development of autism. 
modularity of the mind: A view within psychology and philosophy that the human mind 
consists of a number of separate mechanisms, evolved to solve particular adaptational problems. 
The theory of existing, innate modules, especially for the higher faculties of the human mind 
caused controversy in and outside of psychology due to the misconception that it supports genetic 
and evolutionary determinism, as the modularity thesis claims that certain behaviours and 
predilections are innate and hardwired into the human psyche. The converse of this position is that 
the human mind is a general-purpose learning mechanism, more malleable by experience than the 
modular view would allow.  
narrative: a genre of discourse which captures the felt experiences and cultural identities 
of sufficiently human-like agents in a specific storyworld, situated spatially and temporally. A 
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narrative defines cause-and-effect relationships as they relate to the human condition in all of its 
forms. It is a mode of speaking that translates easily into any genre: it can be factual and fictional, 
it might be historic or fantastic, it may be realistic or fanciful, it may present human psychology 
in great detail, or it could describe the experiences of organisms alien to our own way of thinking. 
Narrative is, by definition a product of a situated activity which codifies individual or collective 
perspectives on a natural or social event. Narrative is remarkable because it diverges from the 
canonical state of affairs: it is usually produced when a person or community experiences a change 
in their status, behaviour and daily life, or when it faces a hermeneutic impasse. Narrative is a 
cognitive tool: it seeks to make changes meaningful for the community which experiences it, and 
it attempts to integrate the microcosm of the community into the macrocosm of natural phenomena 
and wider societal influences. Narrative is a travelling discourse, it encompasses many different 
media, and therefore its expressions are highly conventionalised by the practitioners of the media 
it appears in. 
narrativity: a scalar property according to which any given culturally mediated artefact 
possesses story-like qualities, insofar as they feature humanoid protagonists who experience an 
imbalance or disruption in a textually crafted world and perform actions to produce temporally 
located events in the storyworld. 
neurotypical (NT): A word coined by the neurodiversity movement for people whose 
minds follow a typical developmental trajectory (in this context: non-autistic people). 
Theory of Mind (ToM): A hypothesised faculty of the human mind, which is responsible 
for treating human people as thinking beings and not objects. Its module (ToMM) is a neural 
mechanism that attributes beliefs, feelings and other mental content to living beings from the 
biosemiotic cues (facial expressions, tone and pitch of voice, posture, etc.) it processes. 
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“The thought of my family’s graves was the only moment I used to experience true love 
That love remains infinite, as I’ll never be the man my father is […] 
I see all those empty cradles and wonder 
If man will ever change 
 
I, too, wish to be a decent man-boy but all I am 
Is smoke and mirrors 
Still, given everything, may I be deserving…” 
– Tuomas Holopainen (Nightwish 2011), “Song of Myself” 
 
“Mother 
I am always close to you 
I will be waving every time you leave 
Oh, I am you 
- 285 - 
The care, the love, the memories 
We are the story of one 
 
Father 
I am always close to you 
I will be waving every time you leave 
Oh, I am you 
The care, the love, the memories 
You are forever in me” 
– Tuomas Holopainen (Nightwish 2015), “Our Decades in the Sun” 
